ML20204C685
| ML20204C685 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 09/20/1978 |
| From: | Moore R NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811290287 | |
| Download: ML20204C685 (5) | |
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g$f September 20, 1978 a MEMORANDUM TO THE FILE STAFF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PROPOSED LICENSE TO EXPORT FUEL FOR THE YUG0SLAVIAN RRSK0 POWER REACTOR (APPLICATION KSNM-1015) s On September 22, 1976, Westinghouse Electric Corporation applied for a E license to export up to 149,672 kilograms of low enriched uranium to [ Yugoslavia for ute in fueling the KRSK0 Nuclear Power Plant, a 632 MWe E PWR located near the community of XRSK0 in the Socialist Federal Republic ii of Yugoslavia for which export license XR-107 was issued by NRC on May 20, 9 1977. This quantity of material would be sufficient for the initial core loading (Regions 1, 2, and 3) and six additional reloads for Regions 4 s through 9. On January 6,1977 Westinghouse requested that tM September i 1976 application be amended to reflect two separate license applications, as follows* i (1) The first license application (XSNM-1015) is for the iritial core J plus one reload for Region 4. The material involved is 66,752 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.49% U-235. (2) The second licensa application (XSNM-1067) is for reload Regions 5 [ through 9 and covers 82,926 kilograms.of uranium enriched to 3.40% U-235. On August 2,1978 the Executive Branch responded to the NRC request for views and comments with respect to XSNM-1015; license application XShM '067 remains under Executive Branch review at this writing. ~ E In its August 2 response the Executive Branch (1) explicitly addr,essed how the requirements of the NNPA are met and (2) concluded that the proposed i export would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the i United States.. In addition, the Executive Branch has advised: that this fuel export will be pursuant to the US-IAEA Agreement for ? o Cooperation; { l that the export will be under a supply agreement between the IAEA, o 3 Yugaslavia and the US and the Project Agreement between the Agency and Yugoslavia; j y o ' that the Government of the SFR of Yugoslavia has adhered. to all i provisions of the' agreement:amor.g the US, the IAEA, and Yugoslayf a; j q
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that the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act and P.L. 242, or equivalent, have been met; and o that the Executive Branch recommends expeditious approval of license XSNM-1015 to support important United States nonproliferation and foreign. policy goals. l The staff has reviewed the subject application in light of the considera-tions below: Safeguards. As a party to the NPT Yugoslavia has undertaken the obligation to accept IAEA safeguards on all source or special fissionable materials in all peacaful nuclear activities within the territory of Yugoslavia, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. Further, this export will be subject to the agreement between the IAEA and Yugoslavia which entered into force on June 14, 1974. Article IV 2 of this agreement specifies that if the comprehensive NPT safeguards agreement between the agency and Yugosisvia pursuant to INFCIRC/153 is terminated, the safeguards rights and responsibilities of the IAEA provided for in its statute shall 7 be implemented in accordance with arrangements which will supplement this (Project) agreement. The appropriate arrangements shall be agreed forth-with by the Agency and Yugoslavia and shall be based on the Agency's safeguards system applicable to Agency projects, including provisions with respect to Agency inspectors; pending agreement on such arrangements, the Agency will apply safeguards in accordance with the procedures provided for in that system. The Executive Branch concludes, and the staff concurs, that the safeguards criterion of the NNPA is met, o No Nuclear Explosive Use. As a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Yugoslavia has undertaken the obligations not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. In addition to its obligation undertaken under the NPT, the Government of Yugoslavia, in a formal note to the International Atomic Energy Agency in May, 1977 has stated the following-t "In its policy the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of f Yugoslavia has always and consistently pledged itself for nuclear disarmament, and has, consequently, attached exceptional importance to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to the prohibition of
.i n o o . production, stockpiling and the use of nuclear weapons. By ratifying the treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and by at 7nting the Agency's multilateral safeguards system, it has, for its pari., assumed the obligation not to produce nor procure nuclear weapons or nuclear explosives, also that it will not use for military purposes nuclear techniques and technology, which it receives as aid or through the Agency. The Government of the SFR of Yugoslavia has most faith-fully adhered to the mentioned commitments and this constitutes a lasting constant in its policy." In this same note the Government of Yugoslavia also noted that this obligation constitutes an international obligation "which the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will continue to fulfill in every respect." The Executive Branch advises that, in its view, Yugoslavia meets Criterion 2 on the NNPA. The staf f agrees. o Physicai Security. With respect to the proposed license, NMSS-states that it has not conducted a review of the program in Yugoslavia for protection of Category III materiel, inasmuch as no information is available concerning the protection of such material. In November 1975 a team of US officials visited Yugoslavia for an exchange of views on physical security, including a review of regula-tions governing site and transport security. On the basis of this review the Executive Branch has determined that the physical security measures being maintained with respect to nuclear facilities, sites and the transport of nuclear material in Yugoslavia are, as a minimum, compatible with INFCIRC/225/Rev.1. In addition, the Government of Yugoslavia, in a letter dated December 7,1976, to the Director General of the IAEA, noted that: "The Government of Yugoslavia will discharge its responsibilities with i respect to the physical protection of special nuclear materials through its competent authorities in accordance with the law for transport of dangerous materials (Sluzbeni list SFRJ 1974/24, 10.5.1974), including also the guards if necessary or if specified so by the authority. As specified in chapter 4 of the Law, paragraphs 53 and 54, for transport of fiss_ionable and radioactive materials a special permission is required. The physical protection of the far.ility and of the special nuclear material in storage and in use will be implemented according to the general principles as proposed by the Agency in INFCIRC/225 from September '1975." i i
.= o o Although the staff has not conducted a review of protective measures for Category III material in Yugoslavia, neither does it have infor-mation.to the contrary that those protective measures are incompatible with the requirements of INFCIRC/225/Rev. 1. Relative to the export criteria, in those instances where no other information is available, new Section 126 a(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, permits 1 the Commission to base its judgment solely on its assessment of the assurances provided. The staff believes that the physical protection assurances provided by the G0Y to the IAEA are adequate and therefore that Criterion 3 is met. o Retransfer and Reprocessing. The agreement for the KRSK0 Nuclear Power Plant and Related Projects among the KRSK0 consortium and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (Eximbank Credit No. 5370) dated July 25, 1974, includes restrictions against the export to, or use in, any other country of items financed under the agreement and prohibits the lease, sale, or other disposition of any US items financed under the agreement. In a letter dated July 27, 1978 from the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the SFR of Yugoslavia to Secretary Vance, the Government of Yugoslavia confirmed that the " undertakings of the KRSK0 Power Plant ' Consortium according to the agreement. concluded with the Export-Import Bank on July.25,1974 shall apply to all nuclear fuel the KRSK0 Nuclear Power Plant may receive under this ar w ment, irrespective of the duration of that agreement." By lette, :.lso dated July 27, the U.S. Secretary of State noted these undertakings on the part of the Govern-ment of Yugoslavia. In the July 27 exchange of notes the Government of Yugoslavia further agreed, with respect to the disposal of irradiated fuel, "to store the irradiated fuel supplied under this agreement in adequate storage facilities on the territory of the SFR of Yugoslavia for a period of time. sufficient for its possible subsequent use in support of +he economic. developments of the SFR of Yugoslavia and in accordance with l nonproliferation objectives. Furthermore, the SFR of Yugoslavia expresses its readiness to expand its irradiated fuel temporary storage facilities and notes with pleasure the intention of the United States Government to provide appropriate support for these efforts. " Disposition of U.S. fuel irradiated in the KRSK0 reactor would be in ) accordance with the following alternatives: (a) Storage in the SFR of Yugoslavia; (b) Storage, processing or other disposition in accordance with inter-nationally accepted arrangements to which both the Government of the SFR of Yugoslavia and the Government of the United States may subscribe; (c) Storage in the U.S. for a fixed fee under related commercial arrangements, if practicable. y Il li l.
-w-j O O "The undertakings apply to the first core and first reload and any other subsequent reload supplied by the U.S. Termination of this agreed procedure would not affect the rights and obligations of the LU.S. and Yugoslavia with respect to fuel transferred prior to termina-tion." On the basis.of the above commitments by Yugoslavia the Executive Branch expresses the view that the US has the equivalent of prior right of approval to the retransfer of US-supplied SNM. Under the arrangements agreed upon for disposal of irradiated fuel, the US has approval rights for any reprocessing or alteration of SNM to be furnished under the license. Sin:e_no US-origin fuel could be retransferred, except' under conditions acceptable to the US, retrans--... ~ fer approval also extends to produced material. In the staff's opinion the equivalent of Criteria 4 and 5 are met. Notwithstanding the above, the staff notes that (1) the US-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation was coricluded pursuant to Section 124 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, and (2) the recently enacted NNPA makes provis'on for centinued cooperation under such agreements, even though the retransfer and reprocessing criteria contained in the hNPA may not be met, provided that the country or group of countries concerned agree to initiate pegotiations as called for in the NNPA. The Executive Branch has advised previously that the IAEA has agreed to such negotiations. o Sensitive Technology. The proposed export does not involve sensitive technology. o Section 123 Criterion. Since the export contemplated under this appli-cation is expected to occur before March 10, 1980, the Crit'erion of 1 Section 128 of the NNPA would not~ apply. Nevertheless, as a party to l the NPT the SFR of Yugoslivia has accepted IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities. In view of all the considerations above, the staff has concluded that the proposed export meets all applicable export criteria or their equiv?. lent. As required by Section 57 of the Atomic Energy Act and 10 CFR 110.44, the staff has further concluded that the above export, made pursuant to the subject application (1) would not be subject to the terms and conditions of the US-IAEA Agreement for Cooperation, and (2) would not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States or constitute an unreasonable risk to the public health and safety. "/ R. Neal Moore Senior Licensing Reviewer ~ Office of Interna.tional Programs I
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