ML20199A660

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FOIA Request for Documents Re Maine Yankee OI Repts 1-96-125,1-96-40 & 1-96-25.Ltr Undated
ML20199A660
Person / Time
Site: Maine Yankee
Issue date: 10/31/1997
From: Hathaway R
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED
To: Racquel Powell
NRC
Shared Package
ML20199A653 List:
References
FOIA-97-422 NUDOCS 9711180062
Download: ML20199A660 (1)
v • d • e


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Mr. l'owell:

I would like to make a freedom of information act request for the following information. Maine Yankee 01 reports 196125, l.%-40, and 196 25.

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Title:

MAINE YAKdE ATONIC POWER STATION:

INCOMPLETE AND INACCURATE INFORMATION WILLFULLY PRO NRC pr.GARDING THE EMERGENCY FEEDWATER SYSTEN Case No.: 1 96 040 Licensee:

Haine Yankee Atomic Power Company Report Dato: May 30, 1997 329 Bath Road Control Office: 01:RI Brunswick, Maine 04011 Docket No.: 50 309 Status: CLOSED Rev ewed and Approved by:

Reported by:

4 y//Ah [iff g

arry hl Letts, Director Dennis Boal, Special Agent Office of Investigations Office of Investigations Field Office, Region 1 Field O(fice, Region IV Particientina Personnel Ernest P. Wilson, Senior Special Agent Of' ice of Investigations Field Office, Region I lnI;rmJ!ica in thU ret:.:! rc: 6.,g.;g

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t ROT I SENINA, PLACE N

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/di 13 0F I RE T OF TI Olfi il N C TY THE APP OVD OFF 0F I REPO 1 UI IZED DIS Y

L I AD INI TIVE ON CRININAL 10N.

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SYNOPSIS This investigation was initiated on October 24,1996, by the Nuclear Re ulatory Comission (NRC). Office of Investigations (01), Region I (RI), to de.erwine whether incomplete and/or inaccurate iaformation was willfully NYAPCo) during an NRC provided by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (ing the Emergency Feedw Enforcement Conference on October 14, 1994, regard System (EFW) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (NY).

Based on the evidence developed during this investigation. 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate ir.forsation regarding the EFW to the NRC during an October 14. 1994..'

enforcement conference.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS f.A91 SYNOPSIS......................l............

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5 LIST OF INTERVIEWi:ES...........................

7 DETAILS OF INVLSTIGATION.........................

7 Applicable Regulations Pur >ose of Investigation.................. >..

7 7

Bactground.............................

Interviews of Alle r.......................

8 Coordination rithl Staif..................... 9 I

Allegation:

Incom>1ete and Inaccurate Information was Willfully Provided to the stC Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee.....................

10 Evidence / Documents.....................10 Evidence / Testimony.....................12 Agent's Analysis......................20 Conclusion.........................21 LIST OF EXHIBITS 23 l

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LIST DF INTERVIEWEES

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EXHIBIT

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BRAND, Ethan, Sunrvisor. Nuclear Safety EngineeringGroup (N

3), NYAPCo,............. l.........

17 FROTHINGHAM, John, Manager, Quality Programs Departwnt 26 & 27 (QPD), NYAPCo.........................

FRIZZLE, Charles President and Chief Executive Officer, MYAPCo....

20

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. FULLER, E&ard, President, Associated Projects Ana ys s..........

LEITCH, Graham, Vice President, Operations, MYAPCo...........

28 SMITH. Steven, Manager, Operations Department, NYAPCo..........

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....M 7 0 WHITTIER, George, Vice President Engineering, NYAPCo. ;........

22 25 VEILLEUX, Michael, Manager, M'aintenance Department, NYAPCo YEROKUN, Jimi. Senior Resident Inspector at NY, NRC...........

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I DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION i

i Aooliceble Reaulations l

' 10 CFR 50.5: Deliberate misconduct (1994 Edition).

l 10 CFR 50,9: Coupleteness and accuracy of information (1994 Edition),

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Purnose of investination This investigation was initiated on October 24,1996, by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Invest 19ations (01), Region I (RJ),1:o

, determine whether incosplete and/or inaccurate information was willfully provided to the NRC during an Enforcement Conference (EC) on October 14,19N, by the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company (NYAPCo), regarding the Encr9ency Feedwater System (EFW) at the Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station (NY) i (Exhibit 1),

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Backorourtd On August 4,1994, while the NY reactor was in a cold shutdown condition the l

alant operators determined that an EFW isolation valve for the il Steam knerator was leaking. It was determined that under accident conditions which i

l require isolation of EFW, the, isolation valw leakage could exceed Safety Analysis assum)tions and the NRC was informdd on September 1,1994 I

(Exhibit 7),

iY initiated an engineering root cause evaluation that was i

leted st 8,1994 (Exhibit 6), and subsequently initiated a higher 1

Eva October 6. 1994, S 7 C-j The NRC identified the EFW isolation valve leakage issue in NRC Inspection 50 309/94 15, dated September 20,1994 (Exhibit b), and held an enforcement conference (EC) on October 14, 1994, and issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) on October 20,1994 (Exhibit 9). Additional activities were conducted by the licensee, to include reviews by the Nuclear Safety (Audit and Review Co i

(NSARC) and the Plant Operations Review Consittee PORC) (Exhibit 15).

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Coordination with RC Sttif he dra On November 3, 1996 EC:0I 7C In a November 7,1996, telephone conference, Jint YER0KUN. Senior Residentobserved Inspector at HY, NRC, advised 01:RI and the Region I g

orial variations in the documents n I staff e

but did not identify any material conduct an inspection at NY regarding the materials provided to J

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Case No. 1 96 040 9

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01:RI and to provide a written Lammary analysis relativeJo tne focus of this 01:Kl investigation.

OnDecember 12,1996, YER0KUN, conclud1J his review of the EFW documents that had been provided by 01:RI (3 versions o, the NY PRCE fl90, dated October 6, 1994 August 1 and 2,1994 [vice 1996); and 4 vers' ions of the NY EFS Event 16, 1994, and 3 dated Investigation Report [EIR,1 dated Sestemberand ) aid he saw tie results of editin September 20,1994),

s but did not see evidence that informatW "s hidden from the NRC, YER0KUN seid he did not identify any differen a t.

would have caused the NRC's decision following the EC to be different.

)LkOKUN advised that, in general, inadecuacies were highlighted in engineering and in the maintenance. process.

YEROKlN added that tie ordering of the causes did not change MtC

. considerations and de emphasizing engineering problems was not, in itself, a YER0KUN o)ined that the key consideration for the NRC, was that the a' probles.

issua did not rise to a safety sigitificant determination, as demonstrated by the NY safety analysis (Exhibit 19).

On December 1996, the RI staff provided an analysis of the infonnation 7c M

and determined that, in the materials reviewed, NY did not w' th1old information from the NRC (Exhibit 4),

On January 31,1997; YER0KUN provided an analysis of additional information provided by 01:RI and determined, again, in the materials reviewed, that NY

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did not withhold information from the NRC (Exhibit 14).

Allegdios: Incom)1ete and Inaccurate Inforiation was Willfully Provided to the N1C Regarding the Emergency Feedwater System at Maine Yankee Evidence /Doctnents MY Procedure. No. 20 100 1. Rev. 15 (Exhibit 5)

This procedure provides guidance for a Plant Root Cause Evaluation Report, and establishes review res nsibility by the NSEG, the Plant Manager, the PORC; each responsible depa nt manager, and the Vice Fresident for Operations.

In addition, this procedure required the tracking of the report's l

recommendations in the Maine Yankee Task Tracking System (NYTTS).

ED9.1Deedrr2 Foot Cause. dated Auoust 8.1994 (Exhibit 6)

This cbcuneilt titled, *EFW.a.338/EFW A 340 Seat Leakage,' was the initial review of the August 4,1994, EFW valve leakage event and was conducted by Lyndon BARR0N, Performance Engineer, Plant Engineering Department NY. BARR0N concluded that the maintenance procedure did not provide sufficient details regarding seat / disc and actuator orientation.

MY Letter to the NRC dated Seotember 1.1994 (Exhibit 7) l Dis letter transmitted the Licensee Event R rt(LER)ko.9401$totheNRC, which identified Jhe August 4,1994. EFW iso ion valve leakage event. The LER reported that the reactor was in a cold shutdown condition and plant F

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Case No. 1 96 040

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operators determined that an EFV isolation valve for #1 Steam Generator was leaking. Further investigation identified similar leakage:1n the EFW supplies to the #2 and #3 Steam reneratort,.

It was determined that, under accident conditions, which require isolation of EFV, the isolation valve' leakage could e

exceed Safety Analysis asstaptions.

22.1994(ExhibibD.

l EC Letter to NY. dated Sectamher This letter rexx ts the NRC inspection findings (IR No. 50 309/94 15 that incorporated tie August 4,1994, EFW 1eakage event. This NRC ins ion' identified the failure of the NY engineerini organization to dete Ineleakage criteria for the EFW isolation valves, and So translate such into appropriato 3

testing requirements, as en apparent violation.

MRC NOV Letter to NY_ dated October 20. 1994 (Exhibit 9)

This letter transaits the NOV to NY and stamarizes the EC resuli.s. Also attached were copies of overhead slides that HfAPc,o had provided at the Octooer 14, 1994. EC.

MY wtter Transmittino a Revised LER to RC. dated October 28. 1994 (Exvbit 10)

This document revised the safety significance of the August 4, 1994. EFW event downward, citing recentig completed analyses that showed plant safety wa significantly compromise by the August 4,1994, EFW event.

NRC Letter to MY. dated December 5.1994 (Exhibit 111-NY response that expla ned correct ye and preventive actions w This letter acknowled d the NY re ly to the NOV.

It confirmed recei 1

iated regarding post maintenance testing of EFW isolation valves.

NY Nuclear Oversicht Cr-nittee (NOC) Reoorts (Exhibit 13)

The NY NOC' submitted reports for August 13, 1994, January 16, 1995, Juae 7, 15,1995, to the Chainian of the Board, NYAPCo. Also 1995, and August included wit 1 the documents were NOC working notes for the period February 7, 1995, through February 10,1995. These reports, in part, compiled by E&tard D. FULLER, President Associated Projects Analysis, and a member of the NOC, identified areas of concern by the Board at HYAPCo.

In the reports there are references to the August 4,1994 EFW event. These documents were provided to the staff for review.

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NRC Memoran4=. dated Jan' ary 31. 1997 (Exhibit 14)

This memorandum is from the staff to O! and related that a staff review of the additional NY documents (Exhibit 13), provided by 01, determined'that no 1

additional safety or technical co7cerns were presented therein.

'NSARC Meetino Reoort. dated October 21. 1994 (Exhibit 15)

Tnese documents detail a special meeting to review PRCE (190, and identified that PRCE #190 did not include s)ecific root cruse de ions and, 7C therefore, required revision. Tw documents reflect revisionsand the subsequent review and approval of PRCE #190 by t liangoement Review Board Reoort. dated May 2.1995 (Exhibit 16) khis report titled, " Corrective Actions Associated with Hultiple Events Involving Incorrect Assembly of Eccentric Butterfly Valves,' was coupleted by the following individuals: John FROTHIN@{AM, Manager, Quality Programs, Russ PROLTTY, Assistant to the Vice President. 0)erations, Mike EVRINGHAM, Operations Training Section Head, and STOWERS (bard Consultant).

The re) ort stamarized that on March 15, 1995, a larger, but similar valve, was found to have the same problem as identified in the August 4,1994 EFW valve leakage event. MY recognized tho " serious nature" of the problem, including the apparent frilure of corrective action, and initiated this Management The Boar < identified four issues deserving mangement Review Board action.

attention. This report concluced, in part, that certain management >ractices required further review. Items identified were failure to complete RC commitments in a timely manner, and failure to input PRCE recommendations into "MYTTS." This report discussed processes that NY should have enacted to prevent future similar problems, with a trend toward not just correcting the problem but also to review the issue to look for additional oeneric and safety implications. The report identified programmatic problems, f>ut did not detect any wrongdoing issues.

Evidence / Testimony Interview of BRAND (Exhibit 17)

Interviewed on December 10, 1996 t

7 C' BRAND said that NSEG procedu low for numerous rewrites of the draft FRCE reports. He recalled that provided a draft PRCE (190 report to one of the NY ma

'NFI) whos se on was reviewed. BRANI) said the manager may have ask Sto reposition a portion of the report about his (the

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l 7C BRAND Jaid he reviewed PRCE (190 and he was not aware of any NY' attempts to He op;ned that all factors I

hide any information from the NRC in PRCE (190.

i were completely and accurstely reflected therein, including the resolution of

' the EFW valve leakage issue.

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BRAND said that on1 senior level HY. rso

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. EC i

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. interview of FRIZZlf (Exhibit 20)

Interviewed on February 3,1997. FRIZZ',E, President and Chief Lxecutive Officer, MYAPCo 4 aid he attended the pre EC meetings that were routine pre >aratory meetings at NY (Exhibit 19, p.149). FRIZZLE ndance

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as a s FR ZZLE added that he did not

' casual factor in the August 4. gee con gura I

FRIZZLE 199?, E l

also did not recall any discussio that there was a problem with 7d the openness or *1evel of candor" w pre EC meetings (Exhibit 19, p.163).

FRIZZLE said that he attended the EC, and there was no information withheld from the NRC; it was an open and productive meeting (Exhibit 19, p.166).

j Interview of FULLER (Exhibit 21)

Interviewed on February 10, 1997, FULLER, President, Associated Projects I

Analysis, and a member of the NY NOC, recalled the PRCE process at NY and the FULLER said he did not recall discussions about the EFW event in August 1994.

plant configuration control versus inadequacies in the engineering and In addition, FULLER did not recall discussions about a 4

maintenance processes.

related EC, preparatior,s for the ECl or the withholding of information from the IRC.

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about scheduling. FULLER had no recollection of going to 7C.

office to cuestion his e opics pertaining to the EFW or otwr PRCE 4

l 1ssues.

FtLLER said tha may have been part of a gro t discussed 1

1 topics with the i400, but he ad no specific recollection of presence i

or input.

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j Interview of WITTIER (Exhibit 22)

Interviewed on February 19,1997, Wi!TTIER, Vice President, En11neering, l

tiYAPCo, said the plant root cause process is used for issuqs tial; cut acruss departmental lines, and for issues that are. iud)ed to be more information, because the assessment of the issue's significance may change (Exhibit 22, p. 144).

M ITTIER said the pre EC meetings are to first understand what the issues are and then to get a cross section of people to1 ether that are involved with tha j

issues; the August 4,1994. EFW event was in';erde>artmental. The people that rations.

were involved were NYAPCo Counsel, the L.icensing i he purpose was to Maintenance Department, and Engineering De)artment, understand the facts, the causal factors, the root causes of the issues, and i

to outline plans for corrective action. Typically. there is more than one meeting, ar.d. eventually, they have a ' dry run' and actually go through a presentation (Exhibit 22, pp.106 and 107).

M11TTIER said the decision at to which personnel would attend the EC was i

conducted on a gn>up'or collegial basis, and depending on the issue, by the appropriate functioaal manager (Exhibit 22, p.107).

l M11TTIER recalled thatMattended some of the pre EC meetings, but coula j

not remember preciselyToimany there were (Exhibit 22, 1. 113). Wi!TTIER

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said there were conversations about what t at t1e EC, but he did not remember any issue being brougfit fontard p relating to the *1evel of candor.' Mi!TTIER said he did not recall any cation that some issues were out of bounds, or that 'we' did not want to bking those tip to the NRC, to raise their attention or raise a fla, (Exhibi 22, p. 115).

Mi LER g

i I i.ER recall way conversati (MilTTIER) ind' t he did not og conclusions.

WilTTIER saidi lusions were focused ava 111ty of design, or safety anal fomation, and had not focused on inadequacies involving MlITTIER said it'was his personal belief, because x)st maintenance testing.

le conducted his own informal investigation, that this engineering problas basic )roblems with the post maintenance testi l

i were focused on fair' sit that (Y had missed the mark in the needed 7(_'

program / Wi!TTIER fe to 3 ave some si vesents. He did not remember focusing

  • on that area, as seemed to focus on r area. WITTIER recalle. telling is comments, becaura had asked for comments.

t very strongly that the roo cause process needs to be WilTTIER said he independent, and felt a little wkward in this position, because he did not want to tell e what to write when the are doini an nt root cause. But, had esked for hi and be had tons.

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WITTIER said the final PRCE #190 dis yed rtordering, b(t he did not recall 33 anc 134). MillTIER did anything in order to go along not recal Furthef, Mil 1 TIER N

way conver with MillTI

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said he did not remember ever saying that he did not agree with PRCE (190aswritten(Exhibit 14). WlITTIER said he did not, at any time during this process, tell to bur the design conclusion somewhere in the body of the report, ra hi #i i ti it up front. WHITTIER seid ts, which he gave, but what he remembered w st (Exhibit 22, he closed with,

p. 119).

Mi!TTIER said he believed the des ssue was presented to the N'RC', although maybe not in the s r that would have liked. Mi!1 TIER said it

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believ the design issue deserved greater emphasis

'is his memory (that1 believed was appropriate (Exhibit 22, p. 118).

than what he Wi!T Mii1 TIER said he did not pressure to 1* sue the PRCE #190 report, and was not aware of anyone doing that.

IER L,id he did not recall k

FR01li!NGHAM coming to his with fic discomfort about a lengt conversation FROTHINGHAM hadd concerning the fact that I was uncomfortable with his (WF

's)inputtoPRChfl90andthepreparaion meetings for the EC (Exhibit 22, pp. 121 124).

MlITTIER stated that he did not remember ifWeame in to see him, one on 6no, to tell him that he was very corperned about the ' level of candor" 7C that was going to be displayed at the EC on the EFW issue and in PRCE fl90 (Exhibit 22, p. 140).

Interview of SMITH (Exhibit 23) 20, 1997, SMITH, Manager, Operations Department, said he attended all the NY pre EC meetings, but was not sure that 7C Interviewed on February attended all of thee. He did not recall conversations about whether a end the EC (Exhibit 23,pecific EC, but tecalled that W stana would attend the s pp. 8 11).

l SMllli did not recall configuration control being discussed in the pre EC He also did mt recall any discussions about limits on the level r' heetings.

interaction between RC and MY. SMITH attended the EC on October 14, 1994, and made a aresentation. He said no information was directed to be withheld from the NR:, nor was inforvation withheld from the EC (Exhibit 23, pp. 12 14).

SMITH recalled no discuss' ons about the *1evel of candor" during the EC, and 7C he was not aware thatMl lphad voiced concerns about the information presented at the EC (ExE :r t 23, pp.1418).

Interview of YEILLEUX (Exhibit 25) l Interviewed on February, 20, 1997, VEILLEUX Hanager, Maintenance Department,

~ NYAPCo, recalled that he initially requested that BARR0N investigate the I

E Case N. 1 96 040 15 l

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August 4,1994. EFV valve leakage event to determine the foot cause of the probles. YEILLEUX said during,the investigation into the causes of the EFV 76 leaks, it became obvious that the sco>e neede broade (V

requested a more formal PROE, an (Exhibit 25, pp. 12 and 13).

VEILLEUX said the PRCE charterirn authority is the individual who defines the scope of ex>ectation for the roo'; cause detemination, therefore, he (VLILLEUX) 1elped to define the scope of PRCE #190 (Exhibit 25, p. 20).

VEILLIUX recalled several meetings withm from the time PRCE #190 was initiated, to t's time it was finalized. VEILLEUX recalled having,three meetings withMand attended other group meetings. VE!LLEUX said they 7[_

had more than the average number of PRCE meetings, because of the significance o and the technical nature of the issue (Exhibit 25, pp. 20 22).

VEILLEUX saidW did not convey to him a concern that someone else, other than the chartering authority, was directing Show to write PRCE fl90 (Exhibit 25, p. 27).

VEILLEUX recalled some format type changes as PRCE #190 went through various editing modes and changes, but did not recall that the order of the root 76.

causes was an issue. VEILLEUX said he was ware h-greed with the changes, and said he did not pressure (Exhibit 23, pp. 30 34).

VEILLEUX did not recall

.ayingthat$edidnotagreewithhowthe y c._

pre EC meeting was going, or at was going to be presented to the NRC (Exhibit 25, pp. 40 and 51 54).

VEILLEUX said the ' dry runs," were a matter of discussing what was the best 3resentation, how to put this information forward in the best possible light.

1ow to refine presentation skills, and were not of the nature that we should withhold infomation. VEILLEUX said he was not aware of any information that was purposely withheld from the EC (Exhibit 25, p. 41).

VEILLEUX said the order of how the root causes are presented does not matter, as long as they are all somewhere in the paper, or somewhere in the presentation to the NRC. VEILLEUX said it did not matter from a technical s

nature and. the order did not matter to him (Exhibit 25, p. 41).

VEILLEUX said he was not aware thatM complained to any NY officers or 76-officials. relative to the " level of candor" that was displayed at the EC (Exhibit 25, pp. 51 and 52).

VEILLEUX recalled the EC process, to a certain degree, as being a healthy process and there were a lot of discussions. VEll_LEUX explained that NY identified some good information and good root causes came out of the process, although it was a rather lengthy It was his first EC, but he believed that everyone did well, process.and it was their intent to mrovide accurate l

and truthful information for themselves and to the EC (Exhisit 25, pp. 55 and

~

56).

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Case No. 1 96 040

Interview of FROT}ilNGHAM (Exhibits 26 and 27)

Interviewed on March 25,1997, FR0m!NGHAM, Manager, Quality Programs Department (QPD), NYAPCo, said the August 1994 EFW event occurred during a rc l

shutdown, and it t;meared that MY was originally unaware of the significance of the event. BARR0N worked on the initial internal investigation for eleven days, then his isor requested the assistance of a PRCE trained individual (Exhibit 26, p. 1).

FR0iHINGHAM said the editing of PRCE fl90 was sensitive and sought to ensure and to confirm there was reasonable evidence to

' quality, clarity, readability,FROTHINGHAM did not recall any particular causal identify the causal factors.

factor at this time and did not recall the term " configuration control

  • as

, specifically applicable to this EFW event (Exhibit 26, p.1).

FROTHINGHAM recalled that the work order for the eccentric butterfly valves was generically written and Quality Assurance had informed NY Maintenance that FROTli!NGHAM said the eccentric butterfly they did not have enough specifics.

valves were made by Contramatics, Inc., and recalled that another set of valves that were similar were also used in the plant.

FRONINGHAM said PRCE

  1. 190 was not coupleted prior to the EC on October 24, 1994. FROBINGHAM said that procedural adeqJacy was questioned in this event and there were approximately three meetings that he attended prior to the EC. FROTHINGHAM recalled that the biggest concern about attendance at the EC was whether he FROTHINGiAM could would attend, which became the first EC he attended for NY.

not recall whetherWattended the EC (Epibit 26, p.1).

FR0llilNGHAM recalled that the EC was te be a public conference, therefore, how the information was to be presented was a concern; however, FROTHINGHAM stated this concern did not compromise NY's integrity. FROTHINGHAM said he did not recall any mention that information obtained by NY was not to be presented to the NRC (E-xhibit 26, p. 2). FROTli!NGHAM said after the EC, he did not recall any discussions about whether ths information provided to the NRC was inaccurate (Exhibit 27, p.12).

FROTHINGHAM recalled a unique meeting (at the completion of PRCE #

initiated to expedite processi PRCE 190 through the bureaucracy.

In attendance were YEILLEUX,

, BARR0N, James TAYLOR, Senior Nuclear Safety i Engineer, NSEG, NY, and himself. FROTHINGHAM said the uniqueness was that the PRCE #190 report was being presented to the affected managers and they were

" buying"'into the conclusions prior to the formal presentation to the PORC, thereby speeding up the formal PORC review process, which was a len#hy process, recuiring many revisions. FROTlilNGHAM said, in the past, PRCEs were understaffec, resources were constantly being pulled away, and due dates were continually extended. FROMINGHAM said this meeting was an attempt to move the PRCE #190 report quickly (Exhibit 26, p. 2).

FROTHINGHAM did not recall a lot ssion on the substance of the re mrt, or any prolonged discussions with during the development c? the PtCE

  1. 190, but recalled discussions more to move the report, the' pack o

Exhibit 27.

. 12). FROTil!NGHAM said that, as far as he knew of ti,e PRCE fl90 report. Although

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Ca'se No. 1 96 040 17

may have complained that some individuals mi~ght have beer, & set with his recommendations, that would have been fairly routine (Exhibit 27, p.13).

FROTHINGHAM said he did not recall any discussion wherein M stated that Ic he did not agree with the PRCE #190, or the *>ay the information was provided to the NRC in the EC,' or that he was going to raise his Iceil of concern higher up the organizatic,n (Exhibit 27, pp. 20 and 21).

FROTHINCHAH said he was unaware of any directions to undertake a

,,7 c review or an investigation, to try and find out what concerns were regarding 13 development of PRCE #190 (Lxhibit 27, p.

).

FROTHINGiAM said, with respect to PRCE M90, there was a request t>y FRIZZLE that the NSARC review the root cause analysis and draw conclusions about the

, adequacy of the root cause. That review (Exhibit 15) was nerformed, but delayed.y the PORC, which was somewhat resistant to the NSARC review b (Exhibit 16) discovered that,plained that the Mar 4gement Review B FRO 1HIN9Wi also ex for PRCE #190 had not ye!, ban put into the NY task process (Exhibit 27, pp. 24 and 20;.

Interview of LEIPH (Exhibit 28)

Interviewed on Marcc 25, 1997, LEITCll, Vice President, Operations, NYAPCo.

said from an officer 'sevel he had the overall res!x>nsibility for at least the maintenance aspects of this issue, ex31aining that post maintenance testing is an Engineering responsibility. LEITCi said because of the serious nature of this problem, they connissioned a PRCE, the second highest level of root cause evaluation that was in place at that time. LEITCH said he approved the charter for the MCE, so as to define exact ey the scope of investigation and to insure that it was thorough, and did not just address the specifics of this

) articular issue, but also address the generic implications of the issue.

.EITCH said the nonnal process is to provide the final report to the r.hartering authority (Exhibit 27, pp. 9 cnd 10).

LCITCH recalled a number of actions resulting from the PoCE #190, a number of reconnendations, and acetings involving people who had to implement those-re.connendations. The niectings were to insure clarity surrounding the reconnendations: to be sure that the recommendations made sense; and to insure the recommendations were tracked to completion. He recalled a meeting that r

discussed-PRCE #190 when it was in the final draft stage (Exhibit 27, pp.10 and 11).

LEITCH said he knew all three of the individuals who conducted the PRCE fl90,L but did not remember if they atte the pre EC meetings.

discussions about whether or not specifically, would attend the EC (Exhibit 27, pp. 14 and 15).

LEITCH said NY had pre EC meetings, which he attended,' and seid the attendance selection for the pre EC meetings was not cuite as fonnal as one may think, in that they decide to have such a meeting anc the people that are involved show l

up for the meeting. People, generally, understood who was involved: there Ih I CTL Case Nc,. 1 96 040 18

were some infornal discussions, and the people that felt they hcd a role showed up for the meeting (Exhibi,t 27, pp.12 and 13).

LEITCH said for the EC, even before the ' dry run " they had a planning session: wherein they discussed what points needed to be made, who is the best person to make those particular points, prepare the view graph to use for the EC.

in this case, Engineering, Maintenance, Quality Assurance, as well,as the executive management of Operations Engineering, and FRIZZLE, who chose to ecme, As far as who makes the decision who goes, he did not recall the decision making process, but there was some issue having to do with something LEITCH explained.they had as mundane as transport" tion arrangements.

difficulty obtaining comer 6f al jet service to King of Prussia, Perins'ylvania, 6ne flew from Wiscasset, Maine. Tiere was a oractical li many folks could fit in the two airplanes (Ex11 bit 27, pp.13 and 14).

LEITCH said that. (iring the conduct of the

  • dry runs," he did not recall discussions about toe *leve', of candor" or limits on the free flow of LEITCH said that no information that would be discussed at the EC.

information was withheld from the NRC at the EC (Exhibit 27, pp.16 and 17),

, where p p id he has no recollection of meetings with specifically brought up questions about the nformation being

) C-to the NRC, what may be hidden from the NRC, or that the " level of candor

  • with the NRC was less than desirable,(Exhibit 27, pp.17 and 18).

prov LEITCH said, at that time, M worked close to him, physically, and they would see each other in the hal1s and talked frequently about a whole lot of

7 C about a " lack of things. However, he did not recall any discussion, a candor,? nor did he remember any specific mee on any sub,iect, for that matter. LEITCH said he and and continue to have, a very constructive relationship. To LE i,

seems to be free 19).

to talk about any number of issues (Exhibit 27, pp.

LEITCH said, clearly, the valve being installed backwards was a configuration control issue, although he did not recall applying that particular tersinology LEITCH said he would describe those issues as subsets of.

to the situation.

He said problems what he would call configuration control, a broader ters.

So, with post paintenance testing are illustrative of configuration control.

he would say, that there are many things that could lead to configuration control problems, and he would define configuration control as being a broader LEITCH Aaid term than maintenance procedures or post maintenance testing.

there were a lot of corrective actions, steaming from this particular issue, that would have addressed configur stion control. He did not recall using that would have addressed particular tern, but the actions, certainly,d 20).

configuration control (Exhibit 27, pp.19 an LEITCH said he may have told FULLER that the eccentric butterfly valve was an issue, and one of the things that the NOC ought to take a look atT But, as far as prescribing who FULLER should talk to, or what documents he should I

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Case No. 1 96 040 19

review, he did not recall having any discussion with him ig that regard (Exhibit 27, p. 22).

LEITCH said the document titled, "A 'Aanagepent Review Board Report," 'is more comonly call an Event Review Board, and is the highest level of event review.

It is always comissioned by an officer of the coephny to investigate serious

' issues, and ha comissioned the one dated. Hay 2,1995 (Exhibit 27, p. 23).

Aoent's Analysis The August 4,1994, EFW event escalated into a more significant issue than initially assmed. The O! investigation's testimonial and doceentary.

rogression from a relatively low level incident, to the evidence confirm the o'ntion at MY, with a resultant NRC enforcement conference.

highest level of atte

, was involved with the NY EFV event investig The 01 interv ews, with supporting docmentation, confirm, in

general, account of the event's progression. ThePRCE(190 review nferences were confirmed. However, the only process a the NY p testimony dinq1 concerns with the PRCE #190 conclusions, confi nvesti by BRAND and WHITTIER.

lied that WHITTIER recalled telli his ns, but added that he further o

Ne',her interviewee recalled ing re ere vera f information provided to the NR EC.

N the interviewees recrlled discuss,uns#during pre EC meetings about iness with the PRCE (190 conclu ions, none recalled discussions 2C aoou possible attendsnce at the EC, none recalled receiving direct ons a ut the " level of candor" to be used with the NRC, and none received any directions to withhold pcrtinent information from the NRC.

identified Sindividuals he specifically told that he had a concern a

t the information that was goin; to be provided to the NR Lt he would make his concerns known to otwrs. OI interviewed Mb individuals and none of them recalled a conversation wherein related /C problems with the infor.zation that NY r advi so irfo d of his concern.

The NRC:RI staff was provided extensive documentary information obtained by 01:RI, but did not find anything to indicate that information was withheld from the EC.

Notwithstanding the denials of other aised his concerns over thi tter with them, 01 considers ae ible witness. In addition, volunteered to take a polygrap o verify the veracity of his o egations. However, testimonial evidence and the do *ntation obtained 76 (uring the investigation do not appear to support the e ern that root cause information on the the NRC, O!

concludes, from th.EFW event may have been withheld fr.e evidence obta 9e CD OSURE R

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I Case No. 1 96 040 20

the memory and emphasis of any meetings abou PRCE (190 findings and the

' level of candor" ma have been e.levated in consciousness, but not viewed by others as kaving the sir.e significance. This stoht explain, k

somewhat, the discrepancy between his concern and the available evidence.

/

Conclusion Based on the evidence developed during this investigation, 01 did not substantiate that NYAPCo officials willfully provided incomplete or inaccurate

.information regarding the EFW to the NRC during an October 1,4 1994, enforcement conference.

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LIST OF EXHIBITS 1

Exhibit No.

Descriotion

)

1 Investigation Status Record dated, October 24,1996, 2

3 Emer9ency Feedwater Valve Leaka9e Event Investigation, Report: PRCE fl90,andDrafts.

  • 4 NRC Hemorandum, YER0KUN to Letts, dated December 16, 1996.

5 NY Procedure, No. 201001, Rey, No.15, issue date April 25, 1994.

6 (Engineering) Root Cause, dated August 6,1994.

7 NY Letter to the NRC, dated September 1, 1994, with LER 94 016 attached.

8 NRC Letter to KY, dated September '22,1994, with attached Inspection Report 50 309/94 15.

9 NRC NOV Letter to MY, dated October 20, 1994, with attachmer.ts.

10 HY Letter transmitting LER 94 016 01 (Rev.1) to NRC, dated October 28, 1994.

11 NRC Letter to NY dated December 5, 1994, with attachments (NYAPCo's response to NOV).

12 13 HY Nuclear Oversight Committee Reports, dated August 13, 1994, 8

January 16,1995, June 7,1995, and August 15,1995.

14 NRC Memorandum, YEROKUN to letts, dated January 31,1997.

15 Yankee Atomic Electric Company Hemorandum, NSARC Heeting Report, dated October 21, 1994, with attachments.

16 MY Hanagement Review Board Report, dated Nay 2,1995.

17 Interview Report of BRAND, dated December 10,1996.

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18 19 Interview Report of YER0KUN, dated December 12, 1996.

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Case No. 1 96 040

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0 20 Transcript of Interview with FRI'Z2LE, dated Eeb,'uary 3,1997.

21 Interview Report of FULLER, dated February 10,1997.

)

22 Transcript of Interview with Ml!TTIER, dated February 19,1997.

23 Transcript of Interview with SMITH, dated February 20,1997.

24 25 Transcript of Interview with VEILLEUX, dated February 20, li97, 26 InterviewReportofER0 THIN @{AN,datedMarch 25,199'7.

27 Transcript of Interview with '10THINGHAM, dated March 25,1997.

28 Transcript of Interview with LEITCH, dated March 25, 1997.

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NOT OR Llc SCL RE W AP FI LD E DI 0FFI 0F GA G

NI Case No. 1 6 040 24

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