ML20205A800
| ML20205A800 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 08/05/1986 |
| From: | Brons J POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK |
| To: | Muller D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| JPN-86-37, NUDOCS 8608110449 | |
| Download: ML20205A800 (6) | |
Text
~
123 Main Street WNte Rains, New Yd 10M1 914 681.6240
- > NewYorkPbwer
?""1" :s.m1 ter Authority o-t-I August 5, 1986 JPN-86-37 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 Attention:
Mr. Daniel R. Muller, Director BWR Project Directorate No. 2 Division of BWR Licensing
Subject:
James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 Proposed Changes to the Technical Specifications Regardino Reserve Power to Emercency Buses (PTS-85-15)
Reference:
- 1. NYPA letter, J.C.
Brons to D.R. Muller, dated April 10, 1986 (JPN-86-16)
Dear Sir:
Reference 1 submitted a proposed change to the FitzPatrick Technical Specifications concerning the connection of normal and reserve power sources to the plant.
Attachment II,to Reference 1 provided a Safety Evaluation to support the proposed changes. to this letter is a revised Safety Evaluation which supercedes Attachment II to Reference 1 in its entirety.
Forty (40) copies of Attachment I are enclosed.
Attachment I contains no new information.
The changes to the Safety Evaluation are in Section III - Impact of the Change.
This Section has been revised to provide more extensive discussion of significant nazards considerations.
l 8608110449 860805 PDR ADOCK 05000333 P
PDR dh iti
4 Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr.
J. A. Gray, Jr. of my staff.
Very truly yours, John C.
Brons Senior Vice President j
()MuclearGeneration Enc.
cc:
Office of the Resident Inspector U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O.
Box 136
- Lycoming, N.Y.
13093 Mr.
J.
D.
Dunkleberger Division of Policy Analysis and Planning New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2, Empire State Plaza
- Albany, N.Y.
12223 l
l l
l
ATTACHMENT I TO JPN-86-37 PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES REGARDING RESERVE POWER TO EMERGENCY BUSES (PTS-85-15)
Safety Evaluation e
NEW YORK POWER AUTHORITY JAMES A.
FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
DOCKET No. 50-333 l
i L
Section I - Description of the Chance The proposed change to the Technical Specifications is shown in Attachment I to the Application for Amendment.
This change occurs
[
in Section 3.9.A.3 (page 217).
The proposed change would delete the requirement to disconnect an emergency bus from the normal power source and connect it to the reserve power source, when its associated Emergency Diesel Generator system is inoperable.
Section II - Purpose of the Chance This change has been proposed because the requirement to manually transfer to reserve power is unnecessary and may, under some circumstances, degrade plant safety.
As described in FSAR Section 8.5, automatic transfer of power supply is provided for equipment required for a safeguard function.
The transfer equipment is designed so that the normal source breaker or contactor must open before the alternate source breaker or contactor can close, and the alternate source breaker or contactor will not close if an overload condition exists.
The power transfer equipment is designed to meet single failure criteria.
Automatic fast transfer of power supply is Provided from the normal to reserve source.
Automatic residual transfer takes place either after an unsuccessful fast transfer, or when the nature of the disturbance will not allow a fast transfer.
In the unlikely event that neither automatic fast transfer nor automatic residual transfer takes place, a manual transfer can still be made.
The requirement to manually transfer to reserve power when an Emergency Diesel Generator system is inoperable may degrade plant safety since it requires manual transfer to reserve power even when the normal power source is available.
This is an unnecessary operator action.
In addition, if the Emergency Diesel Generator System is made operable within 7 days, another manual transfer is then required to return to the normal power source.
During the evolution of manually transferring power, it is necessary to
" parallel" the two sources of power for a period of time.
During this period, the large phase angle which frequently occurs results in high currents which may cause a breaker trip and result in loss of power and reactor scram.
A reactor scram resulting from the manual transfer action occurred at the FitzPatrick plant and is described in Licensee Event Report 85-019-00 dated August 16, 1985.
The requirement for the two incoming power sources to be available and the remaining Diesel Generator System to be operable is sufficient to ensure that power is available, in the event that one of the Emergency Diesel Generator systems is inoperable.
Section III - Impact of the Chance The proposed change does not change any system or subsystem and will not alter the conclusions of either the FSAR or SER accident analyses.
+
The proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92, because operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with this change would not:
(1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
There is no change in the number of power sources available but only in how they are connected to the plant.
The requirement that the two incoming power sources be available and that the remaining Diesel Generator System be operable, is sufficient to ensure that power is available in the event that one of the Emergency Diesel i
Generator Systems is inoperable.
(2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously analyzed.
The elimination of an unnecessary operator action does not create the l
possibility of a new or different kind of accident.
As
~
described in FSAR Section 8.5, automatic transfer of power supply is provided for equipment required for a safeguard function.
The transfer equipment is designed so that the normal source breaker or contactor must open before the alternate source breaker or contactor can close, and the alternate source breaker or contactor will not close if an overload condition exists.
The power transfer equipment is designed to meet single failure criteria.
Automatic fast transfer of power supply is provided from the normal to reserve source.
Automatic residual transfer takes place either after an unsuccessful fast transfer, or when the nature of the disturbance will not a' low a fast transfer.
In the unlikely event that neither automatic fast transfer nor i
automatic residual transfer takes place, a manual transfer can still be made.
4 (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
4 On the contrary, the existing requirement to manually transfer to reserve power when an Emergency Diesel Generator System is inoperable may degrade plant safety since it requires manual transfer to reserve power even l
When the normal power source is available.
In addition, l
if the Emergency Diesel Generator System is made operable within 7 days, another manual transfer is then required to return to the normal power source.
During l
the evolution of manually transferring power, it is necessary to " parallel" the two sources of power for a period of time.
During this period, the large phase angle which frequently occurs results in high currents j
which may cause a breaker trip and result in loss of power and reactor scram.
The elimination of this unnecessary operator action does not reduce the margin of safety but rather would enhance the safe operation of the plant.
l l
a r,,w,-.--,--
,,,_,-,,.---w w e-ra v-ww-&r-*w w+----------e---e-m-e
=------------+-----------------r----e-e--w-ew--=mw--,,
.~
Section IV - Implementation of the Changes Implementation of the changes, as proposed, will not impact the ALARA or fire protection programs at FitzPatrick, nor will the changes impact the environment.
Section V - Conclusion The incorporation of these changes:
a)
Will not change the probability nor the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equip' ment important to safety as previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report; b)
Will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report; c)
Will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specifications:
L d) does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CPR 50.59; and e)
Involves no significant hazards considerations, as defined in 10 CPR 50.92.
Section VI - References 1)
James A.
FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Final Safety Analysis Report (PSAR), Rev 2, July 1984, Section 8.5.
2)
James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Safety Evaluation Report (SER).
i l
l.. --
... -.-. ~.
- - - - -. -