ML20198P076
| ML20198P076 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1986 |
| From: | Anderson C, Paulitz F NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198P082 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443-86-21, IEIN-84-22, NUDOCS 8606060230 | |
| Download: ML20198P076 (9) | |
See also: IR 05000443/1986021
Text
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
Report No.
50-443/86-21
Docket No.
50-443
License No.
CPPR-135
Priority
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Category
B
Licensee:
Public Service of New Hampshire
P. O. Box 330
Manchester, New Hampshire 03105
Facility Name:
Seabrook Station, Unit 1
Inspection At:
Seabrook, New Hampshire
Inspection Conducted:
March 31 - April 4, 1986
Inspector:
A
Pedi
r/rd
F."Paulitz, Re ' tor Engineer
date
Approved by:
_C. J/. An'derson, Chief, Plant Systems
date
f
/
S4ction, DRS
Inspection Summary:
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Inspection on March 31 - April 4, 1986 (Report No. 50-443/86-21)
Areas Inspected: A routine unannounced facility inspection by one region-based
inspector regarding the resolution of previous inspection findings.
Results: No violations were identified.
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8606060230 860522
ADOCK 05000443
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. DETAILS
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1.0 Persons Contacted
1.1 Public Service Company of New Hampshire (PSNH)
- R. Guillette, Assistance Construction QA Manager
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- J. Tefft, Standards Project Engineer
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1.2 Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC)
G. Mcdonald, Construction QA Manager
- V. Sanchez, Licensing Engineer
- F. Bean, QA Engineer
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- J. Azzopardi, QA Engineer
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- J. Nay, Jr. , QA Engineer
- D. Turner, QA Engineer
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- D. Snyder, Startup QC Engineer
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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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- A. Cerne, Senior Resident Inspector
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- D. Ruscitto, Resident Inspector
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- R. Barkley, Reactor Engineer
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- Denotes those in attendance at exit meeting of April 4, 1986,
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2.0 Licensee's Action on Previous Inspection Findings
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(0 pen) Construction Deficiency Report CDR (79-00-04) RPS Breaker
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Auxiliary Contacts (P-4) Interlock to ESF
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The NRC was notified by Westinghouse in a 10 CFR Part 21 report,
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NS-TMA-2150 dated November 7, 1979, that there was an undetectable failure
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in the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) from the P-4
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interlock. The failure of the reactor trip breaker (RTB) auxiliary switch
(P-4 interlock) to the ESFAS was undetected.
This failure could exist in
a circuit which is required for reactor protection.
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The licensee was informed of this 10 CFR 21 report from Westinghouse by
letter from E. Jordan, NRC, dated November 19, 1979.
The recommended
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corrective action was to use a portable voltmeter and take various
measurements at the RTB to verify the P-4 interlock. The licensee was
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to revise appropriate procedures to require verification, by tests, of
the P-4 contact status following automatic reactor trip or any conditions
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requiring opening of the RTBs. The test would be repeated following the
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reclosure of the RTBs and prior to rod withdrawal.
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The licensee notified the NRC in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-108 dated
December 6, 1979, of the same problem.
Information on the corrective
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action was to be provided by May 30, 1980.
Westinghouse informed V. Stello, Jr., NRC, by letter, NS-TMA-2204 dated
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February 15, 1980, that it has been brought to their attention, by the
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owner of an affected plant, that the Westinghouse procedures would be
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inconclusive under a specific set of conditions.
Since the tests are
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necessary to reveal malfunctioning or failure of an interlock (P-4)
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important to safety, this new information necessitated a revision of
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these procedures to ensure system integrity and readiness.
Specifically,
the present procedures adequately confirm proper status of the P-4 inter-
lock from the normal RTB but not the bypass RTB. Additional measurements
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were included in the revised procedures provided by Westinghouse.
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A final report was sent to the NRC by the licensee, SBN-120 dated
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May 15, 1980. The corrective action was to implement the procedures
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described by Westinghouse in a letter, NS-TMA-2204 dated February 15, 1980
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to V. Stello, Jr. , NRC.
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On the basis of the above corrective action, the construction deficiency,
CDR 79-00-04, was closed.
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NRR objected to the portable method of P-4 verification as documented in
the SER.
The licensee response to RAI 420.74 was a commitment to install
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permanent test switches and meters for implementing procedures for the
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problem identified in the Part 21 letter, NS-TMA-2204 dated February 15,
1980. Westinghouse was requested to provide the design and hardware
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changes necessary for this modification.
Westinghouse notified J. Taylor, NRC, in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report,
NS-NRC-85-3024 dated March 22, 1985, of a potential deficiency with the
hardware change to correct the above problem. Specifically, it was deter-
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mined on March 12, 1985, that the possibility of undetectable failures
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remained. PSNH was identified as an affected plant. The licensee was
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informed to revert to the previously recommended test procedure which was
contained in the letter NS-TMA-2204 dated February 15, 1980.
The licensee notified the NRC by interim 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-794
dated April 23, 1985, of the above hardware problem.
The revised cor-
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rective action would be a revised design and hardware which would
adequately implement the required procedures. This revised design and
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hardware commitment was contained in Westinghouse letter, NAH-2658 dated
March 27, 1985 to R. J. DeLoach.
(YAEC) An unresolved item, 85-11-01,
was assigned to track CDR 79-00-04 which had been previously closed.
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The licensee approved the Westinghouse modification FCN NAHM-10566 P-4
Interlock Testing in a letter, SB-20018 dated October 31, 1985, to UE&C.
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UE&C issued an Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) No. 03113132A.
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This modification included the addition of switches and voltmeters to
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the Reactor Trip Switchgear. The engineering to implement the FCN was
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scheduled to be completed by December 2, 1985.
The construction
deficiency, CDR 79-00-01, was reopened.
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The inspector observed that one of two voltmeters and one of two switches
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had been mounted on the reactor trip switchgear. The other door panel
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had been removed to mount the other voltmeter and switch. The licensee
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indicated that this construction deficiency would be completed by the end
of April. CDR 79-00-04 remains open until:
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the work is complete
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the final 10 CFR 50.55(e) report is received
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the modification is inspected
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the procedure for testing is reviewed
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(Closed) Unresolved Item (85-11-01) ESF P-4 Interlock
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This item is closed because CDR 79-00-04 has been reopened.
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(Closed) CDR (83-00-01) Westinghouse Gate Valves Faulty Indication
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The NRC was notified by the Licensee in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-507
dated May 9, 1983, that certain Westinghouse manufactured gate valves
would indicate they were closed prior to the valve disc fully isolating
flow. A detailed description of the deficiency, analysis of safety impli-
cations, and the corrective action was to be reported to the NRC by
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June 10, 1983.
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A final 10 CFR 50.55(e) report was sent by the licensee, SBN-518 dated
June 10, 1983, to the NRC.
The problem was a limit switch had been
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selected for the red light indication whose rotor position was fixed for
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10 percent open. The 10 percent open position was selected for another
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limit switch which bypassed the opening torque switch.
The red indication
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light is supposed to be turned off when the valve is fully closed, signi-
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fying that the flow is stopped. However, as a result of the rotor setting
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for another function, the red light is turned off when the valve is 10
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percent open and not fully closed.
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This design error which originated on Westinghouse foreign print, FP 53772
(Limitorque Wiring Diagram 15-477-5753-3, Shl&lA), was repeated on 46
valve schematic and wiring diagrams by UE&C.
The corrective action was to
rewire the red indication light to a limit switch, on another rotor, which
could be adjusted so the red indication light would be turned off for the
full closed position, thus indicating no flow through the valve.
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Design Change Notice (DCN) 63/0082A was initiated by the licensee to
implement the corrective action specified in Westinghouse Field Change
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Notice (FCN) NAHM-10525. The licensee notified the NRC by letter, SBN-934
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c'ated January 28, 1986, that the corrective action for the erroneous valve
position, which could allow an intersystem leakage path to go undetected,
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was completed for Unit 1.
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The following documents were reviewed by the inspector for 15 of the 46
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valves that required corrective action:
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work requests
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startup QC inspection report
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startup test packages
The documents were found to be. legible, complete and properly reviewed by
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qualified personnel.
They were also properly identified, stored and can
be retrieved in a reasonable time.
The inspector selected valve CBS-V47 (8806A), safety injection pump
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suction from the refueling water storage tank, for independent verifica-
tion of the above corrective action.
The details of this verification
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are discussed in paragraph 3.
No unacceptable conditions were identified.
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This construction deficiency is closed.
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(Closed) CDR (83-00-10) Westinghouse RPS Mercury Relay Seismic Bounce
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Westinghouse informed R. DeYoung, NRC, in a 10 CFR Part 21 50.55(e)
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report, NS-EPR-2774 dated June 1, 1983, that there were two potential
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problems within the Westinghouse 7300 Process Protection System.
The
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problem associated with this CDR was the seismic bounce of the NTD Card
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relay. This mercury relay contact bounce will result in signal saturation
of the downstream RTD Amplifier (NRA) card in the T hot and T cold circuits
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which would trip the plant. The corrective action was to replace these
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relays.
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The licensee informed the NRC in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-526 dated
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July 1, 1983, of the above problem and the same corrective action proposed
by Westinghouse. A report update, SBN-606 dated January 4,1984, was
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submitted to the NRC.
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A final report, SBN-958 dated March 5, 1986, was submitted to the NRC.
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The corrective action was not the replacement of the mercury relays but,
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the addition of two reed relay contacts wired in parallel to the mercury
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wetted relay contacts. Although the reed relay contacts have a higher
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resistance, the majority of the RTD signal will continue to pass through
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the mercury relay contacts. However, during a seismic event, if bcunce
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is experienced on the mercury wetted relay contacts, the RTD signal will
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pass through the reed relay contacts and will allow for acceptable opera-
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tion of the affected temperature channels.
The new relays are mounted on
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a daughter board which will be attached to the NTC card by bolting.
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The Engineering Change Authorization (ECA) 99/110831 was issued to imple-
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ment the corrective action in Westinghouse Field Change Notice (FCN)
NAHM-10565.
The licensee QA personnel verified the corrective action by
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physically checking the equipment and through a review of documentation.
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The inspector reviewed the following documents:
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UE&C ECA
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SQC inspection report
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Startup test reports
The documents were found to be legible, complete and properly reviewed by
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qualified personnel. They were also properly identified, stored and can
be retrieved in a reasonable time.
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The inspector discussed this corrective action with the startup person-
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nel that made the modification. Two of the four completed circuits were
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removed by the startup personnel for the inspector's verification of
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mounting and wiring connections.
Problems on mounting and contact
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resistance were satisfactorily resolved with Westinghouse. No unaccept-
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able conditions were identified. This construction deficiency is closed,
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. Closed) CDR (84-00-02) Gould Combination Reversing Motor Starter
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Defective
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The NRC was notified by the licensee in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-631
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dated March 5,1984, that a Gould combination reversing starter jammed
during preoperational testing. The cause of the jamming was phenolic
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chips. The phenolic chips resulted from the phenolic side of the con-
tactor being pierced by the screws for termination of the internal load
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side wiring.
In addition, the overload relays were pinching the internal
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wires and had caused insulation damage. This insulation damage could
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cause an electrical short circuit.
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The corrective action was to have Gould redesign and replace 324 Size 1
and 2 reversing starters for unit 1.
The licensee schedule for completion
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of the corrective action was April, 1984. A final report would be sub-
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mitted at that time,
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A final report was submitted, SBN-959 dated March 5, 1986, by the licensee
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to the NRC. This report stated that the above corrective action had been
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completed.
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The replacement was controlled by Non-Conformance Report (NCR)82-184.
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The following documents were reviewed:
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5 work requests
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4 SQC inspection reports
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UE&C vendor surveillance report
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Vendor drawings for vendor QC
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Startup completion verification
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SQC completion verification
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QA completion verification
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The documents were found to be legible, complete and properly reviewed by
qualified personnel.
They were also properly identified, stored and can
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be retrieved in a reasonable time.
The inspector selected the reversing
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starter circuit D85 on motor control center 1-EDE-MCC-521 for verification
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of proper corrective action. The details of this verification are discussed
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in paragraph 3.
No unacceptable conditions were identified. This con-
struction deficiency is closed.
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(Closed) CDR (83-00-12) Comsip Hydrogen Analyzer Catalyst
Contamination
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Comsip, Inc. notified R. Young, NRC, in a 10 CFR Part 21 report, dated
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April 13, 1983, that the hydrogen analyzer catalyst could be contaminated
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by iodine which may be preser.t in the containment atmosphere after a LOCA.
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This contamination could cause incorrect hydrogen readings within ten (10)
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days.
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The NRC issued an Information Notice (IN) No. 84-22, dated March 29, 1984,
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detailing the above problem. This IN also included the Comsip Part 21
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report.
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The licensee informed the NRC in a 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, SBN-531 dated
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July 8,1983, of the above deficiency. The proposed corrective action
was the replacement of the standard configuration catalyst bed by an
upgraded configuration. This new configuration has been tested by the
vendor with no catalyst degradation af ter five (5) months of continuous
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testing. The new configuration modification kits were to be purchased
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for this modification. A status report would be made to the NRC if the
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final report had not been filed by January 20, 1984.
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A status report, SBN-614 dated January 16, 1984, was submitted to the NRC.
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This report stated that the modification kits were delivered to the job-
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site on August 8, 1983. No date was given for completion of this
deficiency.
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The NRC was informed in a final report, SBN-939 dated February 3, 1986,
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that the Class 1E hydrogen analyzers had been upgraded by installing
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modification kits provided by Comsip.
This modification has been
completed for unit 1.
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A Nonconformance Report (NCR) 74-2842 was issued for this modification.
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The following documents were reviewed by the inspector:
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In progress inspection report
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Comsip certification of conformance
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UE&C receipt and inspection
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Comsip replacement procedure
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Construction corrective action certification
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QC corrective action certification
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-QA corrective action certification
The documents reviewed were found to be legible, complete and properly
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reviewed by qualified personnel.
They were also properly identified,
storea and can be retrieved in 'a reasonable time.
However, there was no
documentation for the pressure test and calibration test as specified in
the replacement procedure. The licensee was notified of this deficiency.
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Further investigation revealed that the pressure test had been completed
by the startup test group. A copy of this test was shown to the inspector.
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However, there was.no evidence that the calibration test required by the
installation procedure had been completed. The licensee has committed to
perform this calibration test prior to fuel load. Within the scope of the
above document review, discussion with the personnel who installed the
modification kits, and the personnel who conducted the pressure test, no
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unacceptable conditions were identified. This construction deficiency is
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closed.
(Closed) Unresolved Item (85-22-01) Drawing Control Deficiency
1
The initial Westinghouse (W) drawing, No.1189E15, Foreign Print (FP) No.
30591, provided preliminary information for the switch development of the
reactor trip circuitry.
To incorporate this requirement, United Engineers
& Constructors (UE&C) installed an additional latching relay to meet the
design requirements.
Subsequm tly, W drawing 7247091.FP 70073 was issued
which detailed the final requirements and eliminated the need for the
contact development that was originally detailed in the preliminary
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drawing No. 1189E15/FP 30591. ,
As a result of the latest W re.luirements and in conjunction with code
requirements of IEEE-279, section 4.17, and Regulatory Guide 1.62
(minimization on components in the manual actuation circuits), the
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latching reliy will be removed from the reactor trip circuitry.
The
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licensee has issued an Engineering Change Authorization, No. 038041338,
for the removal of,the latching relay. This deletion resolves the
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specific drawing deficiency.
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The Generic problem of71fferences between foreign prints and UE&C will
be corrected by the new drawings being made for the licensee which will
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be issued for operations. Some of the UE&C drawings which were suitable
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for construction are not suitable for operation and maintenance. The
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licensee proposes to issue 2479 new control wiring diagrams (CWD) which
show all terminations, wires, cabYes in all components within a control
circuit.
The ' schedule for completing thf s task is OctoLe 30, 1986. Both
foreign print drawings and UE&C. drawings will be refercnced in these new
CWDs. All drawings which are re'ferenced will then be placed in storage
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and not used.
Similarly, other higher tier documents needed by the
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operators such as PI&Ds will be redrawri and treated like the CWDs.
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This unresolved item is closed.
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3.0 Independent Verification
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The CDR 83-00-01 problem, addressed in paragraph 2, corrective action
involved the moving of the control wires for the red indicating light.
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The inspector had startup personnel remove the terminal box cover of
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motor operated valve, CBS-47 (8806A0).
The inspector verified that all
the wires were as shown on the wiring diagrams.
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The valve full open to full close movement was measured.
This value was
seven and one-half inches (7-1/2").
The valve was manually positioned at
ten (10) percent open, which is three quarters inch (3/4"). The valve
motor starter had been de-energized prior to this verification.
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The inspector then proceeded to motor control center 1-EDE-MCC-521, Node
085, which is the reversing motor starter for valve CSS-V47 for verifi-
cation of CDR 84-00-02. The wiring was checked against the drawings which
the vendor's QC used during fabrication. The inspector also verified that
the load termination screws did not penetrate the phenolic side of the
The inspector proceeded to the control room where both the. red and green
indication lights were off. The power was replaced to the motor starter
at the motor control center. Both the red and green indication lights
were on.
This is the correct indic'ation for the valve at ten (10) percent
open. The operator then turned the control switch to the closed position.
The red light turned off for the full closed position and the green light
stayed on.
This is the correct indication for no flow through the valve.
The operator then turned the control switch to the open position.
Both
the red and green-lights were on during the valve travel.
The green light
turned off when the valve was full open, the red light stayed on.
This is
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the correct indication when the valve is full open.
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The inspector con'cluded that for both CDR 83-00-01 and 84-00-02, the
licensee had taken proper corrective action.
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4.0 Exit Interview
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The inspector met with the licensee representatives denoted in paragraph 1
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at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector summarized the scope
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and findings of the inspection. No written material was given to the
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licensee during the course of this inspection. At the exit, the licensee
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did not identify any proprietary material contained within the scope of
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the inspection.
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