ML20204A170

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Forwards AEOD/T603, Inadvertent Pump Suction Transfer & Potential Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cavitation at Davis-Besse Technical Review Rept
ML20204A170
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1986
From: Tripathi R
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
To: Rubin S
NRC OFFICE FOR ANALYSIS & EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL DATA (AEOD)
Shared Package
ML20204A171 List:
References
NUDOCS 8605090448
Download: ML20204A170 (1)


Text

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MAy06 M M MEMORANDUM FOR: Stuart D. Rubin, Acting Chief Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AE00 THRU: Peter Lam, Chief Reactor Systems Section 2 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AE0D FROM: Raji Tripathi, Reactor Systems Engineer Reactor Systems Section 2 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AE00

SUBJECT:

INADVERTENT PUMP SUCTION TRANSFER AND P0TENTIAL AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP CAVITATION AT DAVIS-BESSE The subject Technical Review report is provided for your information.

On January 15, 1985, during zero power physics testing, the Davis-Besse reactor tripped following a steam and feedwater rupture control system trip. Subse-quently, the auxiliary feedwater pump (AFWP) #1 suction transferred from the condensate storage tank to the service water system (SWS). The licensee's evaluation of the reactor trip data raised some questions about possible cavitation of AFWP #1. However, there were no measurements of the pump's operating parameters and there was no indication in the control room to suggest an AFWP malfunction. Therefore, AFWP cavitation could not be positively established. However, the licensee has proposed a couple of design modifica-tions to prevent potential AFWP cavitation following a spurious suction transfer to the SWS and subsequent inadvertent isolation of the SWS by the operator.

The automatic transfer of the AFWP #1 in the January 1985 event did not present a safety concern. However, the use of essentially untreated service water has an adverse effect on the secondary water chemistry. As a corrective measure, the licensee has proposed some design modifications for submittal to NRR for review.

While this report was being prepared, on June 9, 1985, an event involving total loss of feedwater occurred at Davis-Besse. An inadvertent AFWP suction transfer was also experienced during this event. As a part of the follow _up activities related to the June 9 event, NRR is currently examining the issue of inadvertent pump suction transfer. Thus, no further work by AE0D is deemed necessary.

Raji Tripathi, Reactor Systems Engineer Reactor Systems Section 2 Reactor Operations Analysis Branch, AE00

Enclosure:

As Stated 0FC : ROAB w : SC:ROAB  : AC:ROAB  :  :  :  :

_____:________/__:...___ _4_: _____ y _:_.. ________:____________:.___________:-_________.

NAME : RTripathi/as PSlam GM SDRubiQ :  :  :  : :

DATE : 4/22/86  : 4/2'if86  : 4/1,0/86  :  :  :  :

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 8605090448 860506 PDR ADOCK 05000346 S PDR