ML20203C654
| ML20203C654 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1997 |
| From: | Langenbach J GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 6L20-98-20066, NUDOCS 9802250228 | |
| Download: ML20203C654 (5) | |
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GPU Nuclear inc.
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,3,.g,o Tel 717 944-7621 February 18, 1998 6L20-98-20066 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555
Dear Sirs:
Three Mile Island Nuclear Station Unit 2 (TMI-2)
Possession Oniy License No. DPR-73 Docket No. 50-320 Biennial 10 CFR 50.59 Report Attached is the Biennial report for Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2 (TMI-2). This repon is being submitted in accordance with TMI-2 Technical Specification 6.8.1.4 and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59. Included in this report are descriptions of changes, tests, and experiments meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 made during the previous two calendar years and a description of the changes made to the PDMS SAR during the previous two calendar years.
Sincerely, 4y James W. Langenbach Vice President and Director, TMI AWM
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TMI Senior Resident inspector s
TMI 2 Project Manager Administrator, Region I File 98041
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6L26 98 2(E6 ihennid 10 CFR 50.59 Report Page 1 of $
TMI-2 PDMS ACTIVITIES DURING 1996 AND 1997 TMl-2 remained in a safe and stable condition during calendar years 1996 and 1997. Activities included rad waste processing, routine surveillances, equipment repair and modification, and dismantlement of non-nuclear portions of the facility. A limited number of modifications were made, as described in the PDMS SAR, to increase equipment reliability and to simplify plant maintenance and operation.
PDMS SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CilANGES The PDMS SAR was updated (Update 2) and submitted to the NRC in GPU Nuclear letter,6710-97-2371, dated August 18,1997. The changes made included descriptions of the modified fire detection system, the relocation of a service air compressor, the deletion of a number of non-radiological, deactivated systems and equipment that have been physically removed from the facility, and organizational changes that have been made within GPU Nuclear. Several other changes were made throughout the PDMS SAR to reflect minor changes in plant configuration, operating practices or system status. Each of the changes made to the PDMS SAR during the previous two years were evaluated and determined to not involve an unreviewed safety question.
PROCEDURE CllANGES The typical categories of procedures that were changed in 1996 and 1997 were ventilation, rad waste processing, fire protes : ion, containment isolation surveillance, and alarm response. All procedure changes at TMI-2 are made using the GPU Nuclear Safety Review Process, which provides a 50.59 screening process to determine if the change requires a written safety evaluation or if the change precludes the occurrence of an Unreviewed Safety Question or Technical Specification change. During 1996 and 1997 there were no procedure changes which required a written safety evaluation. All procedure changes made were determined to not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question.
TESTS AND EXPERIMENTS No tests or experiments not described in the PDMS SAR were performed at TMI-2 during 1996 and 1997.
FACILITY MODIFICATION Activities included in this section were performed without prior approval of the NRC in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. The facility modifications are provided in Update 2 of the PDMS SAR, which has been previously submitted to the NRC. As a result of the non-operating
61 3 98-20066 Ihermhl 10 CI'R 50.59 Report
, _ Page 2 of 5 and defueled status of the TMI 2 plant there are no structures, systems, or components in TMI-2 that perform a safety function. The modifications listed below were evaluated and determined to not constitute an Unreviewed Safety Question. A summary of the modifications and the associated safety evaluation is listed below:
CCD-223001-001, Installation of Heat Sensitive Wire Fire Detection System The fire detection system that this mod replaced required labor intensive maintenance. The former system used 120-volt power in various panels and detectors _ and was thus a potential source of fire.
Some of the former detectors located in the Reactor Building were inaccessible and have not been tested since before the 1979 accident. The former system is old and parts procurement could be a problem in the future. The IIcat Sensitive Wire modification addresses all the liabilities of the former system.
Safety Evaluation The accident scenarios in Chapter 8 of the PDMS SAR do not take credit for the Fire Protection system to either prevent or mitigate the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety. Since the fire detection system does not perform a safety function, installation of the new system and shutdown of the old system will not effect nuclear safety and results in adequate fire protection for TMI-2 with less effort than the former system.
CCR-96-012 Air lutake Fire Detection System TMI-2 During periods of high moisture and cold conditions, the fire detection system experienced electrical grounds, which caused unnecessary alarms and tripping of the ventilation systems. This modification removed and lilled electrical leads associated with the air intake tunnel fire detection system. Table 7,2-1, PDMS SAR, identifies that the Air intake Tunnel is maintained only as a ventilation supply pathway.
Safety Evaluation Combustible r sterials have been removed from the Air intake Tunnel. The only credible way of fire entering the tunnel is from an airplane crash The probability of an airplane crash in the vicinity of the tunnel was estimated to be less than 2E-7/ year. Construction and configuration of the tunnel is such that a fine entering the tunnel from the vertical section will be limited in its travel to the plant, The volume c,f the sump is such that anyjet fuel entering the tunnel from the airplane crash will be contained in t'T area. The sump is of significant distance from the plant that thejet fuel will not travel throudi the tunnel to the plant.
CCR-96-018 Isolation of Fire Service to Unit 2 Turbine Building The TMI 2 Turbine Building had a Fire Service connection on the east and west sides of the building. The east side isolation was accomplished by removing a valve and spool piece and installing a blind flange. The west side isolation was accomplished by removing a piping section and replacing it with a blind flange. The previous Fire Service isolation valves leaked by to telltale-drains in the Turbine Building and required frequent pumping of the Turbine Building sump. The
6120-984(XX,6 lhenni:110 CIR 50.59 Report Page 1 of $
existing Fire Service piping in Unit 2 is not being maintained and may not be suitable for repressurization without repairs.
Safety Evaluation Since the remaining piping is not being maintained, substantial damage to the system and possible personnel harm could occur from repressurization and water hammer. This and the additional time required foi refill could hinder or prevent the Station Fire Brigade from completing its mandate under already adverse conditions. To remedy this situation, a modification was performed by CCR 94-043, which added Fire Senice Water standpipes to the East and West sides of the Unit 2 Turbine Building. This modification allows a method ofintroducing Fire Service from local fire hydrants to the Turbine Building via the installed standpipes. About 200 feet of 2 %" fire hose is staged at each of the Turbine Building standpipes for eflicient response to a fire.
CCR 127283 Relocate 2SA-P-3 from Turbine Building Basement to Service Hullding Hasement This modification relocated air compressor 2SA-P 3 from Unit 2 Turbine Building Basement to Unit 2 Senice Building,281' elevation. This activity required a revision of the compressor's location description in the PDMS SAR.
Safety Evaluation The new location is acceptable since it will be located in an adequately ventilated area in the same building and elevation where the backup compressor 2SA P 2 is located. Compressor 2SA P-3 is connected to existing instrument air receiver tank,2iA T-IB. Service Building 281' elevation will now contain the primary and backup compressors for the PDMS Compressed Air System.
ECD-210209 Disconnect Unit 2 Compressed Air and Unit i Instrument Air This modification disconnected the Unit 2 Compressed Air System from the Unit 1 Instrument Air System. Also, this modification disconnected a large number of tanks and valves from the compressed air system. These tanks are no longer required and disconnection from the system prevents maintenance problems and allows their dismantlement.
Safety Evaluation The TMI-l and TMI-2 air systems are sized to operate independently. Each system has its own set
. of receiver tanks and backup air compressors that are capable of maintaining the required system pressures and flow,- Two unit 2 air receivers were removed from the system by this modification.
The remaining two receivers are capable of maintaining the system pressure. In addition the system size has been reduced which reduces the number of potential leak locations. A change to the PDMS SAR was required because system drawing 302-2014 sheet 1 is referenced. The majority of the equipment on this drawing is being disconnected from the compressed air system. The part that will remain is currently also shown on drawing 302-2012 sheet 2. Therefore the reference to
6120-98 20066 Iliennial 10 CIR 50.59 lleixvt Page 4 of 5 drawing 302-2014 will be deleted from the SAR and the remaining active components only shown on 302-2012 sheet 2 which is aheady referenced in the PDMS SAR.
CCD 128227-001 Repower TMI 2 River Water Pumphouse The space inside the TMI 2 River Water Pumphouse serves no active or passive function for maintaining PDMS conditions. The scope of this chango was to provide permanent power to siipport storage and testing of various non-radiological robotic equipment and mockups.
Safety Evaluation The TMl 2 River Water Pumphouse has been declared deactivated for the purposes of PDMS, and no work being done would change that PDMS classification. Section 6.1.10 of the PDMS SAR has been changed to clarify that this facility will be used for other non-PDMS purposes.
SE 945100-088 and SE 945100-089 GPU Nuclear Organization Changes Changes were made to the GPU Nuclear organization, which afrected the engineering function, and other corporate functions that provide support to TMI 2. The reorganization of the engineering function and other corporate stmeture does not, in itself, atTect any plant system, subsystem, structure, or component.
Safety Evaluation The safety function of the engineering organization and the corporate organization is to support the operation and maintenance of TMI-2 in a manner that will ensure the safety and health of the public and personnel on site. The intent of the engineering reorganization is to consolidate engineering functions into a single organization. The functions and responsibilities of the former organizational units have been incorporated into the new organization. The intent of the corporate reorganization is to consolidate related functions into organizational units, which are process oriented. The organizational configuration of these functions and responsibilities has no relation to nuclear safety and safe plant operations.
SE 115201-006 PDMS SAR Update 2 for Chapter 6 This change deletes deactivated facilities and systems that have been turned over to TM1-1 for use or that have been removed by dismantlement activities.
Safety Evaluation The facilities and systems that have been deleted were all deactivated and do not perform any PDMS required function or plant operation The Processed Water Pump llouse and the Processed Water Storage and Recycle System have been turned over for use by TMI-l and have been modified to meet their requirements. The deleted deactivated systems and facilities reflect dismantlement activities, which do not affect nuclear safety or safe plant operation. Typographical
6120-98-2(XK4 Ibermici 10 CTR 50 $9 Report
. l' age 5 of 5 errors are corrected and statements added to clarify the potentially contaminated status of systems / components not previously identified.
SE I15201-007 PDMS SAR Update 2 for Chapter 3.
This PDMS SAR revision reflects changes to section 3.1, " Regulatory Conformance." This section has been updated to reflect changes made to 10CFR Part 50 from January 1,1995 through January 1,1997. A review of all rule changes and their affect on the PDM 5 SAR is documented with this change. In addition a new article,10CFR 50.66, was added during this time period, therefore, a new subsection to section 3.1 has been added which discusses TMI-2's conformance to this regulation.
Safety Evaluation These changes discuss TMI 2's conformance to NRC regulation changes. As these changes discuss TMI 2's method of conformance to regulatory changes, they do not increase the probability of concurrence or consequences of an accident, or affect the other criteria concerning an unreviewed safety question.
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