ML20203B452
| ML20203B452 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 02/05/1998 |
| From: | Berkow H NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20203B456 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802240290 | |
| Download: ML20203B452 (12) | |
Text
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4 UNITED STATES
[Y. j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION t
WASHINGTON, D.C. 906N 0001
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SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50 348 JOSEPH M. FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.135 License No. NPF 2 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
(Southern Nuclear), dated October 16,1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations, set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions w, the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compilance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF 2 is hereby amended to read as follows:
9802240290 980205 PDR ADOCK 05000348 P
2-(2)
Technical Snacifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.135. are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION f
,:kh.
w Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate ll 2 Division of Reactor Projects - l/Il Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attachment.
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:
February 5, 1998
ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.135 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF.2 DOCKET NO. 50 348 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginallines.
Remove inand 3/4 1 9 3/419 B 3/4 1 3 B 3/4 1 3 B 3/4 1-4 8 3/4 1 4*
1
- overflow - no change
e.
nrAeTivity conipot systrMs CHAPGING PUMP - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION POR OPERATION 3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
APPLICABftITY:
MODES $* and 6.
ACTION:
With no charging pump QPERABLE, suspend all operations l
a.
Anvolving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes.
b.
With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap operations, immediately take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRIMENTS 4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that on recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure # of greater than or equal to 2458 poig when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.
4.1.2.3.2 All charping pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head is removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been removed from their electrical power supply circuits.
- A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to 180'F; however, two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS during pump swap operations fot a period of no more than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 square inches in area.
- Differential pressure is not required to be verified when the RCS is in a water solid condition, yARLEY-UNIT 1 3/4 1-9 AMENDMENT No. 76.135
.. _ - _ ~
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSIgig mRsts RORATION EYETEMS (Continuedl With the RCs temperature below 200*F, one injection system is acceptable without single l failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional rettrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required CPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180'T provides assurance that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCs for a short time to allow the pumps to be swapped.
This allows seal injection flow to be continua 13y mair sined, thus, minimising the potential for RCP number one seal damag, by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal.
Particles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal injection pressure may cause the seal not to fully resent when pressure is reapplied.
Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCs is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCs pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event.
For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCs is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCs is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat siae area of two RHR relief valves.
The boron capability required below 200'T is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN KARGIN as specified in the COLR after menon decay and cooldown from 200'T to 140*F.
This condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,750 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA. This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimites the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical systems and components.
TARLEY-UNIT 1 3 3/4 1-3 AMENDKENT NO. 123,135
)
i t-erieTivrTY eowTaot aratrum l
- A888 The OPERA 31LITY of one boron injection system during.
REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1. 3 MoVAet e couraot kaatunt.tra The specificatiotis of this section ensure that (1) l acceptable power dietrAbution limits are maintained, (2) the minimum SKUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential affects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERAt!LITY of the control rod position indicators is t
required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion 1Laits.
t For purposes of determining compliance with Technical specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod (s), due to being immovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".
The intent of Technital specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a* and utilizing ACTION statement *c" that the rod urgent f ailure '
alarm tw illuminated or that an obvious electrical problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electrical troubleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met.
Misalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.
In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.
The maximuc. rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T yg greater than or equal to 541'F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at operating conditions.
Control rod positions and OPERA 31LITY of the rod position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable.
These verification frequencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's are satisfied.
FARLEY-UNIT 1 5 3/4 1-4 AMENDKENT No.135 l
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't UNITED STATES
,j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WABHINGToN. D.C. 30MH(R1
'%,...../
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING COMPANY. INC.
ALABAMA POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50 364 JOSEPH M FARLEY NUCLEAR PLANT. UNIT 2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.127 License No. NPF-8 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment by Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
(Southern Nuclear), dated October 16,1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the epplication, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regu:ations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.
The issuance of this license amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
2.
Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications, as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment; and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-8 is hereby amended to read as follows:
4 2
(2)
Technical SoecifiriHons The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.127, are hereby incorporated in the license. Southern Nuclear shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.
3.
This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance and shall be implemented within 30 days ofissuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)db.s
"(.oe Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate ll 2 Division of Reactor Projects 1/11 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of issuance:
February 5, 1998
i ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO 127 TO FACILITY OPERATING UCENSE NO. NPF-8 DOCKET NO. 50-364 Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages. The revised areas are indicated by marginallines.
Remove Insert 3/4 1-0 3/419 l
B3/41-3 B 3/413 8 3/4 1-4 P 3/41-4*
' overflow - no change m
1 I
REACTIVIT7 CONTROL SYSTEMS CHARCING PUMP - EMUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
.c =-.
3.1.2.3 One charging pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus.
APPLICABILITY:
MODES 5* and 6.
ACTION:
n.
With no charging pnnp OPERABLE, suspend all operations l
invsiving CORE ALTERATIONS or positigw reactivity changes.
b.
With more than one charging pump capable of injecting into the RCS, except as allowed during pump swap operations, immediat11y take action to render all but the above required OPERABLE pump inoperable as specified in 4.1.2.3.2.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIRE C NTS i
4.1.2.3.1 The above required charging pump shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by verifying, that c.
recirculation flow, the pump develops a differential pressure # of greater than or equal to 2458 psig when tested pursuant to specification 4.0.5.
4.1.2.3.2 All charging pumps, excluding the above required OPERABLE pump, shall be demonstrated inoperable at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, except when the reactor vessel head in removed, by verifying that the motor circuit breakers have been recoved from their alectrical power supply circuits.
r 5
- A maximum of one charging pump shall be OPERABLE whenever.
the temperature of one or more of the RCS cold legs is less than or equal to IBO'F; however, two charging pu.nps may be capable of injecting irar the RCS during pump swap operations for a period of no mors than 15 minutes provided that the RCS is in a non water solid condition and both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE o. the RCS is vented via an opening of no less than 5.7 oguare inches in area.
f Differential pressure is not required to be verified whLn the RCS is in a water solid condition.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 3/4 1-S AMENDMENT NO.127
, as REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 1
BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued) 1 KARGIN from expected operating conditions of 1.77% delta k/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'F.
The maximum expected boration capability requirement occurs at EOL from full power equilibrium xenon conditions and requires 11.336 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 44,826 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
With the RCS temperature below 200'F, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restriccions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.
The limitation for a maximum of one centrifugal charging pump to be OPERABLE and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all charging pumps except the required OPERABLE pump to be inoperable below 180'F provides assurance that a mass addition pres'aure transient can be relieveu cy the operation of a single RHR relief valve. Two charging pumps may be capable of injecting into the RCS for a short time to (llow the pumps to be swapped.
This allows seal injection flow to be continually maintained, thus, minimizing the potential for RCP number one seal damage by reducing pressure transients on the seal and by preventing RCS water from entering the seal.
Fart!cles in the RCS water may cause wear on the seal surfaces and loss of seal xnjection pressure may cause the seal not to fully resent when pressure is reapplied. Low temperature overpressure protection is most critical during shutdown when the RCS is water solid. Mass input transients can cause a very rapid increase in RCS pressure allowing little time for operator action to mitigate the event. For these reasons, more than one pump should be made capable of injecting into the RCS only when the RCS is in a non water solid condition and when both RHR relief valves are OPERABLE or the RCS is vented via an opening of at least 5.7 square inches. A 5.7 square inch opening is equivalent to the throat size area of two RHR relief valves.
The boron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN as specified in the COLR after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 140'F.
Th;e condition requires either 2,000 gallons of 7000 ppm borated water from the boric acid storage tanks or 7,700 gallons of 2300 ppm borated water from the refueling water storage tank.
The contained water volume limits include allowance for water not available because of discharge line location and other physical characteristics.
FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-3 AMENDMENT NO.
127
/
REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES The limits on contained water volume and boron concentration of the RWST also ensure a pH value of between 7.5 and 10.5 for the solution recirculated within containment after a LOCA.
This pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimises the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion on mechanical syctems and components.
The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.
3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section ensure that (1) acceptable power distribution 1tmits are maintained, (2) the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of rod misalignment on associated accident analyses. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.
For purposes of determinina compliance with Technical Specification 3.1.3.1, any inoperability of full length control rod (s),
due to being immovable, invokes ACTION statement "a".
The intent of Technical Specification 3.1.3.1 ACTION statement "a" is to ensure that before leaving ACTION statement "a" and utilizing ACTION statement "c" that the rod urgent failure alarm is illuminated or that an obvious electrics' problem is detected in the rod control system by minimal electrical truobleshooting techniques. Expeditious action will be taken to determine if rod immovability is due to an electrical problem in the rod control system.
The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accompanied by additional restrictions which ensure that the original design criteria are met.
Hisalignment of a rod requires measurement of peaking factors or a restriction in THERMAL POWER; either of these restrictions provide assurance of fuel rod integrity during continued operation.
In addition, those safety analyses affected by a misaligned rod are reevaluated to confirm that the results remain valid during future operation.
The maximum rod drop time restriction is consistent with the assumed rod drop time used in the safety analyses. Measurement with T yg greater than or equal to 541'F and with all reactor coolant pumps operating ensures that the measured drop times will be representative of insertion times experienced during a reactor trip at or.ating conditions.
Control rod positions and OPERABILITY of the red position indicators are required to be verified on a nominal basis of once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with more frequent verifications required if an automatic monitoring channel is inoperable. These verification fruquencies are adequate for assuring that the applicable LCO's ar= satisfied.
I FARLEY-UNIT 2 B 3/4 1-4 AMENDMENT NO.127 1
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