ML20203N536

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Special Rept 86-4:on 860330,jacket Water Hose at Right Side Cylinders Ruptured & Diesel Generator Immediately Secured. Caused by Hose Failure.Hoses Being Replaced as Preventive Measure
ML20203N536
Person / Time
Site: Salem 
Issue date: 04/29/1986
From: Zupko J
Public Service Enterprise Group
To:
NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
86-4, NUDOCS 8605050474
Download: ML20203N536 (3)


Text

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"i O PSlEG Public Service Electnc and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station April 29, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEli GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 1

REPORT NO. 86-4 SPECIAL REPORT This Special Report describing a diesel generator test failure, is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

/

J. M.

Zupko, Jr.

General Manager-Salem Operations JLR:ama C

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s SPECIAL REPORT NUMBER 86-4 PLANT IDENTIFICATION:

iSalem Generating Station - Unit 2 Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hance :k's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 JDLQ;PICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

2C Diesel Generator Test Failure Event Date:

03/30/86 Report Date: 04/29/86 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.86-094 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

.' Mode 1 - Rx Power 100 % - Unit Load 1120 MNe This special report describes a test f ailure involving 2C Diesel Generator which occurred on March 30, 1986.

This report is submitted f or informational purposes in accordance with Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4, and contains the information required by Regulatory Guide 1.108, Revision 1, August 1977, Regulatory Position C.3.b.

Surveillance Requirement 4.8.1.1.4 states:

All diesel generator f ailures, valid or non-valid, shall be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

. Chi March 30, 1986, during normal power operations, routine surveillance testing of 2C Diesel Generator was in progress in accordance with Surveillance Procedure SP(0) 4.8.1.1.2.

At 0243 hours0.00281 days <br />0.0675 hours <br />4.017857e-4 weeks <br />9.24615e-5 months <br />, the jacket water hose at No. 5 right side cylinder ruptured, and the diesel generator was immediately secured.

No equipment was damaged as a result of this occurrence.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

This was an isolated case of hose f ailure.

Although a " root" cause has not been conclusively determined, there exists two (2) possibilities for the failure of this hose:

1.

The hoses associated with the diesel water cooling systems are scheduled f or replacement every eight (8) refueling outages.

These hoses have not yet been replaced under the Preventative Maintenance Program, and this event could possibly be indicative of a non-conservative replacement f requency.

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p SPECIAL REPORT 86-4 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURIpCE: (cont'd) 2.

Inspection of the failed bose revealed that it had been inadvertently painted.

Although visual observation revealed no deterioration of the rubber, the flexibility of the hose may have been affected, resulting in its premature failure.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The failure of the jacket water cooling hose required the stopping of the diesel Def ore the completion of the surveillance test.

This constitutes a valid test and failure as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.108.

With one diesel inoperable, the remaining diesels are capable of providing the required emergency power for minimum safegurards equipment.

This event therefore involved no undue risk to the health or saf ety of the public.

However, as previously stated, all diesel generator test failures, both valid and non-valid, are required to be reported to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.1.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Each diesel water cooling system contains eighteen (18) hoses, each approximately 2 3/4 inches long and 2 inches in diameter.

As a preventative measure (because the root cause was not identified), the hoses on all six (6) diesel generators (three per Unit) are being replaced.

Additionally, the replacement f requency will be increased to every five (5) years and will be revised as necessary to ensure their reliability.

2C Diesel Generator hoses were replaced, and the diesel was subsequently tested in accordance with Surveillance Procedure SP(0) 4.8.1.1.2.

The test results were satisfactory and 2C Diesel was restored to an operable status at 1820 hours0.0211 days <br />0.506 hours <br />0.00301 weeks <br />6.9251e-4 months <br />, March 30, 1986.

At the time of this report, the hoses on lA and 1B Diesels (Unit 1) have also been replaced.

Additional hoses have been ordered, and are presently scheduled for delivery by May 9, 1986.

They will be installed on the remaining three (3) diesels upon receipt.

At the time of occurrence, the required testing interval for the diesel generators was fourteen (14) days as the result of the last valif. diesel test failure which occurred on October 6,1985.

This was classified as a " valid" test failure in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.108, Regulatory Position C.2.e. (6), and marked the third failure in the last one-hundred (100) valid tests.

As a result, the testing frequency was increased to seven (7) days in accordance with Regulatory Position C.2.d. (3).

General Manager-Salem Operations JLR:tns SORC Mtg 86-026 l