ML20202D884
| ML20202D884 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 07/16/1996 |
| From: | Barr K NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Demiranda O NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202D814 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-97-484 50-335-96-04, 50-335-96-09, 50-335-96-4, 50-335-96-9, 50-389-96-04, 50-389-96-09, 50-389-96-4, 50-389-96-9, NUDOCS 9802180025 | |
| Download: ML20202D884 (15) | |
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,8 UNITEo STATES g "
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
'E 101 MARIETTA STRE W.. SUITE 2900 re ATLANTA. GEORGIA 303234199 l
'+4 . . . . . # July 16, 1996 MEMORANDUM T0: Oscar DeMiranda, Regional Allegation Coordinator EnforcementandInvestigatio'CoordlyttonStaff e 2 FROM: Kenneth P. Barr, Chief .
Plant Support Branch /
Division of Reactor S11 e y '
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION N0: Ril-95-A-0183 The Senior Allegation Coordinator received information from an anonymous concerned individual who expressed several concerns involving radiation protection activities and lack of response to concerns and the Speakout Program at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. The Plant Support Branch (PSB assigned the responsibility to review the radiation protection program) was concerns. The radiation protection program allegations were reviewed during two on site inspections conducted during the periods of:
February 26, 1996 through March 1, 1996, and documented in Inspection Report No. 50-335,389/96-04, dated April 29, 1996, and June 17-21, 1996, r,a documented in Inspection Report No. 50-335, 389/96-09.
Our review of this matter has been completed and our findings are documented in the enclosures to this memorandum. The evaluation involved onsite inspection, a review of licensee Radiological Incident Reports, Personnel Contamination Reports, Radiological Surveys, Radiation Protection Procedures and Health Physics Technicians Resumes. The inspector conducted interviews with workers, health physics technicians and supervisors who were involved with the control of contaminated tools and equipment. Tours of the licensee's facilities for tool cortrol were made and the inspector conducted contamination surveys in tool rooms.
Based on our direct observations, review of documentation and the results of the inspection interviews, portions of the radiation protection allegations were substantiated. No violations were identified for the specific events reported by the alleger. However, one non-cited violation (NCV) and one notice of violation (NOV) were identified concerning the licensee's failure to maintain procedures. control of contaminated tools in accordance with the licensee A summary of the allegation, review findings and conclusions are included in the attachments. Inspection Report (IR) 96-09 has not been issued at this time out our draft input to the report is enclosed. Should the alleger 9802180025 980128 PDR FOIA BARTON97-484 PDR
L ..v 2-l subsequently identify himself, the final version of report 96 09 should be.
substituted for the enclosed draft input.
This concludes the PSB staff's activities regarding the Health Physics issues -
in this matter. The case file contains documentation which addresses the Speakout-issues. Therefore, all issues- are- addressed and this allegation is closed.
L Attachments: 1. Allegation Evaluation Report l
- 2. IR 50-335, 389/96 04
- 3. . Draft input'to IR 50-335,389/96-09 0
D
ATTACHMENT 1 ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT ALLEGATION Ril-95-A-0183 QUESTIONABLE HEALTH PHYSICS PRACTICES ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NOS 50 335 AND 50-389 ALLEGATION:
An anonymous concerned individual (CI) expressed several concerns with the radiation protection program.
Concern 1 - The CI re~'rted that, on November 14, 1995, a purple nylon choker strap was founo in a truck outside in the clean area. The CI '
said NRC could talk to the female HP technician that took smears on the
~
truck. The CI didn't know if a radiation incident was reported. The CI stated this had happened many other times.
Concern 2 - The CI reported purple painted tools _had been found in the clean tool room. The CI stated he suspects this is occurring because they (licensee) are hiring temporary employees that are not being properly trained. The CI had personally spoken with the new hires and they are not properly trained or knowledgeable in proper rad control procedures.
Concern 3 - The CI reported that: (a) the Hot Tool Rooms (HTRs) (I&E, Electrical Maintenance, Mechanical Maintenance, and Cont actor Tool
- Cribs) are no longer controlled, (b) one of the workers went into the Mechanical Maintenance Hot Tool room on November 14, 1995, and got personally contaminated and was written up, and (c) they don't have anyone at night in the tool room and anybody can go in and out at will.
The CI stated that he went into the tool room and found two contractors in there using the hot tool . room as a work area and they were spreading contaminat>on as they performed the work.
CONCERN 1 The CI rer '3d that, on November 14, 1995, a purple nylon choker strap was found in a truck outside in the clean area. The CI said NRC could talk to the
'emale HP technician that took smears on the truck. The CI didn't know if a
,adiation incident was reported. The CI stated this had happened many other times.
l DISCUSSION In accordance with licensee procedures, tools designated for use in the Radiologically Controlled Area (RCA) were permitted to have low levels of fixed contamination up to 10 mrem /hr. The tools could not have any smearable contamination in excess of 1,000 dpm/100 cm 2 and were to be identified with purple paint. These tools were referred to as " hot" tools and were not for use in areas outside the RCA.
2 The inspector reviewed licensee survey documents completed in November 1995 and all of the radiological incident reports completed in 1995. The inspector was unable to find any documentation indicating a purple or contaminated chocker strap was found outside the RCA. However, the inspector identified that the licensee found five contaminated slings in the clean tool room on June 19, 1996.
Since the licensee did not have any permanent Health Physics Technicians (HPTs) that were female, the HPT that the CI referred to would have been a vendor HPT, All of the vendor HPTs departed the site in 1995 and the licensee 4
was J' sing another HPT vendor in 1996. Therefore, the inspector was unable to identify or contact the female HPT.
. CONCLUSION 3
' -The inspector was unable to substantiate the specific concern that a contaminated chocker strap was found outside the RCA. However, the inspector did confirm that the licensee had was not adequately controlling contaminated tools and slings and a Notice of Violation (NOV) was issued with NRC inspection report 96-09. ~~
CONCERN 2 The CI reported purple painted tools had been found in the clean tool room.
The CI stated he suspects this is occurring because they (licensee) are hiring temporary employees that are not being properly trained. The CI had personally spoken with the new hires and they are not properly trained or knowledgeable in proper rad control procedures.
DISCUSSION The inspector was unable to confirm that purple tools had been found in the clean tool room. The inspector looked for tools painted purple in the clean tool room during both NRC inspections. No purple-painted tools were found in the clean-tool room during either review. The inspector also randomly surveytd tools in the clean tool room for radioactive contamination during
-each inspection and did not identify any tools having radioactive contamination during those surveys.
The inspector learned that the licensee had significantly reduced the number of full time maintenance and utility wcrkers (laborers) on site in 1995.
During outages temporary maintenance and utility workers were used_to support increased maintenance activities. The inspector determined that many of these personnel-had no-experience in radiation control practices. The training provided to these temporary workers was the same as provided to the permanent workers in General Employee Training (GET). However, the permanent workers onsite for several years would have received the GET training each year and could have more experience and knowledge than that provided in one GET radiation protection training course. Therefore, the CI is correct that temporary workers were not as well trained as the permanent workers due to their inexperience. However, the required radiation protection GET course had not changed significantly and all workers were required to complete the training prior to unescorted access into the RCA.
3
. \
The inspector interviewed various tool room personnel and all individuals interviewed knew that purple tools were for use in the RCA only. Not all tool room personnel knew the specific limits for hot tools. Tool room personnel were not required or qualified to mab contamination surveys of tools. '
CONCLUSION Based on a review of records and discussions with licensee and contract representatives, the allegation was substantiated.
While no tools painted purple were found in the licensee's clean tool room by the NRC inspector, the licensee found unmarked contaminated tools in the clean tool room during their surveys conducted June 18 and 19,1996. - A Notice of Violation was issued in inspection report 96-09 for failure to properly-control contamirated tools.
CONCERN 3a The Cl reported that the Hot Tool Rooms (HTRs) (I&E, Electrical Maintenance,
- Mechanical Maintenance, and Contractor Tool Cribs) are no longer control. led. ~
DISCUSSION During routine operations the licensee only had one hot tool room. During
, outages the licensee established temporary hot tool rooms in the Containment Building and in a mobile tool room moved just outside the licensee's auxiliary building.
-During tours of the ensee's facilities during a non-outage period in February 1996, the i , ector confirmed that the licensee's HTR was not controlled. The HTh was not locked and there were no personnel stationed in the room to maintain control of items entering and leaving the area. The inspector spent several hours surveying tools in the HTR. During those surveys the inspector found three or four small jacking bolts and a hammer having beta-gamma radiation levels slightly in excess of the limits for HTR tools specified in the licensee's radiation protection manual. Following the identification of the procedural violation, licensee management stated that the tool room would be manned for half a day during non-outage periods and would be secured at all other times. The licensee stated that the tool room would be mannnd.during outage periods.
CONCLUSION Based on inspector. observations and discussions with licensee representatives, the allegation was substantiated. The licensee did not have an individual present to control the hot tool room. There was no requirement, however, that the tool room be staffed at all times. Tools for issue in the tool room were required to have contamination levels below limits established in licensee
- procedures. A non-cited violation, in inspection 96-04, and a cited violation, in inspection report 96-09, were identified for failure to properly control contaminated tools. The inspector concluded the lack of control of tools entering and exiting the hot tool room could have contributed to the improper placement of contaminated tools there. During the June 1996 inspection (96-09), the inspector observed better controls for the hot tool room. It was either locked or manned throughout the inspection.
. a 4
1 CONCERN 3b- .
The Cl reported that one of the workers went into the Mechanical Maintenance Hot Tool room on November 14, 1995, and got personally contaminated and was written up. l DISCUSSION The inspector reviewed Personnel Skin and Clothing Contamination Reports (PSCCRs) for 1995. The inspector determined that the licensee had documented two personnel contaminations cccurring on November 14, 1995. PSCCR number 16 documented a worker's contamination of hands-up to 10,000 dpm/100 cm' and clothing up'to 1,000 dpm/100 cm'. As documented in the report:
- Worker got tools from Hot Tool Room and took them to work on 2A CCW Pump, on Exit Worker was contaminated. Tools that he used were found contaminated up to 40,000 dpm/100 cm'. Surveys on drawers and tools in hot tool room as well as pertinent panels on 2A CCW pump failed to detect any contamination."
The inspector was not able to find any evidence that the hot tool room itself (floors, walls, cabinets, etc.) were contaminated on November 14, 1995, or near that date (November 7 - 21, 1996). Licensee radiation protection '_
personnel reported the room itself had not been contaminated. The inspector was able to substantiate personnel were contaminated from contaminat-d tools removed from the HTR. Licensee procedures required loose beta gammi cadiation be less than 1,000 dpm/100 cm'. The tools removed from the HTR by ine workers on November 14, 1995 were contaminated at levels higher than the licensee's procedures permitted and the tools should not have been in the HTR.
CONCLUSION Based on a review of records and discussions with licensee representatives, the allegation was substantiated. Workers were contaminated from tools removed from the hot tool room having contamination _ levels in excess of licensee procedures. A non-cited violation, in inspection report 96-04, and a cited violation, in inspection 96-09, were identified by the inspector in February.and June,1996, for failure to properly control contaminated tools.
CONCERN 3c The Cl reports that they don't have anyone at night in the tool room and anybody can go in and out at will. The ci stated that he went into the tool room and found two contractors in there using the hot tool room as a work area andthey were spreading contamination as they performed the work.
DISCUSSION Licensee personnel reported that the hot tool room was not to be used as a maintenance work area. However, the inspector determined that there was no requirement preventing the performance of maintenance in the hot tool room.
The Cl provided inadequate information for the inspector to verify the
- specific event the alleger described had occurred. The inspector reviewed radiological incident investigations for 1995 and did not find any
. .. t 5
documentation of the hot tool room becoming contaminated _ during the performance of-maintenance activities within it.
L During the February 1996 inspection, the inspector did observe workers using a vice grip in the tool while making repairs to a non-contaminated component.
Since the area was uncontrolled, it was possible that the area could have been used impro)erly resulting in the spread of radioactive contamination.
However,i tle inspector was unable to confirm any such event occurred.
CONCLUSION __
Based on a review of records and discussions with licensee and contract representatives, a portion of the allegation was substantiated. The area was not positively controlled and workers did use the area occasionally as a work area. However, the inspector was unable to determine the room was contaminated in 1995_from improper contamination controls. No violation of regulatory requirer, ants was identified.
OVERAll CONCLUSION:
In summary, a non-cited violation and a cited-violation wbre identified for ~~
failure to properly control contaminated tools. While some of the sprcific allegations were not substantiated, the CI identified a weakness in tae licensee's controls for contaminated tools. This allegation is closed.
- h. _
November 17, 1995 ALLEGER IDENTIFICATION SHEET CASF NO: Ril-95-A-0BO& / 8 3 FACILITY: ST LUCIE ALLEGER / ADDRESS: CHANGE OF ADDRESS:
Mr. ANONYMOUS Mr.
HOME PHONE: (
WORK PHONE: (
)_
)
HOME PHONE: ( )
WORK PHONE: ( )
EMPLOYER: FP&L .
OCCUPATION: UTILITY WORKER 10 YEARS _
DOL COMPLAINT: YES () NO (/) 01 INVESTIGATION: YES () NO (/)
ERA NO: 01 CASE N0:
00L/AD DATE: DATE OPENED:
FINDING: DATE CLOSED:
D0L/ALJ DATE: FINDING: -
FINDING:
00L/50L DATE:
FINDING:
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/0THER CONTACTS l Alleger informed of NRC identity protection policy?... Y/N l Did alleger request confidentiality ?.. ....... .. . . Y_ N /
Did the alleger object to a licensee / state referral?.. Y_ N /
Was the alleger informed of DOL reporting requiraments? Yf N_
Type of Reaulated Activity: (a) Reactor b) Vendor (c) Materials (d)_ Safeguards (e) other:
l Functional Area (s): (a)_ Operations (b)_ Con'.struction (c)_ Safeguards (d)_ Transportation (e)_ Emergency Preparedness (f)/_ Onsite Health & Safety (g)_ Of fsite Health & Safety (e)/_ other: Industrial Safety. Chilled Source- (a)_ Cont Employee (b)_ Former Employee (c)/. Anonymous (d)_ Licensee Employee (e)_ News Media (f)_ Organization (gl.__ Other o
ps Fax:404-562-4766
-,.. - ~ Teb 6 '98
- 1_0:57 P.03 I l 1 .g ALLEGATION REPORT .
Q CASE NO: P.II- 9 5 - A- 0183 FACILITY: ST LUCIE CONCERN M
NO: (1) & (2)
' ' ' - " " - ' - - ' ' " - DOCKET No: 50-335 ALLEGER: (ANONYlOUS) EMPLOYER: FP&L ADDRESS:
' HOME PNoNE: ( ) TITLE: UTILITY WORKER (10 YEARS)
W
___oRK PMoNEt t )
DATE RECEIVEDr 11/16/95 (10:20-11:30AN)
L SAC received information from an annnymous concerned individual.who expressed several concerns involving health physics, lack of response to concerns, and Speak 7at at the St. Lucie Nuclear Plant. *
(1) HEALTH PHYSICS CONCERNS h Example 1 - The ALGR said that last night (11/14/95) they found a purple nylon chocker strap used for lifting that ic supposed to be controlled in the hot area and was found in a truck outside in a clean area. The ALGR truck. said that we could talk to the HP/ females that took smears on the -
The ALGR didn't know if a radiation incident was reported. The ALGR said that this has happened many other times.
S Example 2 -
the clean toolThe room. ALGR said that they have found purple painted tools in The ALGR said that anything painted purple is supposed tools.
to stay on the hot side which is how they control contaminated The ALGR said the reason he suspects this is occurring is because trained. now they are hiring temp employees that are not being properly ALGR has personally spoken with the new hires and they are not properly trained or knowledgeable in proper rad control procedures.
Example 3 -
The ALGR said another problem is with the hot tool rooms '
(I&E, ELEC MAINT, MECH MAIh"r, & CONTRACTOR TOOL CRIBS) which are no longer controlled.
The ALGR said that one of the workers went into the MECH MAINT HOT TOOL room the other night 11/14/95, and got personally contaminated which was written up. The ALGR said that tools are supposed to be free of loose contamination and painted purple. The ALGR said that now they don't have a'2yone at night in the tool room and anybody can go in and out at will.
A11eger informed of NRC identity protection policy?. . . Y/ N Did allager request confidantiality ?. . .. .... Y w/
Did the alleger object to a licensee / state referral?. . . Y - ~
N/
Was the alleger informe'd of DOL reporting requirements? Y2 N_ ~
Tvoe of Raoulated Activityt (d) _ Safeguards (e) othar t_ _ (a)/_ Reactor b) _ vendor (c),,,,,, Materials Funct %nni Area (s) : (a)_,,,, operations (b)__, Construction (c),_ Safeguards (d)_,_ Transportation Health & Safety (g)_ offsite Health & Safety (e),_, Emergency Preparedness (f)/_ onsite
, , . . . . . , . . . -- (e)/__ cther: Industrial Safety, Chilled _
Ask all above quesElons, do not le[ve any blanks.
Forwarn this form to: RII/RAc. P.O. BCI E45 Atlanta. Complete CA 3D301oneDo sheet for each issue.
copies subsequent to receipt by RAC. not retain any file RAC phone numaars are 1404) 331-4193 & 331-4194.
PREPART~) BY: OSCAR DEMIRANDA DATE PREPA_prn: NOVEMBER 16, 1995 O
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. ALLEGATION- REPORT CONTINUATION SHEET CASE NO: RII-95-A-0183 FACILITYs-ST. LUCIE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION The ALGR noted that there are no longer any calibrated M&TE kept in the hot tool room which is kind of a justification for not controlling the tool room. The ALGR said that the calibrated M&TE are kcpt on the cold side.
The ALGR said that one night he went in the hot tool room and found two contractors in there using the hot tool room as a work area. The ALGR
-said-that they were spreading contamination as they performed the work.
2.-LACK OF RESPONSE TO CONCERNS /SPEAKOUT "You bring up safety issues to safety and nothing gets done. They've-even taken pictures and nothing gets done. You tell supervision and nothing gets done. Speakout is a joke - everyone laughs about it.
Speakout is just a coverup program. Whenever anybody goes to Speakout -
everyone knows within minutes about it - ask anybody. The only reason I'd go to Speakout is to get a new coffee mug."
"Believe me - management will get rid of you if you speakout. We all know what happened to Saporito when he spoke out he got fired. DOL is l not an option for me - I.got a wife and kids. -You can't take on management they'll fire ~you. Management just pushes to get the work done no matter what it takes. When we report things to management they never get better."
ADDITIONAL ~ COMMENTS
" People are really getting stressed out because of the uncertaL their employment future. _Everybody's attitude is the same - reo * . of ion in force - nobody cares anymore. People are just doing enough to get by. This has been going on since August 1995."
.The 3d;GR would not identify himself. The ALUR was provided with the case number for future reference.
I P
ACTION REQUIRED !
- 1. ARP REQUIRED j l
PREPARED BY: OSCAR DEMIRANDA DATE PREPARED: NOVEMBER 16, 1995
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ACTIVITY SECTION DATEllNITIALS l " "- ,
REF: Ril-96-A-0145
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SUBJECT:
- 1) St. Lucie Containment Radiation Monitors cannot be ;
safely worked on. They are located high at the top of Lidders in f
containment, have no associated work platforms and scaffolding is not erected for the work. OSHA ISSUE. 2) St. Lucia Cafibration of }i Unit 1 control room radiation monitors was performed informally f based upon vertsal guidanos by lead I&C Specialist, who gave instructiorin on making bias adjustments which were not included in .
the procedure. 3) St. Lucia containment altbome radiation monitor, qde located in containment above the 62' elevation by the elevator, had
' ted without a test of the local / remote alarm in the procedure.
.. had fallen into the lower refueling cavity 4
a rkey ng a recent outage due to a lack of handrails.
4 07/10/96;ODM At i FGER IDENTIFICATION SHEET 1
07/19196;00M INDEX OF CONCERNS 2
07/13/96;ODM ARD MEETING HELD ON 7/19/96. ACTION ASSIGNED TO m
t DRS/PSB (BARR).
5 08/12/96;AJi ACKNOWLEDGEMENT LETTERTO ALLEGER l
- 1. STATEMENT OF CONCERNS i 2. !DENTITY PROTECTION f 3. NRC FORM 3 3&S 01/03/97;ODM DRS CLOSURE LETTERTO ALGR WITH ATTACHED:
- 1. ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT
- 2. REPORT NOS. 96-11 & 96-17 SAC FINAL REVIEW AND CASE CLOSURY , NONE A
01/14/97;ODM NONE 01/14197;ODM CASE CLOSED- OSCAR DEMIRANDA
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,- DESCRIPTION e LOCATION 1/ Containment Radiation Monitors cannot te safely worked on. They are located high at the top of Alleg Rpt ladders in containment, have no associated work Dater platforms and scaffolding is not erected for the Page; work. This in ern va I Para:
Item:
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, ACTION:7/19/96 ARB - ARB DETERMINED THIS TO BE AN OSHA TO BE HANDLED UNDER MC 1007 PROCESS.
ISSUECONCERN.
^
MANAGEMENT OF ALLEGF.R's CONCERN, RESIDENT INSPECTOR INFORM LICENSEE i
~
DOCUMENT THE INFORFiATION ON A DATA SHEET OF APPENDIX 4 j
AO soSURE The inspector determined that this is a non-radiolocical occupational health and safety issue. This industrial safety concern was reported to the licensee with the concerned individual's identity withheld.
Y 2/ i
/ St. Lucie Undt 1 contro.i.
L that calibration of Alleg Rpt radiation monitors was performed informally based upon verbal guidance Dater by lead It.C Specialist, who gave instructions on Page:
making bias adjus which wer t edure. luded in Paras the act ons Item:
pecia wou result in a change in the instrument's accuracy'.
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Later. ' a dif ferent (unspecified) radiation monitor was found to be out of calibration with the bias setting approximately 3 turns out of position,
' ' ' ' indicating that a similar adjustment ha,d been made which affected the monitor's a6 curacy. ,
ACTION 7/19/96 ARB - ACTION ASSI(.NED TO DRS/PSB :(BARR) E.
P'RFORM INSPECTION FOLLOW-UP.
Informati:n in tMs record was d&td in ;ccordance with the freedom of Information ,
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discussed The inspector was unable to verify the "specifif.5. event-
. Mt he allegation occurred.
review, However, during the allegation the inspector found numerous problems with the licensee's l maintenance relative to the and calibration of plant radiation monitoring systems allegations.
3/
A containment airborne radiation monitor, located Alleg Rpt in containment above the 62' elevat. ion by the clavator, had been tested without a te the
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n t at t e enec procedure. e the change had The ALLEGER been made. was unsure as to whether ACTION: _
7/19/96 ARB - ACTION ASSIGNED TO DRS/PSB (BARR). PERFORM INSPECTION FOLLOW-UP.
cTnsuaE :
The inspector determined that the licensee's procedures did not require the testing of the local alarms on plant process monitors and that none of the reviewed documentation of process monitor calibrations indicated the performance of a local alarm test.
The testing of local alarms requirement. for process monitors is a good practice, however, it is not a The inspector confirmed the licensee was not testing the requirements hadprocess local alarms on been violated. radiation monitors having them, however, no The value of the local alarm test was discussed with licensee Report 50-335,389/96-17 (paragraph R3.1) .
representatives and discussed in NRC Inspection g g . " 4 D
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NO. DESCRIPTION LOCATION p,v 4/ I he had fallen into the lower SA11eg'Rpt re ua ing cavity at Turkey Point during a recent outage due te, a lack of handrail.s.
- D'te:
a Page:
Para: ,
Item: _
ACTION: _
ALLEGED7/19/96 EVENT. ARB - TuxKEY POINT RESIDENT INSPECTOR FOLLOW-UP ON HANDLED BY THE LICENSEE. DETERMINE WanHER IT OCCURREL AND IF IT WAS PROPERLYi IF RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION WAS INVOLVED, l, THEN INFORM DRS/PSB. }'
CLOSURE:
The inspector reviewed and discussed condition report 95-857 that was originated due to an incident that occurred on September 18, 1995 during tha Unit 3 refueling outage. The inspection results are
' documented in NRC Inspection Report Nos. 50-250, 50-251/96-11, paragraph R1.1.
The incident involved a contractor employee falling into the lower refueling cavity from the upper refueling' cavity inside Unit 3 containment. The individual was not injured due to the fall as the lower cavity was filled with water at the time. The individual was successfully decontaminated, and as immediate corrective action, the licensee required all personnel working in the cavity to wear" life vests. No uptake of radiation occurred. No radiological exposura limits were exceeded. At the time of the fall, there was no barrier, cuch as hand rails, installed between the upper and lower cavity to preclude a fall.
5/
Date: / / Pa ge: -
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ACT10th CLOSURE:
Teb 6 '93
~
im Fax;4U4-567-4766 11:21 TF December 5, 1995
'NNkdMRM" $k5h5$**h35d5UNdRdhkh5db kkNN5dh$h E ALLEGER / ADDRESS: CHANGE OF ADDRESS: ,
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WORK PHONE: (-) WORK PHONE:
0 EMPLOYER: FP&L OCCUPATION:
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00L COMPLAINT: YES() NO (/)
ERA NO: OI INVESTIGATION: YES () NO (/)
01 CASE NO:
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D0L/AD DATE: DATE OPENED:
3n FINDING:
DOL /ALJ DATE:
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DATE CLOSED:
FINDING:
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FINDING:
DOL /SQL DATE: -
FINDING: _
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/0THER CONTACTS A!!acer informed of NRC Identity protection poucy?... Yf N_
Did sileger request confidentiality ?..... ..... ..... Y_ Nf Did the ausger object to a licensee /stste referrel?... Y_ Nf Was the sileger informed of DOL reporting requirements? Yf N_
Tvos of Reoutated Activitv?_ (e)/ Reactor b)_ Vendor (c) Materists (d)_ Safeguards (a) other: .
Functional Arasfal: (a)_ Operations (b)_ Construction (c)_ Safecuerds (d)_ Transportation (e)_ Erner0ency Preparedness (f)_ Onsite Health & Safety (g)_ OfIsite Health & Safety (o)/,,, other: MAINTENANCE Source: (a)_ Cont Ernployee (b)_ Former Employee (c)/,,, Anonymous (d)_Ucensee Employoo (e)_ News Modle (f)_ Organization (g)_ Other e_.
~ sj was da:ctej :
. moxc wiih the Freedom of information O r Act, exemptions '7C FolA- 9 ~?- VJ Y (i 1
1
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MAY 31, 1996:
4 Florida Power & Light Company ATTN: T. F. Plunkett President - Nuclear Division P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, Florida 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION REPORT N05, 50 250/96-05, 50-251/96-05, 50-335/96-07, AND 50-389/96-07 L
Dear Mr. Plunkett:
l This refers to the inspection conducted from April 22 through May 3.- 1996.
The inspection included a review of activities authorized for your Turkey Point, St. Lucie and Juno Beach facilities. At the conclusion of the - !
inspection, the findings were discussed with those members of your staff identified in the enclosed report. ;
Areas examined during the inspection are identified in the report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observation of activities in progress.
The NRC encourages licensees to implement employee concerns programs and recognizes your positive initiatives to prnvide an effective, alternate means for employees to voice their concerns. - Although we judged ycur programs to be effective at all three company locations (Turkey Point, St. Lucie, and the Corporate Office in Juno Beach), we determined that recent staffing reductions and a perceived lack of employee confidence associated with identity protection may have negative effects on your program in the future.
Specifically, as described in the enclosed report and discussed in the ~
St. Lucie exit meeting on May 3,1996, weaknesses associated with implementation of Florida Power and Light Nuclear Policy NP-800 were noted.
Within the scope of this inspection, no violations or deviations were identified, in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter 'and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY JOHNS P. JAUDON Johns P. Jaudon, Deputy Director Division of Reactor Safe;.
Docket Nos: 50-250, 50-251, 50-335, and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-31, DPR-41, DPR-67, and NPF-16 h V
Enclosure:
Inspection Report
.cc w/ encl: (See page 2)
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FP&L 2 cc w/ encl:
H._N.JPaduano, Manager-Licensing & Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company-P. O. Box 14000 Juno Beach, FL 33408 0420 D. E. Jernigan, Plant General Manager-Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 029100 Miami, FL 33102 R. J. Hovey, Site Vice President Turkey Poin. Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 029100-Miami, FL 33102 T. V. Abbatiello, Site Quality Manager _
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant .
P. O. Box 029100 Miami, FL 33102 G. E. Hollinger, Licensing Manager Turkey Point Nuclear Plant P. 0.. Box 4332 Miami, FL 33032-4332 W. H. Bohlke, Site Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 ft. Pierce, FL- 34954-0128-J. Scarola, Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. O. Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 E. J.- Weinkam, Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant-P. O. Box-128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahasse- FL 32399-1400 (cc w/enti cont'd - See page 3) l j
'FP&L- 3
.(cc/ enc 1 cont'd)
-Joe Myers, Director-Division of Emergency Preparedness Department.of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL -32399 2100
- J.-R. Newman, Esq.
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 1800 M Street, NW Washington,_D.'C. 20036
. John T. Butler, Esq.
Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial. Center Miami, FL 331312398 n
Attorney General -
Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32304
. Bill =Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health'and Rehabilitative Services-1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700.
Jack Shreve, Public Counsel
' Office of-the Public Counsel c/o-The Florida-Legislature 111-West Madison Avenue, Room 812
- Tallahassee,: FL 32399-14001
--Joaquin Avino County Manager of Metropolitan Dade. County
.111 NW 1st Street, 29th Floor Miami, FL. 33128-Joe Myers, Director
-Division of Emergency-Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 4
(cc w/ enc 1 cont'd - See_page 4)
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FP&L 4
(cc w/ encl cont'd)
Thomas R. L. Kindred County Ad:ainistrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 Rockville, MD 20852 Distribution w/ encl:
g Senior Resident Inspector Y U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissinn -R. Coteau, NRR P. O. Box 1448 K. M s, RII Homestead, FL 33090 J. Norris, NRR ~
B. Crowley, RII Senior Resident Inspector G. 211sm, MI U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission IC 7585 South Highway A1A Jensen Beach, FL 34957-2010
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_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~
UN:TEo STATES >
[na atop'%'4 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
{; $ REGION ll 101 MARIETTA STREET N.W., SUITE 290n 9j ATLANTA, GEORGIA '.3323-o199 Report Nos.:
50-250/96-05, 50 251/96 05, 50-335/96-07, and 50-389/96-07 Licensee: Florida Power and Light Company P. O. Box 14000 Juno Seach, Florida 33408-0420 Docket Hos.: 50-250, 50-251, 50-335 and 50-389 License Nos.: DPR-31 DPR-41 DPR-67 and NPF-16 Facility Name:
Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4; St. Lucie Plant Units 1 and 2 Inspection Coi1 ducted: April 22 - May 3, 1996 Lead Inspector: .M h m. M-OvN/1 [. N7 / /W. -
Morris Branch, Surry Senior Retident inspector Date Signed Accompanying Personnel:
W. Bearden, Reactor Inspector G. alton, Reactor Inspector A U M' a -
.tpproved # by: Paul fredricKson, Chief ~ _
Special Inspection Branch Date Signed Division of Reactor Safety
SUMMARY
Secpe:
This spu al announced inspection was conducted at the Turkey Point and St. Lucie nuclear plants and at the FP&L corporate office in duno Beach, Florida.
The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate the effectiveness of s the licensee's Speakout Programs in addressing safety concerns.
Results:
The inspe.ctors concluded that the licensee's Speakout Programs were effective in handling and resolving employee safety concerns.
were not identified. Violations or deviations NP-800, Nuclear Safety Speakout Program were identified.Sev investigative techniques and methods used to make corrective act1onSpecifically; 1) recommendations have the potential to reveal inadvertently the identity of the concerned employee which the Nuclear Policy intends to protect; 2) Many of the Response Letter: to the concerred employees did not.
through implementation as required.as required by NP-300; 3) Correcti
$$fv/0 R4o- - ~
2 Recent staffir.2 reductions and a perceived lack of employee confidence associated with identity-protection might have negative effects on the Speakout Program effectiveness-in the future.
The' review did not identify any technical issues that had been-inadequately resolveo,
+% -
0 e
6 4
4 REPORT DETAILS Acronyms used in this report are defined in paragraph 7.0. -
1.0 Persons Contacted 1.1 Licensee Employees
- R. J. Acosta, Director Nuclear Assurance
- W. H. Bohke, Vice President, St. Lucie E *J. C. Gallagher, Senior Investigator Speakout
- J. K. Luchka, Speakout Site Representative, St. Lucie
- H. N. Paduano, Manager, Licensing and Special Projects
- T. F. Plunkett, President, Nuclear Division
- E. J. Weinkam, Licensing Manager, St. Lucie _ ,
- H. G. Wiles, Speakout Representative, Turkey Point
{ Other licensee employees contacted included construction c?aftsmen, engineers, technicians, operators, mechanics, and electricians.
1.2 NRC Resident inspectors
- B. 8, Desti, Resident Inspector, Turkey Point
- T
- M.
P. Johnson, Senior Resident inspector, Turkey Poirt S. Miller, Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie
- P. E. Fredrickson, Branch Chief, DRS, Region II
- Attended exit interview (Refer to paragraph 6 for additional information.)
2.0 introduction--
The NRC has performed several reviews of the FP&L Employee Concerns Program (Speakout). The most recent review prior to this inspection was documented in IR 50-250, 251/93-23 and 50-335, 389/93-21 and similar to this review, all three of FP&L's Speakout locations (Juno Beach, Turkey Point, and St. Lucie) were inspected. _
During performti;is their inspection, review. the inspectors used a change analysis approach to The inspectors evaluated program changes e:d staffing changes since the October 1993 inspection which concluded that the Speakout Program was working well with the exception of perceived issue resolution timeliness.
3.0 Speakout Program Policy and Procedures (40500)
The inspectors reviewed FP&L Nuclear Policy NP-800, Nuclear Safety Speakout, Revision 3; FP&L Nuclear Division Instruction NSS-1, Nuclear Saf~ty e Speakout Program, Revision 4; FP&L Juno Beach Interdepartmental Procedure IP-802, Nuclear Safety Speakout Program, Revision 2; Turkey Point Administrative
2 Procedure 0-ADM-002, Nuclear Safety Speakout Program, dated February 25, 1993; and St. Lucie Administrative Procedure 0010519, Nuclear Safety Speakout Program, Revision 10.
The policy described in NP-800 is disseminated to all employees in several ways.
First,-it is presented as part of the general employee training when ar, employee starts working at one of the stations or the Corporate Office.
Second, the policy is described to employees by the Nuclear President in a
' taped video that is presented during employee initial entrance and final exits from each station or Corporate Office. The presented information encourages FP&L employees and contractors to participate in the program and to share any concerns they have with their supervisors. Additionally, employees are made aware that if they do not wish to discuss their concerns with supervision they can bring their concerns directly to Speakout or to the NRC. Employee identity protection and anonymity is-implied by the policy as well. The policy indicates that concern resolution will be prompt, unbiased, fact based, with appropriate feedback provided to the concerned employee. The policy further states that any required corrective action will be recommended to the appropriate departments and followed through to implementation.
The inspectors reviewed data associated with Speakout Program implementation.
Concern receipt rate, average age of open concerns, percentage of concerns substantiated, dates of outages, and timeframe of Speakout -staffing reductions were included. The numbers of concerns-for the years 1993 and 1994-from all three locations were approximately 300 per year. Then in 1995 the number of 4
concerns dropped to approximately 150. Although the total number of concerns received by Speakout had gone down over the past two years the numbers received during outages continued to be high. Additionally, during 1994 there were four outages, which may partially explain the higher' number of concerns received. The number of concerns substantiated by Speakout has dropped from approximately 45 percent at the time of the October 1993 inspection to a present average of -33 percent. Speakout staffing has been reduced from three people per location to 1 person per location and many functions currently described in the' licensee's procedures are not being performed.
The inspector's review of NP-800 implementation along with Speakout package evaluation and employee interviews discussed later in this report identified i
the following strengths in the Speakout Program: '
- Employees are generally satisfied with their supervisors' receptiveness to resolving safd y concerns without the intervention of the Speakout Program. They know about the Speakout Program and would use it if needed.
Speakout program procedures are~ comprehensive and detailed.
Speakout staff is dedicated to the program.
Facilities are accessible with adequate protection of files.
4
4 3
Files were organized and contained sufficient inf4rtation that daumented that the employse's concern had been adequately reviewed.
The inspection licensee management, also identified several items that need further evaluation by in that implementin fully meet the stated intent of NP 800. g Tie srocedure or &ctual ptactices do not following weaknasses were noted:
Controlling Procedure NSS 1 did not reflect current practices.
Speakout investigation plans were not being developed or used.
Several speakout positions described were nu h:nger staffed.
Periodic Speakout interviews, which could be used to gage the effectiveness of the system were not being conducted.
Corrective action tracking through to implementation as stated in NP 800 is not clearly specified and is not routinely performed.
Concerns are not always entered into the data base in a timely manner and concerned employees are routinely informed that resolution of their co trns may be delayud.
On titu eviewed indic.tes an increasing trend in open concern backlog and
- o closure following the Speakout staffing reduction in November 1995.
Many of the letters to concerned employees were not detailed and provide little feedback information to the individuals.
Confidentiality protection as described in St. Lucie Procedure 0010519 conflicted with the policy specified in NP 800 and FP&t. Nuclear Division Procedure NSS 1.
Investigative techniques and methods used to make corrective action recommendations have the potential to reveal inadvertently the employees's identity. There did not appear to be a planned process to expurgate information or develop inspection plans tnat would better ass 0re prsservation of the concerned employees identity.
4.0 Employee Interviews (40500)
(
w The inspectors interviewed various levels of managers, Speakout Program '
Coordinators, and 56 employees from various levels (i.e. managers and technicians)-and various disciplines, inclu G 1: engineering, operations, maintenance, chemistry, health physics, and craft personnel. The 56 employees included 10 from Juno Beach,'21 from Turkey Point, and 25 from St. Lucie. The selection was random except the selection was made by deputments in order to obtain a representative sample from the various work discipitr,es. It is
- - - ~
important to note that the interview sample _ size used is consistent with other-
-inspections of this nature but may not allow statistical extrapolation of results to the entire population of workers.
v
4 i The interviews with senior managers indicated that_they supported tha Speakout Programs and were aware of Speakout Program activities.
Interviews with the Sneakout Coordinators revealed that these individuals at all three locations h'd a investigative experience, but lacked sufficient nuclear experience to perform technical reviews for some nuclear safety significance items.- However, the program was established such that the Speakout investigators normally do not perform the technical reviews. The investigator who actually performs the technical review L generally an
- concern. or maintenance person who is te%nically. qualified in the areas of engineer i
1
- Of the 56 persons interviewed, 98 percent said they would report safety
, concerns to their supervisor or management first. Most said that all safety concerns in the past had been adequately resolved by their supervisor or management.
Of the 56, 93 percent said they could go to Snenkout with a safety concern, if the issue could not be resolved with their management.
When asked about what they woul0 de
~
if Speakout did not adequately resolve the safety concern, all persons stated they would then take their safety concern to the NRC.
Of the 56 persons interviewed, 19 percent at Turkey Point and 20 percent at St. Lucie believed or perceived that their dentify would be revealed to their management if they went to Speakout. The basis given by the interviewees for this perception was not that they thought Speakout would actually give their names to management, but the' methods used by Speakout to transfer the concern to other organizations for technical review contained enough data about the circumstances to reveal the concerned employees's identity. One person who was interviewed and had previously been assigned to investigate technical issues said he could always identify the concerned empicyee based on the data he received from Speakout and with his knowledge about the issue before the concerned employee went to Speakout.
in Paragraph 5. This issue is discussed in more detail Eleven percent of the 56 interviewed stated they felt so m hat badgered or knew someone that had been badgered for going to Speakout. Powever, almost all of nuclear valid these same safety individuals issue. said they would go f a speakout if they had a All persons interviewed indicated the Speakout fra.ilities were adequately accessible and 54 percant stated they had used or had knowledge of someone who had used the Speakout Program. Most of the responses to the questions on i timeliness and adequacy of concern resolution was based on either heresay or second hand information. Thirty three percent thought the concerns submitted by them or submitted by someone they . knew were not adequately resolved. Also, 20' percent of the. employees interviewed who had knowledge of a concern believed that the resolution of the concern was too slow. This perception, whether factual or not, has a tendency to supprest the effectiveness of an employee concerns program and should be addressed by the licensee.
~
5 in summary, the inspectors concluded that employees were generally satisfied with their supervisors' receptiveness to resolving safety concerns without the intervention of the Speakout Program. They knew about the Speakout Program and would use it d they needed to, but several had reservations'about the outcome in that their identity might be disclosed. Accessibility to the Speakout was thought to be acceptable to the people interviewed. The i
Turkey Point and St. Lucie. responses received from the interviews wert consistent at Juno B 5.0 Employee Concerns Program files (92720)
The inspectors selected various Speakout Program files that - been closed by the licensee since the last NRC reeiew of the progre '
Files were reviewed to determine adequacy of the licensee's investigation and corrective actions.
Specifically the inspectors reviewed the files to determine if overviews and summaries of activities related to the concerns (i.e., classifications, investigations, safety concerns.and communications) were adequate to address the employees' Additionally the inspector evaluated each file to determine if concerns were clearly identified and if closeout letters to the concerned employee adequately described the concern, the extent of the licensea's review, and anywhether plannedthe employee's corrective actions. concern was substantiated or not substantiated, The inspectors reviewed 45 Speakout Program files, including some at Turkey Point, St. Lucie, and the FP&L corporate office.
substantiated and unsubstantiated concerns. Speakout Files selected included both personnel provided adequate physical protection of the files and all records related to investigations were kept in locked storage with very limited access to protect the individuals' identities. Personnel with a valid need wer; allowed access to file information only after signing a confidentiality agreement. The i inspectors' review of the files indicated that the quality and timeliness of t
the Speakout Program reviews of concerns, investigations, and followup with concerned employees did not vary significantly between locations. The Speakout files were well nrganized and documented. Specific comments included:
Technical reviews of the concerns at all locations were effectively performed such that concerns were fully investigated. Files contained sufficient information to demonstrate that the employee's t.vncern had been adequately addressed.
In most cases reviewed, the closecut letter to the concerned employee was not completed within the 45 day target period but was normally completed in less than four months from receipt of the concern. Most files included an earlier letter to the concerned employees to advise them of the investigation status or that the concern was being addressed.
Files which took longer often included an additional letter advising the concerned employee of the delay. For files reviewed at Turkey Point and Juno Beach, letters to concerned employee' s did not provide sufficient detail to dascribe the licensee's review and ,
i corrective actions associated with the employees' concerns. A few files reviewed did not include a copy of a closure letter.
6 For one file eniewed at Juno Beach, the closecut lettar sent to the concer:M employee incorrectly stated the concern. However the inspec w noted that the documented review contained in the fila was correct and that the concern had been adequately addressed.
Procedure NSS 1 was not always adhered to. For example most files at Turkey Point and Juno Beach did not contain an investigation plan.
Although all locations tracked recommendations resulting from investigations, the Speakout Program did not include a closure process that assures corrective actions are implemented. Speakout recommenMions were sent to line management,. and acknowledgement memos were maintained in the files by Speakout.
Some files did contain actual completion information. _ No inst'nces were identified where any Class I concern resolved. (Class 1 is defined as a nuclear safety issun' was not actually j
- 1, Several administrative errors and lack of attention to detail wei noted. e For example, several files reviewed at Juno Beach included incorrect indexing information and dates.
Two Class 1 files reviewed at Juno Beach did not contain a record of the concern investigation results having been reviewed by the oversight group-(SRC).
In some instances the independence of the investigations was questionable.
The investigative techniques and methods used to make corrective action recommendations have the potential to reveal inadvertently the identity of the concerned employee, Inconsistencies exist in the method used to document acknowledgement to the concerned employee that continued review of the employee's e.oncern might reveal the employee's identity.
, Concerns classified as Class 1 are investigated by the Sneakout staff regardless of whether or not the concerned employee agrees. In some cases the inspectors noted that employees had been asked to sign the conficentiality disclosure acknowledgement even though different methods of reviewing' the concern, without potentially revealing the errployee's identity existed. Ih a few cases no signed form was present even thot.gh the investigation method could have possibly revealed the identity of the .wployee.
The inspectors found the St.1.ucie Speakout Program files to be notably well organized in a clear and consistent order.
Information related to the concerns was thoroughly documented. Closeout letters-to concerned employees contained locations.
a greater level of detail than thost reviewed at the other Utilization of an investigation plan was more common at St. i.ucie than at the other locations.
I
____ -._ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ . _ - . _ - . _ _ . _ _ _ . - _ _ - _ . _ _ . .m__._,
l 7
6.0 Exit Meeting Summary '
The inspection scope and findings were summarized during management interviews held throughout the inspection period with both the company president, site vice presidents and plant general managers and selected members of their staff. An exit meeting was conducted on May 3, 1996. (Refertoparagraph1.0 forexitmeetingattendees.) The areas requiring management attention were 1 reviewed, i the inspection The results.
inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail The licensee did not identify as proprietary any of the materials orovided to or reviewed by the inspectors during this i inspection, Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.
Employee confidentiality information is not contained in this report.
7.0 List of Acronyms and Abbreviation FP&L Florida Power and Light IR Inspection Report _
NP Nuclear Procedure NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission SRC Spenkout Review Committee ;
e r x
l 4
- 95 C'o ut UNITED STAltS
, oa # % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l p' 'S REGION il l
= g 101 MARIE 1TA STREET, N.W.. SUITE 2XC I E :; ATLANT A. GEORGIA 333234199
\' .....,
/
JAN I I 1996 D3 MOR.'!MIDN RD,10VID o
SUBJECT:
ALLEGATION NO. Ril fu A-0001 - ALLEGED PHYSICAL SECURITY VIOLATION f AT ST. LUCIE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT p
N Dear tl 4 This letter refers to a concern you expressed to the Nuclear Regulatory u Commission on January 2,1995, regarding an apparent physical security 2 violation at the St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant. Specifically, you alleged that en December 19, 1994, the door to the Armory located in the East Security Butiding was left open and unattended during, the period 7:15 a.m. - 7:30 a.m.
Our review regarding this matter has been completed, and our findings are documented in the enclosures to this letter. Based on the information provided, we were able to confirm that such an event occurred; however, no violations of the licensee's Physical' Security Plan or security procedures were identified.
This concludes the staff's activities regarding this matter. If you have any questions, you may contact Mr. Oscar DeMiranda of my staff at (404) 331 4193, or by mail at P.O. Box 845, Atlanta, Georgia 30301.
incNrely,
- f/t Bruno Uryc, trector,<
Enforcement and Tnvestigation
' Coordination Staff
Enclosures:
- 1. Allegation Evaluation Report
- 2. Excerpt from NRC Intpection
. Report No. 50-335,'389/95 4 8 Certified Mail No. P 291 242 525 RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED
' ga,aiian in this record was deteted in accord:nce with the Freedom of Information .y Act,exem tionsT F 01 A --
f JY-?4%+ccriy y,,
. ,,. n.
ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT ALLEGATION NUMBER R!l-95-A 0001 ALLEGED PHYSICAL iECURITY VIOLATION ST. LUCIE D0CKET NUN 8ERS 50-33!I AND 50 389 ALLEGATION:
On January 2,1995, the alleger te)orted that on December 19, 1994, the Plant St. Lucie Armory door located in tie East Security Butiding was left open and unattended for a period of approximately 15 minutes.
DISCUSSION:
The alleger's concern was* reviewed during an onsite inspection conducted on March 27-31, 1995. As discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50 335, _
50-389/9508, which documented this inspection, the event described by the ,
alleger was substantiated. The inspector noted that the licensee had documented the event in a Security Incident Report which stated that the door in question was open for ap)roximately two minutes. The Armory is inside the protected area and across tle hall from the continuously occupied, glass enclosed, security access station. Various written statements attached to the Security incident Report documented the fact that the door was closed, tight to the door jamb (versus "open"), but left unsecured while no one was inside the Armory. Several officers inside the security access station were aware of the Armory having been opened at shift change. An inventory accounted for all equipment inside the room after the event was discovered. The inspector reviewed the licensee's report, toured the area in question, and spoke with individuals having personal knowledge of the event.
CONCLUSION The inspector confirmed that the event described by the alleger occurred; however, no violations of NRC requirements were identified as a result. No requirements in the Physical Security Plan nor Security Implementing Procedures required the Armory to be locked when unattended.
O ENCLOSURE 1 m r- - - - - , < - ,,w - - - , - w -
Waarnmu n fg)f7 ALLEGATION REPORT 8Y'*7D"Edhh CASE PILE NO: ObN-OOO/ i.CILITY: Of*, [ t/C/d ALLEGE DOCKET NO. (S) PPR-G 7+N PF-/6 ADDRESS ,
LICENSE NO fo-a ar/Sk'9 ,
DATE/ TIME REC'D
- t// 3f f,4, //ljv7 O
EMPLOYER: ST /. O c/ 6 b HOME PHONE
- TITLE:
tv- WORK PHONE CONFIDENTIALITY REQUESTED: Y N m
)g&TISTi!EALLEGATION? ARMS koom Oce2 WT Ofs/d A y ,D QO L/WA rT c A)DGb -
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}gyLT IS THE REQUIREMENT / VIOLATION? F/>K tt
}gMRE IS IT LOCATED? /d 'fHf M LArr 5'6cuntrY 20tlyNG , -
}ggg D1D IT OCCUR? MC, f 9,19 94J DCYa>CEA) O!)/f- 079D
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1 HON /WHY DID IT OCCUR? U//NA/Ot44)
WHAT EVIDENCE CAN DE EXAMINED?
DID THE INDIVIDUAL EXPRESS A CON',ERN TO THE LICENSEE 7 A/C
] EAT IS TEE STATUS OF THE LICENSER'S AC7.' IONS? B//)
/
WHAT IS THIS AN ISSUE OF7 SAFETY EGUARD DRUGS FALSIFICATION (CIRCLE ONE) -
- DISCRIMINATION OTHER Ask all above questions, do not leave any blanks. Complete one sheet for each issue. Forward this form to: RII/RAC. P.O. BOX 845 Atlanta, GA 30301. Do not retain any file copies subsequent to receipt by RAC.
RAC phone numbers are (404) 331-4193 & 331-4194.
- ADVISE ALLEGERS OF THE 180 DAY DOL REPORTING REQUIPWRWT FOR DISr'D M m TION COMPLAINTS - (INITIAL) YES , NO IdGEE p u*rthkY N drNC in accordance with the freedom of information DATE PREPARED: //3/k Act, exemptions '7C fotA. 77-(/J </
k\
__ _ _ _ _ - _ _._ _ _ __ _ .____ __ _ _ _ - _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ~ . - _
- January 10, 1996 ou
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f' se$EGER IDENTIFICATION SHE m ALLEGER \ ADDRESS: CHANGE OF ADDRESS 3
l O
t'- I W
, BOFE PHONE: B000t PHONE: ,( )
WORK PHONE: ( ) WO,RK PHONE: ( )
. CASE NO: RII-95-A-0001 , FACILITY: ST LUCIE OCCUPATION EMPLOYER:
DOL COMPLAINT: YES () NO (/) OI INVESTIGATICN: YES () NO (/)
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION/OTHER CONTACTS LCA: 9/15/95: CONTACTED THE ALLEGER TO DETERMINE CURRENT ADDRESS.
Inf aimf.i3a la tLs txorJ v:s (W.ed in r,crutdance with the frceJom of Information Act, exemgtions 7 C Ch F0IA 4 / M V \
g vuragd-%7);UMG Feb 6 '98
. 10:59 P.04
's M,e ecuq* unrrto si:ra NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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August 9, 1996 HEMORANDUM FOR: Oscar DeMiranda, Senior Allegation Coordinator Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff FROM: Kerry D. Landis, Chief Reactor Projects Branch 3 .
'livision of Reactor Projects
SUBJECT:
R11-96,-A-0023, 0130, 0162 - QUESTIONABLE OVERTIME PRACTICES The Division of Reactor Projects cerformed a review and independent inssection of these anonymous concerns. Our inspection regarding this matter has >een completed and our findings are documented in the enclosures to this memorandum.
Enclosure 1 is the Allegation Evaluation Report which summarizes the findings, and the inspection results are documented in Encloture 2 NRC Inspection Report No. 50-335,389/96-09, paragraph 08.2.
Based on the information provided, we were able to partially substantiate the allegations. Two violations of regulatory requirements were identified.
This concludes the staff's activities regarding this mattet . These allegations are considered closed. If you have any questions, please contact mC.
Enclosures:
1 Allegation Evaluation Report
- 2. Inspection Report No.
50-335,389/96-09
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ENCLOSURE 1 ALLEGATION EVALUATION REPORT .
~ ~ ~ ~
ALLEGATIONS RII. 96-0023, 0130, 0162 QUESTIONABLE OVERTIME PRACTICES
\) ST LUCIE NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET N0S. 335'AND 389 MM: .
y Alhgation RII-96-A-0023 asserts that engineering overtime practices are leading to excessive numbers of errors.
k Allegation RII-96-A-0130 asserts that personnel are being coerced to work 9 excessive hosrs to finish the outage. Time is not being recorded on time sheets, th. i r .. n. f th h. .
r.m . ate.
ILC ,
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. .s Allegation RII-96-A-0162 asserts that there is abuso of the overtime policy and rules in the valve group.
DISCUSSION:
~
08.1 Control of Overtime (71707. 40500)
- a. Scope t
l The inspector reviewed the licensee's control of overtime for the period of May 13 through June 13. The inspector obtained gate logs for 26
, individuals. The selected individuals were chosen from the liunsee's maintenance, engineering, planning, and management organizations based upon their involvenient in outage activities and the ins understanding of the activities under their cognizance.pector's From the i
results obtained (which demonstrated time spent on site), the inspector reduced the inspection population to five individuals based upon indications of excessive hours. The individuals in question included l
supervisors and engineers with responsibilities for safety-related work, As acceptance criteria, the inspector reviewed TS 6.2.f, which required that the hours expended by personnel performing safety-related functions i
be limited, with an objective that personnel work a normal 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> day, 40-hour. week while the plant was operating. -The TS observed that substantial amounts of overtime mi periods of shuthwn for refueling,ght and established be requiredguidelines during extended for these periods. The TS stated' 4
I DXH fax:404-b62-4766 Feb 6 '93 11:19 P.23 Y
From: Douglas M. Collins loh h RECEITCD To: OXD (.05cAs./A d (DMC) 07 am ,73gibo 1.
NRO REGION -
B Y: _ m pr yg _UJ/fy /jf' Date: Sunday, Harth 12, 1995 7:
Subject:
Security Allegation R.2T ;95-f .- 00 3J AconcernedindividualcalledtheH00(DougWeaver)at1:30amon3/12to express concerns about SBI Nuclear, the contractor who provides security at St. Lucie Crystal and Turkey Point, and who just won the contract for security at River. They also have the contract for some fire watches. The
. Individual wished to remain anonymous and requ -
'wra ---
He stated that SBI is not competent; they have the contracts onO*because they are low bidders. He based this conclusion on several events:
- the suicide of a guard at Turkey Point last year; he implied it,occured onsite.
- lost traiMng weapon at St. Lucie last week. The alleger did not know who took_the weapon.
- the rape of a woma'n at gunpoint at Turkey Point last year, vhich was hushed up (he did not say where on site). -
St. t.ucia lost a loaded magazine at the site. "
. the Security Mana event as loggable. ger at St. Lucie, Bill White, classified the lost weaponThe A a downplay the seriou'sness of the' event.
could t.tke the Jeapon and threaten people with it af if it were a workingThe -
k weapon.
v The alleger said that no one is looking at the overall performance of the security force.
The H00 was on the phone with the individual for 30 minutes. The H00 got the impression that there are contract dispute problems' involved and that this may be the reason for degraded performance of the security force. I emphas~ite .
that this is the impression of the H00 after the 30 minute discussion; it was not a direct statement by the allege .
The he could H00 contact informedthe theRegion allegerIIthat if he wanted allegation to provide further,information, coordinator.
CC: KDL, DRM
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our- - cstrum=ss7=wto ma T~se rrrw P. za Ril 95-A-0033 From: Douglas M. Collins To: OXD O.searl(DMC), e/Mr en 9.et for$ 4 Date: Sunday,M}rch 12, 1995 7:07 am ~ Re4 /trn cQ.
I u subject: Security Allegation .
A concerned individual called the H00 (Doug Weaver) at 1:30 am on 3/12 to express concerns about SBI Nuclear, the contractor who provides security at !
St. Lucie and Turkey Point, and who just won the contract for sJe urity at
- Crystal River. They also have the contract for some fire wathhle . 7he
- individual wished to remain anonymous and requ
,, k recorded 2ha H00 th no he cal . ,
He stated that SB! is no.t competen't; they have the contracts only because they are low bidders. He based this conclusion on several events:
- the suicide of a guard at Turkey Point last year; he implied it occured onsite. '
i
- lost training weapon at St. Lucie last week. The a11eger did not know who '
took the weapon. - ' '
- the rape of a woman at g0npoint at Turkey Point last year, which was hushed ,
up (he did not say where on site).
- St. Lucie lost a loaded magazine at the site. '
the Security Mana '
event as loggable. ger at St. Lucie, Bill White, classified the lost weapon -.
downplay the seriousness of the event. The alleger thought that an individual could take the weapon and threaten people with .it as if it were a working weapon.
The alleger said that no one is looking at the overall performance of the security force.
The H00 was on the phone with the individual for 30 minutes. The H00 got the impression that there are contract dispute problems involved and that this may '
be the reason for degraded performance of the security force. I emphasize that this is the impression of the H00 after the 30 minute discussion; it was not a direct statement by the alleger.
The H00 infomed t$e alleger that if he wanted to provide further infomation, he could contact the Region II allegation coordinator.
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