ML20203D541

Brief of Atty General Fx Bellotti in Support of Admitting Contention Re Emergency Planning for New Hampshire Beach Communities

ML20203D541
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	04/16/1986
From:	Sneider C MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF
To:	Harbour J, Hoyt H, Luebke E Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#286-867 OL, NUDOCS 8604220182
Download: ML20203D541 (48)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00tghD

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIOri *s s

g7 RPR21 Before Administrative Judges: 0 *49 Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson (Ih',6f Emmeth A. Luecke

• Jerry Harbour  !

)

In the Matter of )

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEli

)

) Docket !1os .

(0-YYS H AMP S!!I RE , ET AL. ) 50-4y3/444-OL [jl (Seaorook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) (Off-Site EP)

) April 16, 1986 df,,

)

BRIEF OF A TTORNE Y G ENERAL FRA!!CI S X . BELLOTTI I!!

SUPPORT OF ADMITTING HIS COdTSNTION RELATIVE TO EMERGi'llCY PLAtJN I!!G FOR Tl!E t!Eli HAMPSHIRE BEACTI COMMUf!ITIES On February 21, 1)86, Attorney General Francis X. 3ellotti suomitted a single centention in this proceeding [ attached hereto us "Exhibi t A" ] relating to the emergency plans for the coastal New Hampshire communities within the Seabrook Emergency Planni ng Zone. That contention states :

The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, :iampton , Nor th flampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency a t the Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1), because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within those connu nities cannot under many plausicle meteorological conditions be protected by means l

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of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communities.

On March 5, 1986, the Applicants filed a response to Attorney General Sellotti's contention seeking to exclude it from this proceeding. See Applicants' Response to Off-Site EP Contentions submi tted oy Massacnusetts Attorney General, dated March 5, 1986 [ hereinaf ter " Applicants ' Response"]. On March 14, 1986, the Staf f filed a response seeking to limit Attorney General Bellotti's contention. See NRC Staff's Response to Contentions Filed by State of Massachusetts Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti, dated March 14, 1986.

Attorney General Bellotti hereby files this brief in support of ad.ai tt ing his con tent ion .1!

I. The Contention States a Violation of a Regulatory Standard wi th deasonaole S peci ficity.

The Commission regulations which f orm the basis for Attorney General Bellotti's contention are 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(a)(1) and 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10). Regulation 50.47(a)(1) provides, in relevant part , that "no operating 1/ On March 24, 1986, the Attorney General filed a written Answer to the Sta f f's , Applicants ' and State of Mew Hampshire 's Responses to his contention. See Answer of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti to the Staff's, Applicants' and State of New Hampshire's Responses to His Contention Relative to Emergency Planning fo r the New Hampshire Beach Communities '

dated March 24, 1986 [hereinaf ter " Answer of Attocney General Bellotti"). This brief, requested by the Licensing Board at the pre-hearing conference on March 26, 1986, is intended as a supplement to tha t Answer.

License for a nuclear power reactor will be issued unless a finding is made by NRC that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1),

negu la tion 50.4 7 ( b ) (10 ) requires for a license to issue that

"[a} range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure patnway EPZ for emergency workers and the public

[and that] [g]uidelines for the choice of protective actions dur ing an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are leveloped and in place . . ." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10).

The regulatory standards for emergency plans set forth at 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) can only be viewed in conjunction with the ultima te standard o f 10 C. F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) "that there be reasonaole assurance that adequate protective measures can and will oe taken." See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1) ALAB-819-22, NRC 651, 676-77 (1985) (Although Appeal Board agrees that an evacuation can be accomplisned without t ra f fic managemen t and, further, that there is no requi rement in the regulations for traffic control nor any requirement that an evacuation be accomplished within any specified amount of time, the Board nonetheless finds that the emergency plans must still satisfy the reasonable assurance of adequate protection standard set forth at 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(a)(1) and that Lilco's evacuation plans do not.);

Commonwealth Edison Co. (Byron Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 3-

and 2), LBP-84-2, 19 MRC 36, 252-3 (1994) ("The (applicable]

law is drawn f rom the general standards in 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b) dnd the more specific evaluati0n Criteria of NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, . . . . But there is one rule which applies to all the (emergency planning issues ] . . .  : No operating license will be issued unless 'there is reasonable assurance that adequate pro tective measures can and aill be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. ' 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a)(1).");

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York (Indian Point, Units ? and

3) LBP-83-68, 18 NRC 311, 939 (1983) ("The adequacy of the roads can only be judged by deter.nining whether or not there is reasonaole assura nce tha t adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).").

Thus, the mere f act that an emergency plan provides f or a range of protective responses in satisf action of the super ficial requi rements o f 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10) does not necessarily mean that the range of protective respoqses would be sufficient to satisfy the adequate protection standard of Section 50.47(a)(1). See, e.g., Long Island Lighting Co.,

supra. What the Commission's regulations require, then, is not just the provision of a range of protective responses, but a range of protective responses which will provide " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken . . .

. C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) (emphasis added).

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Applicants , thus , miss the point when they claim our contention should oe excluded because there is "no NRC requirement that any parti cular level of safety be demonstrated, either in general or given any particular accident scenario. " See Applicants ' Response at 15. While it is true that there is no requirement that evacuations be completed within any set amount of time and also true that there is no particularized level of protection which must be I

af forded by evacuation, or by any other protective response, there is still a standard -- requiring reasonable assurance o f

" adequate" protection -- that must be met. I f the Applicants '

view of the Commission standards were taken literally that would mean tnat the conmission's regulations could always be satisfied simply by having an evacuation plan in place, regardless of the eff ectiveness of such plan.2/ According to this reading of the regulations, the Commission's s tandards would be net even in a case where it could be shown that the response of evacuation could never wor k , that is never protect 1

people from radia tion injury. Yet the very term " protective I response" means a response which will " cover or shield from injury or destruction." See Webster's Seventh New 2/ Licensing Boards, however, have consistently looked to the ef fectiveness of an evacuation response in assessing the adequacy of emergency response plans. See e.g., Long taland Li gn ti ng Co . , supra, 22 URC at 676-77; Consolidated Edison Co.,

supra, 18 URC at 989-90; The Detroit Edison Co. (Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Uni t 2), LBP-82-96, 16 NRC 1408, 1422-29 (1982).

Collegiate Dictionary 68 5 (1965). Thus, inherent in the very requirement of protective responses is a requirement that there be some adequate level of safety afforded by that response. To say otherwise would be to disregard the plain neaning of the Commis sion 's regu lati ons . Cf. Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144, 1149 ( D.C. Cir. 1935).

Moreover, it simply does not follow f rom the f act that ther e is no specified amount of time within which an evacuation must ce accomplished, that there is no standard of protection snich must be provided by the proposed emergency response actions. What does follow is that one cannot look at any one particular protective response and require that it, alone, provide a certain level of protection. Rather, one must look i at tha range of protective responses provided in an emergency l plan to determine whether, together, they provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. Thus, repeatedly, when f aced with the issue of whether d particular protective response, such as evacuation, is adequate licensing boards have only been able to answer by determining whether there is another protective response, such as sheltering, which would provide adequate protection in those instances when the evacuation response would not. E.g.,

Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 URC at 990-91 (1983);

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Unitt 2 and 3) LBP-82-39, 15 NRC 1163, 1184-86 (1982);

Kansas Gas & Elec tri c Co . (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), L3P-84-26, 20 NRC 53, 90 (1984).1!

Thus, it is clear, that Attorney General Bellotti's conten tion which asse rts , in essence, that the " range" of

' protective responses provided in the New Hampshire pland/

cannot, under many plausible meteorological conditions, prevent thousands of beachgoers f rom even early death, and hence does J

not provide the requisite reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken for the summer beach population near Seabrook, asserts a violation of a regulatory basis with reasonaole specificity and is therefore admissible.

The NRC Staff nonetheless seeks to limit the admission of the Attorney General's contention to the extent it seeks to litigate:

(a) the dose consequences of radiological accidents or of any specific accident sequences (including the " site-specific accident consequence analysis" referred to in the 3/ It is in large part for this reason, that protective responses must be viewed together in order to determine their adequacy, that Attorney General Bellot ti objects to the Sta f f 's attempt to limit its contention to the sole issue of whether there exist adequate sheltering for the beach population. The adequacy of sheltering cannot be viewed in a vacuum, but can l only be determined when viewed in context with the other protective response options provided in the New Hanpshire plans.

4/ In fact, as our contention and its bases point out, insofar as the transient beach population is concerned, the New i Hampshire Plan does not provide a " range" of protective responses at all; it provides only one protective response --

evacuation. And evacuation, our contention asserts, will not under many circumstances provide adequate protection.

contention's " oasis"; (b) the assertion that emergency planning must assure any particular level of dose protection for the general public; or (c) accident sequences contai ned in the Applicants' pro babilisti c safety assessment .

Staff's aesponse at 2. Yet as the Attorney General has stated previously, fear that cer tain evidence or argunents might be proffered in support of a contention is not a proper basis for limi ting the admi ssibilit y of a contention. The only relevan t issue at this point in these proceedings is whether our contention states a violation of a regulatory basis, and this it clearly does. Tne issue of what evidence may be introduced is J us t not relevant at tnis stage. Moreover, the fact that the Commission has not seen fit t,o f u r the r de f i ne t he t er m "adequa te protect ion" by es taolishing "a threshold number of unacceptable deaths or injuries," see Sta f f 's Response at 4, does not mean tha t a contention cnallengirig the level of protection accorded in a given instance is inadmissible or that the Board should be able to limit the type o f evidence admissible on this point. It means, rather, that any such contention is,admissiole, and it is then up to the Board to determine the adequacy of the protective reponse based on all the relevant evidence of f ered on that issue.

Moreover, the fact that the Commis sion has failed to quantify or further define what constitutes " adequate" protection can only be viewed as a reflection of the fact that this cannot be done on a generic basis . Rather, contrary to

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the Staff 's asser tion , it is only by engaging in site-specifi c analysis that one can determine the adequacy of a specific emergency plan. As one licensing board so aptly noted:

[ M]any aspects of emergency plans . . . are of their very nature site specific. We doubt whether toe Commission could prescribe, by rule, a generic emer gency plan suitable for all reactor sites, as the Staf f's argument seems to suggest. In any event, the Commission did not try to do that, . . . . E xcep t for the specific 10 mile EPZ, the rule speaks in general terms, such as "ade Juate" emergency f acilities, equipment, net hods , s ys tems . S 50.47(b)(3),

(9). A Board can only judge "a dequacy" with respect to levels of risk , some of which vary from site to site.

Southern California Edison company (San Onof re Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-81-36, 14 NRC 691, 698-99 (1981).

It would siuply not be reasonable for the Commission to set a precise level o f dose wa ich , in order for a plant to becone l licensed, no one could ever receive under any circumstance.

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! And Attorney General Bello tti does not contend that any plan wherein some people might under some circumstances receive deatn-level doses would be inadequate. Under that standard, it is doubtful that any nuclear power plan could ever be licensed. What the Commission's regulations do require, then, is that any determination of adequacy be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus the Commission has left it up to the licensing ooards, when presented with evidence of inadequacy, to weigh all the relevant evidence, including levels of doses, numbers 6 6

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of people who might be af fected by those doses, and the probabilities of such accidents occurr ing, in order that they may properly assess whether a plan provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken. See, e.g., The Detroi t Edison Co., supra, 16 NRC at 1424-29; Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-83-8D, 17 NRC 306, 310 (1982); consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989-90.

The Staf f seems to argue, however, that any litigation involving site-specific consequence analyses is inappropriate simply because NUREG-0654 provides tha t "[nlo single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan . . .". See Sta ff 's Response at 3.1/ Although the Staff is correct tnat emergency plans should not be developed with one specific or worst-case accident in mind, the Commission's regulations do require, as noted oy the Staf f,

. :_._ emergency plans "have the flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents." sta tement of Consideration,

" Emergency Planni ng , " 15 Fed. Reg. 55402 (August 19, 1980).

5/ The Applicants' argument, that our contention should be excluded for the mere reason that i f we were to present evidence on site-specific consequences they would present evidence contrary to ours, see Applicants ' Response at 15-16, is absurd. The very purpose of an evidentiary hearing is for presentation of evidence on both sides of an issue so that the true facts may come to light. That the Applicants may have evidencei to counter ours is certainly no basis for excluding l our contention. Cf. Texas Utilities Generating Co. (Comanche '

Peak Stream Elec. Sta., Units 1 and 2) LBP-82-87, 16 NRC 1195, 1199 (1982) ("[The Board] has the righ t and duty to develop a full record for decision-making in the public interest.") .

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And, if a contention asserts, as does the Attorney General's, that with respect to a portion of that planning spectrum, the plans provide virtually no assurance that for large numbers of people adequate protective measures can and will be taken, that is something the Board must look at in determining the adequacy of that emergency plan. See, e.g., Philadelphia Electric Co.

(Limerick Conerating Station, Units 1 and 2) ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681, 713 (1985); Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 989.

The Attorney General, as part of the bases for his contention, has presented evidence that the evacuation response provided in the New Hampshire plans will, under typical meteorological conditions, subject thousands of beachgoers to doses which can lead to death in a matter of days. It is Attorney General Bellotti's contention that an emergency plan I which relies solely on evacuation and sheltering as the two possible protective options, which cannot at present prevent as l many as fifteen thousand beachgoers from being exposed to early death doses by means of evacuation even under typical meteorological conditions, and which contains no plans or provisions for sheltering the beach population, does not provide adequate protection for that population.

In light of such evidence, the Board must do more than just simply assess whether an evacuation or sheltering plan is in place, or whether all the superficial requirements of 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(b) have been met, for it to determine the adequacy of 11 -

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the New Hampshire plans. See, e.g., Southern California Edison Co., supra, 14 NRC at 699 (" Licensing Boards are required to make an overall general finding of ' reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.' S 50.47(a). Such a finding goes beyond a check-list determination of whether a plan meets the Although it may be the case standards of 10 C.F.R. 50.47.").

that in a typical licensing proceeding, it would be unnecessary to look at dose consequences of particular accidents to determine the adequacy of protective responses, Attorney 4

j General Bellotti intends to introduce evidence in support of his contention (some of which has already been set forth in the basis for his contention) which will show that, primarily due to the large summer beach population which exists within close proximity to the Seabrook plant, the situation for the Seabrook nuclear power plant is unique; that emergency response measures which might be perfectly adequate to protect the populations surrounding the average power-plant are simply not adequate to The Board, protect the summer beach population near Seabrook.

then, has an obligation when confronted with this important l ..

safety issue to look beyond the mere fact of an evacuation  !

l plan, and to examine all the relevant evidence on this issue if it is ever to properly assess whether this New Hampshire i

' emergency response plan does in fact provide " reasonable

! assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be i

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taken." 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1) (emphasis added). Cf.,

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), CL1-84-811, 20 NRC 1, 9 (1984).5!

II. Attorney General Bellotti's Contention Relative to the Summer Beach Population Raises an Important Issue of Emergency Planning that is Properly before this Licensing Board.

Applicants proffer as their prime argument for excluding Attorney General Bellotti's contention from this proceeding

- that the Attorney General's contention is not properly before this Board now because the issue of whether the beach population can be adequately protected is really an issue to be litigated at the siting, not the emergency planning, stage.

I The Applicants are simply wrong on this score. The issues raised by Attorney General Bellotti's contention are indeed emergency planning issues properly before this Board. See SAPL

v. NRC, 690 F.2d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 1980).

The Applicants received their construction permit to build the plant at Seabrook in 1976, well before the accident at Three Mile Island and well before the Commission's emergency 6/ If indeed the Board perceives this as a situation involving a " regulatory gap," then the unique safety issues presented by this case should warrant sufficient concern for the Board to

! nevertheless admit this contention for hearing. Cf., Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

4 LBP-82-106, 16 NRC 1649, 1655 (1982); Duke Power Co. (Catawba Nuclear Sta.) Units 1 and 2, LBP-82-16, 16 NRC 1937, 1946 (1982).

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l planning regulations , requiring evacuation planning for the area within ten miles around a nuclear power plant, were in ef fect or even contemplated. Nevertheless, the Attorney General did seek to have heard at that stage in the proceeding the issue of unether the beach population near Seabrook could feasioly be evacuated in the event of an emergency. See Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2),

ALAB-390, 5 NRC 733 (1977). The Atomi c Safety and Licensing Appeal Board deci ded , however , that although thare was a sizable beach population as close as 1.6 miles to the proposed plant, there was no need to determine the feasibility of safely evacuating that population since it was outside the LPZ. Id.;

Public Service Company o f New Hampshir e (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977); a f f 'd NECNP v . NRC, 582 F.2d 87 (1st Cir. 1973). Af ter the Commission's new emergency planning regulations went into effect, Attorney General Bellotti joined Seacoast Anti-Pollution League in seeking to again have heard the issue of the feasibility of evacuating the summer beach population. See Public Service Co.

of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), DD-91-14, 14 NRC 27 9 (1981) . In that case, the Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation decided that based on current information it was not infeasible to develop an emergency plan f or the area surrounding Seabr ook , and that continuation o f the plant 's construction did not pose such an imminent threat as to warrant the extraordinary measure of suspending the construction permit. Id. at 285-86. Nevertheless the Director emphasized that "this decision does not presume to decide the adequacy of

emergency preparedness f or the Seabrook Station," idl. at 285, ,

i and "that in order to recaive an operating license, the applicant must do all things necessary to ensure safe operations of the facility." Id. at 286 (emphasis added). See also SAPL v. NRC, supra.

Yet, the Applicants seek to exclude our contention from this proceeding, arguing, in effect, that just because they were able to satisfy all the Commission's criteria for a >

cons truction permit in 1976, that they have some automatic right, ten years later, to receive an operating license regardless of their ability to satisfy all the standards imposed by the Commission's emergency planning regulations.

?

See Applicants ' Response a t 16. This is simply not the case.

See Power Reactor v. Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 411 (1960).

Inherent in the Commission's two-stage licensing process is

the concept tnat the Commission's regulations and safety

standards are not static. There can be no guarantee in this rapidly developing field of nuclear sa fety .that a proposed nuclear power plant , able to satisfy all the criteria for issuance of a construction permit, will later be able to satisf y all the newly imposed safety standards for issuance of an operating license. See, e.g., Power Reactor, supra. ,

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Indeed, even once an operating license is issued, the process does not stop and the Commission may revoke the license of any plant unable to satisfy new safety or emergency planning standards. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. (Indian Point Units No. 2 and No. 3), C LI -8 3 -16 , 17 NRC 1006 (1983). Thus, regardless of the f act that the Seabrook plant in 1976 satisfied all the siting criteria necessary to receive a construction permit, it must still satisfy all the commission 's emergency planning standards before it can receive its license to operate. See, e.g., Public Service Co. o f New Hampshire, supra, 14 NRC at 279.

Furthermore, Attorney General Bellotti does not contend herein that no energency plan could ever be devised for the Seaorook plant which would satisfy the Commission's standards.

What tae Attorney General does contend is that the current New Hampshire plan does not satisfy those standards. The Applicants are incorrect, however, when they say that all the Commission ever requires by way of emergency planning is to do the best possible with the facilities a t hand. See Applicants '

Response at 2. With respect to certain other of the Commission's emergency planning regulations applicants have certainly recognized that they would have to do more than simply the best w i t h wha t is at hand. 'ience, the Applicants have erected sirens throughout the EPZ to satisfy the noti fication standards o f Regulation 50.57(b)(5 ), and have installed elaborate equipuent, bought supplies, and even built f acilities to satisfy the emergency f acility and resource requir ements of Regulations 50. 4 7 (b ) ( 6 ) , ( 8 ) , (9) and (11).

Thus it is that licensing boards in considering the adequacy of emergency response measures, when conf ronted with the possibility that adequate protection may not be feasible at a particular site, have in fact considered the necessity of requiring what the Applicant would term " extraordinary measures." See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co., supra, 18 NRC at 991 (Board considers the necessity of widening roads);

Consumer Powers Co. ( Bi g Rock Point Piant), LBP-94-32, 20 NRC 601, 695-96 (1984) (Board requires Applicant to consider remedies, including new roads and road improvements, to alleviate problem of serious traffic congestion from occasional summer rock concerts. ); The Detroit Edison Co., supra, 16 NRC at 1428 (Board considers, and rejects as unjustified under the ci rc ums tances , the building of a new evacuation route for a

- small portion of the population near the plant); Consumers Power Co. (Big Rock Point Plant), LBP-82-77-16 NRC 1096, 1100 (1982) (If no means for relocating the public transit-dependent portion of the popula tion exists, then Applicant may need to supply the resources "out of i ts own pocket . ") .

While Attorney General Bellotti is not suggesting that

" extraordinary measures" will necessarily be required at the Seabrook site, the Attcrney General does contend that whatever

is necessary to satisfy the Commission's standards of reasonable assurance of adequate protection must be met before this plant can ever receive its license to operate. The safety of the beach population cannot be ignored. If this means, as the Applicants sugges t , that this plant may never receive a license to operate because, being sited so close to populous beaches, the Cou.aission's emergency planning standards could never be satisfied, see Applicants' Response at 16, then that must be the case. Under the present emergency response plans there is no reasonable assurance that the summer beach population can be adequately protected, and i f it requires, then, that the Applicants must take some " extraordinary measures" to achieve that requisite assurance of adequate protection, then the Applicants must take those necessary

ae as u re s . There can be no basis , however , for excluding Attorney General Bellotti's contention from this proceeding for the reason Applicants posit, that i f the facts supporting his contention are proven true extraordinary measures might be required to provide reasonaole assurance of adequate protection.

CONCLUSION For all the foregoing reasons, the contention of Attorney General Francis X. Be llo t t i should be admitted to this proceeding.

Respectf u lly submi tted, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI By: b Carol S.

Sneider Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division Department of the Attorney General One Ashburton Place, Room 190 2 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 Da ted : April 16, 1936

& il A

EAh t UN!!ED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSI0tl ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSIt:G SOARD Before Administrative Judges:

Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson E neth A. Luecke Jerry Harcour

)

In the Matter of ) Docket t:os . 50-443-OL

) 50-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF )

NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al. ) ~~

(Seabrook' Station, Units 1 )

and 2) ) February 21, 1986

)

CONTE:: TION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLANNI!G FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH COMMUNITIES By order dated January 17, 1986, tne Board providea all parties an opportunity to file new contentiens on recraftec emergency plans suomittec to FEMA cy the Sta 2 of New Hampsnire. We have reviewed the new plans an: find that they in no way address or alleviate ene concerns snich pronptec our earlier contention (a copy or whien ts attacned nereto as Exhibit A) regarding the adequacy of emergency planning for Massachusetts citizens present in tne ::ew Hangsnire beach communities within the EPZ at the time of an energency. Tnus,

1

{ the new plans continue to rely on evacuation and sheltering as the two possible protective actions in the event of a serious 4

accident. -See N.H. RERp, at 2.6-5. However, the plans have in no way developed the option of sheltering for ene-beach populations despite the severe limitations, discussed in Exhibit A hereto,..on evacuation as a protective response for those persons.1/

) While the Board's Order did not appear to require this we are, in an excess of caution, hereby refiling our earlier

contention. Developments since our earlier filing provide j additional bases for our contention and will be thoroughly I addressed in our testimony. For example, the Applicants' own Probabilistic Safety Assessment contains release sequences 1

j which~ support the need for adcitional proteettve measures for the beach area populations. Anc, as FEMA personnel have 1/ The New Hampshire plan is hopelessly confusing on the question of sheltering for the beach populations, indicating on the one hand that "[s]heitering may not be consicered as a '

protective action on the seacoast beaches daring the summer

• and on the other hand that "[t]ransients witnout if possible, to seek access to suitable shelters will be directec directions to a nearby puolic builcing from 'ocal emergency .

workers." See N.H. RERP, at 2.6-8. Suffice it to say it i remains the case, as we stated in the bases far our contention,  :

l that

]

Neither the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response plan nor the local community plans contain any analysis of available public sheltering, or its i capacity to accomodate tne beach populations or to

- provide sheltering from radionuclides, or any plans for effecting such sheltering. In snort, there is at ,

present no basis for (and has not been) any development of sheltering as a potential protective action for the beach population.

l Exhibit A, at 12-13.

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determined, the revised New Hampshire plans fall to demonstrate that the New Hampshire Ep2 communities have sufficient personnel and resources (including communications equipment) to implement the plans / or that certain of the communities (including Ryed! and Hampton,5! two of the coastal towns) even intend to implement the plans. See Exhibit C hereto, a document prepared by FEMA personnel in response to these latest New Hampshire plans anc entitled " planning Milestones.")b In short, there continues to be no " reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken" to protect Massachusetts citizens on New Hampshire beaches at the time of an accident, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a)(1).

2/ The plans contain no letters of agreement assuring the provision of necessary resoarces.

3/ According to pleacings filec witn this 5;ard by the Town of Rye, that Town has not even reviewed the plan submitted for it by the State or New Hampshire and is not committec at this time to implementing any such plan. For these reasons the Town of Rye has informec FEMA that it will not participate in an upcoming exercise of the plans anc has thus far refused to authorize the installation of strens necessati to alert the public, and particularly the beacn population, in the event of an accident.

4/ On October 29, 1965, the Hampton Boarc ot Selectmen wrote Governor Sununu (see Exhibit B hereto) indicating, inter alla, that all Town departments lack sufficient manpower to implement tne plan.

5/ FEMA notes the need for contingency plans from the Etate of New Hampshire to cover any communities where the local governments are not connitted to implementing plans and specifically criticizes tne plans for their tallure to addcess the beach populations.

For this reason we respectfully urge the Board's acceptance of our prior Contention attacned hereto as Exhibit A.

Respectfully submitted, ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI By: r, n4,j Jo Ann Snotwell ,/ '

Asjistant Attorney General Entffoncental Protection Division Departcent of the Attorney General One Ashourton Place, Room 1902 Boston, MA 02108 (617) 727-2265 DATED: February 21, 1986

_ 4 -

EXHIBIT "A" UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING SOARD Sefore Administrative Judges:

Helen F. Hoyt, Chairperson Emmeth A. Luebke Jerry Harbour

)

In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL

) 50-444-OL

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, et -al. )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 )

September 9, 1983 and 2) )

)

2 CONTENTION OF ATTORNEY GENERAL FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI RELATIVE TO EMERGENCY PLANNING FOR THE NEW HAMPSHIRE BEACH COMMUNITIES On August 23, 1983, the Board ordered that contentions relating to off-site emerg.ency planning for any or all of the fifteen New Hampshire communities for whica draft emergency plans were recently submitted 1! ce filed on or before this date. In accordance with that order, Attorney General Bellotti hereby submits a single contention which relates to off-site 1/ The fifteen communities are Hampton, Newton, Rye, Stratham, Exeter, New Castle, North Hampton, Seabrook, Brentwood, Kensington, Newfields, Portsmouth, South Hampton, East Kingston, and Kingston.

emergency action in the coastal beach areas of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye which are frequented by Massachusetts citizens.

CONTENTION:

The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. 550.47(a)(1),

because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within those communities cannot under many plausible meteorological conditions be protected by means of evacuation even from early death and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the ceach area transients within those communities.

SASES:

The draft emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye all rely on evacuation and sheltering as the two options for protecting persons present in those communities at the time of a radiological emergency at Seabrook Station which results in a See, radiological release to areas within those communities.

e.g., Seabrook Plan, at II-I6 - II-IB; Rye Plan, at II-I6 -

II-I8; North Hampton Plan, at II-I7 - II-20; and Hampton Plan,

3-at II-I7 - II-20.

However, a preliminary site-specific accident consequence analysis performed for the Massachusetts Attorney General has revealed that, given the unusual circumstances associated with dense beach populations, evacuation cannot protect the transient beach area populations in the vicinity of the Seabrook site from early death in the event of a PWR 2 release as defined in the NRC's Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400) on a summer weekend.

A Seabrook-specific accident consequence analysis is being performed for the Department of the Attorney General by Dr. Jan Beyea, a nuclear physicist with extensive experience in accident consequence modelling and analysis. (A copy of Dr.

Beyea's' resume is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated herein by reference.) Dr. Beyea has advised the Department that there are unique considerations involved in the modelling and analysis of accident consequences for a site such as Seabrook having a large summer beach area population which have never before been taken into account in generic or site-specific consequence studies. In addition to the obvious effects on accident consequences of the increased population and evacuation times associated with summer beach areas and the absence of shielding normally provided by ouildings, there are increased consequences due to material deposited directly on the skin and hair of beachgoers and on vehicles in the plume.

The former factor has received no consideration in accident

-4 -

consequence analyses in the past and the latter has received inadequate consideration.

In the work which Dr. Beyea and his assistant Brian Palenik, a graduate student at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have performed for this Department to date they have investigated the conditions under which the nearest beach population to this site, at about two miles, might be exposed to doses at a threshold level for early death (200 rem) in the event of A PWR 2 release as defined in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). Estimates of the time within which that population would receive a 200 rem dote have been calculated for various weather stability classes and wind speeds using two sets of assumptions. The first set assumes that all persons are inside automobiles when the release occurs and receive only a fraction of the doses they would receive if they were in the open, exposed directly to a plane of contaminated ground.

These results have been calculated using the assumptions which have heretofore been considered standard in accident consequence calculations. The second set of results goes beyond the standard assumptions, to account specifically for the Seabrook beach situation. Those results assume that some of the population will not have reached -heir vehicles before plume passage such that there will be a " skin deposition dose" and a " car deposition dose." For each of the two sets of results calculations have been performed separately for high

This division was necessary and low energy release rates.

given the large uncertainty in the height to which the radioactive plume will rise, a factor which is affected by energy release rates and which is an important determinant of the doses to a nearby population.

Tables 1 and 2, which follow hereafter, contain the results of Dr. Beyea's modelling and analysis as described above. The entries in the last column of each table result from a comparison between the time required to reach a 200 rem dose and current estimates of the time required to evacuate the population within two miles on a summer weekend. See Table 3.

The data set forth in these tables reveal that the summer weekend beach population within two miles of the Seab' rook site cannot be protected from early death by eans of evacuation under many weather conditions.

It should be noted that neither precipitation nor slow wind forth in Tables speeds have been considered in the analyses set 1 and 2. Both such conditions are more severe than those represented in the tables. The frequencies of tne Pasquill stability classes reflected in Tables 1 and 2 ari reported in the Applicants' ER-OL are given in Table 4. The frequencies of the A, B, and C stability classes increase during the summer months, with C the most frequent of the three. D and E are the dominant stability classes. The results discussed herein are not, therefore, based on infrequently occurring or worst-case weather conditions.

TABLE 1 PROTECTION OF CLOSEST BEACH POPULATIONa)

FROM EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER WEEKEND DAY DI HIGH ENERGY RELEASE RATE Dose Staoility c) Wind Speed scaling d) Time to Reach Protection *I (m/sec) Factor 200 rem of Populatior Class A 2 .53 .73 14.5-20.9 Yes A 2 1.0-1.3 9.0-11.5 Yes

.53 .78 )> 2 4 Yes A 4 A 4 1.0-1.3 19.2-25.0 Yes

.53 .78 4.6-6.4 No 3 2 1.0-1.3 3.2-3.8 No a 2

.53 .73 12.2-17.8 Yes a 4 1.0-1.3 7.6-9.6 Yes 3 4 2.6-3.4 No C 2 .53 .78 1.9-2.2 No C 2 1.0-1.3

.53 .73 3-11.5 Yes C 4 5.1-6.4 No C 4 1.0-1.3

.'53 .73 Yes D 2 )> 2 4 1.0-1.3 Yes D 2 )) 24

.53 .73 6.5-9.2 Yes D 4 4.2-5.3 No D 4 1.0-1.3 a) The population two miles from tne plant, 6 Stu/ hour, b) Assumes an energy release rate of 176 x 10 c) Pasquill staoility class.

d) The dose scaling factor range of .53 .78 assumes an individual is in a car within ene plume. The dose scaling factor range of 1.0-1.3 assumes an individual is in a car witnin ene plume, witn a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on the individual .

4 e) Protection of the population from a 200 rem dose or higher. This If the assumes an evacuation time of about five and a half hours.

evacuation time is longer, tne population is not necessarily protected.

TABLE 2 PROTECTION OF CLOSEST BEACH POPULATION"I FROM EARLY DEATH ON A SUMMER WEEKEND DAY D)

LOW ENERGY RELEASE RATE Dose Scaling d) Protection C)

Stability c) Wind Speed Time to Reach Factor 200 rem of Population Class (m/sec)

.53 .78 13.8-19.9 Yes A 2 1.0-1.3 8.6-10.9 Yes A 2 Yes A 4 .53 .78 )24 1.0-l.3 18.4-23.7 Yes A 4 No a 2 .53 .78 3.7-4.9 2.5-3.0 No a 2 1.0-1.3

.53 .78 9.9-14.2 Yes a 4 1.0-1.3 6.2-7.8 Yes 3 4 ZL1 No C 2 .53 .78 No C 2 1.0-1.3 <[1 No C 4 .53 .78 1.7-2.2 1.3-1.5 No C 4 1.0-1.3 3 2 .53 .73 <[ l No.

No D 2 1.0-1.3 (1

(,1 No D 4 .53 .78 No D 4 1.0-1.3 <[ 1 a) The population two miles from the plant. 6 Btu / hour, or an b) Assumes an energy release rate of 20 x 10 equivalently low plume for reasons unrelated to the energy release rate.

c) Pasquill stacility class.

d) The dose scaling factor The range .53 .78 assumes an individual is in a of scaling car within the plume. dose factor range of 1.0-1.3 assumes an individual is in a car within the plume, with a dose component from radioactive material deposited on the car and directly on theThis individual.

e) Protection of the population from a 200 rem dose or higher. If the assumes an evacuation time of about five and a half hours.

evacuation time is longer, the population is not necessarily protected.

i

TABLE 3 SEABROOK EVACUATION CLEAR TIME ESTIMATES ^I SUMMER WEEKEND / FAIR WEATHER SCENARIO Radius Degrees HMMb ) Vorheesc ) Maguired) NRC*I 0-2 360* 4:50 5:10 5:40 ---

0-3 180* E 5:20 --- --- ---

0-5 360* 5:50 5:10-5:40 --- ---

0-10 350' 6:05 5:10-6:10 5:50 11:25 a) Time (hours: minutes) for the population to clear the indicated area after notification.

b) Preliminary Evacuation Clear Time Estimates for Areas Near Seabrook Station, HMM Document No. C-80-024A, HMM Associates, Inc., May 20, 1980.

I c) Final Report, Estimate of Evacuation Times, Alan M. Vorhees & Associates,l July 1980.

~-

)

d) Emergency Planning Zone Evacuation Clear Time Estimates, C.E. Maguire, Inc., February 1983.

e) An Independent Assessment of Evacuation Time Estimates for a Peak Population Scenario in the Emergency Planning Pacific Zone of Northwest the Seabrook Laboratory Nuclear Power Station, M.P. Mueller, et al.,

NUREG/CR-2903, PNL-4290.

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l

TABLE 4 FREQUENCY OF PASQUILL STABILITY CLASSES AT SEABROOK a)

(Values in % of Time) 3 C D E F G Month A 1.27 3.80 49.65 29.40 7.88 5.91 Apr 1979 2.11 1.20 2.86 4.82 52.86 26.51 5.27 6.48

tay 2.92 6.69 12.26 39.83 25.49 6.13 6.69 June 11.56 29.12 28.84 12.65 5.99 July 4.90 6.94 2.91 4.71 9.97 43.07 26.59 7.34 5.40 Aug 11.81 30.69 27.36 10.33 10.42 Sep 1.25 7.64 0.81 2.96 5.79 39.30 34.05 10.09 7.00 Oct 4.76 43.92 34.83 9.37 6.57 Nov 0.00 0.56 2.70 47.03 41.35 5.81 2.70 Dec 0.00 0.41 1.88 6.59 51.88 30.38 5.78 3.36 Jan 1980 0.13 2.03 5.37 50.36 34.69 5.66 1.45 Feo 0.44 1.64 5.34 43.15 24.66 6.03 8.49 Mar 10.68 3.37 7.08 43.31 30.38 7.76 5.37 Yearly 2.22

'eriod of Record: April 1979 - MarchSource: 1980. SB Stability class calculated a) 1&2, ER-OLS, Table 2.3-24 u?ing 43'-209' delta temperature.

The size of the beach area poutlation around Seabrook is uncertain. One estimate of this population for 1980 has been made by Public Service Company of New Hampshire and is found in Table 5. Although its accuracy is uncertain, this estimate does indicate that a substantial number of people are located within two miles of the plant. The number of persons that would be located within a plume obviously varies with wind direction, but it also varies with stability class and distance from the plant. At two miles the plume could be viewed as being between a 29' wedge (A stability class) and a 13* wedge (D stability class)S compared to the 22.5 population wedges in the table.

In addition to investigating the conditions under which the beach population within two miles of the Seabrook site might be exposed to early death doses, Dr. Beyea and Mr. Palenik have commenced work designed to determine the radius within which early deaths might result in the vicinit',' of this site assuming an accidental release on a summer weekend. Dr. Beyea has found early death radii ranging f rom <2 to 4.3 miles assuming a PWR 2 i release as defined in the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400), C stability class weather conditions, an evacuation time of 5-1/2 l hours, and the two sets of dose scaling factors discussed previously. For weather conditions with overcast skies (D 2/ Wedges arc assumed to have plume widths equal to three times the horizontal dispersion coefficient.

TABLE 5 AI BY SECTOR D) 1980 BEACH AREA TRANSIENT POPULATION ESTI:1 ATE Ring Jadii ENE E ESE SE SSE (miles) NE 0 0 0 0 0 0-1 0 464 14,647 12,780 5,842 129 23 1-2 1,104 8,882 0 0 3,905 654 2-3 608 0 0 0 6,198 3-4 8,710 0 0 0 0 8,880 4-5 4,344 0 0 0 0 16,597 5-10 5,660 Source: Public Service of New lfampshire, Seabrook Station - Units 1 & 2, Environmental Report, Operating License Stage, Figure 2.1-19.

a) Estimate of peak transient population found oy multiplying the capacity of beach area parking lots (less leased space) by 3.2 persons per venicle, and contrioutions from off-street parking users, seasonal residents, and overnight visitors.

b) Eacn direction in the taole is the centerline of a 22.5 degree wedge.

l i

stability class), or longer evacuation times,2# the early death radii will be larger. And the time before doses reach 200 rem, assuming a PWR 2 release on a summer weekend evening and a low energy release rate such as that assumed in the draft Seabrook Probabilistic Risk Assessment, is less than four hours out to 6-7 miles from the site. Thus, the beach area population within 6-7 miles exposed to the plume would not be protected from early death even if there were a 20-30 percent reduction in evacuation times from daytime to evening. It should be noted in this connection that at least the Hampton Beach area has a very substantial nighttime population.

Thus, primary accident consequence data developed for this Department reveal that evacuation cannot under a number of plausible weather conditions protect the sammer weekend beach area populations in the vicinity of this site from even early death. The results described herein do not account for the less severe consequences of radiation illness and delayed fatalities due to latent cancers. Despite the severe limitations on the utility of evacuation as a protective option for the transient beach population, however, there are currently no provisions for sheltering that population within the EPZ. Neither the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency f

3/ The Applicants have now provided a 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 5 minutes ,

l estimate for summer weekend simultaneous beach evacuation within ten miles of the site. See Applicants' Direct Testimony No. 1, filed July 15, 1983, at 19-20.

Response Plan nor che local community plans contain any analysis of available public sheltering, or its capacity to accommodate the beach populations or to provide shielding from radionuclides, or any plans for effecting such sheltering. In snort, there is at present no basis for (and has not been) any development of sheltering as a potential protective action for the beach populat:on.

Respectfully submitted, FRANCIS X. BELLOTTI ATTORNEY GENERAL 37: - --- -

JO jd1N SiiOTWELL Asgi an: Attorney General En ronmental Protection Division One Ashbarton Place Boston , :: A 02108 (617) 727-2265

" EXHIBIT A

l Aprt! 1983 i

EDUCATION:

Ph.D., Col w bia University, 1968 (Nuclear Physics)

B. A. , AmNrst College,1962 EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: '

I 1930 to date, Senior Energy Scientist, National Audubon Society, 950 Teird Avenue, New York, New York 10022.

1976 to 1930. Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies.

Princ,3 tar) Universi ty.

1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, .-oly Cross College.

1968 to 1970 Researcn Associate Columbia Unisersity Pnysics Cepartment.  !

CONSULTING WORC Consultant on nuclear energy to tne Office of Tecnnology Assessrent, the New .

Jersey Cepartrent of Env1rennental Protection; the Gf fices of the Attorney General in l New fork State a'ic the Con cnwealtn of "assachusetts; the state of lower Saxony in West Ger any; t+2 Swedish Energy Comrission; and varioas citizens' groups in t.he United States.

PUBLICATICNS CONLERNING ENE33Y CONSE VATION AND ENERGY P0;. !CY :

1

"".ocrents en Energy Fe ecasting, aterial su:-i tted for the record at

e hearings cef:re tre Sac:rm ttee en Investiga ' -s anc Oversignts of the Cc nittee en Science anc Tecr.nology, b. 5. Ecuse of :epresentatives; Cor-ittee Print, June 1, 2, 1951 [?,c. l' _/.

' -e Audutor Erer;j ;lan Tecnrical e: ort,' Pe:e-s,n, Eeyea, Paulson and Cutler. .ational Asc2:n iociety, April 198;.

"Locatino arc Eli-inating Obscure but Pa;or Ere ;y Losses in Residential

' : si g .' Harrje, Ltt ar.d :eyea, A$r: E Trarsa:tices , 55, E art (( (197g).

Winner of A5nG AE Catstancing paper anarc. ,

' ; . tic Fea t LCss arc .:rservaticr ;clic . E at t . Ee ea , 51 rcen. ASME Tecnnology and Scciety Divisich pa;er 7F-75-5, do s. r.. -e.ts, 1975.

"Cc rents en the pro csed FTC tra:e regulation rule en lateling and adver-tising of thermal insulatien,' Jan Beyes and Gauta' L *.t. tes ti'nony before the Feceral Trade Convr.ission, Jan;ary 1978.

" Critical Sicnificance of Attics and Base ente " the Energy Balance of Twin Rivers Townhouses ," SeMa , Dutt, .eteki , Enerc c a- Ouildinas,'!alure 1 (1977), Page 261. Also Cna:ter 3 of Sav'rg Ener .s in teef o~e, Sallinger, 1978.

"The Two-Resistance Pccel for Attic Heat FICw: l'Ol1Catlors for Centervation Policy " Woteki, Cutt, Beyea, Energy--the International Journal, 3_, 657 (1978).

" Energy Conservation .r an Old 3-Story Apartr'ent Complex," Beyea, Harrje, Sinden, Energy Use Manag,erent, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergamon 1977, Volune I, Page 373.

" Load Shif ting Techniques using Ho're Appliances,' Jan Beyea, Robert Weatherwax, Energy Use Managenent_, Fazzolare and Smith, Pergan'on 1978, Voluine !!!/lV, Page 121.

4 2

- PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENERGY RISKS:

- Articles:_

" Containment of a Reactor Meltdown," (with Frank von Hippel),

Bulletin of the Atomic,5cientists, 38, Page 52, Decemoer 1982. l l

"Second Thougnts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Power: Both Sides, W. W. Norton and Co. (New York, 1932).

" Indoor Air Pollution,' Com.Tentary in tre Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, l

37. Page 63, February 1931. j "Er.ergency Planning for Reactor A c' dents," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36. Page 40, :ece-ber 1930. ( An earlier version of this article acrearea in Cer an as Cha ter 3 in ir Ernstfall hilflos?, E. R. Koch, Fritz Vahrennalt, ecitors, (1ecenreuer & Wits:n, Ccicgne, 1980.)

" Dispute at :ncian Point," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 36. Page 63,

May ;953.

ublished

erates:

- Tre Crisis o' .2 ' ear Ener;j, 5utject Nc. 367 on Williar Buckley's Firing Line, 0.5.5. Telee1sion. Transcrict pr rted tf Southern Educational Corrunicatiens l l

Asscciati:n, 923 W:c:rew Street, P. C. Ec4 5966. Colu-tia, South Carclina, 1979.

..:le a- Oe ac t:rs : -:a Sa'e are Thec'. ca-el : scassien s; nsored t, tne acace f r re o' :Pe ,a tional ;cacerj o' icierces. :'.01 Const1tation Avenue, Wasningt:n, 3. C. 2: '.3, "a, 5, lia:.  !

f

)

Ce? orts' I

iica t'

-s #ce Mortali ty Of ..eaienin;

• e Cle ar Air i c *. , 'with

3. Ste.e v ':ir;. 'at1:nal 'aduton $ociety, Sr 1r:r e *.3'. 00litj analysis i

ep3rt ert Ce: Ort No. ',3, Vaj 1932.

'Sc e L:,; er- C:nsecuences of Hjc:tnetical "e::r :eleases c' Radicac>.ivitj l to :-e at :s:rere frcr Tncee Mile :stant, Oe::rt :: t e : es1:ert's Coun:11 cn l l Envirenrental Gaalit/, Cece-:er 1920.

- " Decontamination c' :ry: tan 85 fr: eree v1'e ! ' ard Noc' ear Plant, ( wi t-

Eendall , et.al . ), Reccc cf :ne Unicn of Concerre: 5:ier:1sts to tne l

Governor of Pennsylvania, vaf 15, 1950.

I "ta e CaTrents on C:cser,uences of recotnetica! Rea:t:r Accidents at tre Phili: ines f.; clear Pcwer Plant" (-1t9 Gcedon in0 ; son!, National Auduton 5ccie I Enviren ental Policj Analysis Department Report No. 3, Acr11 1980.

" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of 'mproved C:ntainment," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Re ort PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.

"The Effects of Releases to the Atrosphere of Radioactivity from Hypothetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Governnent of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.

J' -

l

.[

Reports (Cont'd.):

" Reactor Safety Research at the large Consequence End of the Risk Scectrum,"

presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Researcn in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1,1978.

A Study of Sore of the Consequences of Pyootnetical ?eactor Accidents at 5tecknolm, 05 1 1978:5.

Barseback, report to tne Swedish Energy Cor. mission  ;

January 1978. 1 f

l  :

Tes timony:

}

" Sore Consecuences of Catastrconic ;ccidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for E'ergencj Planning," testi,.cnf anc cross-eea ,ination before tne Nuclear Regu'atory Con-issten's Atcmic Safet/ anc Licensing Board, on tehalf of i tne'New York State Attornej General and otners, 'uly 1932.

$ " n the Patter cf *:alication of Cringe and cckland Cosnties, Inc. f ar Ccnversion to Coal of Losett Lnits 4 and 5,' testirony and cross-examination on tne nealth impacts of eliminating structers as a recutrecent for conversion to coal; :epart ent of Er.viren. ental :escurces, State of New York, November 5,1931.

t

" Future Pres:ects 'cr Cc. ercial Nuclear Pooer in tre United States," before

- i tne Sutco r.tttee on Cversi;nt and Investigati:ns, Co,-1ttee on Interior and Insular Aff airs, U. 5. ncuse of Representatises Cctc:er 23, 1981.

' Stock:11ing of otassiu- !cci:e for ne Gene"31 "utlic as a Condition f:r

. "es tart Of ***' Uni t *.: . 1. tes ti~ "j and crcss-e. inati:n tefore tne Atomic Safet/ and Licensin; 5: arc en :enali cf :ne ;cti *..: lear 3rca; Representing i tork, A;ril I?;1.

'l

';;Vice and Oec:- er:at1Cr.s Concer".i"; n3r;es 1, 0 93000" Cesign and Sa#etj

{ ne 2:: tent at Three Mile [Slar ,

l Analysis ahicn sacd d te ecutrec in Lig"; c' l s 3 P' ent tc t"e *,,;le3r Re;;latOry Ccc- ss: Or c r.;eenta: "e Oro;Csed rulemaking rear'n' Cn ce}r3:ec c:res. Cece er 29. 135:'.

1

';;ter"?t*ses t: t"e 'ntian Fotot '.;; ear T ea

"5,  ! *.3 E'ert te fc'e tae

Envi rar en!31 ; stection C:--t itee o' tre ',ew tr- ' 1 *. . :: .":' t , Ce: enter 10, !;73.

Alsc :eiore *."e .o . :: tee ' *neAlso lr:act :n

• e., s c rs -.;;, :f Oeictor A c1 dents at "Ccnse uartes c' a 303strc:qic Reactor

• Indian Point," June 11, 1979.

) Accident " statement to tne t;ew Ycrk City Board cf 'esitn, ;;;us t 12,197c (wi tn Frank von Hippel).

"E-ergency Plannir- fcr a Catastrcrnic Reactor ;c:tdent,' Testimony tefere the California Energy Rescurces anc Develo;. ent Co issicr. E'ergency Response

! and Evacuation Plans Fearir;s, Noveeter 4, 1973, Tage 171 "Srce -Terr Ef fec*.s of Catastrcphic ACC'd9nts On ' ' ' ant ttes Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testircny before tre California Energy Pesources and Development Commission, December 3, 1976.

" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Ji"~e50ert. Tes tinony before the New York State Board on Electric Generation Siting and the Environrent in the Matter of Long Island Lighting Comcany (Ja-escort Nuclear Power Station, Units ! and 2), May 1977.

l

4 Miscellaneous:

" Comments on WASH-1400," Statement to the Subconcittee on Energy and the Environment, Oversight Hearings on Reactor Safety, June 11, 1976, Serial No. 94-61, Page 210. ,,4

" Upper Limit Calculations of Deaths from Nuclear Reactors," Bull. Am. Phys.

Soc. 21, !!I (1976).

4 e

i i

I

EXHIBIT "B" PLANNING MILESTONES 3333333333333333333 New Hampshire

1. We have not received a complete submission of New Hampshire Plans. We understand that work is being completed on these sections:

- Letters of Agreement, including those referenced in appendix C of the local pl ans . - These letters, particularly for transportation, are necessary so we will know what f acilities we will visit as part of the exercise. We need your proposal as to how you propose to demonstrate your exercise objectives so we can formulate our observer strategy.

- Evacuation Time Estimate. We understand f rom reading the progress reports the updated ETE will require greatly increase personnel resources to staf f traf fic control posts.

-A & N Design Report, as referenced 'in state and l ocal pl ans .

- needed to determine if local resources and training are sufficient to carry out all functions which may be assigned.

2. The plans do not show sufficient personnel resou*ces at the local l evel s:

- personnel for emergency positions.

- provide for transit dependent popul ations as stated in the plan.

- proper number of dosimeters for the emergency workers.

3. Contingency P1ans

- With respect to an exercise, we were informed that the following communities are not going to participate:

- Rye

- South Hampton

- Hampton Falls

- Hampton (possibly)

- We do not have contingency plans from the State of New Hampshire which show what they plan to do in the event that local government (s) does not perform the required emergency functions in the event of an accident at Seabrook 4 The plans for those towns with a beach popul ation and some state  !

agencies procedures need to be revised to reflect their responsibil-ities to assist in protecting that population in the event of an accident.

5. Local Plans are not specific as to how they will meet the needs of the transit dependent popul ation, including mobility-impaired and institu-tional populations, such as hospitals and nursing homes. We, therefore, cannot evaluate the plans. We are al so concerned that the local plans are excessively cumbersome as designed.

6. Actual install ation of at least minimum comunications equipment.

Massachusetts

1. Formal submission of pl ans from Massachusetts.

' EXHIBIT "C"

]own ofNarnplon 9

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• 26 2y2; pg39 350/S 97nniversary '

1633 - 1963 Januaty 16, 1986

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I ,.  :.- Eb - % 3.........,a, 50 ~ W Y d.

Henry G. (lickers, Regional Director Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I, J. W. McCormack Port 0ffice .. ' a

• 006 S Court House Boston, MA. 02109

Dear Mr. Vickers:

The Hampton Board of Selectmen has requested in a separate letter dat any public heatings held by your agency be held in de Seacoast area.

The Emergency Evacuation Plans for the Seabtook Power Station utre acencu ufithout the acnnoval of the Kampton Board.

forwaraea u ucut On a 3-T \l absent) vote, a letter pointing out utaWiesses <n the plans uns sent to Governor Sununu and Richatd Sttome, the State Civil Defense Director, on October 29, I985. No re sponse was received until December 2nd and no changes in the plans were made then; de reply uns simply that our concerns were not valid. We undetstand that de plans were forwarded to FEMA on December 9th, hardly leaving your boatd time for further response.

We also understand hat the plans wete forwatded by FEMA to the NRC on January 8th, as revieutd but not approved. The Town is vety concetned as to uhat this transmittal means in terms of our being able to re-port to our citizens that at have worked to get the best evacuation plan possible.

As the plans wete sent without local board's apptoval, we feel that they should be returned for further work and not submitted until local connunities uink that they are workable.

Sincerely,

/ftlR THE BOAR 0 0F SELECTMEN

/

7,/ J Chairman kn R. Walker ORJ/cb overnor Sununu; letter from Governor Sununu; and Enes: Copies of letter letter from Director Strome 136 20innacunnel 0?oac{ }{amplon, Xeas ]{ amp 35 ire 03J42 Jef 603-926 6766 t't' . II.S. Nuclear Reaulatory Countssron

~

. SOuluOfkG/npl Oil

• . W-e

E CY 2i Pd :10 330/E 2nniversary _

1636 - l966 October 29, 1985

'0' - N Honorable John Sununu Governor's Office Q j & cf $ d b State House Concord, New Hampshire 033:

Dear Governot Sununu:

The undersigned membets of the Harpton Board of Selectmen wish to state their reservations about the adequacy of ue Radiological Emergency Response Plan. These reservations were publicly presented at a meeting of the Board on October 3,1985, a meeting scheduled between new members of'&e Board and local department heads, but uhich was attended by officials from New Hampshire Civil Defense.

Our original questions about de plan concerned population estimates.

We understand dat d e figure of 85,000 peak population has been revised to 110,000, a move in de right direction but still icwer than traf fic counts and local business figures indicate. Perhaps our best comment on the population figures is that Gey can only be an estimate and they will vary widely frca day to day, especially on sumer weekends.

Other problems remain. Very serious are 6e esticates of the number of personnel required to effect an orderly

• evacuation. Each ol ou_1 denttment heads agnood that he lachs sullicient mque to en y cut th$

plan, 5at each has beon infd in nomo d n4ditional help trem the State.

Such advice appears to have been given to each town in the zone; obvictisly there will not be enough workers to go arcand. As a collary to the numbers required, dere are no provisions for securitu Lor workers' homes and families nor does there seem to be provision for specialized equipment other than dosimeters. it is unclear if de count on dosimeters is a State tatal or a town by tow:: total, as out radiological of ficer said dat he cculd obtain all the equipment needed in a matter of a few hours. Is more protective apparatus, mch as suits or gicves or breathing apparatus, needed?

l Another sericus consideration is de lack of communication and coordination in moving school children cut of the area. On October 3 l Ge statement uns made that Civil Defense is working with school of ficials; i

1

~ /36 l.)innacunnel Iroarf ]{amptron, Tero ]lampsNire 034D AS 603-L'6 6766

October 19, 1985 Honorable. John Sununu .

Page Two out ' local superintendent had received a copy af the plan de previous day.

There art many problems; number of buses available (for 16 towns),

availability af suf ficient bus drivers, traffic problems caused by '

parents trying to get to schools to pick up 6eir own children, fornut signed agreements with bus companies. An added problem with buses is the number of non-auto owning residents who would need transportation, and vacationers who are at the beach without automobiles.

There seem to be sevete inconsistencies in the amount of uutning time available to accomplish evacuation. Can conrunities rely on the 18-hout figure dat was ptesented in August as the time we would have to act? The maximum figute given to move the population out (7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />

'and 40 minutes) is given for a suruner population on a bad weather day; may ut suggest that a sawer population on a very hot Sunday is likely to be larger and pose potentially more traffic problems, both with overheated cars and tempers?

We ate not qualified to consnent on the adequacy of most buildings on Hampton Beach for sheltering, if dat should be the preferred action.

Howver, the plan completely ignores uat there. may be ucusands of beach goers clad only in bathing suits during a radiological accident.

Last and vitallj important is the problem of roads leading out of Hampton. The Church Street access to Route 51 and thence to Route 101 is inadequate for de "nornal" non-panicked pcpulation. Route t is already over-loaded with daily winter traffic. All towns in the area will rely on these routes to get to I-95; it simply cannot be done safely or quickly. Nuclear plant owners and regulators have known for over six years that evacuation plans would be necessary; du. ting that time no setiouswork has been done on Seacoast roads nor do thete seem to be plans to improve these roads significantly.

In conclusion, this plan seems to be written primarily to justify the requirement that a plan exist rather than to make a serious attempt to evacuate an endangered citizenery. We have tcuched on what seem to us to be primary and basic weaknesse1. Added to dese is the general distrust of our citizens towards the owners of the plant, occasioned by inconsistencies between promises mde and results delivered during de construction process.

lee would respectfully urge that you consider not approving this plan; but il you _must, that ycu do with the understanding that you are opposing the. recommendation of the maiority of the Hamoten Rnnnd n y Seuctese Thank you for your conrideration.

~

Ver cc: Richard Strome Gerarld Coogan { \y sincerely, 2 A ' 6. <'

. -=..

William Cahilt , .

Robert Preston G John R. Walker State Representatives s, yt . ,.,g,a m

Area Towns l Ansell W. Palmer bka 0 ti2 v.c.[g-a ,

DonaR.Janetb(s

o:

.o+

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW ) Docket No.(s) 50-433/444-OL HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

)

)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I, Carol S. Sneider, hereby certif y that on April 16, 1986 I made service of the witnin document by mailing copies thereof, postage prepaid, by first class mail, or as indicated by an asterisk by express haail, or as indicated by a double asterisk by hand delivery to:

a

• Administrative Judge *Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Helen.Hoyt, Chai rper son Atomi c Sa fety & Licensing Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Eas t Wes t Towers Building Commission 4350 East West Highway i Eas t Wes t Towers Building Bethesda, MD 20814 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814

• Dr. Jerry Harbour *She rwin E . Turk, Esq.

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Of fice o f the Executive Legal U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Director Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building Eas t West Towers Building 4350 East West Highsay 4350 East West Highway Bethesda, MD 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814 H. Joseph Flynn, Esq. Stephen E. Merrill, Esq.

Assistant General' Counsel Attorney General

, Office of General Counsel George Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Federal Emergency Management Assistant Attorney General Agency Of fice o f' the Attorney General 500 C Street, S.W. 23 Capitol Street Washington, DC 20472 Concord, NH 03301

Docketing and Ser vice Paul A. Fritzsche, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Office of the Public Advocate Commission State House Station 112 Washington, DC. 20555 Augusta, ME 04333 Rooerta C. Pevear Ms. Diana P. Randall State Representative 70 Collins Street Town of Hampton Falls Seabrook, NH 03874 Drinkwater Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety & Licensing Robert A. Backus, Esq.

Appeal Board Panel Backus, Meyer & Solomon U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 116 Lowell Street Co rxaission P.O. Bo x 516 Washington, DC 20555 Manchester, NH 03106 l Atomic Safety & Licensing Jane Doughty

, Board Panel Seacoast Anti-Pollution League

! U.S. Nuclea r Regu la to ry 5 Market Street Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Wasnington, DC 20555 Paul McEachern, Esq. J. P. Nadeau Matthew T. Brock, Esq. Board of Selectmen Shaines & McEachern 10 Central Road l 25 Maplewcod Avenue Rye, NH 03870

! P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Ms. Sandra Gavutis, Chairperson Mr. Calvin A. Canney Boar d of Selectmen City Manager

! RFD 1, Box 1154 City Hall Rte. 107 126 Daniel Street E. Kingston, NH 03827 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Senator Gordon J. Humpar ey Mr. Angelo Machiros, Chairman U.S. Senate Boar d of Selectmen Washington, DC 20510 25 High Road (Attn: Tom Burack ) Newbury, MA 10950 Sena tor Gordon J . Humphrey Mr. Peter J. Matthews 1 Pillsbury Street Mayor Concor d, NH 03301 City Hall (Attn: Herb Boynton) Newb u r ypo r t , MA 01950 Mr. Donald E. Cnick William Lord Town Manager Boar d of Selectmen Town of Exeter Town Hall 10 Front Street Friend Street Exeter, NH 0383? Amesbury, MA 01913 Brentwood Board of Selectmen Gary W. Holmes, Esq.

RFD Dalton Road Holmes & Ellis Brentwood, NH 03833 47 Winnacunnet Road Hamp ton , NH 03841 Philip Ahrens, Esq. Diane Curran, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General Harmon & Weiss Department of the Attorney Suite 430 General 2001 S Street, N.W.

State House Sta tion $ 6 Washington, DC 20009

. Augusta, ME 04333 i

• • Thomas G. Dignan, Esq. Richard A. 9ampe, Esq.

R. K . Gad III, Esq. Hampe & McNicholas Ropes & Gray 35 Pleasant Street 225 Franklin Street -Concord, NH 03301 Boston, MA 02110 Beverly Hollingworth Edwa rd A. Thomas 209 Winnacunnet Road Federal Emergency Management Hampton, NH 03842 Agency 442 J.d. McCormack (POCH)

Boston, MA 02109 William Armst rong Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Civil Defense Director Boar d of Selectmen Town of Exeter Jewell Street, RFD 2 10 Front Street South Hampton, N9 03827 Exeter, NH 03833 Stanley W. Knowles, Chairman Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairperson 3oard of Selectmen Board of Selectmen P.O. Box 710 13-15 Newmarket Road North Hampton, NH 03862 Durhan, NH 03824 L

Allen Lampert Admi nistrative Judge Sheldon Civil Defense Director J. Wolfe, Chairman Town of Brentwood Atomic Safety and Licensing 20 Franklin Street Boar d Panel Exeter, NH 03833 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 >

Je ra rd A. Croteau, Cons table 82 3each Road, P.O. Box 5501 Sali soury, MA 01950 u.l...d . 1 D i. . ' ( c Carol S . Sneider Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Division April 16,19 86 ,

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