ML20199E284
| ML20199E284 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 11/19/1997 |
| From: | Schopfer D SARGENT & LUNDY, INC. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 9583-100, NUDOCS 9711210154 | |
| Download: ML20199E284 (41) | |
Text
_ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _____ _____ _
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$II((N[s November 19,1997.
Project No. 9583100 .
- Dobbet No,50-423 i
Northeast Nuclear Erergy Company Millstone Nuclear Pow er Station, Unit No. 3 Independent Corrective Action Verification Program ,
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 I have enclosed the following thirteen (13) discrepancy reports (DRs) identified during our i review activities for the ICAVP. These DRs are being distributed in accordance with the ;
Communications Protocol, PI MP3-01.
DR No. DR MP3 0292 - DR No. DR-MP3-0579 $
DR No. DR MP3-0340 DR No. DR-MP3-0580 DR No. DR-MP3-0373 DR No. DR-MP3-0608 ,
DR No. DR MP3-0415 DR No. DR MP3-0632 DR No. DR MP3-0509 DR No. DR MP3-0640 DR No. DR MP3-0566 DR No. DR-MP3-0642 DR No. DR-MP3-0644 I have also enclosed the following four (4) DRs that have been determined invalid. No action is required from Northeast Utilities for these DRs. The basis for their invalid determination is included on the documents.
DR No. DR-MP3-0498 1 1
DR No.- DR MP3-0501 0(
m
~ DR No DR-MP3-0507 I
- DR No. DR-MP3-0511 N
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23 P Il!E ElEp(Eglill e sa$ #c4
.n 55 East Monroe Street
- Chicago,it 60603 5780 (JSA
- 312-269 2000
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I United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission November.19,' 1997 ;
Document Control Desk Project No. 9583100 :
Page 2 I have also enclosed the one (1) DR for which the NU resolution has been reviewed and accepted by S&L.
DR No. DR MP3 0201 Please ditto any questions to me at (312) 269-6078.
Yours very truly,
^ -
{ .
D. . opfer Vice President and ICAVP Manager DKS:spr Enclosurcs
- Copies:
E. Imbro (1/l) Deputy Director, ICAVP Oversight T. Concannon (1/1) Nuclear Enerhy Advisory Council J. Fougere(1/1)NU mtWewpse. A97ar1I194 due i
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0292 Misistone unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: syriem #1 VALID I
- Potential Oper6oitely issue D6ecipline: MechanicW Desg" Diectopency Type: Compotent Dete Om .
Y No Systemfrocese: Rss NRC Significmco level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Putdished: 11/22/97 D'acropeacy: inconsistencies between FSAR Tbis 6.1 1 & 6.3 4 and i component design w/ respect to materials Deecription: ftem i FSAR Table 6.2-62 identifies the pump casing as ASTM-A452 Type 304. Containment recirculation spray pump design specification 2214.802 044 through Revision 1 shows the pump suction well casing to be made of materials designed to materia!
specifications SA 182 F304 and SA 358 Grade 304 G1.1.
Drawing 2214.802 044 018 Revision E shows the suction well to be rnade of materials designed to material specifications SA 240 304L, SA 182 304L, SA 358 304L, SA 312 316L and SA 312 304L, but the drawing does not specify the material for the -
suction well casing. FS AR Table 6.1 1 shows the suction casing ,
to be made of materials designed to material specifications SA-182 F304 and SA 312 TP304 No other pumps parts are identified as a pump casing.
, item 2 FSAR Table 6.1 1 shows the containment recirculation ecolers to include a housing made of galvanized steel. Containment
. recirculation cooler design specification 2214.803-020 through Addendum 5 does not identify a cooler housing or any parts made of galvanized steel. However, the specification does identify the cooler to have a shell made of specification SA 240 Type 304 stainless steel. Design drawings 2214.803-020 004 Revision F and 2214.803-020-002 Revision G also do not show a cooler housing or any parts made of galvanized steel.
Item 3 FSAR Tables 6.1 1 shows the strinless steel valves in the engineered safety features systems to have valve stems made of specification SA 182 F316 or SA 187 F304 material.
FSAR Table 6.3-4 shows motor operated valves containing radioactive fluids having stems made of autenitic or 17 4 PH stainless steel. Containment recirculation system components are described in FSAR Section 6.3 to be included in the emergency core coooling systern.
Tha ug[ygalmrinle in f*RAR YnedAc A 1.1 nrvi A M.1 ranrntant Printed 11M9/971:07.40 PM ' Page 1 of 5 e
Q ~ , -
N e ast Udinles ICAVP DR No. DR fAP3 0292 Ministone unN 3 Discrepancy Report gute and globe valves. Butterfly valves do not have valve stems. Therefore, tutterily valves are not represented by the valve components specified. However, FSAR Tables 6.1 1 and 6.3-4 do not identify the type (s) of valves reprosented by the materiallist. If the stem materiais listed in FSAR Tables 6.1 1 and 6.3-4 are meani to apply to butterfly valve shafts, stem material discrepancies other than those identified here would exist, .
The following motor operated valves have stem materials different than that specified in FSAR Table 6.1 1. V . wever, these valves do meet the stem material requirements in FSAR Table 6.3-4.
3RSS*MOV8837A.B 3RSS*V973 3RSS*MOV8638A.B 3RSS*V977 978 3RSS*MOV38A,B 3RSS*V980 981 3RSS*V26-29 3RSS*V984 3RSS*V32 33 3RSS*V988-995 3RSS*V58 59 ,3RSS V25 3RSS*V62 69 3RSS V918-919 3RSS*V911913 3RSS V934 3RSS*V916 3RSS V939 3RSS*V920-931 3RSS V941944 3RSS*V946-953 3RSS V960 3RSS*V958 959 3RSS V963 966 3RSS*V961962 3RSS-V969 3RSS*V967 968 3RSS V979 3RES*V970-971 3RSS V983 Material references are drawings:
2282.050-676-103 Revision i 2282.150154 022 Revision K 2282.050-676110 Revision E 2282.150154-026 Revision G 2282.050153 039 Revision B 2282.150154 042 Revision G 2282.050153-042 Revision A 2282.150154 043 Revision G 2282.150154 018 Revision G 2282.150154-044 Revision G 2282.150164-019 Revision G 2282.150154 046 Revision G 2282.150 154 021 Revision G ltem 4 FSAR Table 6.1 1 specifies botting and studs for engineered safety system components to be either material specification SA-193 Grude B6 or Grade B7, or SA 452 Grade 660. Botting material given in FSAR Table 6.1 1 does not specify whether 11 applies to all bolting or just pressure boundary botting.
Therefore, the botting specificat'on is assumed to apply to all bottire.
The following components use botting from material other than SA 193 Grades B6 or B7, or SA-452 Grade 660:
PtWed 11M E971:07.45 PM Page 2 of 5 nw - -
ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0292 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report 3RSS*P1 A,8,C.D 3RSS*V970-971 3RSS*EJ1A,B,C,D 3RSS*V973 3RSS*EJ2A,B,C,0 3RSS*V977 978 3RSS*MOV38A,B 3RSS*V984 3RSS*MOV20A,B C.D 3RSS*V967 968 3RSS*V3, 6, 9,12 3RSS*V980 981 3RSS*V32 33 3RSS'V911 3RSS*V58-59 3RSS V933. V940 3RSS*V62 63 3RSS V25 3RSS*V66-67 3RSS V941944 3RSS'V913 3RSS V935 938 3RSS*V916 3RSS V918 919 3RSS*V920-931 3RSS V960 3RSS*V946 953 3RSS V934 3RSS'V988 995 3RSS V939 3RSS'V958 959 3RSS V963 966 3RSS*V961962 3RSS V969 3RSS*V26 29 3RSS V976 3RSS*V64-65 3RSS V979 3RSS*V68-69 3RSS V983 3RSS*V912 Material references are:
Drawings:
2332.910-669-026 Revision H 2282.150 154-021 Revision G 2332.910-669 027 Revision J 2282.150154-022 Revision K 2282.050-676103 Revision i 2282.150-154-026 Revision G 2282.050-676110 Revision E 2282.150154 042 Revision G 2282.053153-036 Revision A 2282.150154 043 Revision G 2282.050-153-039 Revision B 2282.150154 044 Revision G 2282.050153-042 Revision A 2282.150154 046 Revision G 2282.150154 018 Revision G 2282.150154 055 Revision F 2282.150154-019 Revision G Specifications:
2214.802-044 Revision 1 SP ME 784 Revision 2 Note that some pressure boundary botting shown on the drawings and specifications is SA-453 Grade G60, so there might be a typographical error associated with this botting.
Item 5 FSAR Tables 6.1 1 shows that the stainless steel valves and components in the engineered safety features systems have nuts made of specification SA 194 Grade 6, SA 194 Grade 2H or SA-453 Grade 660 material. The nut material given in FSAR Table 6.1 1 does not specify whether it applies to all nuts or just pressure boundary nuts. Therefore, the nut material specification is sssumed to apply to eli nuts.
Printed 11/IE971:07.46 PM Page 3 of s
4 ICAVP DR No. DR MP34292 Northeast UtilWes ,
Minietone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report The following components have nuts from material different than that specified in FSAR Table 6.1 1:
3RSS*EJ1A,B.C,D 3RSS*V970 971 3RSS*EJ2A,B,C,D 3RSS*V973 3RSS*MOV38A.B 3RSS*V977 978 3RSS*MOV20A.B.C,D 3RSS*V984 3RSS*V3,6, 9,12 3RSS*V967 968 3RSS*V32 33 3RSS*V980-961 3RSS*V58-59 3RSS*V911 3RSS*V62 63 3RSS-V933, V940 3RSS*V66-67 3RSS V25 3RSS*V913 3RSS V941944 3RSS*V916 3RSS V918 919 3RSS V935-938 3RSS V9CO 3RSS*V920-931 3RSS V934 3RSS*V946-953 3RSS V939 3RSS*V988 995 3RSS V963-966 3RSS*V958-959 3RSS V969 3RSS*V961962 3RSS V976 3RSS*V26-29 3RSS V979 3RSS*V64-65 3RSS V983 3RSS*V66-69 3RSS*V912 Material references are:
Drawings:
2332.910-669-026 Revision H 2282.150-154 021 Revision G 2332.')10-669-027 Revision J ?'t82.150154 022 Revision K 2282.050-676103 Revision i 2282.150-154-026 Revision G 2282.050-676-110 Revision E 2282.150154-042 Revis'on G 2282.050153-036 Revision A 2282.150-154-043 Revision G 2282.050153-039 Revision B 2282.150 154-044 Revision G 2282.050153-042 Revision A 2282.150154 046 Revision G 2282.150154 018 Revision G 2282.150-154 055 Revision F 2282.150-154-019 Revision G Specifications:
SP ME 784 Revision 2 Review Val 6d invalid Needed Date initiator: Feingold, D. J. O O O 11/11/97 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A Q Q Q 11/11/97 VT Mgri Schopfer, Don K O O O $5/1'S7 IRC Chmn: Sngh, Anand K O O O $ 8 S7 D.i.:
INVALID:
L Date:
Printed 11/1gg71 cyMN'i Page 4 of 5 e
4 ICAVP DR N3. DR MP3 0292 Northeast Utilities Miiistone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report
- . ~ , .
Previously klont6 fled by NUF Q Yes i.9) No Non Descrepard Condation?C) Yes 9) No Resolutkm Pend 6ng?O Y + No Re.auti= un,e.av.d? O v.. + No Rev6ew Accogdeble Not Accogdeble $leeded Dale mg, g VT Leed: Nort Althony A VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K
=
IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K g Date:
SL Commerds:
l Prtnied 11/19971:07.61 PM Page 5 of 5 l
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4
=
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0M0 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review oraup: System DR VALID Potential Operstety leeue Diecipline: Structurel Deeg" F=-- my Type: Calculaten O va f5) No System #rocese: N/A NRC 54pencence level: 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Publ6ehed: 11/2297 D6ecrepency: Support Loads on BZ Drawings DescripHon: Support loads shown on BZ drawings ( Pipe Support Details ) do not reflect the latest loads from Pipe Support Summary used in the pipe support calculation. Pipe Support Summary is a part of latest stress calculation. This is a generic issue, Following are the few sample Drawing Nos, 12179 BZ 19A 20-5 12179-BZ 198-42 4 12179-BZ 739B-219-3 Review Valid invei6d Needed Date initietoet Petel, A. O O 11/1497 VT Lead: Ns1 Anthony A Q Q 11/17/97 VT Mgr Schopfer. Don K Q Q 11/17/97 IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Q 11/1897 Dete:
INVALID:
Dele:
RESOLUTION: ,
Prevlously identir.ed by NU7 O von iGI No Non Discrepent CondeHon?Q vee (9) No Resolut6on Pending70 vee 's> No Reeanution unresoived70 vee 's) No Review
,g Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date
.VT Leed: Nevi, Anthony A VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K O O O IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Dele:
SL Cortunents:
Printed 11/19971$8 35 PM Page 1 of 1
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3 0373 Millstone Unk 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: System DR VU Rev6ew Element: Systerr '.m691 PotenU2t Operebeldy leaue Diecipl6ne: Mp Aarvcal Deegn Q y ,,
D6ecrepency Type' calculemn systerWProcos: Oss
$ No MC sign 6f6cence & Nel: 3 Date faxed to NU:
DatePubl6shed: 11/22/97 Diecrepency: Calculation US(B) 295 D**cription: The purpose of US(B)-295 Rev. 5/CCN 1 is to determine the minimum RWST drawdown levels and drawdown times. The calculation provides the design basis for the low-low RWST switchover level setpoint.
Eight discrepancies were identMed in Calculation US(B) 295 -
(see DR MP3-0266 for discrepancy in FSAR and in Calculation US(B) 295):
- 1. Level to volume-to-drawdown time conversions are all accurate to four significant figures except tank volume at 57.88 ft (which should be 1,177,599 gal rather than 1,180,127 gal) and volume at 58.33 ft (which should be 1,192,937 gal rather than 1,194,444 gal). [p.6A) These quantitles are off by no more that 0.2% (about 1.5 inches) and are for non safety relatJd parameters, so they do not affect the validity of the calculation.
- 2. The high-high level setpoint is given as 58 33 ft in US(B) 295, but is actually 58.40 ft in 3 ENG 167 Rev. 0 (p. 60). The high level setpoint is given as 57.58 ft in US(B) 295, but is actually 58.15 ft in 3-ENG 167 [p. 6B]. These quantitles are off by no more that 7 inches, and are for non safety related parameters which are not used in the computation of any of the drawdown times or drawdown levels, so the validity of the calculation is not affected.
o
- 3. According to Calculation 34510031232E3, the instrument setpoint inaccuracy / drift for the low-low level setpoint is +25.92 in, .28.28 in. Calculation US(B) 295 uses +/ 24 inches (pp,6a, 6b,6c,6d,7a,10, and p. 5 of CCN 1) for determining drawdown levels and drawdown times. This discrepancy has a significant effect on calculated drawdown times.
- 4. The telephone memo of 3-26 74 (Attachment 3 to US(B)-295) should not be refer ^nced as the basis for completing the manual switchover of ECCS suction from the RWST to the containment sump within 10 minutes [pp. 60,6E,6F,6G,8, and 9].
Westinghouse letter NEU 1016 (to SWEC, dated 3 27 74) is the proper reference for the 10 minute manual switchover time (in accordance with C4 icuimion 357P). There is a basis for the 10 minute manual switchover time, so this discrepancy does not
'. affect the validity of the calculation.
- 5. No basis is given for the assumption that operatois would secure an RHS pump that failed to automatically trip on low low RWST level within the first 2 minutes of manual ECCS suction Pnnted 11/1&97 IM 27 PM b
~- . ._ _ _ __ _
ICAVP DR No. DR MP3-0373 Northeast Uti!ms Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Repoft to manually trip en RHS pump needs to be resolved to venfy the validity of the RWST switchever level (and the RHS purnp trip / low-low level alarm setpoint), the minimum RWST switchover level of 18.90 ft (see DR MP3-0766), and the minimum RWST drawdown time from the minimum level at the termination of ECCS suction switchover to the top of the ECCS suction.
- 6. US(B) 295 identifies hydraulic cabulations US(B)-245, Rev. O snd US(B)-312, Rev. O as the source for maximum QSS. HHSI and LHSI flows [p. 7]. Pump flows in these two hydraulic calculations are presented as a set of supply curves (flow as a functw.1 of RWST to RPV Dp or RWST to-containment Dp) for the LOCTIC containment pressurization analysis. There is no discussion of how these supply curves were interpreted to ootain maximum pump flow for RWST drawdown. There is no constancy on how this was done. HHSI flows for the minimum and maximum ESF cases are taken for a Dp of 23.4 psi, while LHSI flows for the mmimum and maximum ESF cases are taken for a Dp of 7.92 psi. P(R) 1096, Rev. O should have been used as the source of maximum QSS flow because it finds the supply curves for unde 0raded pumps, whereas US(B) 312 finds the supply curves for degraded pumps. The issue of what are the correct flows needs to be resolved in order to verify all of the minimum RWST drawdown levels, the switchover level (and the RHS pump trip / low-low level alarm setpoint), and all of the minimum RWST drawdown times.
- 7. CCN 1 to US(B)-295 references P(R)-1062 as the basis for changing the maximum QSS flow from 5000 to 5200 gpm for one-pump operation, and from 6000 to 6500 gpm for two-pump operation. P(R) 1062 does not contain this input. The correct reference is P(R) 1096 (See DR MP3-0440). The issue of what are the correct QSS flows needs to be resolved in order to verify all of the minimum RWST drawdown levels, the switchover level
, (and the RHS pump trip / low-low level alarm setpoint), and sll of the minimum RWST drawdown times.
- 6. CCN 1 to US(B) 295 references US(B) 245, Rev. O as the basis for changing the maximum RHS flow from 4850 to 5100 ppm for one-pump operatiori, and from 9700 to 10200 gpm for two-pump operation. As discussed above, US(B) 245 does not contain any specific numbers for maximum pump flow. It provides a series of different RHS flows as a function of RWST-to-RPV Dp. US(B)-245 had previously been cited as the basis for the 4850 and 9700 opm maximum RHS flows, The lack of documented basis RHS pump flow necos to be resolved to verify the validity of the RWST switchover level (and the RHS pump trip / low-low level alarm helpoint), the minimum RWT switchover level of 18.90 ft (see DR MP3-0266), and the minimum RWST drawdown ilme from the minimum level at the
'ermination of ECCS suction switchover to the top of the ECCS suction.
l Calculation US(B) 295 should be revised to resolve l discrepaneses 3. 5. 6. 7 and 8.
Prwed lin&W 009.33 PM Page 2 of 3 l
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g ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0373 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report nev6ew vand invand Needed Deie initlefor: Waheland,J.F. O O O $ 5'11/S7 VT Lead: Nort, Areeny A .
Q Q 11/11/97 VT Mgri Schopfer, Don K -
O O ii"'S7 RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Q Q Q 11/1&S7 Date INVALID:
Dele:
RESOLUTION:
Prevkmely identWied by NUF (.) Yes ;95 No Non D6screpent Condstkm?Q Yes (G) No Resolution Pending?O Yes 16) No ResolutionUnresolved7O Yes (*) No Rev6ew ACC*Plebie Not Accepdeble Needed Dale gg VT Lead: Nort, Ar'aiony A b VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K O O O RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Date:
SL Conenorde:
I l
Printed 11/19971:09.36 PM Page 3 of 3 l
1 e- er- y -w > -% -
y, i-+ v,m. -
e +.-
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP34418 miletone Unit 3 Discrepancy Repo:t t g Moview Oraup: syetem DR VALID I
Potential Operetdiety leeue D6*cip66ne: Mocwwat Dwg" 06ecrepancy Type: Component Data O vee
@ No
~
syetamerocese: Ds3 NRC sigadecence levet: 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/2297 D6ecr*Pency: The RWST material in spec 2275.001023 & drwg 2214.601-023-001 is inconsistent w/ FSAR Table 6.2-61.
D*ecr$Ption: FSAR Table 6.241 identifies the Refueling Water Sterage Tank to be made of specification A240 T304L stainless steel. The tank design specification 2275.001023 through Addendum 3, FSAR Table 6.1 1, and design drawing 2214.601023-001 Revision R describe the tank as having a shell and heads made of specification SA 240. Type 304 stainless steel. 'Ihere is a ,
discrepancy in that the FSAR specifies a low carbon alloy where the design specification and drawing do not indicate such.
Review Ve86d invalid Needed Date init6etor: Feingold, D. J. O O O $5'1657 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A O O O 1 ' '"'87 VT Mgr Schopfer, Don K O O O 1 t'1'S7 IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K O O O $5'16S7 Date:
INVAUO:
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Prev 6ously 64entified by NU? () Yee iol No Non Discrepent CondNion?C) Yee ei No Resolution Perdng?O vee + No Renoivison unresolvedtO vee =*) No Review g Acceptable Not Acceptelde Needed Date i VT Lead: Nort. Anthony A VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K
- e, sL Commente:
I
.l l
Printed 11/19971;1011 PM page 1 of 1 ,
I l
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP34609 Millstorm un;t 3 Discrepancy Report neview aroup: syen.m onvAuo A'
potential Operatuitety lseue EM ;: Mecherseel Deadg" Ohcropency Type: componert Dets Ow M No systemProcess: HVX NRC signifk.ence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Put:66ehed: 11/22/97 06*ctopomy: Areas maintained at a negative pressure by SLCRS and ABVS Deeceiption: During review of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System (SLCRS) and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) discrepancies regarding 1) which buildings and areas are maintained at a negative pressure during a LOCA and
- 2) which systems are required to maintain the negative pressure were identiflod.
FSAR Section 1.2.10 states that following a postulated accident, particulate and gaseous radioactive meterial is ducted from the containment enclosure and the buildings contiguous to the containment structure to the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS), where it is filtered and discharged to the atmosphere through an elevated stack rather than through a ground-level vent.
FSAR Section 3.1.2.41 states that the supplementary leak collection and release system (SLCRS) collects radioactive leakage from the contalnment to the containment enclosure and contiguous areas following a LOCA or reflease of radioactivdy due to a fuel handling accident.
FSAR Section 6.2.3 states that the secondary containment is comprised of the containment enclosure building, engineered safety features building (partial), auxiliary building, main steam building (partial), and hydrogen recombiner building (partial). The secondary containment is kept under a negative pressure relative to atmoshperic pressure. The negative pressure is maintained with the SLCRS ope,'ating together with the charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area ventilation system and auxiliary building flitration portions of the auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS). The SLCRS operating together with the charging pump, reactor plant component cooling water pump and heat exchanger area ventilation system and auxiliary building filtration portions of the auxiliary building ventilation system (ABVS) also rnalntains all contiguous buildings (main steam valve building, engineered safety features building (partially), hydrogen recombiner building (partially), and auxiliary building) under a negative pressure following a DBA by exhausting air from these area _s.
I SAR Section 6.2.3.1 states that the SLCRS is designed to .
maintain a negative pressure in areas contiguous to the containment.
FSAR Section 6.5.i states that the SLCRS system operated in conjunction with the charging pump, component cooling pump.
Printed 11/1&171:10 42 PM Page 1 of 2
l Northeast Utilities lCAVP DR No. DR MP3 0609 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report auxiliary building filters, is designed to maintain a negative pressure in the containment enclosure building and associated contiguous structures (auxillary building. ESF building, main steam valve building, and hydrogen recombiner building) during aLOCA.
FSAR Section 6.5.3.2 states that the secondary containment at Millstone 3 consists of a containment enclosure structure and the contiguous buildings.
P&lD EM 148E 12 and ductwnrk drawings EB 72A 6 and EB.
72B 4 shows that the SLCRS does not directly exhaust air from the hydrogen recombiner building as blankoff plates have been installed on the exhaust openings.
PalD EM 148A 2/ Joes not show the ABVS exhausting air from the main steam valve building.
PalD EM 148E t2 does not show the SLCR exhausting air from the main steam valve building, P&lD EM 152810 shows 1,350 cfm transfer air to the SLCRS in the auxillary building thru containment enclosure via MSV/ Cont shake space, Rev6 w vand invahd Needed Date initiator stout, M D. Q Q Q l1897 VT Leed: Nort, Anthony A Q Q Q 11/1/97 VT Mgt: Schopfer, Don K D D O 5 ' SS7 1RC Chrm: $1ngh, Anand K Q Q Q 11/1&S7 Date:
INVALID:
Date:
RESOLUTION:
, Previously ident&Aed by NU7 O Yes ' @ No Non D6ectopent Condit60n?Q Yes Si No Resolution Pend 6ng?O Yes (5) No Resolut60nUnresolved70 Yee s) No Review Acceptable Not Acceptelde Needed Date VT iead: Nort Anthony A O O O VT Mgt: Schapfer, Don K O O 1RC Chmn: Shgh, Anand K Date:
sL Conments:
I I
Printed 11/1E971:10 46 PM Page 2 of 2 i
ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0666 .
Northeast Utilities Millstone UnN 3 Discrepancy Report nev6 w oroup: system DRvAuo EW: system W Potent 6el Operebelay Isoue D6ecip46ne: h DoeVi Om Dioctopency Type: Instemeten Requrements ,g
~
SystenvProcese: HVX f#tC Slenetcance level: 3 Date FAXedio NU:
Date Published: 11/22,97 Deecrepency: Auxiliary Building Ventilation Ductwork Classification Deecription: During review of the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System a discrepancy in the classification for the ductwork between the missile hood on the auxiliary building roof and the ventilation vent on the turbine building roof was identified.
Specification SP ME 576 specifies non-QA non-seismic duct construction for the 10 ft by 10 ft duct from the auxiliary building roof to the ventilation vent.
Specification 2170.430-565 specifies QA category ll non selstnic duct construdion for the 10 ft by 10 ft duct from the auxillary building roof to the ventilation vent.
Attachment 1 of NU letter B11392 dated December 6,1964 from W. G. Council to B. J. Youngblood states "The ventilation ductwork associated with safety related portions of the Auxiliary Building Ventitation System is seismically qualified. This ductwork runs through the auxiliary building outside to the turbine building where it attaches to the turbine building vent stack which is not seismically qualified." -
Per FSAR Section 9.4.3.2, the plant ventilation vent is the release point for all ventilation exhaust air from the auxiliary, waste disposal, and fuel buildings, the containment structure, and contaminated portions of the service building. The ventilation vent effluent point nf release is at elevation 157 feet.
Per FSAR Section 6.2.3, the auxiliary building filtration units discharge to the environment via the ventilation vent oil the roof of the turbine building.
Per FSAR Section 9.4.3.2, in the event of a SIS, the auxiliary building ventilation filter exhaust fans vent through the ventilation vent after filtration Per FSAR Section 6.5.1 the charging pump, component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger exhuast ventilation system is classified as an ESF filter system.
Per F T3An iable J.21 and Section 9.4.3.1 the auxiliary buhding exhaust filtration system is ANS Safety Class 3 Per FSAR Section 9.4.3.3, the charging pump, teactor plant component cooling water pump, and heat exchanger ventilation and the filtration units including their fans are QA and Seismic Category 1.
PrWed 11n9971:11:35 PM Page 1 of 2
0 ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0666 Northeast Utilities meistone unk 3 Discrepancy Report Per FSAR Section 3.12.64, t.fter a postulated acCksent, the safety related ventitation vent hgh range monnore aad the safety related Millstone i stack monitors are used to monitor the effluents from spaces contiguous to the containment structure.
Reykw Valid inval6d Needed Date Inillator: Stout, M. D. O O O $625/87 VT Lease: Nort. Anthesty A O O O $ 1S7 VT Mgrt Schopfer. Don K Q Q Q 11/10%7 IRC Chmn: Singh, Anere K Q Q Q t1/1&97 Date:
INVALID:
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Pts riously identined by NU7 O vee '9) No Non Discrepent Condetkm?O )es >#1 No RasohA6on Pend 6ng?O vea s*> No R.aoivisonunrossevedrO vos 4) No Review initletort (none)
VT Leed: Neri, Antrony A O O VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K O O O 1RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Date:
SL Commente:
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Printet 11/19971:11:40 PM Page 2 of 2
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Northeast Uulmes ICAVP DR No. DR4AP3-0879 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report '
ReviewGroup: AodjordMagehon DR VAUD I II N Potent 6el Operotduty lseue 06ecapl6ne: linochewal Deegn Diecrepancy Type: Licensing Documert O va M No system / Process: N/A NRC Signihwe levd 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Putd6ehed: 11/22S7 D6ecrepexy: Discrepancy Between Accident Analysis Assumptions and Calculated Minimum AFW Performance Capability Deecription: Westinghouse Report WCAP 8330,
- Westinghouse Anticipated Transients Without Trip Analysis,' dated August 1974, evaluated the loss of normal feedwater event with the consideration of no reactor trip. This evaluation used the assumption of an auxillary feedwater system response in less than 60 seconds at a flow rate -
of 1760 gallons per minute in the demonstration of adequate capability of the plant to mitigate the accident.
- Pit.nt Safety Evaluation for Millstone Generating Station Unit 3',
dated August 1990, Westinghouse evaluated the inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve event, in oemonstrating adequate response, Westinghouse assumed an auxiliary feedwater system flow of 1200 gallons per minute for 4 loop operation and 900 gallons per minute for 3 loop operation.
(The 1200 gallons per minute is used in lieu of the 1760 gallons per minute stated above to incorporate conservatism.)
DBDP.MP3 FWA,
- Millstone Unit 3 Nuclear Power Plant Design Basis Documentation Package - Auxiliary Feedwater System,'
(DBDP) Revision 1, dated June 1,1995 specifies the design flow for each motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump as 575 gallons per minute at 1289 psla. This represents a required flow of 470 gallons per minute, a recirculation flow of 45 gallons per minute and 12% margin.
The DBDP also specifies the design flow for tne turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump as 1150 gallons per mirmte at 1289 psia. This represents a required flow of 940 gallons per minute, a recirculation flow of 90 gallons per minute and 12% margin.
The DBDP specifies minim'r1 auxillary feedwater flow requirements for a number of accident scenarios. However, the ATWS and tuck open safety or relief valve events discussed above are not addressed in the DBDP.
SP3622.12, " Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A Cold Shutdown Flow Test," performed on 26MAY95 indicates a full flow capability of the 'A" motor driven pump of $48.3 gallons per minuto at a pressure of 1312 psig. This includes a recirculation flow of 43.3 gallons per minute.
SP 3622.2 2, ' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B Cold Shutdown Flow Test,' perfomied on 26MAY95 indicates a full flow capability of the 'B' motor driven pump of 545 gallons per minute at a pressure of 1357.6 psig. This included a recirculetion flow of 45 nalinne nar minuta Printed 11/19971:12 45 PM Page 1 or 3
DR No, DR MP3-0679 Northeast UtiHties ICAVP Millstone UnN 3 Discrepancy Report
- SP 3622.3 5,'TDAFW Pump Mode 3 F911 Flow Test," performed on 2JUN95 was not comDieted satbfactortly because of check valve malfunctions. The PORC approved a change to the procedure (ACR 3260) which allowed the completioit of the check valve surveillance. Tested full flow capability is not recorded on the data sheets provided by NU.
Proto Power Calculation 96-0$7,'MP3 Auxiliary Feedwater System Comprehensive Flow Analysis", Revision 0, dated 16APR97 (including CCNs 1,2, and 3) evaluated the performance of the auxiliary feedwater system for various accident scenarios. One of these events represents the ATWS event, lor,s of normal feedwater without reactor trip. The response includes the scen rio of 2 motor driven pumps and 1 turbine driven pump supplying 4 intact steam generators. For this sMnario, the maximum calculated flow capability of the auxiliary feedwatst system under degraded pump flow conditions is 1130 gallons per minute at 1000 pla.
The Proto Power calculation indicates that the auxiliary feedwater system's capability to respond to the minimum flow conditions cited in the DBDP is adequate in the degraded condition.
Review of these data reveals two discrepancies:
1 The DBDP has neither justified ignoring or addressed the higher auxillary feedwater system flow requir'.tments for the ATWS and stuck open safety or relief valve events.
- 2. The Proto-Power calculation for fully degraded auxiliary feedwater system flow indicates a system capability (1130 gallons per minute at 1000 psla) which is inconsistent with the analysis assumption (1760 gallons per minute).
Further, the degraded auxiliary feedrater system capability is inconsistent with the assumed flow associated with stuck open safety or relief valve event analyses (1200 gallons per minute for I 4 loop operation and 900 Gallons per minute for 3 loop operation). I Review Valid invalid Needed Date InMietor: Peebles, W. R.
O O O 5 t'10S7 VT Lead: Rahep Raj D D D D ti'ioS7 VT Mgri Schopfer. Don K O O O 5 5'ioS' IRC Chmn: Singh. Anand K O O O imS)
Dele:
INVALlo:
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Previously identined by NU? O Ye. (Si No Non D6screpent CondetiontO Ye. 'sh No i
Resolution Pendeng?O vos @ No Re.osuison unreceivedtO ve. + No !
Prtnied 91r14971:12 49 PM Page 2 of 3
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ICAVP DR N3. DR-MP34679 Noetheast Utilities uilistone unit 3 Discrepancy Report RevW
_, w:_ m u u esa w w om VT Leed: Rehop RW D VT Mor: setepfw, Don K O O O RC Chmn: Cyi, Anand K :=
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP34640 wilstone unk 3 Discrepancy Report Review Graup: system DR VALID
- " Potential Operebuey issue
@ Yes D6ecrepency Type: Lkenean0 Danent g g, ayaterwProcess: HVX NRC sierncence level: 3 Date faxed to NU: 1 Date Published: 11/22,97 Descrepancy: Secandary Containment Drawdown with SLCRS and ABVS
Description:
During 9vitw of the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release bystem (SLCRS) and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) discrepancies regarding the required seconoary containment drawdown time were identiflad.
Secondary containment drawdown requirements in the FSAR are:
FSAR Section 6.2.3.3 states that the SLCRS in conjunction with the auxiliary building filter system draws down the pressure to the minimum 0.4 inch negative pressure in 110 seconds from the time of emergency diesel generator breaker closure.
FSAR Section 6.2.3.3 states that the SLCRS and ABVS is required to drawdown the SLCRS areas to a negative pressure within 120 seconds after the accident. The negative pressure is measured at the /.uxiliary Building 24 6 elevation and maintained per technical specifications at greater than or equal to 0.4 inches of water guage after a design accident.
FSAR Table 1.9-2, SRP 6.5.1 B.5 states that the SLCRS draws down enclosures contiguous to the containment to a minimum negative pressure of 1/4 iwg in 60 seconds after S!S.
SER Section 6.2.3 states that the capacity of the SLCRS is bufficient to reduce and maintain a pressure of 0.25 iwg throughout the enclosure building and contiguous buildings within 1 minute after the accident, assuming a wind velocity of 22 mph.
The calculations that determine the secondary containment drawdown time and SLCRS airflow are calculations:
P(B)-843, Rev. O Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System P(B) 1089, Rev. 0 Establish Acceptance Criteria for Air Leakage Through Pipe and Electrical Penetrations The objective of calculation P(B) 843 was to determine the required capacity of SLCRS and the time required for SLCRS to achieve a negative pressure of 0.25 iwg in the containment enclosurh building and contiguous buildings. The results of the calculation indicate that with a 9,500 cfm SLCRS fan capacity the drawdown time to -015 Iwg is 30 seconds. Review of the calculation identified the following discrepancies:
- 1. Calculation does not provide references for the building Prtried tins 971:13.31 FM Page 1 or 4
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0640 ,
umstone unit 3 Discrepancy Report :
- 2. Calcuistion does not adequately account for differences in air density between the outside air (infiltration into building) and at the inlet to the SLCRS exhaust fan. The air density at the fan inlet is lower than the infiltrating air due to heat gains in the building and the electric heater in the SLCRS filter unit.
- 3. Assumes that fan flow is constant because the fan is equiped with variable inlet vanes. Neither P&lD EM 146E 12 nor specification 2176.430141 show in!st vanes and associated controls for fans 3HVR*FN12A/128
- 4. Calculation does not address wind effects on leakage through the containment enclosure.
Calculation P(B) 1086 determines the allowable leakage rates and exhaust alrflows for the areas exhausted by the SLCRS fans. Reviow of the calculation identified the following discrepancies:
- 1. Calculation determined that an exhaust rate of 130 cfm was required for the hydrogen recombiner building,4950 cfm for the containment enclosers building and 1350 cfm for the main steam valve building. P&l; EM 148E 12 shows the exhaust openings for the hydrogen recombiner building being blanked off, no airflow exhausted from the main steam valve building, and 6430 cfm exhausted from the cont!.inment enclosure.
- 2. Calculation does not address wind effects on leakage through the containment enclosure. This results in under estimating the leakage through the containment enclosure.
In response to M3-RF1-00472 that requested the calculation (s) that determine the secondary containment drawdown time with the SLCRS assisted by the ABVS, NU in M3-IRF-00622 transmitted IST 3-93-45 and IST 3 93-46 which presented SLCRS and ABVS test data and calculation 92-071339M3, SLCRS Drawdown Test Pressure Correction Factor Calculation.
NU stated that the combination of these documents satisfies the request for the secondary containment draw down time with SLCRS and ABVS. Review of IST 3-93-045 SLCRS & ABVS Restest of PDCRs MP3 93-200 & 205 and IST 3-93-048 SLCRS
& APVS Restest of PDCRs MP3 93-200 & 205 in Winter Mode from an engineering perspective identified the following discrepancies:
- 1. Plant conditions at time of the test did not co respond to postulated post LOCA cor.ditions. Therefore, not all heat loads that wculd be present during the postulated acc' dent were present, The tested drawdown time needs to be adjusted to address ar;as such as the main steam valve building that have the non-safety ventilation system that provides cooling during normal plant operating isolated on a SlS. Due to differences in
, heat gains present during test and occident conditions the tested
! draw down time will be faster than the accident condition time.
l Prtnted 11/19/971:13 34 PM P uc ; of 4
k Northeast Utilities ICAVP Dft No. DR MP3 0580 Milletone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report
- 2. Test did not record differential pressures and times for the recombiner building which is inside the secondary containment boundary. ,
- 3. Test results do not identify SLCRS or ABVS system airflows during test. Technical Specification 4.6.6.1 states that the GLCRS is considered operable with a flow rate of 7600 cfm to 9600 cfm. Results need to be adjusted to correspond to minimum altflow conditions since the tiraw down time is directly affected by the SLCRS airflow rate.
- 3. The acceptance criteria of a 2.5 minute drawdown time to 0.4 iwg negative pressure in IST 3 g3 045, Rev. O. Change 7 and IST 3 03-046 Rev. O Change No.1 do not agree with FSAR drawdown times show above.
NU letter 815028 dated December 14,1994 submitted a proposed revision to Technical Specifications for the Supplementary Leak Collection and Release System. The proposed Section 4.6.6.1.d.3 Surveillance Requirement is
" Verifying that each system produces a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.1 inch Water Guago in the Auxillary Building at 2415" elevatiorMthin 60 seconds after a stPrt signal and a negative pressure of greater than or equal to 0.4 inches Water Gusge in the Aexiliary Building at 24'6" elevation within the next 120 seconds." On page 6 of the ittter NU siates "With the proposed negative pressure criteria for the secondary containment, it could be assummed that all leakage into the secondary containnseilt is filtered, since a sufficient negative pressure is achieved within one minute and the final required negative pressure is achelved within the next two minutes."
When the difference between accident and test heat loads, wind effects, and correction factor for the measured differential pressure are accounted for, not all areas within the containment enclosure will be at a negative pressure within M s6conds.
Other Discrepancy Reports that address related itsues.
DR MP3-0514 Containment Enclosure Building Negative Pressure DR MP3 0030 Dra wfown Times for Rod Ejection Au:ident and LOCA Rev6ew Val 6d invalid Needed Date initletor: Stout, M. D.
O O O in24S7 VT Lead: Nort. Arthony A Q Q p 10r31/97 VT Mgr: Schopfer. Don K Q Q Q 11/697 IRC Chmn: singh. Anand K O O 11'ISS7 O
Date:
INVAUo:
ausse.
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Previously idenuned by nut U Yes @ No Non D6screpent Condit6on?U Yes @ No PrWed 11MES71:13 36 PM Page 3 of 4
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3-0680 Millstone Unn 3 Discrepancy Report P"dM Peneng?() Yes @ No PhmM untomotvedF() Yes ? No Rev6ew g Acceptatdo Not Accootatdo Needed Date VT Lead: Nort Anthony A VT Mgt: Schopfer. Don K IRC Chmn: Lingh, Anand K O O one:
SL Corrmords:
PrWed 11/19971:13 38 PM Pap 4 of 4
_ _ - ~ _ _ - . . ~
Northeast Utilities 10AVP DR No. DR-MP34608 Millstone unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: Prog >emmMc DR VALID Rev6ew Element: Correc&ve Acton Process g
E", ;: Opershon.
N . ny Type: Correcove Achon O Ya syriernProcess: N/A g
NRC sion6Acence level: 4 Date faxed to NU' Date Putd6shed: 11/22/97 D6ecrepancy: Lack of Ga ,tric Imolications Assessment Deecription: MP3 LER 97 020-00 provides a description of a condition where the design placement of flow throttle Valves for cooling water to the containment air coolers was set such that insufficient cooling would be provided to the containmutt t'uring a loss offsite power c>ndition. The issue is primarily related to iriadequate cooling for an operator to perform credited fire event related mitigation actions in the containment. The action requests generated by NU to address this issue appear to be limited to remediation of this particular issue. The NU corrective action for this condition did not include an assessment of the generic implications on other post fire credited actions w!th rogard to conditions that could interfere with completion of the required actions.
Alternately, a review cc d be made to determination if the existing basis documentation for these act;ons adequately accounts for such conditions. Specific 6tly, such a rev!*.w or basis should consider design and operation subtleties that might be overlooked relative to environmental impacts or other obstructions to complete the actions.
Review Valid invahd Needed Date inet6etor: Bennett. L A, V1 Lead: Ryan. Thomas J O Q Q 11/11/97 O O O 1i:/97 VT Mgr: Schopfer. Don K O O O 15/12/S7 IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K O O O 1't$ 5S7 D.i.:
IffIAllo:
Date:
Resol UTION:
Previously ident6Aed by NU7 O Yes 91 No Non D6scropont Condition?Q Yes (9) No Resolution Pend 6ng?O Yee + No heeosuiion uare.oiv.d?O Yo. #1 No Review Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date VT Leed: Ryan. Thomas J O O O VT Mer: Schopfer, Don K
- me cw ev. Anand x Dets:
{ ] ]
sL Consnents: s Prinbd 11/1&S71:16 22 PM Page 1 or 1 I
w.- - - T - --
w- -
..r,
0 Northeast tstilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3-0432 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: Progranwnsho DR VALID Rev6ew Element: Correda Acton Proceso g p
D6ecipl6,w: Enwonmnental oushreaten '
W ;my Type: Cortsettve Action O vee SystemProcese: N/A g
NRC Sign 6hcance level. 4 Date FMed to NU:
Date Putd6thed: 11/22.97 i
06ecrepene,: Technical and Quality Problems with a Calculation
Description:
Condition Report (CR) M3 971273 deals with problems found in S&W calculation PR 220, Revision 0, titled " Radiation Levels for 8Equiprr.3nt Qualification m the ESF Building". No corrective action was taken for this CR since the NU Radiological Assessment Branch performed an independent review of the calculation and was . Die to follow the calculation and determine the results were acceptable. In addition, where S&W references or QAD output were not available, the results or assumptions were checked with similar results in the NU electrical equipment qualification files and the results matched well.
- 1. S&L nuclear and environmen*al qualification engineers reviewed the technical criticisms of the calculation and detemilncd that there is not enough documentation in the CR package to completely confirm the technical adequacy of the calculation given the nature and extent of the criticisms.
If the comparison with the NU electrical equipment qualif'e,ation files meets the requirements for design verification by use of attemate calculations, this may be used to qualify PR 220 Revision 0, for safety related use provided the documentation l showing consistency of resu!!S is auditable and the criticisms conceming the identification of the calculation, appropriateness of input data, assumptions and computer code used are resolved.
- 2. CR M3-971273 also points out some aspects of the calculation which do not meet Regulatory Gude 1.64 dated June, 1976. This guide is a commitment of NU's Quality Assur1nce program Topical Report. Presumably, S&W either had to commit to this guide or ASME NQA 1. In any case, the fact that the computer code and run could not be found, the lack cf documentation or support for some of the assumptions (where appropriate), and the fact that the calculation did not ref'ect the redesign of the recombiner shed among the other state <j criticisms indicates that the quality of the calculation does not meet Unit 3's licensing basis, j The lack of suf6cient information in the CR package to justify the "use as is" oisposition is a discrenant y, Review Valid inval6d Needed Date initiator shoppard, R. P- 0 0 0 11/1/87 VT Lead: Ryan. Thornas J G O O 11/1/97 VT Mgr* Schopfer, Don K O O O 11/1oS7 IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K G O O "'$$S7 Printed tin &971:23 05 PM Page 1 of 2 )
l Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0432 Misistone unit 3 Discrepancy Report Date:
IfWALID:
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Preytously ident6Aed by NUF C) Yes I No Non Discronent Corwem6en?L) Yes ~S YNo Rosedution Pending?O v + N. P-%unr ev.etO vee (SD No Revistv
___m._
.e.___, g .&_____ , . _ _ _
M Date VT Lead: Ryan. Thomas J VT Mgt: Schopfer, Don K .
IRC Chmn: 66nvi, Anend..
Date:
SL Conenents:
l Printed 11/19971:23.11 PM Page 2 of 2
. ~
. Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0640
- Misistone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6ew Group: Programr.mte DR VALlO Review Element: Test Procedure Diecipline: Mechencal Desig" D6ecrepancy type: Teet Requiremente O va SystemProcese: N/A @ No NRC &lgninconce level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/22/97 D6screpency: Ultrasonic Examination of Rek.aor Pressure Vessel Studs Dactlption: Procedure NU UT.27 Revision 5, describes the method to examine the above studs. The procedure is based on Code Case N-3071 and utilizes a shear wave technique supplemented by a surface wavr. teclanque.
Case N-3071 is not part of the Unit 3 Inservice inspection Program. In addition,IWA 2232(c) of ASME Section XI requires that ultrasonic examination of studs follow Article 5 of ASME Section V. Paragraph T 536.1 of Section V requires that thL ultrasonic examination be a straight beam, axial scan.
Review Valid invalid Needed Date inettetor: shopperd. R. P.
O O 11/SS7 VT Lead: Ryan, Thomme J
@ Q 11/6 S 7 VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K O O O 11/10'97 IRC Chmn: singh, Anand K Q 111' &97 Date:
INVALID:
Date:
9 RESOLUTION: '
Pts twsiy identifled by NU7 C) Yee (91 No Non Discrepent Condetion?() vee @ No f4esolution Pending?O vos @ u. Resoiuiioa unr.wvedro v.e @ u.
Review
- g. Acceptable Not Ac;eptable Needed Date VT Lead: Ryan, Thomas J VT Mgt; schopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: singh. ,'nend K Date:
SL Commente:
Printed 11/19971:23 42 PM Page 1 of 1
Northeast Utiinles ICAVP DR No. DR-MP34642 Mil! stone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date gg; g)
VT Lesd: Nort. Anthory %
- VT Mgr: Echopfer, Don K O O 1RC Chrm: SNh, Anand K .
SL Comments:
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_p. - _ .2m .m:
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0642 Ministone unit 3 Discrepancy Report Restec Gmup: System DR VAUD I
Potential Operatuity issue Diecipline: Mechanical Omegn Diecrepency Type: Component Detr O va
@) No
~
System 9tocess: HVX NRC signincence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 1. 22/97
~
Discrepancy: SLCRS and ABVS Filler Unit Fire Protection Piping and Deluge Valves Doctlption: During review of the fire protection interface with the Supplementary Leak Collection System (SLCRS) filter units 3HVR*FLT3A/33 and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (ABVS) exhaust filter units 3HVR*FLT1 A/1B a discrepancy regarding the classification of the deluge valves (3FPW FV70, 71,72,73) and piping was identified.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Rev. 2, Position C.2.c requires that all components of an engineered-safety-feature atmospheric cleanup system should be designated as Seismic Category I if failure of a component would lead to the release of significant quantitles of fisslor, products to the working or outdoor environments. FSA9 Table 1.8-1 does not take exception to this requirement.
The PMMS database identifies valves 3FPW-FV70,71,72,73 ns non seismic non-CAT 1 components.
The deluge valve arKI fire protection piping between the deluge va!ve and the filter unlt were provided by specification 2103.460-363 Special Hazard F;te Extinguishing System in accordance with NFPA 15. The spacification does not identify any seismic requirements for the deluge valve or piping.
The deluge valve and piping form part of the pressure boundary for the filter units. Failu:e of these items to maintain their pressure integrity post tecident would result in air bypassing the demister, prefilter and bEPA filter. There is also the potential for air bypass of the charcoal adsorberin the filter units.
Review VaW invalid Needed Date initletor: stout, M. O, 8 O O 11' o'97 VT Leed: Nort, Anthony A B O O 1 '10S7 VT Mge: schopfer, Don K Q O O 1 110'S7 IRc Chmn: singh, Anand K G O O 11'1SS7 Dei.:
INvAUD:
Date:
RESOLUTKAM:
Previously klontthod by NU? O Yes @ No Nori Discrepent Condelion?Q Yes ? No Resolution Pending?O va @ No naauuonuar wved?O va @ No Review Panted 1119971:24 20 PM Page 1 of 2
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3-0644 Millstone unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Or.4 p: syneem DR VALID Potential Dpereb41 sty issue Diecipi6ae: uschances owgn 4 .,,
Discrepancy Type: Component Date SystemProcess: HVX O No NRC Signincance level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/22/97
~
Descrepancy: SLCR3 and ABVS Filter Unit Drain Lines Descripuon: Durireg review of the Supplementary Leak Collection System (SLCRS) filter units 3HVR*FLT3A/3B and the Auxiliary Building Ventilation System (A3VS) exhaust filter units 3HVR*FLT1 A/1B a discrepancy regarding the classification of the drain lines was identified.
Regulatory Guide 1.52, ReV. 2, Position C.2.c requires that all colnponants of an engineered-safety-feature atmospheric cleanup system should be designated as Seismic Category 1 if failure of a component would lead to the release of sit nificant quantities of fission products to the working or outdoor environmonts. FSAR Table 1.8-1 does not take exception to this requirement.
The filter unit drain lines shown on P&lDs EM 148A 24 and EM-148612 and piping drawing EB-40D-13 are not identified as Seismic Category I components.
The drain piping bety;oen the isolation valves and the filter unit form part of the pressure boundary for the filter units. Failure of the drain lines to maintain their pressure integrity post accident would result in air bypassin0 the demister, prefilter, HEPA filter and the charcoai adsorber in the filter units. This would degrade the efficiency of the filter unit.
Review Val 6d invalid Needed Date init:ator: stout, M. D. @ [ Q 11/7/97 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A @ ] [ 11/7/97 VT Mgt; schopfer, Don K Q O O $1"SS7 1RC Chmn: segh, Anand K G O O 1'18S7
. Date:
INVALID:
Date: S REs0LUTION:
Prev 6ously identined by NU? O Yes @ No NonDiscrepent(EiE*117Q Yes t No Resdutio.Pending?O Yes <!)No Resolutionunresolved70 vos 'fiNo Review initiator: (none)
VT Lead: Wl. Anthony A VT Mgt- hchopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: singh, Anand K Date:
Pnnted 11MS/971:M50 PM Page 1 of 2
Northeast Utilities ICAVP _ DR No. DR-MP3 0444 ,
Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report-
)
SL Comments * !
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Pnnled 11/1M71:27.04 PM Page 2 cf 2
_ . . ,,, 7v<_
e ICAVP DR No. DRe#3 0498 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Group: System DR INVALID
- # Potential Operabi4My issue Diecipiirse: Mechenecal DeWgn Om Discrepancy Type: Component Data gg SystemProcess: QSs NRC significance levet: 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/2297 Discrepancy: Inconsistency betweaq valve design specification 2282.150-154
& FSAR w/ respect te r.eismic design.
Description:
FSAR Section 6.2.2.1, Table 1.81s Table 1.8N 1, and Safety Evaluation Report Section 6.2.2 state that the quench spray system is in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29 for Seismic Category 1 systems. In contrast valve design specification 2282.150-154 Revision 2 does not address the seismic qualification for the following safety-related queench spray.'
- stem and containment recirculation spray system manual valves:
3QSS*V50-58 3OSS*V940 V941 3OSS*V948-V951 30SS*V968-V975 3QSS*V933-V936 3QSS*V957-V959 3QSS*V964-V967 3QSS*V986, V987 3RSS*V32 33 3RSS*V58-59 3RSS*V62-69 3RSS*V911913 3RSS*V916 3RSS*V920-931 3RSS*V946-953 3RSS*V958-959 3RSS*V961962 l 3RSS*V967 968 3RSS*V970-971 3RSS*V973 3RSS*V977 978 3RSS*V980-981 3RSS*984 3RSS*V988-995 The oiber quench and containment rec,irculation spray systems valve design specifications reviewed specifically address seismic requirements for the component. An example is specification i 2282.050-153 Revision 3.
Review Valid invalid Needed Date initiator: Feingold. D. J. [ g Q 11/17S 7 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A O O O 11'17/S7
! VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K O O O IRC Chmn: Sirgh, Anand K O O O I
Printed 11/1&971:03 44 PM Page 1 of 3
ICAVP DR No. DR MP3-0498 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancv Report Date: 11/13/97 INVAUD: Specification No. 2282.150-154 is for ' Stainless Steel Valves,2 In. and Smaller, Manual and Motor Operated, ASME Section lit, Classes 1,2 and 3, ANSI B31.1, Class 4*, The portions of the specification pertaining to motor operated valves (Parts B and D) have been deleted. Part A addresses ASME Class 1,2 and 3 manual valves which are generally Seismic Category 1. Part C addresses ANSI B31.1 manual valves, which would typically be non-safety-related, non Seismic Category i valves.
The valves in question in the quench and containment recirculation spray systems are ASME Class 2 or 3. The design of valves for Class 2 and 3 applications is specified in ASME Code Subarticles NC-3600 and ND-3600 respectively. The ASME Section lll Code year specified in the specification is 1974, in the 1974 Edition of the Code these Subarticles only require that tne design of valves meet ANSI B16.5. No design report or seismic report was required in this edition of the CNe.
The specification adds that the valves shall be designed to Code Case 1635-1. This Code Case was issued in August of 1974 to provide guidance on how to design valves for upset, emergency and faulted loads (which include seismic loads), in this Code Case it states that the valves shall be designed such that the piping system, and not the valve, is the limiting factor; i.e. the valve body is stronger than the pipe. This is generally done by comparing the valve body sectional properties and material strengths to those of the pipe (as described in Section 2.1 (a) and (b) of the Code Case). Thus the valve is proven seismically adequate if the piping is seismically adequate. The manufacturer is not required to provide a Design Report or Stress Report per this Code Case.
The Code Case goes on to discuss the design of valves with operators having extended structures, but these requirements would only apply to motor and air operated valves, not to the manual valves covered by Part A of this specification.
in conclusion, seismic qualification of the manual valves is addressed in Specification 2282.150-154 by stipulation of ASME Code Case 1635-1. Of course, use of Code Case 1835-1 also implies that the piping system in which the valve is installed is designed for the applicable seismic loads. Note that, for other Millstone valve specifications, seismic requirements are generally given for motor and air operated valves (which have extended structures) and Code Case 1635-1 is specified for manual valves.
Date: .
REs01.tmON Previously identtAed by NU? O Yes @ No Non Dt.crepent Condition?O Yes T No Resolution Pending?O ve. @ No Re.osuiion unre.oived70 ve. @m Review Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date Pnnted 11/19/971:03 49 PM Page 2 or 3
o ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0498 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report VT Lead: Nwt, Anthony A O O O VT Mer: Schopfer, Don K O O O IRC Clunn: Singh, Anand K Date:
SL Comments:
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Printed 11/1997103 52 T;a Page 3 of 3
Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3 0801 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Group: System DR INVAUD Review Element: System Dee*0n pgw pq %
DiocWine: Mechenecal Deedgn hz ; xy Type Component Date O vee IM No
~
SysteeWProceae: Rss NRC significence level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/22S 7 Discrepency: The maximum operating pressure for various pipelines is inconsistent w/ the design pressure.
Deectlption: The maximum operating pressure given in calculation P(R)-1187 Revision 1 for the following pipelines is greater than the design pressure determined in calculation P(R)-1186 Revision 1 (CCN
- 2) and plant computer data base, PDDS:
3 RSS-001 105-2 3-RSS-001 109 2 3-RSS-001 113 2 3-RSS-001 117 2 3-RSS-008-048-2 3-RSS-008-052 2 3-RSS-008-054-2 3-RSS-008-055-2 3-RSS-006-040-2 3-RSS-008-041 2 3-RSS-006-047 2 3-RSS-008-053-2 The maximum operating pressure in calculation P(R)-11871s given as 300 psig. The design pressure determined in calculation P(R)-1186 Revision 1 (CCN #2) is 275 psig. The design pressure reported in the plant computer data base, PDDS, for the above listed lines is generally 275 psig, except ,
where the pressure is reported at 600 psig for portions of some of these lines .
Review Veied involid Needed Date initiator: Feingold, D. J. O @ Q 11/1&97 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A O O O 11/15S7 VT Mgr: schopfer, Don K Q Q Q IRC Chmn: singh, Anand K O O O Date: 11/18/97 Y INVALID: This discrepancy report duplicates Discrepancy Report DR-MP3-454, items 3 and 4.
Date:
l RESOLUTION:
Previously identified by NU? O Yes (#1 No Non Discrepent Condition?O Yes ten Na Resolution Pending?O vos @ No Resolution Unresolved?O yes @ No Review Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A Pnnted 11/19S71M23 PM Page 1 of 2 I
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP' DR No. DR-MP3-0601 Millstone Unit.3 Discrepancy Report VT Mgrt Schopfw, Don K O O 1RC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Date:
O O SL Conwnents:
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3 0507 Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Rev6 w oroup: System DR INVALID Re h E h :S W W Potentiel Operability issue Diecipline: Mechenecal Des %n Discrepancy Type: Componord Data O va
@) No SystemProcess: RSS NRC Signincance levet: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published:
- If22/97 Discrepancy: No minimum wall calculations for pipelines Dactlpuon: No minimum wall calculations are identified for the following pipelines:
3-RSS-001 105-2 3-RSS-001 109-2 3-RSS 001 113-2 3-RGS-001 117 2 3-RSS-001 058-2 3-RSS-001-065-2 3-RSS-001 070-2 3-RSS-001080-2 3-RSS-004122 2 3-RSS-004-123-2 3-RSS-004 124-2 3-RSS-004 125-2 3-RSS-150-043-2 3-RSS -150-051 2 3-RSS-150-084-2 3-RSS-150-087 2 3-RSS-750-060 2 3-RSS 750-063-2 3-RSS-750-072 2 3-RSS 750-077 2 3-RSS-750-104-2 3-RSS-750-106 2 3 RSS-750-112 2 3-RSS 750116-2 3-RSS 750-126-2 3-RSS-750-127 2 3-RSS-750-128-2 3-RSS-750129-2 3-RSS-750-0M-2 3-RSS-750-095-2 3-RSS-750-096-2 3-RSS 750-097-2 3-RSS-750-045-2 3-RSS 750-049-2 3-RSS-750-082-2 3-RSS-750-090-2 3-RSS-001-600-2 through 3RSS-001-612-2 3-RSS-001-614 2 through 3RSS-001-760-2 3-RSS-001800-2 through 3RSS-001-960 2 Review Valid invalid Needed Date Iniuator: Feingold, D. J. O O O 22'17/S7 VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A [ g Q 11/17/97 VT Mgt: Schopfer, Don K O O O IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K O O O Date: 11/17/97 INVALID: This discrepancy report is considered invalid because it duplicates Discrepancy Report DR MP3 280.
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Previously identifled by NU7 O ves (t) No Non Discrepent Condinon?Q ves if) No ResolutionPending?O vos @) No Resolution Unresolved?O vos @) No Review initiator: (none)
VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A VT Mar? Schnr+rar r w g O O O IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K Date:
SL Comments:
Printed 11/19/971.o4 58 PM Page 1 of 1
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ICAVP DR N:. DR-MP3-0511 Northeast Utilities Millstone Unit 3 ' Discrepancy Report Review Group: System DRINVALID Review Element: System Design p , gy Dieciphne: Mutand Dw$n D6ecrepancy Type: Component Data O vm
@ No SystemProcess: OSS NRC Significance level: 3 Date faxed to NU:
Date Published: 11/2297 Diecropency: No minimum wall calculations for pipelines.
Description:
No minimum wall calculations are l'1entified for the following pipelines:
3-QSS-001805-2 through 3-QSS-001900-2 3-QSS-0019012 through 3-QSS-001936 2 3-QSS-006-045-2 3-QSS-006-046 2 3-QSS-006-015-2 3-QSS-006-060-2 3-OSS-006-0612 ' 3 OSS-006-014 2 3-OSS-006-064 2 3-OSS-006-065-2 3-QSS 750-804 2 3-QSS-010-030-2 3-QSS-012-001 2 3-QSS-012 024 2 3-OSS-012 028 2 3-QSS-150-016-2 3-OSS-012 035-2 r 3-QSS 750-040-2 3-OSS 750-053-2 Pipeline 3-OSS-014-026-2 on P&lD EM-115A Revision 18 is apparently listed as pipeline 30SS-012-026-2 in the plant computer data base, PDDS, Review Valid inveNd Needed Date inittetor, Feingold, D..', O O O 15'17/S7 VT Load: Nort, Anthony A O O O 11'17/S7 VT Mge: Schopter, Don K O O O BRC Chr m: Singh, Anand K O O O Date: 11/17/97 INVALID: This discrepancy report is considered invalid because it duplicates Discrepancy Reports DR-MP3-281 and DR-MP3-436.
Date:
RESOLUTION:
Previously identined by NU7 Q Yes # No Non Discrepent Condition?O Yes t#1 No Resolution Pendmg7O vos ts) No Resolution Unresolved 7O ve. + No Review Acceptable Not Acceptable Needed Date VT Lead: Nort, Anthony A VT Mge: Schopfer, Don K IRC Chmn: Sqh, Anand K SL Comments:
Prtnted 11/19,97125 46 PM Page 1 of 1
l o Noetheast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR-MP3-0201 Ministone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Review Group: Pi v. . i :~ DR RESOLUTION ACCEPTED Potential OperatWity lseue D6erW: Other D'ecrepenci Type:installetionimplementsbon Om felNo Syster,efrocess: N/A NRC Signincence level: 4 Date faxed to NU:
Date Putsshed: 10/1Q97
, D6screpancy: Inappropriate Commercial Grade Procurement
Description:
In commercial grade dedication packages and associated documentation which were reviewed, two examples were found of inappropriate class'fication of procurement documents as commercial grade.
1 Commercial Grade Dedication Form (CGDF) # MP3-92-017 was written to dedicate air flow measurement services, in Section 5 of this form, the vendor was required to qualify test personnel to ANSI N45.2.61978. This is an inappropriate use of commercial grade dedicatior by NU.
The purchase order for this service was classified as commercial grade which does not meet 10 CFR 21 as it existed in 1992 or as it exists today because the procurement contained specification requirements unique to facilities or activilles licensed as described in 10 CFR 21.3(a)(4)(a-1) and it imposes part of a quality assurance program which complies with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
10 CFR 21.3(a)(4)(a 1) in 1992 defined a commercial grade item in part as an item that is not subject to design or specification requirements that are unique to facilities or activities licensed pursuant to 10 CFR Parts 30,40,50,60,61,70,71 or 72.10 CFR 21.3(1)(li) today defines a basic component in part as items designed and manufactured under a quality assurance program which complies with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.10 CFR 21.3 (3) today states: "In all cases, basic component includes safety-related design, analysis, inspection, testing, fabrication, replacement of parts, or consulting services that are associated with the component hardware whether these services are performed by the component supplier or others."
ANSI N45.2.6-1978 is unique to activities licensed pusuant to the regulations listed in 10 CFR 21.3(a)(4)(a-1). It is endorsed with comments by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.58. In addition, personnel qualifi6d to this Regulatory Guide are used to perform testing governed by Criteria 11 and XI of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B.
Thus, the air flow measurement services discussed above should have been procured as a basic component (" nuclear Grade"), i l
- 2. CGDF # MP3-0019 (?)- the numoer is difficult to read -
signed July 25,1989 was for a belt drive for a Foxboro panel recorder. The attached standard purchase order notes in this package has " Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Nnncompliance, applies to this Printed 11/19,971:02.s3 PM age 1 of 3 l
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Northeast Utilities ICAVP DR No. DR MP3 0201 Millstone unit 3 Discrepancy Report component and no basis is provided for NU to perform the commercial grade dedication.
Review Val 6d invalid Needed Date loftietor: sheppard, R. P.
O O O a24S7 VT l. sed: Ryan, Thomas J G O O S'2'S7 VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K 4
O O O S' 5'S7 NtC Chmn: singh. Anand K O O O 10/4S7 Date:
INVAUO:
Date: 11/17/97 RES0WTION: Disposition:
NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report item #1, DR-MP3-0201, has identified a condition not previously discovered by NU which requires correction. The Commercial Grade Dedication package MP3-92-017 was writtan to dedicate air flow measurement services. In section 5 of this form the vendor was required to qualify test personnel to ANSI N45.2.6-1978. This was incorrect, the acceptance criteria of the Commercial Survey CSR NO;96-038 should have been used. The approved QA program of CSR NO:96-038 is " Qualification Procedure for Test .
~
and Balancing Technicians revision # 3" and is part of the vendor's QA program. The test technicians were qualified to this procedure. A Condition Report (CR) M3-97-3587 was written to provide the necessary corrective actions to resolve this issue.
The approved Corrective Action Plan (CAP) for M3-97-3587 is attached. No work is required in the field and this CR is not tied to startup. This activity is to be completed by 12/19/97 and is being tracked in the HU Action item Tracking and Trending System (AITTS) as A/R 97025570-02. NU considers the Significance Level to be a Level 4 discrepancy because the test technidans were qualified to the correct criteria. The CSR was not accurately documented. NU has concluded that the item # 2 reported in Discrepancy Report, DR-MP3-0201, does not represent a discrepant condition. The Commercial Grade Dedication Package MP3-0019 was written to dedicate a belt drive for a Foxboro panel recorder. The original purchase order invoked Part 21 however, the Foxboro Company took exception to Part 21. The purchase order was revised 6/30/89 by NU to delete the above requirement by a change to the standard purchase notes. Significance Level critaria do not apply here as this is not a discrepant condition.
Conclusion:
NU has concluded that Discrepancy Report item # 1, DR MP3-0201, has identified a condition not previously discovered by NU l which reqdres correction. The DR idemified an administrative issue of inappropriate use of commercial dedication, a
, commercial grade dedication package (MP3-92-017) was used l to dedicate air flow measurement services. Tha CSR NO:96-038 upproved procedure " Qualification Procedure for Test and Printed tina 971:02.58 PM Page 2 of 3 l -
4 -
A DR No. DR MP3 0201 Northeast Utilities ICAVP
. Millstone Unit 3 Discrepancy Report Balaricing Technicians revision # 3" should have been referenced to qualify technicians. Condition Report (CR) M3 3587 was wntten to provide the necessary corrective actions to resolve the issue. NU considers the Significance Level to be a Level 4 discrepancy because the test techniciens were qualified to the correct criteria. The CSR was not accurately documented. NU has concluded that the item # 2 reported in Discrepancy Report, DR MP3-0201, does not represent a discrepant condition. The Purchase Order was revised 6/30/89 to delete the Part 21 requirement. Significance Level criteria do not apply here as this is not a discrepant condition.
Previously idenuned by Nu? Q Yee iGi No Non D6screpent condelion?O Yee t9) No Resoluuon Pending?O vee @ No Reeoiuison uar.conved?O vee @ No Review inauetor: Sheppard. R. P.
VT Leed: Ryan. Thomes J VT Mgt: Schopfer. Don K IRC Chmn: Singh, Anend K Dele: 11/17/97 sL conenente: 1. As a result of this Discrepancy Report NU initiated Condition Report (CR) M3-97 3587. The CR states that the preparer of commercial grade dedication package MP3-92-017.
misinterpreted Commercial Survey CSR NO:96-038. ANSI N45.2.6 was used by NU to evaluate the vendors personnel qualification program. As such the error in the dedication package is administrative only.
- 2. The change to purchase requisition PM 2714, awarded to Foxboro, which delated 10 CFR 21 is acceptable.
Pnnled 11/1M71:o3.o1 PM Pop 3 of 3