ML20203F320
| ML20203F320 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Zion File:ZionSolutions icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1986 |
| From: | Farrar D COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO. |
| To: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| 1541K, NUDOCS 8604250118 | |
| Download: ML20203F320 (2) | |
Text
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N Commonwealth Edison
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) One First Nitionil Plaza. Crucago, Illinois
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Address R; ply to. Post Office Box 767 j} Chicago, Illinois 60690 N
April 10, 1986 Mr. James G. Keppler Regional Administrator J#C U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Consission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137
Subject:
Zion Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-295/86-001 and 50-304/86-001
Reference:
February 28, 1986 letter from W. D. Shafer to Cordell Reed.
Dear Mr. Keppler:
The referenced letter transmitted the results of a routine safety inspection conducted by M. T. Ploski and others of your office on January 28 and February 10-11, 1986, of activities at Zion Station. The report also identified two exercise weaknesses and requested a response.
Commonwealth Edison Company's response to these weaknesses are contained in the attachment to this letter.
If any questions concerning this matter arise, please direct them to this office.
Very tru
- yours, D.
. Farrar Director of Nuclear Licensing im Attachment g g
'Q cc: Zion Resident Inspector
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J. A. Norris - NRR 860425011k kOOOh95
{DR ADOC APR 141986 1541K PDR
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.o ATTACHMENT Weakness #1 The licensae failed to demonstrate the exercise objective of notifying the NRC Operations Center within one hour of the initial emergency classification.
(50-295/86001-01; 50-304/86001-01) (Paragraph 6.a)
Response
The missed ENS call resulted from poor communications between the Shift Engineer and the SCRE. A review of notification requirements and procedures will be conducted during the next scheduled operator requali-fication class. This review will be given to all Station Directors and Shift Supervisors.
Communications within the Control Room organization and documenting time /date of notifications shall be emphasized. This review will be completed by June 30, 1986.
Weakness #2 Excessive time was taken to declare the EOF fully operational and in command of emergency response activities.
(50-295/86001-02; 50-304/86001-02) (Paragraph 6.e)
Response
Discussion with the Environmental Emergency Coordinator (EEC) led to the following conclusion. The primary reasons for delay was concern for taking command during a time when conditions were changing rapidly..The EEC arrived at the EOF at 5:15 after an hour and a half drive. Having been out of contact with plant status during this period, the EEC was attempting to update and validate his information. The EEC learned from the Environmental Director in the Corporate Command Center of a potential need to upgrade protective actions on the NARS form. The EEC, who was not yet fully briefed on the offsite environmental status, decided to delay assuming command until the new NARS form had been issued. At about 6:00 p.m. when the EEC learned that there was no need for a new NARS, the EEC concurred with the Recovery Manager's request that the EOF assume command.
While Corporate Emergency Planning believes that the EEC's decision was justified, discussion with the EEC did indicate a lack of awareness of the philosophy behind minimum staffing.
This lack of understanding contributed to the delay.
A review of minimum staffing requirements will be conducted during the next revision to CSEP. In addition, a letter explaining the philosophy behind the current minimum staffing will be drafted and circulated to all CSEP directors and managers.
This letter will be mailed no later 1
than May 30, 1986.
1541K
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