ML20203F201
| ML20203F201 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/31/1984 |
| From: | Harrison G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Gilinsky V NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203F188 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8604250078 | |
| Download: ML20203F201 (3) | |
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.\ ' UNITED STATES
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'5i,fj NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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Melt 0RANDUM FOR: Comissioner Victor Gilinsky FROM: Gregory Harrison, Project Manager Licensing Branch f2 .
. Division of Licensing
SUBJECT:
DIFFERRING PROFESSIONAL OPINION " INTERPRETATIONS OF APPENDIX R" DATED MAY 2, 1984, EBERLY, et al.
In your speech before the College of Natural Science Alumni Association, Michigan State University, on April 9, 1981, you stated in part, the following:
" ...the revival of nuclear power's prospects now depends also on our ability to control accident risks both to people and to their pocket books, and to do it convincingly."
a " ...it seens obvious that the nuclear industry ought to pay more attention to safety..." ,
- "The nuclear power plant safety problem stems fundamentally from
- the lack of a healthy respect on the part of owners and regulators alike for the vulnerability of these machines."
- "There is for example, a sequel to the 1975 Browns Ferry fire.
1 That accident led NRC to conclude that fire protection systems were vital to nuclear safety. New fire protection requirements were issued. The Browns Ferry fire is said to have cost a billion dollars in plant danage, power replacement and the like. Yet this year NRC staff was obliged to propose a $50,000 fine as a result (of) TVA's failure to neet the basic requirements for fire pro-tection -- requirements drawn up in consequence of the devastating fire in that very plant. How is one to explain an attitude towards safety on the part of the plant supervisors that this reflects?"
...the public still depends on the nuclear regulators for protection...
that the NRC needs to be less defensive about doing its-job."
The context of the above remarks is not made explicit here and it does not have to be. Your remarks stand on their own quite well.
Now, I submit that the there is a sequel to the sequel of Browns Ferry, VI7., that:
I a. certain utilities have banded toget'her (Fire Protection Utility Group) post - Appendix R and sought to resist, delay and fudge the fire protection requirements 6604250078 851218 S-l PDR REVGP NRCF
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Commissioner Gilinsky ~
b.' additionally, these utilities have repeatedly tried to water-down the Appendix,R requirements and, eventually, these utilities gcined an audience with upper NRR management
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- c. orja resu)t has been the formation of " Interpretations of
-Appendix.R" which I now understand has acceptance by R. Vollmer, V. Stello# ELD, et. al.
- d. further, these interpretations aire against the specific
' recommendations by the NRR fire protection staff. In fact I understand that the staff fire protection engineers .
wgre not utilized in the formation of the " interpretations."
This is , incredible and illustrates a. flagrant disregard of fire safety by upper NRR management. Obviously, the NRC fire protection staff agrees because they issued the subject
- DP0 and it is signej by,no less than five NRC FPEs!
- e. D.C.Cooksimpi)chosethe"donoth'ing"alternativewhen faced with the requirenentt of Appendix R and a directive by DL to analyze their plant for confomance to sane, this plant was found to he in gross ' violation of Appendix R requirements
- f. Other operating plants to varying degrees have taken advantage of the fact that the Appendix R review process, in effect,
" rewards" those who do little, nothing, or simply keep
,j requesting exemption requests g, on the other hand, other plarts, e.g., Calvert Cliffs, .
understood Appendix R and implemented the requirements to '
i ( the staffs' satisfaction - why cannot the fire protection
. utility group grasp the problem? (Answer: they are using
. the shield for ambiguity and legal folie to stall)
Ittis almost a dedade since the Browns Ferry fire and we are still mired down in 'our own bureaucracy regarding Appendix R.. Appendix R was supposedly developed to expedite the fire protection review of operations plants and to close open issues which could n t 'oe resolved. Appendix R represents a boil down of the NRC position (s) en many fire protection issues and can be viewed as the "botten line." Why it it that we etnnot implement these sinple requirements and process exemption requests in a timely manner?
What should we do now? As stated in the subject DPO, we should proceed as we have been, e.g., review exenption requests and eventually followup each plant with an I&E audit inspection. Violations should be dealt with on a case-sy,-case basis and, when appropriate, substantial (six digits) fines shouli De' levied. I have one suggestion however, and that is to have "the Comission:
-charge th.e CMEB staff to identify, as we did with D.C. Cook, ten
, operating plants most licely to have a deficient fire protection program and/or flawed enoption requests - this effort can be done
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in one af ternoon meeting of " brain stoming by Ferguson, et al.
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Commissioner Gilinsky -
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-direct CMEB to transmit these results, without a written basis and without NRR concurrence, to the Conmission by June 8, 1984
-then direct I&E to audit these plants to the requirements of Appendix R using, in part, NRR fire protection engineers and ASB engineers; this effort could be completed by September 15, 1984
-direct I&E to prepare for the Commission a brief and concise summary report on the findings with the objective of making it explicit as to how these plants stacked up aganist Appendix R
-direct I&E to aggressively followup deficiencies in a manner similar to that of D.C. Cook The above actions can be undertaken with the spirit of an audit. Also, because of the weight of the evidence befora us now, e.g., D.C. Cook et al.,
Browns Ferry fine, the subject DP0, etc., we do not have to be defensive. In other words, let's look at the bottom of the barrel now. I urge you to support the thurst of the subject DP0 and, further, to inspire the Commission to take actions such that an attitude adjustment is effected on those utilities that are still resisting our fire safety requirements. Finally, I urge'the Commission to consider surgically removing the fire protection section from CHEB/DE and to transplant it within DSI. _
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Gregory A. Harrison, P.E.
Fire Protection Engineer cc:
j Commissioner Palladino R. Eberly Ccamissioner Roberts D. Kubicki Comnissioner Aseistine J. Stang Ccnnissioner Bernthal C. Ramsey W. Dircks J. Ulie V.'Stello T. Wambach H. Denton S. Trubatch E. Case W. Shields R. Mattson V. Benaroya R. Ferguson L. Rubenstern D. Eisenhut F. Rosa R. Vollmer J. Conrad
- L. Rubenstein
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