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Insp Rept 50-312/86-08 on 860203-0307.Violation Noted:On Two Occasions,Calibr Tools Uncontrolled at Work Site When No Work Being Accomplished.Unresolved Items Re Station Batteries & Open Item in Security Area Also Identified
	ML20202J014
Person / Time
Site:	Rancho Seco
Issue date:	03/31/1986
From:	Miller L, Myers C, Perez G; NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:	;
Shared Package
ML20202H971	List: IR 05000312/1986008; ML20202H966; ML20202H983; ML20202J014;
References
	50-312-86-08, 50-312-86-8, NUDOCS 8604150510
	Download: ML20202J014 (7)
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No. 50-312/86-08

, Docket No. 50-312

License No. DPR-54

Licensee:

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Sacramento Municipal Utility District'

P. O. Box-15830

Sacramento,~ California 95813

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Facility Name: Rancho Seco Unit 1s

Inspection at: Herald,' California (Rancho Seco Site)

Inspection conduct d: F r 3 March 7, 1986

Inspectors:

G. PyPeprez, Ap

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~ Spi 6pResidentInspector Date Signed

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C. J. 'ers ' si Inspector Date Signed

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L. g! Miller, @ tion Chief Date Signed

, Summary:

Inspection between February 3 to March 7, 1986 (Report 50-312/86-08)

Areas Inspected: This routine inspection by the Resident Inspectors involved

the areas of operational ~ safety. verification, maintenance, safety system

verification, and surveillance. During this' inspection, Inspection Procedures

61726, 62703, 71707, 71710, 90712, 94703, 94703, 94702 and 30703 were used.

Results: Of the areas inspected, one apparent violation on tool control was

identified. Also three unresolved items dealing with station batteries, and

one open item in the security area were identified.

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8604150510 860403

PDR ADOCK 05000312

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

a. Licensee Personnel

G. Coward, Manager, Nuclear Plant

J. McColligan, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Plant

S. Redeker, Nuclear Operations Manager

J. Shetler, Nuclear Scheduling Manager

B. Spencer, Nuclear Operations Superintendent

M. Price, Nuclear Mechanical Maintenance Superintendent

N. Brock, Nuclear I&C Maintenance Superintendent -

R. Colombo, Regulatory Compliance Superintendent

J. Field, Nuclear Technical Support Superintendent

S. Crunk, Incident Analysis Group Supervisor

J. Jurkovich, Site Resident Engineer

F. Kellie, Acting Chemical and Radiation Supervisor

L. Schwieger, Quality Assurance Manager

M. Hieronimos, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent

D. Comstock, Assistant to the Operations Superintendent

J. Jewett, Site QA Supervisor

H. Canter, QA Operations Surveillance Supervisor

C. Stephenson, Regulatory Compliance Engineer

B. Daniels, Supervisor,_ Electrical Engineering

R. Lawrence, Assistant to Department Manager

J. Irwin, Supervisor, I&C' Maintenance

T. Tucker, Nuclear- Operations Superintendent

C. Linkhart, Electrical Maintenance Superintendent

Other licensee employees contacted included t'echnicians, operators,

mechancies, security and office personnel.

Attended the Exit Meeting on March 11, 1986.

2. Operational Safety Verification

At the start of this report period the plant was in a cold shutdown

condition. The plant has been in this mode of operation since the

December 26, 1985 plant trip initiated by a loss of integrated control

system power.

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During this period the inspectors observed control room operations, 4

verified proper control room staffing, reviewed applicable logs,

conducted discussions with the operations crews, reviewed selected

emergency systems, reviewed tag-out records, verified proper removal from j

service of affected components,'and verified the licensee's adherence to

. limiting conditions for operations.

Tours of the auxiliary, turbine,'and reactor buildings and the general

site area were conducted to observe plant equipment condition, and to

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verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need

of maintenance.

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The inspectors reviewed portions of non-licensed operator logs, conducted

various discussions with the non-licensed operators and observed them

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performing their assigned duties.

, During tours of the facility, the inspectors frequently entered

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radiologically. controlled areas. The. inspectors verified _ compliance:with

the licensee's radiation protection program. .The inspectors discussed '

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the radiation work permit- requirements and,the. radiological conditions of'

the work areas with workers in the radiologically controlled areas.

Also, the inspectors verified proper clothing requirements and observed "'

the method of personal frisking when exiting radiological controlled

areas. The inspectors randomly examined selected. radiation protection ,

instruments to verify operability and adherence to' calibration frequence.

In addition, the pig-pen areas of the A and B OTSG were observed for

proper radiological controls.

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The physical security plan was evaluated on a daily basis during this

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period by observing security. performance during theLinspector's daily

activities. This involved the entry process, wearing of photo . j

identification badges by personnel, escorting of. visitors, and security

compensatory measures. The inspector found a personnel security badge -

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inside the restricted area.on March 6, 1986. Additionally,' the person

who lost his security badge was acting as a visitor escort. The

inspector observed the licensee's action which included, in order, the

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dispatchment of. officers to an area where the person:without the badge J

was thought to'be, use of the public address system to locate.the

-individual, and finally, the identification and' recovery of the. .

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individual. Due to.the nature of this event, the inspector contacted the .!

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Region V office and the event will be inspected during a future security

inspection. This item will 4e considered open (50-312/86-08-01).

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3. Monthly Maintenance Observation

Station maintenance activities of' safety-related and non-safety-related

systems and components listed below were observed and reviewed to

ascertain that they were conducted in accordance with approved. _

procedures, regulatory guidesi and industry codes or standards and in

conformance with technical specifications-

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The following items were considered duringethis review: The limiting,

conditions for operation were met while. components ~or systems were

removed from service'; approvals were obtained prior =to initiating the -

work; activities were< accomplished'using approved procedures and were u

inspected as= applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were. -

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performed prior to returning ' components ' or: systems to service; activities " j

were accomplished by qualified 4 personnel;; radiological controls were ,

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implemented; and, ,

fire prevention controls'were< implemented. .s

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' Included in this' area ~was the review and ob'servation of' troubleshooting

activities'related to' valves *that had; failed.to. operate properly;during

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The following items were observed and/or' reviewed:

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The dissassembly and reas ably o'f the hand operator-device of

the auxiliary feedwater' controlivalves 'FV-20527 and.FV-20528. -

c This also included the troubleshooting investigation of the

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valves' performance. t

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'The troubleshooting,' dissassembly and ' reassembly of auxiliary

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feedwater manual isolation valves, FWS-063.

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, The' stroking of auxiliary feedwater manual isolation valves,.

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FWS-064, to, verify the operability of the1 valve.

L The' inspector verified that the written maintenance instructions were

followed during the work for all. of these items. - No violations or

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1 deviations were identified. i

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' 10CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion _12 requires that measures shall be

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established to assure that tools,tga'uges, instruments and other.

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measuring and test' devices used in activities affecting_ quality are

, properly controlled. Additionally the licensee's Quality Assurance

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Policy 12' requires the same measures for control ~of measuring and-

test devices as Criterion 12.L AP 18, Plant Heusekeeping and

Inspection,. requires that " Tools and test equipment shall be stored

in their proper location at the end of the workday 'and anytime when

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Contrary ,to these requirements, _ the inspector found, on two occasions,

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calibrated tools uncontrolled at the work site, when no work:was being

, accomplished. On March 5, and again on March 7, as.the inspector ~was; j

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making a tour of the computer roomL adjacent to the control room, between ,

L 6:30 a.m.' and 7:00 a.m. , the inspector observed the following unattended '

calibrated tools placed on'a tool. cart, in ca'rdboard boxes,.and'on the

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CTE - 30788 Crimper

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! CTE - 30720' Crimper

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CTE - 30682 Crimper

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CTE - 30030 Torquing screwdriver.

CTE - 00432 Voltmeter

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This is-an apparent viol: tion *(50-312/86-08-02).

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4. Safety Features System Walkdown

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f The inspector walked down'the B Diese1~ Generator system'to verify'its: _

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status. This was -done after a' scheduled surveillance had been completed. ,.

The inspector confirmed.the' system's valves were lined up'as per~the .

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[- ' licensee'sLprocedures. -The equipmenticondition was. satisfactory. Also,

' . instrumentation that had calibration requirements 'was reviewed ~and- found-

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,to be in calibration'at that time. -

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No violations or:dev'iations were. identified. -

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5. Monthly Surveillance Observation

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The major surveillence activity during- this report period was eddy

current testing on the B Once Through Steam Generator (OTSG). The

licensee, through their secondary chemistry sampling, recognized a slight

increase in the tritium concentration level of the B OTSG prior to the

reactor shutdown of December 26, 1985. There was no other indication of

a steam generator tube leak, i.e. condenser air ejector count rate and

secondary activity were normal, and the primary to secondary leak rate

did not identify a leak. Therefore, although no indications, as defined

by the Technical Specifications, existed for an OTSG tube leak, the

licensee decided to inspect the A and B OTSG's for possible tube leaks.

By the end of this report period the licensee had completed the eddy

current testing in the B OTSG and had developed a list of tubes to be

plugged. The list of sample size and size of tube degradation'is

presented below:

TUBE SAMPLE SIZE DEGRADATION >40% DEGRADATION >20%

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3% (929 tubes). 6 4

6% (1855 tubes) 6 7

12% (4200 tubes): 18 29

LANE / WEDGE REGION (100% SAMPLE SIZE)

642 16 20

The tubes in the greater than 40% degradation category will all be

plugged. The licensee also will plug 12 tubes in the greater than 20%

degradation category, as a preventative measure. A total of 58 tubes are

planned to be plugged. The sample size for all tube samples was more

than the minimum size identified in the Technical Specification. The

licensee has taken a conservative approach to the testing of the B OTSG

in that they followed the technical specification inservice surveillance !

requirements even though they were not required to do so at this time.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Management Meetings

During this report period the inspector participated in the following l

meetings with the licensee:

February 10, 1986, Licensee's presentation of findings from the

December 26, 1986 event

February 18, 1986, Licensee's. presentation on the Post Accident

Sampling System (PASS) system

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March 4, 1986, Enforcement Conference on Security Violations

March 6, 1986, SMUD Board of Directors Meeting

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7. Reviews of Degradation of Station Batteries

The inspector was notified by the licensee that they had identified

serious degradation of the batteries for the safety-related 125 volt D.C.

system (batteries A, E, C and D). The degradation was the deterioration

or flaking of the cell plates and also the flaking of the plate's hook

area where the plates connect to the cell's posts. This flaking of the

hook area is exhibited in the A, B, C and D batteries. Three unresolved

items related to this degradation were developed by the inspector.

a. Seismic Qualification

l The inspector observed the batteries' deterioration during

inspections of the battery rooms. In addition the inspector

compared the as-built condition of the batteries to the licensees'

controlled drawings (6292-E9.02-1-S1 and 6292-E9.02-22-S1) and found

l discrepancies. The controlled drawings require a cell to cell

measurement of one-half of an inch, the inspector found a majority

of the cell to cell measurements to be greater than one-half of an

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inch. Additionally, the drawings do not specify an end gap

l measurement for the distance from the end cell to the steel end

stringer of the battery rack, yet the drawing does show, in a

sectional view, the end cell butted up against the end stringer.

The inspector found the end space measurement to vary from

three-sixteenths of an inch to up to one inch, with no end blocking

l material between the cell and the end-stringer.

The inspector also located a letter from GNB Batteries Inc., the

vendor, dated March 27, 1985 addressed to the licensee, describing

l GNB's recommendation for the spacing between the end cell and the

l end stringer of the battery rack. The spacing was recommended to be

no greater than one-quarter of an inch. The letter also stated that

the measurements were due to the vendor's seismic testing of their

batteries. It was evident that the vendor's recommendation was not

applied to the A, B, C and D batteries.

The vendor's drawing for the lay out of the original seismic

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qualification test, (drawing 057064C), shows three battery cells

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inch and end gap measurement of six and five-eighths of an inch.

This large end gap was filled with cell blocking material, which was

to be urethane, styrofoam or an approved equivalent. Therefore, it

appeared the batteries had not been installed per the design and the

seismic qualification of the batteries may have been compromised to

some degree. 'This item is considered unresolved, pending further

review of the significance of these nonconformances

(50-312/86-08-03).

b. Battery Operability-

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The deterioration of the battery cells at the plates' attachment to

( the posts was evident in most of the cells. This type of

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degradation was not expected of these batteries.- The licensee's

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Updated Final Safety Analysis Report states "...that no changes have

been observed which would indicate physical weakening of cells of

similiar construction which have been in service for over 40 years,

and cells of identical construction which have been inservice for

over 15 years. The manufacturer concludes that the A, B, C and D

system batteries will be capable of meeting the specified seismic

requirements for at least 20 years after installation."

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The inspector questioned whether the batteries should have been

considered operable, given the advanced deterioration of the battery

plates. Licensee representatives stated that they believe that the

batteries are operable.

These items are considered unresolved (50-312/86-08-04), pending

further review of the licensee's basis for this assertion.

c. Surveillance Program

In a previous inspection report (50-312/85-08) the inspector

identified errors and weaknesses in the surveillance program for the

station batteries. In addition it was identified that the duty

cycle discharge test performed on a refueling outage basis may not

be in compliance with the test required by the Technical

Specification (TS). TS 4.6.4.D requires the 125 volt DC system to

be tested: "...during each. refueling interval, the battery shall be

subjected to a rated load or equivalent test. . ." This test is

explained in the TS Bases as a surveillance "...which has been

demonstrated over the years to provide an indication of a cell

becoming unserviceable long before it fails." Due to the recent

indication of the batterys' physical condition it appears that the

test did not provide sufficient information to determine whether the

rate of battery deterioration was increasing. The inspector noted

that the licensee's surveillance program may not be adequate in

providing sufficient information to determine the batterys'

operability. The determination of whether the licensee's program

complied with the Technical Specifications is considered an

unresolved item (50-312/86-08-05). (Since this item is similiar to

unresolved item 85-08-01, item 85-08-01 will be administratively

closed.)

8. Exit Meeting

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The resident inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in

paragraph 1) at various times during the report period and formally on

March ll, 1986. The scope and findings of the inspection activities as

given in this report, were summarized at the meeting.

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ML20202J014

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