ML20202C183
| ML20202C183 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/09/1954 |
| From: | Mccullough C Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Nichols K US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20202C166 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-85-646 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8607110136 | |
| Download: ML20202C183 (13) | |
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.g- March 9, 1954 4
/ Mr. K. D. !:ichels General Panager U. S. Atomic Energy Commission
,l. Uashington 25, D. C.
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Dear Mr. Nichols:
Mr. A. Tammaro, as Chairr.an of the Board of Evaluation of FWR Participat. inn, has asked for a preliminary opinion on the suit-ability of the site proposed by Duquesne Power and Light Ccmpany at Shippingport, Pennsylvania, from the point of view of hazards.
It is my opinion in consultation wAth two members of the Advisory Committee nn Reactor Safeguards that this site is suitable provided l that the reactor system is so designed that contain'aent cf radio-I active material can be guaranteed beycnd reasonable doubt. It is
[ a general view, based on preliminary information, that this is a t reasonable requirement and one that can be attained. This rigid requirement rests upon the fact the 0:-io River, below the site in question, is one of the most heavily used scurces of domestic and industrial water in the United States.
l It is r;y understanding the PNR will be a reactor instauation enly and no chemical separation will take place at this site.
These conclusions are consistent with the preliminary informatinn
- given a Subgrcup of the Advisory Comraittee on Heactor Safeguards on January 22, 1954. A copy of the minutes of this meeting is attached.
It is ray further understanding that, as the project progresses, ;
further information will be available for Committee study. '
This conclusion on the ShippinEp:,rt site was concurred in by Colnnel Reuel C. Stratton and Er. Abol Wolman of the Advisory Com-mittee on Reactor Safeguards.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ C. Rogers l'cCullough C. Rogers McCullough Chairman Advisory Cemrtittee on Reactor Safeguards When separated from enclosures, handle
' 4 this document as UfCLASSIFIED '
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- ENCLOSURE 3 The basis reviewed forBarker, by J. H. the site Jr.criteria for the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) wa
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y This problem was previously considered by a subgroup of the ACRS at a moeting I
- in New York on January 22, 1954. It was noted that the power level of the PWR is to be 264 megawatts. For a reactor operating at this power, where the release )
of fission products into the atmosphora must be considered, an exclusion distance :
l of some 5 miles would be required for reasonable safety. Such an exclusion ;
area would be prohibitively expensivo for the purpose for which the PWR is in-tended.
It is, thorofore, essential to the success of this program that the re-actor system, including means for containing radioactive raaterial released by any equipment malfunction, be developed so that off-site hazards will not re-quire a large exclusion area. Pmvided such containment can be guaranteed be-j yond reasonable doubt, an exclusion distance of some 1/2 mile was recommended '
as being reasonable, to provido for future expansion and to prevent the encroach-ment of undesirably close settlements. However, it would not be desirable to locate the reactor iradiately adjacent to a heavily por>ulated area.
Following a study of soveral Government sites t.nd review of proposals from industrial organizations, the Duquesne Light cnd Power Coepany was selected for )
the operation of this facility.
the Shippingport site was selected as the rc.ost euitable.Of This site the is three on thesit as suggest south bank of the Ohio river some 25 miles downstream from Pittsburgh. Suf-
- ficient land will be owned so as to provido en equivalent exclusion distance of 1/2 mile. Included within tha 1/2 nila will bu ptrt of the Ohio River, in-cluding an uninhabited island.
It was noted that a railroad line mns through the sito; servico. howsvar, this line is used-only infraquently and then only for froight The structure being considered for providing edequato containment consists of ponents. steel pressure vossels in which will be located the primary reactor com-three These pressuro vessels would be at least partially buried in the ground and covered with dirt. The non-radioactive steam from this system would pass to a generating plant located a short distcnce away abovo ground.
The Conraittee concurred with the actior.s taken by the Chcirman in transmit-j~ site.tho attached lettor to the General Manager on tha proposed Shippingport ting es
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l SUB00hMITTEFS TiEPORTS (Person's nono uddorsoored indicates person taaking r
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Detroit Edison Ronctor Ilorvey Brooks, Choircan, r nd D A Ungara i A Subcomittoo nocting una hold in Docton with nenbcre of the Dotroit Edison group.
Although a considernble onount of theorctical colouletions and study has boon of unebrtain given to the nuclecr propertion of this reactor, there rannin a number factore. It oppours that oven though this le o feat rocotor it aoy be ponniblo coefficient. to desC 1 n it so thct it hos a dcrinito ntgotivo tempcrature Work on a scale snoller thcn the full elzo recctor should inkon et somo rtmote locction, such na NTiTS. r-probably mitteo with the Dctroit Edison group cro planned.Further neatinga of the Subcon-3 Scfoty Control of tho Shut-down Roda for NEX:
Johns, and R. C. Str atton D. A. nogers, Chcirman, I. B.
It vos reported thct at tho request of tho /J:C this Subcomittoo uns oppointed to review tho design of the now acrcty rods for the NRX.
ik This 7ontrol rod wes designed by the lancrican Machino and Foundry Company. The Subcomittoo had ag itthe cdvico was entirelyof consultenta and togother they rev1wed this design and ccicluded actiefcotory. A Subcomnittee report hca boon issuod.
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m-PEESSUh1MD WTER *nEi.CTOR It wts explained that there ucs a pioon of Innd owned by the Nctional Trcusit Company which intruded into tho 25008 radius around the PMI site. This land is used for stofego of fuel at the present time. The Duquesne Light Cocpeny has een uncblo to acquire this lend and hcd arrangcd for an agroenent rostrictinE ho uso of this icnd to industrin1 purposes. This agreement via read and the ornittoo opprovcd the land owned by the National Transit Company being within ho 25008 redius if this agreencnt could be consucmated.
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fCONSOLIDATEDISONECTOR l he Cc.aittee ws informed thct Consolidated Edison Compcqy of Ncv York, Inc.,
l had applied for a licenso to build end oporato a nuclear power plant. The Com-nittee had been furnishod with copies of their applicction for licenses. Be-cause the Cossolidated Edison Company was the first applicent for a large scale
! nucletr powcr plant license and in addition plonned to do this vithout financial j c.ssistence fron the AEC this ves an unique ecso. It vos explained that Messrs.
Mcryin Fox and J. T. Weills hcd bcon obtained es. consultants and they together with Wensel and McCullough had revioved the inforcm. tion presented on this pro-l posed reactor end had devcloped a series of questions requiring additional infor-1 notion. Voills reported on a more cercrul review of the renetor information
! presented. The whole problen ucs discussed in sono detail and it vos the general
, opinion of the Cormittee thct c great doel of Edditional information would have to bo obtained bt. fore the Cornittee could make any detcrninntion as to the hazards l rciated to this reactor. A further Subconnittoo cetion is picnned at a dato tc bc sot by the Consolidcted Edison Company.
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he, actor Hazards Evaluation Staffs McCullough r@orted thet the Atemio Energy Coomission had approved setting up a Reactor Hazarda Evoluction Staff reporting to A. Tnmno, Ascistant General
. Manager for Rosearch cnd Industrial Development. This steff ia to consist of rbout fivo peoplo end Dr. H. T. Wcnsel is tho first menbor. There was considcr-cble discussion about the philosophy cnd functions of this staff and its rela-l tion to the ACRS. ,
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g.g The Cetnittee ottonded the third P~wR loving this noeting S. Krcsik discussed in furthTechnical Forum on M
' the recctor safety problens associated yith thi er detcil with the Commi s reactor.
The lorig tern chengos in reactivity end tenporet concern with this type of r ecctcr boccupouro cf the coeffic'ient are a pricary planned long exposure of the At present nany of those chan6cs not be predicted. .
end thrir or for plutoniun effectn fornr. tion.
followed during operction cnd there is consider blIt is plcnno r e carefully
[ shifting of blanket fuel clenont to cenpensato for le flexibility possib
\ The plcnned ccroful attentien to these prcblon ong tort rcactivity changes.
i initial blanket locding is of inportcnco tcs th thrcughout the lifetino of the e anfety cf this reactor.
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Issued: Hay 18, 1955 1
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! In tha criginal soloction of the Shippingport sito for the PMi, it was planned to have a cne-half nilo exclusien area in all directions.
nocessary real estato, difficulties have been encounterod, In acquiring the f At its 31gventh llaating the ACRS recornanded that if ths Duquesne Light C could not' acquire by purchase a tract of land owned by the National Transit Ccapany which is within 2500 foot of the Pim location, an agroenent with tho transit conpany to rostrict tha uso of the land would be an acceptablo substituto Subsequently it has provod impossible to soeura tho specified agroonent , or on ditional parcels on the frings of tha sito.rossonabla torns to acquiro
- to approvo the sito without securing any The Connittco thereforo was asked control over the thrao parcols cf land i which V would planned. havo to bo centrollod to satisfy the ono-half axelusion aroa orig
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1 Tha Cocnittoo racondands that the Shippingport sito fer the PE be ap-proved of parcals rataining the 1/2 uilo radius with tha exceptions of the thrao land enuneratod, I
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Mr. Osbern nade an infornal raport giving the essentials of the results of the Subcorr.ittao ucating held on .iugust 29th with the Consolidated Edison Coupany.
The details of this vill ba found in the ninutos of that subcoru.11ttoo neating. ,
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/ EXECUTIVE EESSION Government Chairmanship Dr. NoCuhough stated that the Connittee was operating under a temporary exemption from the Attorney General's ruling requiring that all Govern- '
ment advisory boards be chaired try full-time government employees. He had been infomed that his tem as Chairman 'had been terminated Doomber 31, 1955, and later extended to February 1,1956, to enable the General Manager to appoint a govertanent employee as Chairman. The Committee I
members agreed to send a letter to the General Manager expressing their unanimous feeling that the Chairman of the ACRS should be independent of 1
direct AEC pmgram and job security pressures. Several drafts of such l a letter were prepared and the Secretary was asked to combine them into one letter for signature by all the members. l l
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i Pressurised Wter Reactor (No report available at time of meeting)
. I This session was opened with introductory remarks by Admiral H. G. Rickover.
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Drs. S. Krasik, W. R. Ellis and B. Lustaan presented a review of the cur-y rent status of the PWR hasards studies. No recommendations were p ssented U by Westinghouse or asked of the Committee. Dr. Krasik made the following general statsoents. It was stated that the PWR is a stable reactor with
> a strong negative temperature coefficient and good coupling between fuel element and coolant temperatures. Rates of reactivity addition are very
. l limited. Any excursion which can occur is stopped by boiling of the ;
, water. It was stated that no excursion can occur which would result in I fuel vaporisation and that there is no chance of a chemical reaction which
- , would result in rupture of the primary loop. The system is safe against i
' loss of electrical power both from the standpoint of hasards and equip-g* [ l ment damage. The high pressure system is enclosed in a container which will take the peak pressure resulting from rupture of the primary loop ,
. i and one bbiler. The only means by which radioactivity can be released to the mntainer is by a primary loop break. Primary coolant, activity
, itself would not present a serious hazard even if released to the atmo-
' sphere. Release of fission products to the ountainer would result in dosages of the order of a few r at a few hundred meters distance. Fail-ure to contain fission products could result in very large dosages.
Dr. Ellis reviewed the site and design. It was stated that the piping would be stainless steel, fabricated under strict contal and with ultra-sonic testing to insure absence of defects. Every component which falls under the AS4E Code vill be designed to it, with two exceptions: 1) No i relief iralves, and 2) They will not completely anneal all vessels.
' These exceptions have been appmved by the State of Pennsylvania.
I t The inner stop valves of the primary loop are hydraulically operated.
,. Since pressure detemination is made outside this portion of the loop
' no infomation on pressure in the reactor vessel would be available if both stop valves in each of the four loops were closed. The reactor i } vessel is lined with 1/4" 304 stainless steel ar3 all cladding and
' structural elements in the core are zirconium. Differential expansion
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t of the fuel-bearing and supporting plates of the sub-assemblies is con-
' sidered unimportant. Decay heat can be dissipated by natural convec-tion with one loop in operation. A Stone and Webster survey of piping *
- ' failures covering hundreds of installations has revealed no h1-g
-ils w is this typ M piping. The foundation has therefore not l
been designed to take a sudden shear of the pipe.
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,- power / flow ratio, loss of flowmperature shell vill be tested at 70 pai or loss of powerScram excursions t .
The steel container ,
second. and vill then be lined with 6 to 12" of- ,
gunnite which would not be pene,trated vond 10 psi--without cracking the gunnite.
e at 5008 per by a 75 p ested be-box in which it is enclosed also e11 estimated at 1 n orced conerate total project oost of thirty seven m/2 million dollars, as compared with a illion dollars.
since the specifications were setantup for the contai activity requirement to contain the pressure resultingow from eliminatea primthe ary loop rupture.
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, Tests show no intergranular corrosion of 25 to 100 ppm flouride ions. v or of the materials. of zirconiumD l
i ject to hydrogen embrittlement or - which radiationThe pria-is not sub- indary !
be subject to slight abrittlement asructed, a result might of iritic ste rradiation, but in-
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pile able sel data indicate villembrittlement be exposed.
thatfluxit of at the would 107 takg 10e any yegs detect- to groduc a possibiility, expected. brittleWhile failures the leading ' occurrence to shearing o of small cracks r missiles are not Formation of an oxidized surface layer in the zirooni um, which molta at I greatly the chance of molten zirconium .
o decrease Reaction entering t.
th a reaction of molten ziroonium dispersed n cate that in water w after only a few per cent of the zirconium has reacted .
quenched from 100 to 10% of normalDr. Erasik reviewed ua analogue computer res pressure rise of 500 pai (powercf: which show a temperature rise of 60ng and a load change pressure 2500 psi). operating pressure 2000 psi and design 4k/sec) from startup Steady would rod result withdrawal in eventuat the mahm rate (5 x 10-4
~ the pover leveling off at 200% normal. A iling of the water with reaction was not violent,at 200% design power in the STR and while^s n occurred the given.
Rates of water loss due to breaksnof the various piping were sizes i the faulty loop before the water level falls e o isolateto thUp to 3" diam A aproposed flooding systs would keep the core e top cov of the core. ,
i is 4 to 5" break. ered even if there I . vould suffice to remove- the after heat.If the core were only half oovered, s -
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'* the pressure would still fall afterethtiroonium reacts.vith water,en ,
the hydrogen burns, the pressure wuld e 52.8 psi peak.
It in addition.
suffices to prevent this additional riserise . to 80 pai, but a Melting af the seed elements gives so that forsation of a secondary criticaland a furth o separation from the blanket 3
mass appears to be impossible.
frequent unfavorable conditionsThe meteorological data c !
winds crossing the river,
- including inversionar s at the Shippingport site show and local drainage '
} Dr. Erasiknostated the reactor thatmuld radioactivity because r of th of a minor accident.
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unattended for oneHe further bour without each the control room in th stated damagethat the plant could operate ,
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It is expected that a report containin ,
sented vill be distributed to the Committg much of the information pr s cident studies are continuing and it the was e ti I tection system would be worked out year. ee s in withinear future. Ac-attached as Appendix "A",The nCommittee's the next six letter months to amated Generalthat M th i
to the anager on this item is t
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