ML20204G006

Testimony of Fm Bernthal Before House Subcommittee on Energy & Environ Re Replacement of Commission W/Single Administrator

ML20204G006
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Issue date:	07/22/1986
From:	Bernthal F NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
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TESTIMONY OF COMMISSIONER FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT July 22, 1986 Mr. Chairman, I did want to offer some additional thoughts, first on the question of replacing the Comission with a single administrator, and second, on certain _other proposals for regulatory and administrative reform at the NRC.

In regard to the single administrator proposal, in my judgment it is essential to realize what is at stake, and how we at the Comission have come to this pass of near unanimous recomendation that our jobs be ,

abolished.

I do not believe there are flaws inherent in the Comission form of governance, as oriainally conceived, for regulating a subject as controversial as nuclear power. The need for continuity and stability in the nuclear regulatory process seems to beg for a comission. But the perverse system we now have goes far beyond stability -- it is tying us in knots. It leads not to consensus, but to fragmented and ultimately flawed decisions.

- As if the constraints of a strict adjudicatory process, with all the rules of "on the record", " separation of functions", and "ex parte" weren't complicating enough, the Sunshine Act requires that where three or more Comissioners are gathered together, no conversation of substance may be held unless the public is also present.

8608070034 860722 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR

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In other words, we can't talk to our staff, we can't talk to you, and we can't talk to each other.

The point of collegiality is to arrive at a balanced and reasoned decision, in the hope that five heads of diverse experience and knowledge are better than one. But the Sunshine Act has so distorted and crippled the Comission concept of governance that I have reluctantly concluded that, absent significant change in the law, a single administrator is the only practical solution.

I wish to emphasize, however, that in my judgment the public interest would be only less the loser in that circumstance. It would be far better to

~

permit the commission system to function as it was originally intended than to be forced to resort to a single administrator so that the Sunshine Act becomes irrelevant to final decision-making. Ironically, it is not the more politically responsive single-administrator executive agencies which have been penalized into ineffectiveness and inefficiency; it is we commissions -- we with the inherent checks and balances and the special safeguard of the public interest.

The Commission is a vehicle for stability and protection of the public need to have represented and to hear various and dissenting points of view in this matter of the safe use of nuclear energy. For a subject so contended as is nuclear power today, I believe the public will be the poorer not to have the benefit of such diverse opinion. If collegial decision-making is desirable in principle but impossible in practice because of misguided if well-intentioned law, the solution is not to dispose of collegial decision-making.

The strictures of the Sunshine Act have slowly spelled the demise of the free and frank exchange of ideas which is the foundation and purpose of collegial decisionmaking. Anyone who believes that such candid exchanges occur regularly in the Commission's open meetings is deluding himself. Nor is there any longer such a thing as a closed Coninission meeting on sensitive subjects lawfully closable under the Sunshine Act. The estimable

i concept of collegial decisionmaking has thus been rendered an illusion --

degraded in practice to what often amounts to decisionmaking by exhaustion.

Some argue that the fault lies in the unwillingness of this Comission (as though it is really any different from all the others) to discuss publicly all matters with unalloyed frankness and candor. That is like saying, as has sometimes been said, that Marxism would be a perfect system but for the deficiencies of human beings.

Last year the Comission amended its regulations interpreting the Sunshine Act to comport more with common sense and with the intent of the Act. We decided to adopt the interpretation of the law embraced by the Congress itself when it enacted the legislation, by the Administrative Conference of the Congress, by the Supreme Court, and by virtually every other government agency in Washington.

The consequences of the Commission's sensible and well-intentioned action are well known. Our decision was often deliberately distorted, portrayed in the news media and elsewhere as an attempt to create a wall of secrecy

' around the Commission, when the real objective was simply to rescue what was left of the concept of collegial discussion.

My conviction has since grown that this misbegotten statute, the Sunshine Act, will eventually preside over the general demise of the commission form of governance, a form which I remain convinced has its place in our system of regulation. It will be interesting to see how much sun shines on the private deliberations of a single administrator head of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

i l

But our cumbersome administrative procedures are not alone in contributing to an inefficient and sometimes ineffectual NRC. I have long believed that l

Congress' decision to abolish the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) to oversee all aspects of the development and use of this still new

, technology was a fateful mistake.

l l

l

While Congress now rightly concerns itself with the accountability of comissions, Congress a decade ago began to speak with a multitude of dissonant voices in carrying out its responsibilities for oversight of the NRC. If the disparate opinions of five Comissioners often seem confusing to the Congress, the directives of half a dozen and more comittees of oversight jurisdiction seem equally confusing to the Commission. Of greater consequence, however, is whether the new regime of fragmented Congressional jurisdiction provides the systematic and coherent oversight so necessary for those matters once under the purview of the JCAE, and so important to our national well-being and security.

Be that as it may, should Congress now choose to adopt the single administrator approach for the NRC, as I believe on balance it should, careful thought must be given to the details of its implementation. For just as a competent, objective, dedicated single administrator can more efficiently and productively manage nuclear regulation, a less capable or less well motivated individual could in short order do irreversible damage to the still fragile viability of the nuclear option in this nation.

This brings me to H.R.4648, which embodies principles of considerable merit. More than a year ago, I urged the Commission to consider forming a separate, Comission-level group to investigate events such as that at Davis-Besse. Instead, the Comission adopted a piecemeal, ad-hoc approach, and constituted separate groups to explore causes and remedies for the Davis-Besse, Rancho-Seco, San Onofre-1, and Gore, Oklahoma incidents.

While the performance of those investigative teams has thus far been laudable with respect to technical evaluation, the question of credibility in NRC Staff self-evaluation remains. It is unrealistic to expect that there will not be at least a few significant incidents per year at NRC-licensed facilities, and it is increasingly apparent that the Commission needs some permanent entity to deal with events where the procedures of NRC itself might be in question.

O l

Having thus been clearly counseled by the Brookhaven study, by the ACRS, and most recently by the Chairman of the Davis Besse Ad Hoc Review Group )

(not to mention by events themselves), I am at a loss to explain the Commission's inaction. Failure to take this logical administrative step simply invites Congress to do what I believe would be unnecessary and u_nwise n outside the context of a single administrator agency.

I therefore support the legislation proposed in H.R.4648 to establish an independent Nuclear Safety Board only in the event that the NRC becomes a single administrator agency. The Rogovin and Kemeny Comissions both recommended such a Safety Board within this context. Should Congress fail to establish a single administrator NRC, I would continue to oppose the Safety Board concept because we already have an independent nuclear safety board -- it's called the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

Finally, I proffer a suggestion for an alternative path to the generally agreed and desirable objective of establishing a single-administrator NRC.

Within two years, all but a handful of nuclear powerplants in this country will have completed their construction phase, and should have been licensed for operation by the Commission. Therefore, between now and 1990, this agency will make a transition from an agency preoccupied with engineering and construction to an agency monitoring nuclear powerplant operations and the safe use and disposal of radioactive materials -- a mode which could well continue through the remainder of this century.

Given this circumstance, it would seem to me that the Congress should seriously consider as an alternative to the proposed single-administrator NRC the advantages of combining the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency under a single agency head. Several European countries have a similar arrangement, so the idea is hardly novel. Indeed, the establishment of an indepencant NRC was, in some respects, from the beginning an accident of legislative history. Had the EPA not been constituted before the breakup of the Atomic Energy Commission, matters might well have turned out differently.

A number of useful purposes might be served by taking such an action at this juncture, not the least of which would be considerable budgetary savings, and a straightforward path to single administrator. Moreover, relieved of its special responsibility to oversee a historically great multitude of engineering and construction projects, the NRC would share a comon objective with the EPA -- protection of the public health, safety, and the environment.

Instead of the NRC and EPA finding themselves beset by a host of overlapping jurisdictional entanglements, as we do at present, I believe the combined expertise and institutional experience of these two agencies would prove to be wholly complementary and indeed, synergistic. The risks associated with acid rain, chemical wastes, air pollution, and the panoply of environmental insults generated by the activities of man should in the long run, along with the risks of nuclear power generation, be treated on a comon footing.

The only objection that has thus far been offered to this suggestion is that, for unspecified reasons, either EPA or NRC or both are too weak to withstand each other. I believe the concept deserves more serious consideration. There is ample time for further thought, but by 1990 a combined EPA and NRC may well be an idea whose time will have come.

With a balanced and objective view of risk and public acceptance, such an agency could develop broad regulatory and environmental policy to encompass our respective areas of responsibility, for the greater public good.

If I may now turn to H.R.1029, H.R.2488 and the NRC bill, H.R.1447 dealing with licensing reform, a few aspects of the proposed legislation warrant

, urther f comment. First, as the Comission has previously testified in other hearings, the last sentence of proposed Section 185(b) of H.R.1447 should be modified. As originally submitted to Congress, this section provided that facility operation should commence based upon the combined construction permit and operating license "unless the Comission determines that good cause exists for delaying such operation."

I m

i 1

e Such language would have made final approval of facility operation a matter of mere " negative consent" by the Comission. A majority of the Comission has therefore agreed that the last sentence of Section 185(b) should instead read:

" Prior to comencement of operation, the Comission shall determine, based upon the requisite program of inspections, tests and analyses, whether construction has been completed in conformance with the combined construction permit and operating license and consistent with the regulations of the Comission."

This alternative language simply commits the Comission to make a formal, affirmative finding that the NRC has done its job properly before allowing a powerplant to begin operation, thus foreclosing the possibility of initial plant operation on " procedural autopilot", as it were.

The second item deserving coment involves hearing rights at the latter stages of the licensing process. Last year, Senator Simpson queried the Comission about the S.836 provision for requests for hearings prior to commencement of facility operation. Section 185(b) requires that, before the Commission may designate an issue for hearing at an advanced stage of the licensing process, it must find that the issue:

... consists of a substantial dispute of fact, necessary for the Commission's decision, that cannot be resolved with sufficient accuracy except g a hearing...." [ emphasis added]

Identical language appears in all three House-introduced bills.

Interestingly enough, the quoted language did not originate with either the NRC or DOE bill. Almost identical language can be found in Section 134(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed by the Congress in 1982, the section which deals with hearing procedures for spent fuel pool expansions and transshipments.

t I believe the underscored language should be deleted from the Bills now before the Committee. The deletion would erase the nagging concern that the Comission, after all, would be free to decide that an issue could be determined with sufficient accuracy in lieu of a hearing. Whether or not such determinations might in principle be possible outside the context of a hearing, the other requisite findings specified in Section 185(b) are by themselves sufficient to assure that only significant issues which could not have been raised previously are considered for litigation late in the game.

A third noteworthy point: Various sections of H.R.1447 dealing with backfits direct that, before a facility modification may be required, the Commission must determine, based upon significant new information, that the proposed modification "is required to protect the public health and safety...."

and that "the modification will substantially enhance the public health and safety...."

The quoted language in the various sections of H.R.1447 is troubling.

Suffice it to say that this language is susceptible to several readings --

none of them satisfactory, in my view. Moreover, while the proposed legislation was not, I believe, intended to be inconsistent with the NRC Backfit Rule, the fact remains that n_o o reading of the "backfit" language in H.R.1447 is consistent with the NRC's recently promulgated rule.

In previous hearings on this subject I have gone into further detail on the difficulty with the backfit provisions and language in the proposed legislation. I therefore strongly endorse the position the Commission has now taken that the language dealing with backfits in these bills had best be removed entirely.

The above points notwithstanding, I wish to reemphasize that the proposed legislation, with certain appropriate adjustments, will provide an essential and timely statement by the Congress -- a statement that will illuminate the path to the next generation of standardized nuclear powerplant construction in our country. I strongly urge and support the leadership and effort of this Committee to achieve that end.

i TESTIMONY OF COMMISSIONER FREDERICK M. BERNTHAL U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT July 22, 1986 Mr. Chairman, I did want to offer some additional thoughts, first on the question of replacing the Commission with a single administrator, and second, on certain other proposals for regulatory and administrative reform at the NRC.

In regard to the single administrator proposal, in my judgment it is essential to realize what is at stake, and how we at the Commission have come to this pass of near unanimous recommendation that our jobs be abolished.

I do not believe there are flaws inherent in the Commission form of governance, as oriainally conceived, for regulating a subject as controversial as nuclear power. The need for' continuity and stability in the nuclear regulatory 4

process seems to beg for a commission. But the perverse system we now have goes far beyond stability -- it is tying us in knots. It leads not to consensus, but to fragmented and ultimately flawed decisions.

As if the constraints of a strict adjudicatory process, with all the rules of "on the record", " separation of functions", and "ex parte" weren't complicating enough, the Sunshine Act requires that where three or more Commissioners are gathered together, no conversation of substance may be held unless the public is also present.

s In other words, we can't talk to our staff, we can't talk to you, and we can't talk to each other.

The point of collegiality is to arrive at a balanced and reasoned decision, in the hope that five heads of diverse experience and knowledge are better than one. But the Sunshine Act has so distorted and crippled the Comission concept of governance that I have reluctantly concluded that, absent significant change in the law, a single administrator is the only practical solution.

I wish to emphasize, however, that in my judgment the public interest would be only less the loser in that circumstance. It would be far better to permit the commission system to function as it was originally intended than '

to be forced to resort to a single administrator so that the Sunshine Act becomes irrelevant to final decision-making. Ironically, it is not the more politically responsive single-administrator executive agencies which have been penalized into ineffectivanact and inafficiancy; it it we commissions -- we with the inherent checks and balances and the special safeguard of the public interest.

The Commission is a vehicle for stability and protection of the public need to have represented and to hear various and dissenting points of view in this matter of the safe use of nuclear energy. For a subject so contended as is nuclear power today, I believe the public will be the poorer not to have the benefit of such diverse opinion. If collegial decision-making is desirable in principle but impossible in practice because of misguided if well-intentioned law, the solution is not to dispose of collegial decision-making.

The strictures of the Sunshine Act have slowly spelled the demise of the free and frank exchange of ideas which is the foundation and purpose of collegial decisionmaking. Anyone who believes that such candid exchanges occur regularly in the Commission's open meetings is deluding himself. Nor is there any longer such a thing as a closed Commission meeting on sensitive subjects lawfully closable under the Sunshine Act. The estimable

_a .. . -_ _ _

concept of collegial decisionmaking has thus been rendered an illusion --

degraded in practice to what often amounts to decisionmaking by exhaustion.

Some argue that the fault lies in the unwillingness of this Comission (as though it is really any different from all the others) to discuss publicly all matters with unalloyed frankness and candor. That is like saying, as has sometimes been said, that Marxism would be a perfect system but for the deficiencies of human beings.

Last year the Commission amended its regulations interpreting the Sunshine Act to comport more with comon sense and with the intent of the Act. We decided to adopt the interpretation of the law embraced by the Congress itself when it enacted the legislation, by the Administrative Conference of

~

the Congress, by the Supreme Court, and by virtually every other government agency in Washington.

The consequences of the Comission's sensible and well-intentioned action are well known. Our decision was often deliberately distorted, portrayed in the news media and elsewhere as an attempt to create a wall of secrecy around the Comission, when the real objective was simply to rescue what was left of the concept of collegial discussion.

My conviction has since grown that this misbegotten statute, the Sunshine Act, will eventually preside over the general demise of the commission form of governance, a fonn which I remain convinced has its place in our system of regulation. It will be interesting to see how much sun shines on the private deliberations of a single administrator head of the Nuclear Regulatory Comission.

But our cumbersome administrative procedures are not alone in contributing to an inefficient and sometimes ineffectual NRC. I have long believed that Congress' decision to abolish the Joint Comittee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) to oversee all aspects of the development and use of this still new technology was a fateful mistake.

1

While Congress now rightly concerns itself with the accountability of comissions, Congress a decade ago began to speak with a multitude of dissonant voices in carrying out its responsibilities for oversight of the NRC. If the disparate opinions of five Commissioners often seem confusing to the Congress, the directives of half a dozen and more comittees of oversight jurisdiction seem equally confusing to the Commission. Of greater consequence, however, is whether the new regime of fragmented Congressional jurisdiction provides the systematic and coherent oversight so necessary for those matters once under the purview of the JCAE, and so important to our national well-being and security.

Be that as it may, should Congress now choose to adopt the single

~

administrator approach for the NRC, as I believe on balance it should, careful thought must be given to the details of its implementation. For just as a competent, objective, dedicated single administrator can more efficiently and productively manage nuclear regulation, a less capable or less well motivated individual could in short order do irreversible damage to the still fragile viability of the nuclear option in this nation.

This brings me to H.R.4648, which embodies principles of considerable merit. More than a year ago, I urged the Commission to consider forming a separate, Comission-level group to investigate events such as that at Davis-Besse. Instead, the Comission adopted a piecemeal, ad-hoc approach, and constituted separate groups to explore causes and remedies for the Davis-Besse, Rancho-Seco, San Onofre-1, and Gore, Oklahoma incidents.

While the performance of those investigative teams has thus far been laudable with respect to technical evaluation, the question of credibility in NRC Staff self-evaluation remains. It is unrealistic to expect that there will not be at least a few significant incidents per year at NRC-licensed facilities, and it is increasingly apparent that the Commission needs some permanent entity to deal with events where the procedures of NRC itself might be in question.

d 6

Having thus been clearly counseled by the Brookhaven study, by the ACRS, and most recently by the Chairman of the Davis Besse Ad Hoc Review Group (not to mention by events themselves), I am at a loss to explain the Commission's inaction. Failure to take this logical administrative step simply invites Congress to do what I believe would be unnecessary n and unwise outside the context of a single administrator agency.

I therefore support the legislation proposed in H.R.4648 to establish an independent Nuclear Safety Board only in the event that the NRC becomes a single administrator agency. The Rogovin and Kemeny Commissions both recommended such a Safety Board within this context. Should Congress fail to establish a single administrator NRC, I would continue to oppose the Safety Board concept because we already have an independent nuclear safety board -- it's called the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Finally, I proffer a suggestion for an alternative path to the generally agreed and desirable objective of establishing a single-administrator NRC.

Within two years, all but a handful of nuclear powerplants in this country will have completed their construction phase, and should have been licensed for operation by the Commission. Therefore, between now and 1990, this agency will make a transition from an agency preoccupied with engineering and construction to an agency monitoring nuclear powerplant operations and the safe use and disposal of radioactive materials -- a mode which could well continue through the remainder of this century.

Given this circumstance, it would seem to me that the Congress should seriously consider as an alternative to the proposed single-administrator NRC the advantages of combining the NRC and the Environmental Protection Agency under a single agency head. Several European countries have a similar arrangement, so the idea is hardly novel. Indeed, the establishment of an independent NRC was, in some respects, from the beginning an accident of legislative history. Had the EPA not been constituted before the breakup of the Atomic Energy Commission, matters might well have turned out differently.

l

A number of useful purposes might be served by taking such an action at this juncture, not the least of which would be considerable budgetary savings, and a straightforward path to single administrator. Moreover, relieved of its special responsibility to oversee a historically great multitude of engineering and construction projects, the NRC would share a common objective with the EPA -- protection of the public health, safety, and the environment.

Instead of the NRC and EPA finding themselves beset by a host of overlapping jurisdictional entanglements, as we do at present, I believe the combined expertise and institutional experience of these two agencies would prove to be wholly complementary and indeed, synergistic. The risks associated with acid rain, chemical wastes, air pollution, and the panoply of environmental insults generated by the activities of man should in the long run, along with the risks of nuclear power generation, be treated on a common footing.

The only objection that has thus far been offered to this suggestion is that, for unspecified reasons, either EPA or NRC or both are too weak to withstand each other. I believe the concept deserves more serious consideration. There is ample time for further thought, but by 1990 a combined EPA and NRC may well be an idea whose time will have come.

With a balanced and objective view of risk and public acceptance, such an agency could develop broad regulatory and environmental policy to encompass our respective areas of responsibility, for the greater public good.

If I may now turn to H.R.1029, H.R.2488 and the NRC bill, H.R.1447 dealing with licensing reform, a few aspects of the proposed legislation warrant further comment. First, as the Comission has previously testified in other hearings, the last sentence of proposed Section 185(b) of H.R.1447 should be modified. As originally submitted to Congress, this section provided that facility operation should commence based upon the combined construction permit and operating license "unless the Commission determines that good cause exists for delaying such operation."

2 i

Such language would have made final approval of facility operation a matter of mere " negative consent" by the Commission. A majority of the Commission has therefore agreed that the last sentence of Section 185(b) should instead read:

" Prior te commencement of operation, the Commission shall determine, based upon the requisite program of inspections, tests and analyses, whether construction has been completed in conformance with the combined construction permit and operating license and consistent with the regulationsidf the Commission." ,

This alternative language simply commits the Commission to make a formal, affirmative finding that the NRC has done its job properly before allowing a powerplant to begin operation, thus foreclosing the possibility of initial plant operation on " procedural autopilot", as it were.

The second item deserving comment involves hearing rights at the latter stages of the licensing process. Last year, Senator Simpson queried the Commission about the S.836 provision for requests for hearings prior to commencement of facility operation. Section 185(b) requires that, before the Commission may designate an issue for hearing at an advanced stage of the licensing process, it must find that the issue:

... consists of a substantial dispute of fact, necessary for the Commission's decision, that cannot be resolved with sufficient accuracy except at a hearing...." [ emphasis added]

Identical language appears in all three House-introduced bills.

l Interestingly enough, the quoted language did not originate with either the NRC or DOE bill. Almost identical language can be found in Section 134(b) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act passed by the Congress in 1982, the section which deals with hearing procedures for spent fuel pool expansions and transshipments.

i

a s

I believe the underscored language should be deleted from the Bills now before the Comittee. The deletion would erase the nagging concern that the Comission, after all, would be free to decide that an issue could be determined with sufficient accuracy in lieu of a hearing. Whether or not such determinations might in principle be possible outside the context of a hearing, the other requisite findings specified in Section 185(b) are by themselves sufficient to assure that only significant issues which could not have been raised previously are considered for litigation late in the game.

A third noteworthy point: Various sections of H.R.1447 dealing with backfits direct that, before a facility modification may be required, the Comission must detennine, based upon significant new information, that the proposed modification "is required to protect the public health and safety...."

~

and that "the modification will substantially enhance the public health and safety...."

The quoted language in the various sections of H.R.1447 is troubling.

Suffice it to say that this language is susceptible to several readings --

none of them satisfactory, in my view. Moreover, while the proposed legislation was not, I believe, intended to be inconsistent with the NRC Backfit Rule, the fact remains that n_o reading of the "backfit" language in H.R.1447 is consistent with the NRC's recently promulgated rule.

In previous hearings on this subject I have gone into further detail on the difficulty with the backfit provisions and language in the proposed legislation. I therefore strongly endorse the position the Comission has now taken that the language dealing with backfits in these bills had best be removed entirely.

The above points notwithstanding, I wish to reemphasize that the proposed legislation, with certain appropriate adjustments, will provide an essential and timely statement by the Congress -- a statement that will illuminate the path to the next generation of standardized nuclear powerplant construction in our country. I strongly urge and support the leadership and effort of this Comittee to achieve that end.

4.

PREPARED TESTIMONY SUBMITTED BY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PRESENTED BY LANDO W. ZECH, JR., CHAIRMAN TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

, COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS i

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES CONCERNING LICENSING REFORM AND OTHER MATTERS SUBMITTED: JULY 22, 1986 4

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-- - - - ---,-O, - . . _ . ..__,.,._y y , ,,,, ,,

O Mr. Chairman, members of the Comittee, today marks my first appearance before this Subcommittee in my new role as Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. My fellow Comissioners and I are pleased to appear before you today for the purpose of discussing 4 issues: (1) nuclear power plant licensing reform legislation, (2) whether the NRC should be restructured as an agency headed by a singl'e administrator, (3) whether the NRC should have an Inspector General, and (4) whether an independent Nuclear Safety Board should be established to investigate significant events involving nuclear facilities -

or materials.

The Commission believes that the time is long overdue for licensing reform legislation. The current NRC licensing process has rot changed substantially since it was originally enacted 32 years ago in the Atomic Energy Act. That licensing process was a prudent course to follow when the nuclear power industry was in its early conceptual and development years. In the early years there were many first-time nuclear power plant applicants, designers and constructors, and numerous developmental design concepts. Accordingly, the process was structured to allow licensing decisions to be made while design work was still in progress and to focus on case-specific reviews of individual

^

plant-site considerations.

One of the primary shortcomings of the present system is that it lacks predictability and stability. This is due in large part to the configuration and implementation of the two-step licensing process. The design of the plant G - . - -

a

-z.

and the regulatory standards for reviewing the design are not well t;xed at the time a construction pemit application is filed. The design is actually developed during the course of construction to meet regulatory standards which may also change.

The inspections, tests, and analysis which need to be performed are not fully defined until the operating license review has been well under way. Thus, the Comission and the applicant do not reach agreement at an early stage with respect to the detailed implementation of NRC requirements. Extensive additional tests and analyses are sometimes required late in the construction process. This may lead to plant modification which could have been avoided by identifying the inspec'tions, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria at the time the plant was licensed for construction.

With the maturation of the industry, it is now possible to describe and evaluate (a) standardized plant designs on a generic basis, (b) essentially complete designs prior to plant construction, and (c) proposed plant sites without plant design details. Accordingly, the Comission has concluded that the licensing process must be reformed to reflect these and other developments concerning the licensing review of nuclear facilities.

After a thorough review of its current licensing process, the Commission has determined that the process could be improved and stabilized if Congress enacted legislation which encouraged ruclear power plant standardization, facilitated early site reviews, and permitted issuance of a combined license to construct and to operate nuclear power plants. NRC (H.R.1447), 00E (H.R.2488),

and former Congressman (now Senator) Broyhill (H.R.1029) have all submitted legislative proposals which contain these features.

Many of the deficiencies in the licensing process could be eliminated through standardization of designs. Standardization should ideally encompass essentially complete design of the nuclear steam supply system and of the balance of plant components which have safety significance and which can be designed independent of specific sites.

Under the proposed legislation, procedures would be established which would provide for Comission consideration of standardized designs that could be generally approved in advance of the receipt of a specific license application.

Subsequently, if a utility proposes to use the approved design, no further review of the design would be required, except to assure that the conditions for approval of the design have been complied with and that the design is suitable for the site selected.

The Commission believes it is important for Congress to endorse standardization formally through enactment of licensing reform legislation that encourages the use of standardized designs. The use of standardized designs offers the potential to reduce today's lengthy construction times and costs. More i significantly, from the viewpoint of the Commission, standardization should facilitate high quality construction and safe operation of specific plant designs. For example, standardization would stimulate standardized programs of

. quality control and make for better, faster training of cperators and workers.

l

- ~ - - .

Also, experience gained from one or another aspect of operations would be relevant to the operating personnel, equipment, maintenance and procedures of

- standardized plants wherever they are located. Exchanges of information between utilities would be more valuable. Lessons learned could be readily applied to other plants using the same standardized designs. In sum, standardized designs could improve plant safety and reliability.

The proposed legislation also adds new sections intended to permit the 1

- resolution of site-specific questions at an early stage in the licensing process. The legislative proposals include provisions which authorize the Commission to issue a site permit even though no application for a construction permit or a combined CP/0L has been filed. These sections have been proposed to facilitate early identification and resolution of site issues after giving an opportunity for public participation. Subsequer.t facility applications could reference a site permit, and final site determinations would be binding unless there is a substantial reascn not to do so.

Finally, the legislative proposals before Congress would permit the NRC to issue a ccmbined construction permit and operating license. The NRC could not adopt fully one-step licensing as defined in the bills without legislation. A one-step licensing process would add further predictability and stability to the licensing process by giving the licensee greater assurance that if the facility is constructed in accordance with the terms of the CP/0L license, the facility will be permitted to operate once construction is complete without the possibility, as under the present system, that operation of a completed plant f may be postponed indefinitely solely for procedural reasons.

O Under the current statutory provisions, a public hearing may need to be held prior to issuance of an operating license. The hearing takes place long after the applicant has made many crucial decisions. Under the legislative proposals, opportunities for public participation in public hearings will be focused on approvals at the beginning of the process before construction is commenced and long before any substantial construction has occurred. This should enhance the effectiveness of public participation because the hearing would take place before firm decisions are made by the applicant.

The proposals also provide that construction quality will be assured through a -

program of inspection tests and analyses. The program will be specified in the combined construction permit and operating license when it is issued, after opportunity for public hearing.

The NRC does not support statutory backfit criteria. It believes that backfitting can best be handled. administratively under its recently promulgated backfitting rule. We may need the flexibility to make adjustments to that rule as experience is gained in its application. A statutory provision on backfitting might preclude such modifications.

Although the NRC, DOE, and Broyhill legislative proposals are quite similar, there are differences between the proposals. The differences are small. An example of a difference is that under the NRC proposal the combined CP/0L standardized design licensing reforms would not apply to breeder reactors. DOE and Senator Broyhill would have the reforms apply to applications for breeder reactors and reprocessing plants. Because the Commission has not recently l 5 -- _ _ - . _

- 6' -

1 completed a review of a license application for a breeder reactor or a reprocessing plant, we are reluctant, in the absence of experience, to recomend the streamlined procedures set forth in our legislative proposal. A detailed comparison of the NRC, DOE and Broyhill proposals is appended to this testimony.

The Comission urges Congress to enact licensing reform legislation. Although no new power reactors have been ordered for several years, the statutory structure for the existing licensing process should be changed now. The one-step licensing process envisioned by the bill can only be brought about by legislation. The licensing system ought not to be an unwarranted obstacle to the continued timely availability of nuclear power to help provide a share of the national energy mix when the need for new generation capacity arises.

With respect to whether the NRC should be restructured as an agency headed by a single administrator, each Comissioner has given this matter considerable thought and a majority of the Comission supports the single administrator concept.

In recent years there have been three independent examinations of the structure of the Comission. Following the Three Mile Island accident, both the Kemeny i Comission and the 'Rogovin Special Inquiry Group recommended that the NRC be l

headed by a single administrator. In a strongly worded statement, the Kemeny Comission declared that "as presently constituted, the NRC does not possess i the organizational and management capabilities necessary for the effective pursuit of safety goals." The Rogovin Inquiry Group concluded that "the

-T-central and overwhelming need is for legislative and executive reorganization to establish a single chief executive with the clear authority to supervise and direct the entire NRC staff." More recently the Grace Comission recomended that Congress enact legislation which would strengthen the authority of the Chairman as the chief executive officer of the agency.

In large part the central focus of the debate on the structure of the NRC is whether the public is better served by an organization in which important decisions are made through a collegial process or by a more efficiently managed agency headed by a single decision-maker. In addressing this issue the Rogovin Inquiry Group stated "there is not an agency in Government that would not better provide for a diversity of views if it were headed by a Comission. It is not likely, however, that any of these agencies would be as well managed."

In 1954 when Congress enacted the Atomic Energy Act, one of the primary mandates of the agency was to regulate the development of the commercial uses of nuclear power which were then in their infancy. In the ensuing 32 years much has changed. One hundred comercial nuclear plants have been licensed to operate, and the Comission's primary focus now is on ensuring the safe operation of those operating plants. In carryire aut this role, it is the Comission's view that efficient manageme% : it reasingly important.

Collegial decision-making and efficient management are not well suited for each other. For example, prompt decision-making is difficult because time must be afforded for each Comissioner to consider the issues and provide separate views. As a result, there is frequently delay in responding to requests from G . . - , --,

.g..

Congress, in issuing adjudicatory decisions, making rulemaking decisions, and providing policy direction to the NRC staff. Debate of issues is often unduly prolonged in an attempt to develop a consensus position, and because of the diverse Comissioner views, the NRC staff and the public sometimes receive confused signals.

Moreover, the Government in the Sunshine Act has greatly diminished the exchange of diverse views which is the primary benefit of a Comission structure. The Comission cannot usually meet as a body except in public meetings. This requirement that Comission deliberations be held in scheduled public meetings greatly diminishes the opportunity and quality of such exchange of views. The Administrative Conference recently looked at this issue and reached the same conclusion. In a 1984 report to the Congress. it concluded that an undesirable effect of the Sunshine Act had been a diminution of collegiality in multi-member agencies.

In the event that Congress does not enact legislation to create a single administrator, then the Commission would encourage review of the Sunshine Act to eliminate or reduce the problem for collegial decision-making.

Regarding the third issue, the Comission opposes H.R. 4835 which would establish an Inspect 6r General within the NRC. The Comission's audit and investigative unit for internal affairs--the Office of Inspector and Auditor (0IA)--has direct access to the Comissioners, and has all the necessary

, independence to do its job. Moreover, since the Agency is relatively small, the Comission believes it is important that DIA remain a necessary management s -- -

- , - , , - - - - . , , - , , - - - , - - - - -- e g --- -

.y.

extension of the Commission in overseeing the programs and activities of the NRC. Establishment of an independent Inspector General would take some of those management benefits away from the Commission. In the absence of any showing that statutory independence is needed for 0IA, the Commission opposes establishment of an office which would lessen its ability to direct the functioning of the Agency and which would impose new, burdensome, and probably costly, requirements on the Commission.

Finally, the Commission opposes H.R. 4648 which would establish an independent Nuclear Safety Board. In 1984 Congress directed the NRC to conduct a study of the need for and feasibility of an independent organization responsible for conducting investigations of significant safety events at NRC-licensed facilities. In response, the NRC contracted with Brookhaven National Laboratory. Brookhaven submitted its final report to the NRC in February of 1985.

Brookhaven recommended the establishment of a statutory office of nuclear safety, headed by a Director reporting to the Commission. However, the study stated current practices for investigations of operating events have been conducted in a " proficient and technically competent" manner.

While Brookhaven s'uggested a number of improvements for event investigations, it noted that, for the most part, these improvements could be implemented within the present organization structure. Many of the improvements recommended by Brookhaven have best adopted as part of the newly established and successful NRC Incident Investigation Program.

4 , , - - - ---

Based on the Comission's review of the Brookhaven Report and other studies of the issue, the Connission believes that there are no major deficiencies in the NRC accident investigation program that would warrant formation of an independent Nuclear Safety Board.

Rather than to correct an existing deficiency, the justification for a Nuclear Safety Board appears to rest almost entirely upon a perceived need to eliminate any potential conflict'of interest in order to gain increased public, media, and Congressional confidence in the investigatory process. It is argued that a Nuclear Safety Board would increase confidence in the investigatory process by _

relieving the NRC of the responsibility to investigate and determine the cause of an event to which the NRC's own regulatory actfvities might have been contributing factors.

Under H.R. 4648, the Nuclear Safety Board could direct the NRC to perform the desired investigations and then review the results. This would not create the perception of an " independent investigation." On the other hand, if the Nuclear Safety Board would conduct its own investigations, then the resources contemplated for the Board would need to be substantially augmented.

It appears that its task could be comparable to that of the National Transportation Safety Board. That Board currently has approximately 320 employees and its budget is in excess of 22 million 611ars per year. While we are not suggesting that the Board would need, or should be given, a staff of 320, the desired investigative results would not be obtained by transferring l

the 40-45 full-time employees currently assigned to NRC's Office for Analysis i

f _ _ _ _ - , . , . - , -- n r

-II -

4 and Evaluation of Operational Data to the Nuclear Safety Board. Either the resources allocated must be substantially increased or the expectations about the results must be substantially reduced.

A Nuclear Safety Board would also likely lead to a duplication of existing Consission functions. Further the Board's activities might hinder the Commission from acting effectively in the event of an incident. And in any event, the Board could well be preempted by a presidential commission if there were a significant accident in the future.

This concludes the Commission's prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the opportunity to discuss these important matters with the Committee this morning and will be glad to respond to any questions you may have.

9

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. s COMPARISON OF H.R. 1447 (NRC BILL) H.R. 2488 (DOE BILL) AND H.R. 1029 (BROYHILL BILL) - STANDARDIZATION AND LICENSING REFORM NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL Short Title

" Nuclear Powerplant Licensing " Nuclear Facility Standardiza- " Nuclear Powerplant Standardization and Standardization Act of 1985* Act of 1985* Act of 1985*

Sec. 2 - Findings and Purposts Sec. 2 - Findings and Purposes Sec. 2 - Findings and Purposes Sec. 2(a) Essentially same except DOE Sec. 2(a) virtually identical to refers to ' national interest" NRC bill and meeting " safety and environmental criteria" while NRC refers to " clear and coordinated energy policy" and meeting " applicable criteria".

Sec. 2.(a)(1)-(2) - Interstate Same Sec. 2(a)(1-5) - Virtually Commerce le affected; public identical to NRC bill participation should be assured Sec. 2(a)(3) & (4) - Licensing Essentially the same but condensed and public health and safety into 2(a)(3),

enhanced by use of preapproved or standardized design.

Sec. 2(a)(5) - Early site Essentially the same but is in selection will facilitate 2(a)(4).

licensing process.

Sec. 2(a)(6) - Licensing decision Sec. 2(a)(5) - Similar: Sec. 2(a)(6) Similar: licensing should be made early and if Licensing decision should he and regulatory process will be

- - _ _ _ _ _ =- . _ . . . _ . . , - . . . _. .

2 NRC DILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL an opportunity fnr a hearing has made early and licensing will facilitated if licensing decisions been provided, no further adjudi- be facilitated if issues are made at the earliest feasible cation unless evidentiary showing resolved in an earlier phase of the process and issues has been made. proceeding are not reconsid- resolved in NRC proceedings are ered in the absence of a showing not subject to further adjudication under this Act and NRC in the absence of a substantial

] regulations. evidentiary showing required by this Act and NRC regulations.

! Sec. 2(a)(7) - Licensing should Nothing similar Nothing similar be timely and adjudicatory ,

l procedutes invoked only where j dispute can be resolved with sufficient accuracy through sach procedures.

Sec. 2(a)(8) - Regulatory process Sec. 2(a)(6) - same as NRC bill Sec. 2(a)(7) same as NRC should provide greate stability.

1 Sec. 2(a)(9) - It is appropriate Sec. 2(a)(7) - Essentially the Sec. 2(a)(8) Essentially the same for NRC to give limited consid- same eration to economics.

(Not in NRC bill) Sec. 2(a)(8) - NRC should (Not in Broyhill bill) adopt criteria to govern changes in regulatory requirements (backfitting).

Sec. 2(b) - Purposes Sec. 2(b) - same Sec. 2(b) - same Sec. 2(b)(1) - Facilitate use of Sec. 2(b)(1) - Essentially the Sec. 2(b)(1) - identical to NRC preapproved sites / standardized same

, designs Sec. 2(b)(2) - Provide for Sec. 2(b)(2) - Same except Sec. 2(b)(2) - identical to DOE issuance of combined CP/OL that CP/OL is to enhance public health and safety as

,1 1 i

3 NRC DILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL opposed to assuring continued protection Sec. 2(b)(3) - Improve stability Sec. 2(b)(3) - Essentially the Sec. 2(b)(3) - Essentially the same of licensing standards and same finality of prior licensing approvals TITLE I - SITING AND LICENSING TITLE I - LICENSING

& REGULATORY REFORM Sec. 101 - Amends S 185 of AE Act Sec. 103 - same Sec. 103 - same Sec. 185.a - Eliminates earliest Sec. 185.a - Same as NRC Similar to DOE approach but adds and latest completion date for proposal but further amends statutory requirement that applicant 4

cps. section to remove provisions be competent providing for no OL if good cause showing that issuance of OL would not be in accordance

with Act. (Required finding that OL will be in conformity with Act and regs same as in NRC bill.)

Sec. 185.b (Cp/OL) Sec. 185.b

- applies only to " thermal - applies to same class of - same as DOE neutron generating facilities

• facilities as NRC provision but adds breeders and repro-cessing (" commercial produc-tion or utilization facility")

1

- permits combined - Essentially the same - Essentially the same but also CP/OL upon certain findings adds statutory requirement that applicant be competent.

l

- provides opportunity for - same - same hearing pursuant to 5 189 of AE Act i

I 1

1 t

. s 4

NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL I

- inspections, tests, anal- - same - no comparable provision yses, and acceptance criteria to be incor porated in the combined license

- Not in NRC -

Sec. 185(b)(1) - CP/OL Not in Droyhill must include a " phased approval procedure for construction quality assurance"

- Not in NRC ,

Sec. 185(b)(1) - NRC may Not in Broyhill also provide for inspections by

" licensee designated QA inspectors, designated engineering and inspection representatives, and Commission inspectors

• Prior to operation NRC shall - Same, except 30-day - Utility must notify NRC at least 9 publish 30-day public notice of notice based on utility months prior to intended date to intended operation. Hearing notice to NRC of readiness to commence operation. Upon receipt of only where " good cause*, operate and no requirement of where there is substantial " good cause*

notice Commission is to publish 30 day dispute of fact that cannot notice for members of public to request hearing. Hearing will be held if issue be resolved without a hearing, and either issue was not and could not have been raised in earlier

! could not ~have been raised in proceedings involving facility, site, or designs issue consists of original Cp/OL proceeding, or substantial factual dispute that cannot a material non-conformance be resolved with sufficient accuracy with the license exists which except at hearing; Commission decision 5

could prevent safe facility depends on resolution of issue, and with operation. respect to issues involving i

verification, inspection and testing

" necessary to establish proper construction there has been a noncon-formance with license which could materially and adversely affect safe j operation of facility.

I- .

5 1

a-NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL

- If hearing is to be held, - Essentially the same - Doesn't provide for post-commencement operation may commence prior hearings, to hearing unless NRC finds 4

hearing must be prior to operation in order to protect safety or security.

! *- After Commission submitted - No compar'able provision - No comparable provision S.836 to Congress, majority of Commission informed Congress that bill should be modified to include provision which provide prior to commencement of operation NRC shall determine whether construction has been completed in conformance with 1 terms of CP/OL and NRC regulations.

].

) -

After hearing, CP/OL may - Nothing similar - Similar to NRC but no " good cause be modified: operation should standard" i be based on CP/OL unless is good cause.

)l j Sec. 185(c) - No modifications Sec. 104 adds to AE Act a Sec. - Sec. 104 adds to AE Act a Sec. 30 j to final determination on an 187 entitled *Nodifications* entitled "Nodification of Regulatory

+

issue previously considered and Sec. 187(a). NRC shall not Requirements." No modifications to

decided in "any proceeding for require modifications in regulatory requirements unless the the issuance of a permit or design approvals, site proposed change will substantially license for that facility, permits, facilities (including enhance the public health and safety

! facility site, or approval of breeders and reprocessing or common defense and security as a

! design ... under 5 194* unless plants) holding a CP, OL, or result of improved overall safety of =

significant new information combined CP/OL, or any design, facility operation and overall improve-  !

indicates that the change is procedure, or organization for

)-

required to protect safety or any facility (including breed-ment is justified. Changes made only after a systematic, centralized 1

security and safety or security ers and reprocessing plants), documented review. All changes shall be will be s'ub'stantially enhanced.

! unless it determines substan- made by rule, regulation or order.

j (Note: Similar provisions tial improvement in overall l

1 i

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NRC BILL DOE BILL DROYHILL BILL repeated again for early site safety of facility operation

> in 193(f) and for standard required under the AE Act designs in 194(el.) would result, and the improve-ment is justified taking into account specified mandatory factors.

- Potential' risk reduction to public from accidental off-site releases

- Impact on worker exposure

- Installation and continu-ing costs, including construc-tion delay and continuity of service

- Potential safety impact of changes in plant or oper-ational complexity including effect on other requirements

- Commission resource burden

- Potential impact of facility differences on relevance and practicality of change

- Whether change is interim or final and justification if interim

- Such other matters as Commission deems necessary Sec. 187(b) - Commission shall establish centralized process

. o 7

HRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL DILL to consider changes. Changes made only by license amendment, rule, or order. Section does not apply to immediately effective plans to protect safety or security.

Sec. 103 - Early Site Review Sec. 102 - Early Site Approval Sec. 102 - Early Site Approval Adds new 5 193 to AE Act Adds new S 194 to AE Act that Adds new 5 194 to AE Act that is providing for site permits for is the same as HRC S 193 except the same as NRC S 193 except that production and utilization

• that facilities.

• - renewals must be filed 12-18 - no specified time period for filing mos. before 10 yr. expiration date

. renewal requests and no limit on number (NRC 12-36 mos.), and renewals (no of renewals limit) for 10 year periods (NRC refers to "a renewal" for 5-10 - ten year renewal period yrs)

• - DOE bill requires renewals - renewal shall be granted unless unless there is significant significant new information that makes new information showing it likely site will not comply with this non-compliance with Act or Act or NRC regulations.

regulations. NRC bill requires a renewal unless will not comply with Act or regs.

- DOE bill has no specific No provision on deferral of fees provision regarding deferral of license fees (HRC S 193(b) &

S 193(d)(2)).

- NRC bill (5 193(f)) DOE bill precludes relitiga- Sec. 105. No reconsideration of issues precludes relitigation or tion at hearings, and does not resolved in any other proceeding under rereview of considered and speak of rec eview itself, but this Act in the absence of significant decided issues unless relitigation is allowed if new information substantially affecting there is significant new informa- there is material factual conclusions reached in other proceeding.

tion which requires change to disputer the issue could not 1

. e 8

NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL protect safety or security and have been considered and the change will substantially- decided earlier or there is enhance safety or security. noncompliance with the site permit that could materially and adversely affect safe operation.

- DOE bill'provides for - same as DOE judicial review of site permits under 5 189(b).

NRC bill is silent on issue.

Sec. 104 - Approval of Designs Sec. 101 - Approval of - same as DOE (amends AE Act by adding 5 194) Standardized Designs (amends AE Act by adding 5 193)

Same as NRC except: Same as NRC except:

- applies to all production - same as DOE and utilization facilities (including breeders and repro-cessing plants). NRC applies only to thermal neutron reactor power plants.

• - NRC shall have procedures - same as DOE for review of major sub-systems; NRC bill says *may".

• - DOE bill provides for - 10 year renewals like DOE except renewals for 10 year periods, no time specified for filing application if renewal application filed for renewal 12-18 mos. before expiration.

NRC bill calls for renewal of an additional 5-10 yrs if application filed 12-36 mos.

before expiration.

, O 9

NRC BILL DOE BILL' BkOYHILL BILL

• - DOE bill requires - same as DOC renewals unless there is significant new information showing noncompliance with Act or regs. NRC bill requises a renewal unless noncompliance with Act or regs.

- DOE provisions on - No reconsideration of issues relitigation are the same as in resolved in any other proceeding

, 5.193, and differ from NRC bill under this Act in the absence of in same way. gjgnificant new information sub-stantially affecting conclusions

- NRC application of amend- reached in other proceeding. However, ments to design approvals to CP biil also states in another section or CP/OL applications filed that design approvals cannot be before effective amendment date, modified at all except in a design where applicant opposes this, approval amendment proceeding.

subject to DOE statutory backfit provision in the new Sec. 187 - Amendments would be subject to entitled " modifications." NRC backfit criteria contained in uses the relitigation contention legislation.

here which requires the additional finding (not in DOE bill) that the amendment is required to protect safety or security.

- Under DOE bill design - same as DOE approvals are specifically subject to judicial review under S 189(b).

- NRC bill allows CP, - DOE bill permits

• deviations - same as DOE CP/OL, OL applicants to seek from all permits, licenses, and approval from NRC of a

• variance

• design approvals without NHC appr oval, from design approval if variance unless there is change in technical complies with Act and regs, specifications or an unreviewed safety question, in which case an amendment to the permit, license or approval is required.

?

. O 10 NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL Sec. 201 Amends Sec. 11 of AE Act to Nothing comparable Nothing comparable define thermal neutron facility Sec. 202 Defines

• standardized design" Not defined flot defined Sec. 203 Requires regulations to No comparable provision Nothing comparable implement Act within 180 days Sec. 301 Sec. 201 Conforms S 105(c) of AE Act Similar Sec. 201 - similar but unlike NRC and

" Antitrust Provisions

• DOE bills subjects site permit reviews to anti-trust reviews.

Sec. 302, 304 Equivalent Provision (Sections 203-204 Amends existing sections of AE DOE bill amends S 186(a) like Sec. 203-206 - similar to DOE provision Act to reference design approvals NRC bill. Also, unlike NRC ar.d site permits in 5 161(o) and bill, includes site permits S 186(a) and design approvals in 5 191(a) dealing with atomic safety and licensing boards. Does not add reference to design approvals or site permits in 5 161(o)

- thus may be no inspections of site permits or design approvals allowed.

. e 11 NRC BILL DOE BILL BROYHILL BILL No comparable provision No comparable provision Sec. 204. Adds reference to site permits and design approvals to Sec. 187 dealing with modification of licenses.

Sec. 205. Nakes conforming changes to Sec. 189a on hearings and extends so-called Sholly authority for issuance immediately effective amendments to combined CP/OLs.

Sec. 207. Updates current statutory citations.

Sec. 305 Sec. 305 Table of Contents similar Similar, but changes spread throughout bill.

Sec. 303 Sec. 202 Amends 5 182(b) of Act to require seems to require ACRS review Sec. 202 - No ACRS review required for ACRS review of site permits, of all applications to grant, site permits or design approvals or design approvals, amendments to review, or amend all cps, amendments thereto, site permits and design approvals CP/OLs , O Ls , si t e pe r mi t s , and referred for review by commis- design approvals.

sion, and beginning of operation in case of combined CP/OL.

Sec. 401 All sections of Act take effect No comparable provision No comparable provision on date of enactment and apply to pending proceedings.

No comparable provision No comparable provision Sec. 207 - makes conforming changes to references to Administrative Procedure Act.

. _ _ _ _