ML20199H548

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Special Rept:On 971008,fires Detection Zones 1-30,1-32,2-30 & 2-32 Taken out-of-service to Prevent False Alarms During Work Activities.Affected Detection Zones Located at Elevations 673 & 694 in Units 1 & 2 Reactor Bldgs
ML20199H548
Person / Time
Site: LaSalle  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 11/21/1997
From: Dacimo F
COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9711260148
Download: ML20199H548 (3)


Text

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,s 26tti Nonli 21st iloati Marvillo.11 613 s l #75' icisis3s <a,i November 21,1997 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject:

Special Report on Fire Detection and Fire Barriers LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50 373 and 50-374 This Special Report is submitted in accordance with LaSalle Unit 1 and 2 Operating Licenses NPF-11 and NPF-18 respectively, Appendix A, and Technical Specifications 3.3.7.9,3.7.6, and 6.6.C.

Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 requires, as a minimum, the fire detection instNmentation for each fire detection zone of Unit 1 and Unit 2 shown in Tre a 3.3.7.91 shall be OPERABLE whenever the equipment protected by the iire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE, and requires the restoration of the instruments to OPERABLE status within fourteen (14) days.

Technical Specification 3.7.6 requires all fire rated assemblies, including l

walls, floor /cellings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area, and ali sealing devices in the fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable and piping penetration seals and ventilation seals) shall be OPERABLE at all times, and requires the restoration of the assembly to an OPERABLE status within seven (7) days.

On October 22,1997. Fire Detection Zones 1-30,1-32,2-30, and 2-32 had been out-of service for'a period greater than fourteen (14) days. Fire Detection Zones 1-30,1-32,2-30, and 2 32 were taken out of-service on i October 8,1997 to prevent false alarms during hot work activities (i.e., g

. welding, cutting, and grinding). Such alarms have the potential to distract and desensitize workers to valid fire alarms. The affected detection zones f} i p~

are located at elevations 673' and 694' in the Unit 1 and 2 Reactor Buildings.

9711260148 971121 I PDR ADOCK 05000373

o . The hot work was being performed in support of critical path work on Unit 1

. ' and 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Inlet Piping Isolation Valvos 1E12-F068B and 2E12 F068B. A fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected areas at least once per hour while the !astruments were inoperable.

The fire watch patrols, along with the additional fire protection measures provided when hot work bctivities were in progress, ensured detection capability was kval6ble while the electors were inoperable. Fire Detection Zones 1-30 and 132 were retumed to an OPERABLE status on October 31,1997. Fire Detection Zenes 2-30 and 2e32 were retumed to an OPERABLE statua on November 3,1997.

On October 22,1997, Fire Doors 260 and 849 wele inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days. The doors were ope'ied on October 15,1997, to allow temporary power cables to be routed tb:ough the doors during the 14?Y Bus Outage. The doors are located on elevation 731' of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building. A fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7,6 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected areas at least once per hour while the doors were inoperable. The fire watch patrols, along with OPERABLE fire detection on at least one side of the affected assembly, minimized the potential far fire to spread beyond the affected barriers while the doors were inoperable. Fire Doors 260 and 849 were retumed to an OPERABLE status on October 25,1997.

On October 30,1997, Fire Doors 262 and 266 were inoperable for a period greater than seven (7) days. On November 3,1997, a fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building from the Unit 1 Turbine Building and a fire barrior separating the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building from the Unit 2 Turbine Building were inoperable for a period gmater than 7 days. On November 10,1997, Fire Doors 261,611,612,615,854, and 855 were inoperable for a period greater than 7 days. The affected barriers and doors were impaired to allow the passage of temporary equipment (e.g., cable and cooling water lines, air handling units, etc.) in accordance with LaSalle Special Procedure LLP-96118," Shutdown of Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (AEER) HVAC During Dual Unit Outage." Special Procedure LLP 96-118 is being implemented to provide temporary cooling to the AEERs while both trains of AEER Ventilation (VE) HVAC systems are shutdown for maintenanco during the existing dual unit outage. All of the affected barriers and doors are located on elevation 731' of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Building. Fire watch patrols were established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected areas at least once per hour while the barriers and doom are inoperable.

The fire watch patrols, along with OPERABLE fire detect:on on at least one side of the affected assembly, minimizes the potential for fire to spread beyond the affected barriers while the barriers and doors are inoperable.

The fire watch patrols will remain in place until the affected barriers and doors are retumed to an OPERABLE status upon completion of LLP-96-118, which is currently scheduled to be completed in February of 1998.

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a: : . .- . If there are any questions or comments concoming this letter, please refer'- 'l

' them to me at (815) 357 6761, extension 2212._  :

Respectfully,.-

-F ac' o .;

ant General Manager -

- LaSalle _ County Station :

A. D. Beach, NRC Regicc. !!! Attministrator -

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0 cc:  ;

. M. P. Huber, NRC Senior nt.sicent inspector - LaSalle '  ;

D. M. Skay, Project Manager - NRR - LaSalle -  :

F. Niziolek, Office of Nuclear Facility Safety - IDNS E

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