ML20204C026
| ML20204C026 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001308 |
| Issue date: | 10/26/1978 |
| From: | Dawson D GENERAL ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | Cunningham R NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY & SAFEGUARDS (NMSS) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7811270240 | |
| Download: ML20204C026 (2) | |
Text
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PROGRAMS DIVISION GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY,175 CURTNER AVE., SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA 95125 c) 0 DMO-252 9
Docket No. 70-1308 U
License SNM-1265
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October 26, 1978 4
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- u. a m menem Office of Nuclear Material Safety & Safeguards W er U
t m%T Attention: Mr. R.E. Cunningham, Acting Director Division of Fuel Cycle & Material Safety N(
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission n
Washington, D.C.
20555 Gentlemen:
1
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS re LACROSSE FUEL ASSEMBLIES; LTR. R. STAR 0STECKI (NRC) TO D.M. DAWSON (GE)
DATED OCTOBER 18, 1978 The subject questions and General Electric's responses are given below:
1.
The application does not addreas the accident condition in which a basket is accidentatty dropped (or tipped) in the cack unloading pit.
It was determined in the revieu for the major amendment of December 3, 1975 that such an accident might permit fuel to extend a maximum of 42 inches out of the basket.
It should be shown that thic that arranaement is suberitical for a basket of Lacrosse assemblies.
la. A criticality analysis of a hypothetical extension of Lacrosse fuei bundles from a fuel storage basket has been performed, based on the following
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Fuel - 3.925% enriched Lacrosse fuel as defined in General Electric's application of September 22, 1978.
b.
Geometry - nine bundles immersed in water, with horizontal spacing equivalent to that of the storage tube centerlines and vertical centerline spacing reduced by one inch between tiers to simulate the effect of fuel deflection.
Despite the fact that the full length of fuel cannot be ejected from the basket, an infinite length of fuel is assumed.
c.
Stainless steel absorbers - none, except fuei cladding d.
Reflection - Infinite water This analysis shows a k ff of 0.923 i.007.
The analysis was performed by Battelie Pacific Northwest Laboratories, Richland, Washington.
2.
The GE application proposes that the k, limit for the 10x10 type BWR fuel be 1.38 as compared to their con-cultante calculation of k, as 1.35.
This discrepancy should be justified.
2a. The value for k, of 1.38 was selected to provide a reasonable operational tolerance above the caiculated (KEN 0) value of 1.352 for the most reactive Lacrosse fuel bundle. The k, for the basket array at the rod lattice k, of 1.352 is 0.85510.006.
Using this ratio, a bundle with a rod lattice k of 1.38 results in a of 0.873. The basis of these relation-basket array k, described in the GE May 1975 submittai ships has been for Project-1 (Criticality Safety Basic for the MFRP Project-I Fuel Bundle Storage Baskets, Batte11e Pacific NorthwestLaboratories,May1975).
P1 ease contact either C.C Herrington or R.K. Stitt if there are further questions regarding these matters.
Respectfully submitted, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY ce Of hrD.M.Dawson, Manager Licensing.& Transportation 408*925-6330 MC 861 DMD:HAR:bn
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