ML20202F428
| ML20202F428 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1998 |
| From: | Guarnieri S BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9802190198 | |
| Download: ML20202F428 (6) | |
Text
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Italtimore Gas amiDectric Compcmy Atanager 39 W. Inington Street Safety & AfedicalServices I$th Hoor llaltimore, Alarylaml2t201
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February 9,1998 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Docur..nt Control Desk SUILIECT:
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 Calvert Cliffs independent Spent Fuel storage Installation; Docket No. 72-8 Fitness for Duty: Program Performance Data (July 1 -- December 31.1997)
The Semi Annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data (Attachment 1) and Lessons Learned (Attachment 2) are submitted for the period of July I through December 31,1997 in accordance with 10 CFR 26.71(d).
Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yours,
- w (WW SRGffER/bjd Attachments: (1)
Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Personnel Subject to 10 CFR 26 (2)
Lessons Learned Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant July 1 - December 31,1997 cc:
(Without Attachments)
- 11. J. Miller, NRC R. S. Fleishman, Esquire Resident inspector, NRC J. E. Silberg, Esquire R. I. McLean, DNR f
Director, Project Directorate 1-1, NRC J.11. Walter, PSC
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A. W. Dromerick, NRC C
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Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Personnel Subject to 10 CFR 26 RALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY -
12/31/1997 Company 6 Months Ending
. CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT F. BRUCE MARTEN!!L PROGRAM MANAGER
__(410)234-6162 Contact Name Phone (area code)
CUTOFFS: Screen / Confirmation (ng/ml)
[X] Appendix A to 10 CFA 26 Marijuana 50/ng/ml Amphetamines
/
Cocaine
/
Phencyclidine
/
/
Oplates
/
Alcohol (% BAC)
/
RANDOM TESTING RATE FOR EMPLOYEES & CONTRACTORS = 50%
Long Term Short Term Testing Results Licensee Employees Contractor Personnel Contractor Personnel Average Number with Unescoded Acrese 1777 37 339 Cctegories Tested Positive Tested Positive Tested Positivo Pro Access 20 0
8 0
75 0
Post accident 0
0 0
0 0
0 Observed Behavior 3
1 0
0 1
0 Random 488 0
13 0
118 0
l Follow-up 4
O O
O O
O
}
i Other 0
0 0
0 0
0 TOTAL 615 1
21 0
194 0
i
'lI4E55 FOR DUTY PROGRAM
~
PERFORMANCE DATA r
rERSONNEL SUBJECT TO 10 CFR 26 Baltimore Gas & Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Reporting Period:
07/01/97-12/31/97 The following list is a breakdown of Manaagment Actiona taken as a result of confi med oositive drug / alcohol scree 5lngs performec under the Calvert Cliffs Finness For Duty Program:
TEST TYPE ACTION TAKEN Employee (1)
Access Terminated
BREAKDOWN OF CONFIRM POSITIVE TESTS FOR SPECIFIC SUBSTANCES Refusal l
l l
Amphe-Phency-l Alcohol ' to Test 1
2 f
3 4
lidine i 4
Marijuana Cocaine Opiates tamines Licensee Employees 1
I Long-Term Contractors I
Short-Term Contractors l
I TOTAL 0
0 1
0 0
0 0
1
~
LESSONS LEARNED CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT JULY I - DECEMBER 31,1997 Errors were found in the programming that extracted data from the Security Screening Data System (SSDS) and transferred the data into llEIDI, the drug and alcohol testing data base and random selector.
One error, discovered September 12,1997, resulted in the omission of two individuals from the random testing pool. This error was found during a verification that all individuals who reported to the Emergency Operations Facility were in the random testing pool. Neither of these individuals had unescorted access to the protected area. He two individuals were unaware they were omitted from the pool. They were under behavioral observation. They were given drug and alcohol tests upon discovery of the error and had negative test results. The coding problem that omitted individuals who reported to the Emergency Operations Facility from the random testing pool, but never had unescorted access authorization, was corrected. No other individuals had this coding configuration in SSDS.
On October 20,1997, during a verification of data as the FOCUS SSDS was being replaced with an Oracle based system, it was discovered that 128 individuals on loan from other utilities had been omitted from the random pool due to a programming design flaw that omitted the logic for this category of workers. This programming change occurred September 1,1995 when llEIDI.
was implemented. All of these individuals had unescorted access authorization for less than 60 days. They were under behavioral observation while on site. As none of these individuals had current unescorted access at the time of discovery of the error, drug and alcohol testing was not performed.
The other errors were discovered October 22, 1997 during this SSDS upgrade and the veri 6 cation of data extraction for importing into HEIDI Thirteen long-term contractors who currently had unescorted access authorization had been omitted from the random testing pool since November 17, 1995. A telephone report (Event No. 33138) was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on October 23,1997. Again, the individuals were unaware they were omitted from the pool and were under behavioral observation. They were hardcoded into the FOCUS extract. Drug and alcohol tests were performed on the thirteen individuals on discovery of the error. Testing was completed on twelve of the thirteen individuals by October 30,1997, -
with negative test results. As the thirteenth individual was unavailable for testing, his unescorted access was suspended until he returned December 1,1997, and was tested. His results were also negative. This error was a different coding problem than the one above. The individuals had been in the random testing pool since implementation of the Fitness for Duty Rule in January 1990. They were deleted from the pool on November 17,1995 when a change made by Security Screening was added to the FOCUS program that extracted the data from SSDS into llEIDI.
The extraction of data from the upgraded SSDS and the importing of data into HEIDI, was extensively tested and verified for accuracy. A daily report to determine if there were other 1
individuals who were omitted from HEIDI through the FOCUS extraction from SSDS was run from October 23,1997 (day after discovery of error) until November 17,1997 when the Oracle SSDS application was operational. No other individuals were found to have been omitted. A weekly audit report to ensure that individuals required to be in the random pool are extracted from SSDS and imported into HEIDI correctly has been implemented. Other planned corrective actions are: (1) creation of a software configuration management plan for SSDS and HEIDI scheduled for completion March 1, 1998; (2) creation of a unit procedure to modify SSDS 1
m
LESSONS LEARNED CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT JULY I - DECEMBER 31,1997 application transaction codes schedu!cd for completion June 1, 1998; (3) development of an audit program to evaluate the integrity ofSSDS Fitness for Duty and Emergency Response Plan identified workers schcduled for completion May 1,199S; and (4) review of IIEIDI program to ensure compliance with site information management procedures scheduled for completion June 1,1998.
The Information System individual who made the changes to SSDS was not the Information System individual who made the changes to the importation of data into llEIDI. The impact of changes in SSDS upon llEIDI was not fully understood nor was data verification conducted.
Both of the Information System individuals involved in the November 1995 changes had background investigations as required in 10 CFR Part 26, Appendix A. Subpart D.2.3 for personnel who administer the testing program, were under behavioral observation, and were not omitted from the random testing pool.
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