ML20204C520
| ML20204C520 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 07/25/1986 |
| From: | Barton P Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Savio R, Wylie C DUKE POWER CO., Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-CT-1850, NUDOCS 8607310251 | |
| Download: ML20204C520 (6) | |
Text
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. . .tT-/rko g.. _ .
r . 7pgst Memorandum to: C. J. Wylie, Chairman vi' Ad Hoc Subcommittee'on - -
TVA Reorganization J .,
At g tion: ,
Richard Savio -
4,-
Senior Staff Engineer /t > -
From: Paul H. Barton, Consultant
Subject:
June 12-13, 1986 Chattanooga, Tennessee *gg meeting of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on TVA regarding the TVA Nuclear Performance Plan.
The following comments and recommendations are based on the information presented at the subject meeting and on the TVA Nuclear Performance Plan presented to the NRC on March 10, 1986. These comments are limited to the subjects which C. J. Wylie and Homer Hagedorn suggested that I was best qualified to consider.
Salary Structure and Management Development The TVA Nuclear Performance Plan and the presenta-tions at the meeting clearly point out that the root cause which led to the shutdown of TVA's nuclear power plants l
l was the lack of a sufficient number of experienced nuclear managers. Based on my own experience in the industry and my knowledge of the TVA Nuclear Program, I fully agree with this conclusion.
There are two basic reasons for TVA not developing and retaining nuclear managers. The most important is the salary structure which has the top pay limited by statutory l limitations. The second reason is their management training and performance evaluating programs were not adequate. The ,
l effect of the salary program on top nuclear management _
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positions has existed for some time, especially.since the Three Mile Island incident, followed by an industry desire to upgrade the quality of nuclear operating personnel. The 1
8607310251 860725 DESIGNATED ORIGINAL PDR ACRS CT-1850 PDR Certified By GgM o S
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Y problem with the TVA salary program was noted by the -
. President's private Sector Survey (Grace' Report) which 1 ree6mmended that corrections be made immediately in order to hold together the nuclear program management
. team.
Considerable improvemant has been made recently in the compensation package for nuclear employees, but to the best of my knowledge, at the present time, top pay within the TVA organization is limited to a Grade M-13,
$72,000 per year. This means that M-13 applies to the Board of Directors. From M-8 to M-13, moving up five management levels, there is only a $6,545/ year increase in top pay. This does not provide sufficient incentive to inspire one to higher management and more responsibility.
An experienced and qualified nuclear station manager seeking additional responsibility can obtain job offers 25 to 50% above what TVA can now offer. Until the statutory limitation is changed to permit TVA to pay salaries competitive with the industry, it will be difficult, even with their proposed management development program, to hold experienced top level nuclear managers.
The Nuclear Performance Plan which TVA proposes to follow is relying heavily for the next two years on con-tract personnel for senior management positions. Within the two year period, a sufficient number of experienced and qualified managers are to be developed from existing TVA personnel or recruited from the industry to become senior management employees. The plan clearly accepts the fact ,
that, due to basic salaries of TVA senior nuclear managers <__
being below industry norms, they will continue to experience ;
difficulties in recruiting experienced nuclear managers for permanent positions. This means that within the next two 2
years TVA must develop from present employees senior -
man)gers to fill most all of the twelve or more pos1tions now filled -by contract personnel. In order *E to accomplish this, there must be created an extensive and well organized management development program which will motivate and instill confidence in their present middle and lower management personnel. The plan recog-nizes the need but gives little information as to how this is to be accomplished.
. A brief presentation was made on June 13, 1986 at the Sequoyah plant by M. E. Taylor, Manager, Nuclear personnel, outlining goals and objectives for a manage-ment development plan. The plan is to be developed over the next nine months and one of the goals is to find and train 20 to 30 people for top management positions. This presents a very tight schedule and little appears to be in place at this time except a planned training and moti-vating workshop for 2200 middle managers.
Considerably more information needs to be presented concerning how this " boot-strap" management development is going to be accomplished in time to replace the contract managers.
Engineering and Nuclear Safety Based on the presentations of June 12 and 13, 1986 and the documentation available, I am not satisfied that the proper relationship and division of responsibility have been established between the Director of Nuclear Engineering (
j and the Director of Nuclear Safety and Licensing. Addit ional ;-~
information needs to be submitted regarding who in the organization is responsible for nuclear safety as it 3
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related to system design and modifications; probabilistic risk assessment and its results; and safe operating procedures as they relate to system design and industry
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experience. In other words, who is responsible for an independent look at " Nuclear Safety" from the point of view of system design and operation--not just being in compliance with regulations, codes and standards?
Reference was made at the Sequoyah meeting on June 13 to a new group identified as the " Independent Safety f Engineering Group" with three people at the site but reporting off-site to the Director of Nuclear Safety and Licensing. More information is needed concerning the duties and responsibilities of this group.
Another item that needs clarifying is: Who is responsible for nuclear fuel management in the new organization? I believe it was stated that the Director of Nuclear Services was responsible for fuel. Why are fuel and new core reload designs not the responsibility of Nuclear Engineering?
The description of the new Nuclear Engineering organization, which was presented in Chattanooga on June 12, 1986,.did not fully explain the division of responsi-bility and coordination between the Headquarters Group, l
located in Knoxville, and the Engineers, located at each nuclear site. For example, there appears to be four levels of management between the " Lead Engineers on Site" and the Director of Nuclear Engineering. Additional infor-mation is needed concerning the authority of the site e engineers to make plant modifications and how they assure i_
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that their modifications are in compliance with all licensing commitments, regulations, codes, standards and nuclear safety system requirements.
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.I Resume power Operations The decision by the TVA Board of Directors to pleoe the entire TVA Nuclear Program under the manage-ment of one man with full authority to direct the program is an excellent decision. I believe the present management team assembled by Mr. S. A. White, if it can hold together and maintain its present motivation, is capable of achieving the excellence in management that is necessary to assure that the TVA nuclear units are operated in a safe and efficient manner presenting no threat to the health and safety of the public. However, the organization of the management team as presented at the meeting on June 12 with 26 people reporting directly to Mr. White cannot continue to be effective as the total organization returns to full activity. The organi-zation needs to be broken down under four or five selected managers who alone report directly to.Mr. White.
This will naturally develop into an informal organization if not made formal. At this time I cannot predict the timetable for when it will be prudent to resume full nuclear operations. It would require considerable study of the restart plans for Browns Ferry, Sequoyah and Watts Bar to determine when these units can safely begin pro-ducing power.
At the meetings on June 12 and 13, little information was presented concerning the additional work required to prepare Browns Ferry for safe return to power or for fuel loading at Watts Bar, but the items holding up the restart of Sequoyah appear to be of minor nuclear safety signifi- 7 i cance. A maximum effort should be applied by both the TVA --
and NRC organizations to complete the necessary documenta- !
tion and review of safety questions for Sequoyah and return those units to power at the earliest date that nuclear 5
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safety can be assured. High morale of nuclear plant ,
operating personnel is one of the most important -
ingredients for plant safety. Restoring power operation
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at Sequoyah would do wonders for the morale of the entire TVA nuclear organization and restore confidence in present management.
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