ML20202D032
| ML20202D032 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Clinton |
| Issue date: | 11/24/1997 |
| From: | Beach A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Jackie Cook ILLINOIS POWER CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202D037 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-461-97-18, NUDOCS 9712040128 | |
| Download: ML20202D032 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000461/1997018
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NUCLEAR REULATORY COMMISSION
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November 24, 1997
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Mr. John G. Cook
Senior Vhe Pres 6 dent
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Clinton P wer Station
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lilinois Power Company
Mail Code V 275
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P.O. Box 678 -
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Clinton,IL 61727
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SUBJECT:
NRC REGION 111 AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM REVIEW OF THE FAILURE
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OF THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMP 'A' CIRCUlT BREAKER TO OPEN
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ON DEMAND (INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-461/97018)
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Dear Mr. Cook-
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This letter forwards to you the results of the NRC's Augmented inspection Team (AIT) in.pection
of the August 5,1997. Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump *A* circuit breaker failure. The AIT
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inspection was conducted from August 515,1997, at the Clinton Power Station (CPS). The
failure of the RHR breaker, when combined with a similar failure on July 22,1997, was
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considered very significant by the NRC because of the common failure mode potential.
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,
The AIT team members were Messrs. G. Wright (Team Leader), 8. Campbell, Z. Falevits, and
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T. Tella from this office, and S, Alexander and J. Knox from the Office of Nuclear Reactor -
Regulation. The, enclosed report presents the results of the AIT's assessmerd of the August 5,
1997, cittnit breaker failure at CPS. The AIT also assessed CPS' proposed inspection plans,
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methods, and root cause determination for both the July 22 and August 5 failures. As part of its
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assessments, the AIT reviewed available maintenance histories and procedures, vendor
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instructiona and recommendations, and independently it,4pected the failed breaker, The AIT also
assessed CPS' proposed inspection plans, methods, and root cause determination for the
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July 22 and August 5 failures,
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Based on the above inspection activities, the AIT concluded that both circuit breaker failures
'
were caused by inadequate and inappropriate maintenance activities, and deficiencies in CPS' [
corrective action system.- CPS' preventiv' maintenance program did not lubricate all vendor
recommended areas of the RHR Pump A breaker, most notably the main and aroing conta
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addition,' CPS occasionally used unapproved cleaning agents which had the potential to remove
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vendor applied lubricants, without relubricating the areas. Further, CPS had not effectively -
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evaluated the findmgs from NRC Inspection Report No. 60-461/97003 regarding breaker
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maintenance, had not developed effective immediate actions to address known maintenance
deficiencies, and had not effectively evaluated and identified a root cause for the July 22,1997,
'
circuit breaker failure The combined deficiencies resulted in a potential common mode failure
being introduced into at least all 4.16-kV circuit breakers at CPS manufactured by Westinghouse
Corporation.- The AIT discussed their findings with you and members of your staff during a public
meeting on August 20,1997.
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YiWF concluded that CPS' corrective adlons addressing previously identified breaker
preventive maintensnoe deficiencies were neither thorough nor effective. Because this failure
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demonstrated continuing, pervasive deficiencies in the corrective action program, the NRC
decided to issue a Demand for information letter (DFI). The DFl specifically targeted IP's
,
corrective action program and its effectiveness in ensuring the operability of safety related
systems, in addition, the DFl informed CPS that it had to provide its response to the NRC prior
to the NRC considering authorizing unit restart.
The AIT also concluded that the investigation of the August 5 failure was significantly more
rigorous than the investigation into the July 22 failure. While CPS' August 5 failure investigation
was much improved, NRC prompting was necessary at times to ensure the investigation was
thorough. For example, CPS' initial root cause determination concentrated on a lack of
lubrication and did not initially consider that springs used to open the breaker coul.d have
i
contributed to the failure to opose. CPS' review confirmed that while the major contributor to the
failure was lack of lubricant, a bent and short kick out spring played a considerable role in the
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breaker failing to open.
The AIT did not review CPS' corrective actions for addressing all 4.16 kV volt safety-related
',
circuit breakers. The acceptability of those corrective actions will be determined by a separate
Inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have concoming this inspection.
Sincerely,
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A. Bill Beach
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Regional Administrator
Docket No:
50-461
License No.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50461/97018
See Attached Distribution
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J. Cook
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The AIT concluded that CPS' corrective actions addressing previously identified breaker
preventive maintenance deficiencies were neither thorough nor effective. Because this failure
demonstrated continuing, pervasive deficiencies in the corrective action progrs,m, the NRC
decided to issue a Demand for Information letter (DFI). The DFl specifically targeted IP's
corrective action program and its effectiveness in ons Jring the operability of safety related
systems, in addition, the DFl informed CPS that it had to provide its response to the NRC prior
to the NRC considering authorizing unit restart.
The AIT also concluded that the investigation of the August 5 failure was significantly more
'
rigorous than the investigation into the July 22 failure. While CPS' August 5 failure investigation
was much improved, NRC prompting was necessary at times to ensure the investigation was
thorough. For example, CPS' initial root cause determination concentrated on a lack of
lubrication and did not initially consider that springs used to open the breaker could !vne
"ontributed to the failure to open. CPS' review confirmed that while the major contributor to the
failure was lack of lubricant, a bent and short kick-out spring played a considerable role in the
breaker failing to open.
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The AIT did not review CPS' corrective actions for addressing all 4.16-kV voit safety-related
circuit breakers. The acceptability of those corrective actions will be determined by a separate
inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's * Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
We will gla6ty discuss any questions you have concoming this inspection.
Sincerely,
/s/ Janes L. Caldwell for
A. Bill Beach
Regional Administrator
Docket No:
50-461
1.icense No.
NPF 62
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-461/g7018
See Attached DistriNhgn
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ CLIN \\CLl97018.AIT
SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
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DATE
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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These findings would normally have led to consideration of escalated enforcement action and
potential civil penalties. However, the AIT's findings (nat CPS' corrective actions addressing
previously identified breaker preventive maintenance deficiencies were neither thorough nor
effective and its inability to effective identify the cause(s) of the July 22,1997, breaker failure,
caused the NRC to reassess its enforcement options. Because of the continuing, pervasive
deticiencies in the corrective action program, in spite of previous significant civil penalty actions,
the NRC decided to deviate from its normal enforcement practices and issue a Demand for
Information letter (DFl). The DFl specifically targeteu IP's corrective action program and its
effectiveness in ensuring the operability of safety related systems. In addition, the DFl informed
CPS that it had to provide itt response to the NRC prior to the NRC considering authorizing unit
restart.
The AIT also concluded that the investigation of the August 5 failure was significantly more
rigorous than the investigation into the July 22 failure. While CPS' August 5 failure investigation
was much improved, NRC prompting was necessary at times to ensure the investigation was
thorough. For example, CPS' initial root cause determination concentrated on a lack of
lubrication and did not initially consider that springs used to open the breaker could have
contributed to the failure to open. CPS' review confirmed that while the major contributor to the
failure was lack of lubricant, a ber.t and short kick-out spring played a considerable role in the
breaker failing to open.
The AIT did not review CPS' corrective actions for addressing all 4.16-kV volt safety-related
circuit breakers. The acceptability of those corrective actions will be determined by a separate
inspection.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's * Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
We will gladly discuss any questions you have conceming this inspection.
Sincerely,
A. Bill Beach
Regional Administrator
Docket No:
50-461
License No.
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-461/97018
See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ CLIN \\CLl97018.AIT
SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES
receive e copy of this elociament, leedcate la the boa *C* a Copy withet,t ettechrnentlencloewee *E' s Copy with attachment / enclosure
OFFICE
Rill
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NAME
GWright:nh
JJacobson
JGrobe
GGrant
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DATE
11/ /97
11! /97
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11/ /97
11/tl /97,
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OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
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J. Cook
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The A!T also concluded that the investigation of the August 5 failure was significantly more
rigorous than the investigation into the July 22 failure. While the August 5 failure investigation
was much improved, NRC prompting was necessary at times to ensure the licensee's
investigation was thorough. For example, CPS' initial root cause determination concentrated on
a lack of lubrication and did not initially consider that springs used to open the breaker could
have contributed to the failure to open. CPS' review confirmed that while the major conMbutor to
the failure was lack of lubricant, a bent and short kick-out spring played a considerable role in the
breaker failing to open.
The AIT did not review CPS' corrective actions for addressing all 4.16-kV voit safety-related
circuit breakers. The acceptability of those corrective actions will be determined by a separate
inspection.
in accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's * Rules of Practice,' a copy of this letter and its
enclosures will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room.
We will glady discuss any questions you have conceming this inspection.
_
Sincerely,
<
A. Bill Beach
Regional Administrator
Docket No:
50-461
License No.
,
Enclosure:
Inspection Report No. 50-461/97018
cc w/ent
W. D. Romberg, Assistant
Vice President
R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Safety
and Performance improvement
J. Sipek, Director Licensing
Nathan Schloss, Economist
Office of tho Attomey General
G. Stramback, Regulatory Licensing
Services Project Manager
General Electric Company
Chairman, DeWitt County Board
State Liaison Officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
OOCUMENT NAME: G:\\CLINiCLI97018.AIT
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OFFICIAL RECDRD COPY
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W. D. Romberg, Assistant
Vios President
R. Phares, Manager, Nuclear Safety
and Performance improvement
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J. Sipok, D6 rector- Ucensing
Nathan Schloss, Econom8st
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Offloe of the Attomey General
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G. Stramback, Regulatory Uconsing
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Services Project Manager
General Eloctric Company
Chairman, DeWitt County Board
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State Lleison officer
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
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Distributiotj
Chairman Jackson
Commissioner Dious
Commissioner Diaz
Commissioner McGaffigen
T. Kress, ACRS
L Callan, EDO
G. Tracy, OEDO
H. Thompson, Jr., DEDR
A. Thadani, DEDE
9. Collins, NRR
F Miraglia, NRR
R. Zimmerman, NRR
E. Adensam, NRR
J. Roe, NRR
S. Richards, NRR
G. Marcus, NRR
J. Lieberman, OE
J. Goldberg, OGC
T Martin, AGOD
A. Beach, Rill
Regional Administrators-Regions I, ll and IV
J. Caldwell, Rlli
G. Grant, Rill
M. Depas Rill
J. Grobe, Rlli
J. Jacobson, Rlli
H. Clayton, Rlli
J. Strasma, Rlli
G. Wright, Rlli
S. Alexander, Rill
S. Campbell, Rlli
Z. Falevits, Rlli
J. Knox, NRR
T Tella, Rlli
M. Knapp, RES
Docket File..;]0
PUBLICAE-1
OCFO/LFARB~ j
DOCDESK (E-Mail)
GRI Clinton
Rlli: ORS (2)
Rill:DRP
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W. D. Romberg, Assistant
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R. Phe:Os, Manager, Nuclear Safety
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and Performance improvement
J. Sipok, Director Ucensing
Nathan Schloss, Economist
Office of the Attomey General
G. Strombeck, Regulatory Ucensing
Services Project Manager
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General Electric Company
Chairman, DeWitt County Board
State Liaison ofrH:er
Chairman, Illinois Commerce Commission
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