ML20202C626

Compliance Evaluation Rept Approving Amend to Coc GDP-2

ML20202C626
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	11/13/1997
From:	NRC
To:
References
NUDOCS 9712040026
Download: ML20202C626 (2)

Text

_

ddC i ,, . f Moog h1 -k UNITED STATES DVS?ld CO/

3 .j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION astmweec -" o,

$***J 1797 liOV 10 PH 2: gember 13, 1997 DOCKET: IW416#CUMENT ROOM CERTIFICATE HOLDER: United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Portsmouth, Ohio

SUBJECT:

COMPLIANCE EVALUATION REPORT: APPLICATION DATED JUNE 16,1997, COMMITMENT TO IDENTIFY STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS NECESSARY TO MEET NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY DOUBLE'CONTING"NCY PRINCIPLE BACKGROUNQ On June 16,1997, United States Enrichr..ent Corporation (USEC) submitted, in accordance with a commitment made in its certificate application, a request to add an additional criticality safety program element to the list of elements committed to in Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) Technical Safety Requirement (TSR) 3.11.1.

Section 3.9 of the PORTS Safety Analysis Report (SAR) Revision 4 dated July 26,1996, summarizes the upgrades required to bring the process facilities in compliance with the descriptions provided in SAR Chapter 3. One of the upgrades involves the identification of Structures, Systems and Components (SSCs) also referred to as AQ-NCS SSCs, and associated support systems required to meet the nuclear criticality safety (NCS) double contingency principle. Issue 23 of the Compliance Plan (DOE /ORO-2027/R3) required USEC to identify AQ-NCS SSCs and their associated support systems and delineate the boundaries of AQ NCS SSCs, before March 3,1997. According to USEC, this actico has been completed. A commitment made in SAR Section 3.9.10, ertitled " Identification of

[

Nuclear Criticality Safety SSCs," requires USEC to follow-up by revising TSR 3.11.1 to reflect identification of AQ NCS SSCs and their associated support systems. As such, USEC has proposed a new fourth bullet to TSR 3.11.1 to state:

Identification of SSCs and support systems necessary to meet the double contingency principle. ,8 DISCUSSION h TSR 3.11.1 requires USEC to establish, implet.. ant, and maintain an NCS program as described in the SAR. It also requires the NCS program to address adherence with ANSI /ANS standards, NCS responsibilities, NCS process evaluation and approval, design

- philosophy and review, criticality accident alarm system coverage, procedure requirements, posting and labeling requirements, change control, surveillance and assessments, and technical aspects in addition to these existing elemental requirements, this amendment documents the requirement of identification of AQ-NCS SSCs and support s/ stems. The Guality Assurance (QA) requirements applied to SSCs are designated as AQ-NCS,in accordance with USEC's QA Plan submitted as part of the PORTS certification application.

9712040026 971113 gli h,e *

• PDR- ADOCK 07007002

• e C PDR

. -._ _ - .-_.- _ ~ . _ _ _ . - - . . _ _ _ . . .

y [e: ..

a y ;;J ...

. :L -

]

d

2. .

- ENJillONMENTAL REVIEW lssuance of an amendment to the Portsmouth Certificate of Compliance (GDP 2), by adding an additional TSR commitment reisted to the PORTS NCS program by requiring

.!dentification of SSCs and support systems necessary to meet thu double contingency

.;- principle, is~ subject te the categorical exclusion provided in-10 CFR 51.22(c)(19).

Therefore, in acccrdance with 10 CFR 51.22(b), neither an environmental assessment nor Jan environmental imf.act statement is reruiM for the prcposed action., s

, ' CONCLUSION The NRC staff has determined that the additional requirement of identifying and maintaining SSCs and suppcrt systems relied upon by USEC to meet the NCS double contingency - .

principle, will not significar.!!y increase the potential for, or radiological or chemical l

consequences from, previously analyzed accidents, and will not result in the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. In addition, the NRC staff has determined that this 1 --  : amendment will not result in a significant reduction in any margin of safety, nor will it result in an overall decrease in the effectiveness of the plant's safety, safeguards, or r- security programs, On the contrary, this amendment may constitute an increase in the NCS margin of safety and in the effectiveness of the plant's NCS program. Therefore, the L NRC staff recommends approval of this amendment, Region 111 staff have no objection to this proposed action.

f Princioal Contributor Yawar Faraz d

1 Y

i-1 1

L:

- - . _.