ML20203B573
| ML20203B573 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Pennsylvania State University |
| Issue date: | 02/20/1998 |
| From: | Randy Erickson PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV., UNIVERSITY PARK, PA |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802240321 | |
| Download: ML20203B573 (3) | |
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(Ill4) W-9580 PENNSTATE 2l%'aff*"
IMincy A. Erkkum The Penn91Wa sute Unnerury p .
vice Preudent for Rewarth XM Old Main Dean of the Graduate Sthool Unheruty Park. PA IM02-1504
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C February 20,1998 Nuclear Regulatory Commission I Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 [
i Re: Reportable Occurrence - TS 6.1.3.a (1)
L License R 2, Docket No.50-005 L
Dear Siror Madame:
m This report is being submitted in accordance with Sections 6.5.2 and 6.6.2 of the PSBR Technical
. Specifications (TS). Initial verbal notuicatior.s of this reportable occurrence were made to Richard Dudley of the Nen-Power Reactors and Decommissioning Pioject Directorate and to Tom Dragoun, Region 1 on February 9,1998. The telephone notifications v ere confirmed in writing ,
_ that sam: day by copies faxed to Mtryin Mendonca, PSBR Project Manager and fo Tom Dragoun with mail copy to the Document Control Desk.
TS 6.1.3.a states in part: "The minimum staffing level when the reactor is not secured shall be: (1)
A licensed opeiator present in the control room, in accordance with applicable regulations."
Dscrintion of Event; t E On February 9,1998 at approximately 9:35 AM, the duty SRO and an opei iter trainee were O conduenng Monday moming critical rod positions. The reactor power had been steady for several >
minutes at 50 watts; the reactor was in automatic centrol; and the trainee was recording hourly readings. A second SRO entered the control room to gather some inbrmation from the trainee f regarding his type of dosimetry. At this point, the duty SRO asked the second SRO to momentarily take over while he perfumed a filter change for an air monitor M N reactor bay,
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about 20 feet outside the control room. The second SRO agreed and the duty SRO left the control room. The second SRC held a brief discussion with the trainee ..cquired the desired information from the trainee and then walked out of the control room leaving the trainee alone at the console.
The duty SRO was returning to the control room, observed the departure and immediately re-ente-d the control room. The elapsed time of the vwlation is estimated to be no more than five (5)
- r. ands.
The duty SRO paged the second SRO to the control room to iaforr.' him of his err; the second SRO had just realized what he had done and was already ruurning :o the contro; rcom. The 7 second SRO realized that a violation of the TS had occurred and reported the incident to the RSEC Director.
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Fe 3ruary 20,1998 IdbdOO5.98 Review of tne Event:
The three individuals involved were intemewed by the Director. Based on that initial review of the g event, two perfoimance issues were identifieo.1) The lack of a formal turnover between the two SROs and 2) inattention on the part of the second SRO. Furthcr mterviews, counseling, and self-l assessments by the three individuals involved confirmed these issues; further they confirmed that the requirements of TS 6.1.3.a.(1) were fully understood.
When the second SRO entered the control room he was focused on completing a number of administrative matters which included modifying the dosimetry currently issued to several operations personnel of whom the trainee was one. He fully understood he had been requested to
.h act as the SRO while the duty SRO left the control roo.n and he verbally accepted the SRO 73- responsibilities. Rather tnan changing his full attention and focus to the operation of the reactor, he B pursued acquiring the needed information regarding dosimetry from the trainee, and then with that original task completed, left the control room. The trainee, after answering the SRO's questions, returned his attention to the console and the hourly readings and did not notice the second SRO's
] depanure until he heard the bay door close and saw the duty SRO re-entering the control room.
The second SRO was fully aware of the evolution in progress, since this was a routine Monday morning training session and critical rod posit;on data gathering. Despite this knowledge, the turnover should have involved a status briefmg to ensuce that the second SRO was aware of reactor status. Since this was a momentary SRO coverage, them was no formal tumover of the duty and no logbook entries were made. Thus, thete was neither a detailed verbal interchange nor a specific physical action which would help cnange the focus of the secona SRO from his originalinteat to the responsibilities of reactor operation.
Upon receiving a verbal accepance of the duty by the second SRO, the regular duty SRO correctly usumed he was temporarily relieved to perform the intended work outside the control room.
flowever, the duty SRO should not have allowed himself to be diverted fro n his primary duty of reactor supervision and operation. The work of changing the air IT.onitor filter could have been done during the morning checkout walkaround or by requesting the trainee, the second SRO or the third person on shift to perform the filter change. Both SROs thus allowed themselves to be diverted from their primary focus on assuring safe reactor operation.
Both SROs involved are noted for their high level of attention to detail and conformance with procedures. In this isolats ase, cach allowed themselves to have their attention diverted from their primary role as licensed operators.
Corrective and Preventative Actions:
The RSEC Director met with the two SROs aint pr vid:d counseling as to their duties and responsibilities as licensed operators. Changes are ocing made to the reactor operating procedures wl.ich will enhance the ternover process between operators. These changes will be completed by February 27th. Trainirm was conducted for all licensed personnel as well as trainees regarding these changes. Discussions during this training emphasized the need for formal briefing and turnover of operator or supervisor responsibilities even for short intervals of time. Emphasis was gisen to the need for operators to focus their full attention to safe operation in compliance with the letter and the intent of the regulations, the license, Technical Specifications, and PSBR procedures while on duty. The staff exchanged ideas on how they cou'd help each other achieve the needed focus.
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3. = . ' -
February 20,1998 Idb4005.98 If you have any questions regarding this matter, please call Dr. Sears at (814) 865-6351.
Sincerely.
k Dr. Rodney A. Erickson Vice President for Research Dean of the Graduate School RAE:CFS/ldtW005.98
[v: T. Dragoun (NRC Region 1)
M. Mendonca (NRC lieadeuarte. )
J. M. Mason (College of Engineering, Assoc. Dean of Research)
G. J. McMunry (College of Engineering Assoc. Dean)
E.11. Klevans (NucE Department liead)
W. F. Witzig (PSRSC Chairman)
C. F. Sears (RSEC Director)
T, L. Flinchbaugh (Manager of Operations and Training) e Subscribed to the sworn before me en this 20 day of ~ h w n L_,1998,.
Neury Public in and for Centre County, Pc nsylvania. F Ahn05 kn aY tn
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NOTARIAL SEAL PAMELA J, $TALTFE4 Norvy Public State Co.Nye Geo. Ceaw county, PA M, Oomanssion Exones July 2. 2001 I
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