ML20199E808

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Insp Rept 50-458/86-19 on 860428-0502.Deviation Noted: Two Limitorque Operators W/Apparently Unqualified Wiring & Test Repts for Wiring in Several Operators Not Available at Site
ML20199E808
Person / Time
Site: River Bend Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 06/06/1986
From: Ireland R, Norman D
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To:
Shared Package
ML20199E801 List:
References
50-458-86-19, IEIN-86-003, IEIN-86-3, NUDOCS 8606240088
Download: ML20199E808 (7)


See also: IR 05000458/1986019

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APPENDIX B

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report:

50-458/86-19

License:

NPF-47

Docket:

50-458

Licensee: Gulf States Utilities

P. O. Box 220

St. Francisville, Louisiana 70775

Facility Name:

River Bend Station (RBS), Unit 1

Inspection At:

St. Francisville, Louisiana

Inspection Conducted:

April 28 through May 2, 1986

Inspector:

I. M

4/z/c//

D. E. Norman, Reactor Inspector, Engineering

Date' ~ ^

Section, Reactor Safety Branch

Approved:

e[. M

4//,/d

R. E. Ireland, Chief, Engirteering Section,

Ddte"

Reactor Safety Branch

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Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted April 28 through May 2, 1986 (Report 50-458/86-19)

Areas Inspected:

Special, announced inspection to determine what wiring is

installed in Limitorque valve operators and to review licensee's environmental

qualification documentation to ensure that qualification of wiring is

adequately established.

The inspection also included a review of licensee's

actions relative to IE Information Notice (IN) 86-03.

Results:

The inspection determined that Limitorque had qualified valve

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operators without internal wiring being in place and that some wiring later

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installed by Limitorque did not have documentation to show qualification in

accordance with requirements of 10 CFR 50.49.

The licensee previously had

taken corrective action regarding unqualified wiring and determined that no

further action was required with respect to IN 86-03; however, the NRC

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inspector found:

(1) two operators with apparently unqualified wiring,

(2) test reports for wiring in several operators were not available at the

site.

P606240088 860620

{DR

ADOCK 05000458

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DETAILS

1.

Persons Contacted

Gulf States Utilities (GSU)

  • W. J. Cahill, Senior Vice President
  • P. F. Tomlinson, Director, Quality Services
  • I. M. Malik, Supervisor, Quality Engineering
  • T. L. Crowe, Quality Assurance Manager
  • D. M. Rynnerson, Director, Nuclear Plant Engineering
  • R. E. Bailey, Supervisor, Quality Control
  • G. K. Henry, Supervisor, Electrical Engineering
  • R. B. Stafford, Director, Operations Quality Assurance
  • H. M. McClellan, Senior Compliance Analyst
  • J. C. Deddens, Vice President, River Bend
  • E. R. Grant, Supervisor, Nuclear Licensing
  • T. O. Moffitt, Quality Engineer
  • J. L. Frick, Supervisor, Electrical Maintenance
  • L. Schell, Senior Electrical Engineer
  • D. R. Gipson, Assistant Plant Manager, Operations

R. King, Licensing Engineer

J. H. McQuirter, Licensing Engineer

H. S. Garcha, Senior Quality Assurance Engineer

J. E. Spivey, Operations Quality Assurance Engineer

R. Eddings, Electrician

B. Johnson, Electrician

F. Boyle, Quality Control

D. Derbonne, Supervisor, General Maintenance

Stone and Webster (S&W)

A. Abella, Senior Field Engineer

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

  • D. D. Chamberlain, Senior Resident Inspector

W. B. Jones, Resident Inspector

  • D. E. Norman, Reactor Inspector

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  • Denotes those present during exit interview on May 2, 1986.

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Purpose:

The purpose of this inspection was to identify wiring used in Limitorque

valve operators installed in harsh environment, to review licensee's

environmental qualification documentation to ensure that qualification of

wiring was adequately established, and to review licensee's actions

relative to IN 86-03.

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3.

Inspection Summary

a.

Review of Previous Licensee Actions

During the disassembly of a spare Limitorque operator, which was

originally intended for use at RBS, Unit 2, the licensee disco"ered

that the control wiring was apparently unqualified.

It was

subsequently verified by Limitorque that no qualification

documentation was available for the wiring.

Since the operator

(2E22-F011) was of the same vintage as the remaining operators

provided by General Electric, those operators were also inspected and

found to have unqualified wiring.

The wiring was later replaced

according to Modification Request (MR) 86-0037 and the condition was

reported by LER 86-008.

The following operator numbers, with

corresponding Limitorque serial numbers, were included in the

modification:

(1) 1E22*M0VF001

(S/N 219152)

(2) 1E22*MOVF004

(S/N 232682)

+(3) 1E22*MOVF010

(S/N 220882)

(4) 1E22*MOVF011

(S/N 220881)

(5) 1E22*MOVF012

(S/N 223864)

(6) 1E22*MOVF015

(S/N 223875)

(7) 1E22*M0VF023

(S/N 223009)

+(8) 1DFR*MOV146

(S/N 223969)

+0riginally provided for Unit 2.

Five additional valves (S/N 219153, 220880, 222394, 223970, and

230642) manufactured during the same time period, and provided for

Unit 2, by General Electric, have not been modified since their

future application is unknown. Their status has been documented by

Condition Report 86-052, and they have been tagged to prevent use

without prior approval.

Condition Report 86-038 reported that an inspection was performed

during 1985 on all 62 Limitorque operators in the reactor building

and identified that only Rockbestos or Raychem wiring was used.

Either wiring was acceptable to Revision 5 of the Installation

Specification 228.160.

An additional inspection was reportedly

performed on January 12, 1986, of five randomly selected operators

outside containment.

This inspection verified all acceptable wiring

except for one unidentified jumper wire connecting terminal 3C to 7C,

on operator S/N 275572 which was reported on CR 86-049.

The wire was

subsequently dispositioned as acceptable per the installation

specification.

Based on the previous inspection activity related to

Limitorque wiring, the licensee concluded that no further action was

considered necessary in respect to IN 86-03.

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b.

Hardware Inspection

(1) Sample Selection

The Master List of safety related equipment located in a harsh

environment was reviewed and a sample of 22 operators, of the

216 listed, was selected to be inspected.

This sample was later

reduced to 10 after reviewing results of the licensee

inspections of operator wiring.

Selection of the final sample

was based on the following criteria:

(a) operators from several

safety systems, (b) range of Limitorque serial numbers, (c) at

least one operator previously inspected by licensee, and

(d) operators located outside high radiation areas.

The

following operators were included in the sample:

(1) 1CCP*MOV129

(S/N 330879)

(2) 1CNS*MOV125

(S/N 316310)

(3) 1C11*MOVF083 (S/N 277282)

(4) 1E12*M0VF0038 (S/N L376337)

(5) 1E12*M0VF105 (S/N 328286)

(6) 1E33*MOVF005 (S/N 329986)

(7) 1FPW*MOV121

(S/N 321186)

(8) 1HVN*MOV130

(S/N 325731)

(9) ISWP*MOV5078 (S/N 318079)

+(10) 1LSV*MOV19A

(S/N 275572)

+Previously inspected by licensee.

(2) Findings

Each operator was inspected to establish the type of internal

wiring.

Most long wires could be identified by wiring

manufacturer markings; however, many short wires did not have

markings and were identified by visual comparison to wires with

markings.

All wires in eight of the operators were identified

as Raychem or Rockbestos Firewall III.

Operator S/N 275572 had

one short jumper wire which did not have markings and did not

appear similar to the identified wires.

Most wires inside

operator S/N 277282 were red and had markings of "Phalon AMW

105 C FR-1 CSA TEW."

Field wiring which interfaced with the operators was also

inspected.

All wires appeared to be the same type; however,

specific identification could not be made at this point since

the jacket material, which contained the markings was not

visible.

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c.

Documentation Review

(1) System Component Evaluation Work (SCEW) Sheets

SCEW sheets for the sample operators were reviewed to determine

specified and qualified environmental conditions, method of

qualification, qualified life, and reports used to establish

qualification. The following discrepancies were identified

during this review:

(a) SCEW sheets indicated that several unqualified model SMC

operators were installed in harsh environment. The

operators have been replaced; however, the SCEW sheets have

not been updated to reflect this change.

(b) SCEW sheets reference the qualification report of the

Limitorque operator which was qualified without internal

wiring.

The wiring qualification report, therefore, should

be part of the qualification documentation and should be

referenced on the SCEW sheets.

The failure to update SCEW sheets and to reference all

applicable qualification documentation therein are apparent

deviations from the River Bend Station Environmental Qualifica-

tion Document, Revision 1, March 1985.

(458/8619-01)

(2) Cable Pull Tickets

Cable pull tickets for field cable interfacing with the

following operators were reviewed to establish cable identity.

(a)

ICCP*M0V129

(b)

ICNS*MOV125

(c)

1E33*M0VF005

(d)

1HVN*MOV130

The cables were identified as Okonite-FMR insulated cables whose

qualification was reported in Okonite Reports SWGS-1282-1 and 2.

(3) Vendor Qualification Reports

The following manufacturer or test laboratory qualification

reports were reviewed:

(a) Limitorque Report B0058, Valve Actuator Qualification,

dated January 11, 1980.

(b) Rockbestos Report QR 5805, AWG Power Cable, dated

November 18, 1985.

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(c) Okonite Reports SWGS-1282-1 and -2, Okonite Insulated Cable

Nuclear Qualification Report, dated December 15, 1982.

(d) S&W Calculation Nos. 12210-EQS-4, -5 and -10, Calculations

to Support Qualified Life of Limitorque actuators.

(e) Franklin Institute Research Laboratories Report F-C4033-1,

Tests of Raychem Flamtrol Insulated and Jacketed Electrical

cables, dated January 1975.

It was mentioned previously in this report that wiring

qualification reports were not referenced on the SCEW sheets;

however, the licensee provided "Rockbestos Report QR 5805 which

appears to establish qualification of Rockbestos wiring used in

the operators.

The licensee presented Franklin Report F-C4033-1

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as the basis for establishing qualification of Raychem wiring,

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but this report does not appear to provide that basis for a

single conductor, nonjacketed wire as used in the operators.

While the wire does appear to be qualified it currently lacks

qualification documentation.

This is considered to be an

unresolved item pending verification that qualification

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documentation exists.

(458/8619-02)

A test report for the Phalon wiring, used in operator S/N 277282

was not reviewed by the NRC inspector; however, a summary of a

telephone conversation between the licensee and Limitorque

stated that the test report did not include aging and that mild

to moderate PVC insulation damage resulted at about 2 x 107

Rads, which is the specified radiation environment for the

operator.

Phalon wiring does not appear to be properly

qualified. This is a potential violation of 10 CFR 50.49.

(458/8619-03)

In paragraph 3.b(2) it was reported that one short jumper wire

in operator S/N 275572 had no identification markings and did

not appear similar to identified wires.

This same wire has been

identified during two independent inspections, once by a

licensee QC inspector and once by the NRC inspector.

Since

qualification documentation could not be provided for the wire,

this is considered a potential violation of 10 CFR 50.49.

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(458/8619-04)

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4.

Licensee Corrective Action

Shortly after discovery of the apparent unqualified wire in operator

S/N 277282, the plant experienced a SCRAM because of an unrelated problem.

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Prior to restarting, the licensee replaced the questionable wires with

qualified wires and conducted an inspection of the following operators:

a.

1E33*MOVF008 (S/N 275562)

b.

1E12*MOVF073A (S/N 275566)

c.

1E112*MOVF073B (S/N 275567)

d.

1E112*MOVF074A (S/N 275569)

e.

1E112*M0VF074B (S/N 275568)

+f.

1LSV*MOV19A (S/N 275572)

g.

1LSV*MOV19B (S/N 275573)

h.

1E33*MOVF006 (S/N 275574)

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1E33*MOVF026 (S/N 275575)

j.

1E51*M0VF077 (S/N 275862)

+k.

1C11*MOVF083 (S/N 277282)

+Previously inspected.

No additional unqualified wires were found.

Limitorque stated in a memorandum to S&W, dated February 3,1983, that

they provide two types of a<',uators for nuclear service.

Units for inside

containment had Rockbestos rirewall III or Raychem Flamtrol control

wiring.

Units for outside containment with serial numbers greater than

283870 also had Firewall III or Flamtrol wiring, but earlier unit' had TEW

wire.

After the inspection of the above operators, all operators with

serial numbers below 283870 located in a harsh environment have beer

inspected at RBS.

Approximately 140 valve operators in a harsh

environment outside containment with serial numbers greater than 283870

have not been inspected.

5.

Exit Interview

An exit inverview was conducted on May 2, 1986, during which time results

of the inspection were reviewed with members of the GSU staff.