ML20198J548
| ML20198J548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 10/15/1997 |
| From: | Polston S UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| References | |
| GDP-97-1035, NUDOCS 9710210134 | |
| Download: ML20198J548 (3) | |
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October 15,1997 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission SERIAL: GDP 97-1035 Region 111 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351 Paducah Gascous Diffusion Plant (PGDP)- Docket No. 70-7001 - 10 CFR 95.25 Report in accordance with 10 CFR 95.25(10 this report summarizes the actions taken as a result of the discovery of a security Classified Storage Room (CSR) door left open and therefore, a CSR access point to an area housing classified material lefl uncontrolled. Attachment I is the actions taken to preclude recurrence.
On September 16,1997, at approximately 10:25 a.m., an employee (Employee #1) working in an office (Room B 10, Building C-710) within a security CSR that contains classified information/ material, departed the CSR and proceeded to another CSR access point (an adjoining office) located to the east of his office, On September 16,1997, at approximately 10:30 a.m., a second employee (Employee #2) was attempting to locate a third employee (Employ e #3) in an adjacent office located to the west of Employee #1's etlice. When Employee #2 received no response to knocking on Employee #3's door. Employee #2 then proceeded to Employee #1's work area in search for Employee #3 and noticed the CSR door was slightly ajar. Employee #2 knocked on the CSR door, opened the CdR door, and discovered thwe was no one present in the office. Employee #2 visually observed both ends of the corridor outside Employee #l's office and did not see other employees in the area. Employee #2 entered the room and telephonically contacted the Manager, Process Technology and NDA, to inquire as to the whereabouts of gj Employee #3 and to determine how to secure the CSR door. Employee #3 was subsequently V
discovered in the vicinity and proceeded to the office of Employee #1. Employee #2 relinquished control of the CSR to Employee #3, who is Employee #1's immediate s Employee #3 submitted a self-identified problem report relative to the incident.
On September 23,1997, Employee #1 was interviewed relative to the incident, He stated that on gh September 16c 1997, he departed his office at approximately 10:25 a.m. and proceeded to an
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adjacent oq1c@Ernployee #1 stated that he was absent from his otiice for approximately five minutes, or less. The CSR door has a pneumatic door closer attached which is intended to close
.t!1e3foor upon the departure of any employee. On the date of the incident, it appears that the pneurnatic door closer failed to completely close the door. The CSR door contains a " Simplex" h
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-t United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page Two October 15,1997 locking mechanism which was being used during normal ollice hours " Simplex" is a system of linger activated combinations that was used to open the CSR door throughout the day. When departing the room the door would close behind an employee and lock when the " Simplex" latch seated in the receptacle attached to the CSR door frame When the CSR vras first opened in the morning, and secured for the night, the three-position combination lock in the CSR door was
- utilized, Employee #1's 00 ice houses two combination lock security containers which are used to store documents classified Confidential, Restricted Data (RD). There were no classified documents len out and unattended in Employee #1's office when the CSR door was discovered to be ajar.
liowever, located in the rear of the office is a door that leads into an adjoining laboratory that is considered part of the CSR. Material classified Confidential, RD is stored in the laboratory in 14-foot aluminum tubes and scaleu on both ends by bolted fianges. This precludes visual access and would impede physical access. Because of the size of the tubes, the classified material cannot be locked in a standard size security container, Therefore, classified material is stored in the rear of the C% in which Employee #1 and Employee #3 perform their daily job tasks.
- Access control to the material through the CSR entry point was not maintained for a period of approximately five minutes when the CSR door was ajar, The possibility of corr. promise of classified documents is considered remote because all classified documents were locked in security containers. Additionally, the classified material was shielded from visual access and the physical removal of the material would have been precluded because of the length of the aluminum tubes, the minimal time the CSR was left open and unattended, and the presence of armed Security Police Officers (SPOs) in the Controlled Access Area (CAA).
If you have any questions regarding this incident, please call Bill Sykes, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (502) 441-6796.
Sincerely,
/
Steve Polston General Manager Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant SP:WES:JLI-I:mel Attachment ec:
NRC Division of Security NRC Senior Resident inspector, PGDP (NRC Document Control Desk
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Docket No. 70-7001 Page1of1 UNLOCKED CSR - ACTIONS TAKEN 1.
On September 16,1997, the practice of opening the CSR door utilizing the " Simplex" combination lock was discontinued. Each time an employee leaves the CSR unattended the CSR door will be closed, and the three-position combination lock will be actuated.
Further, each time the CSR is opened and locked the SF-702, " Security Container Check Sheet" will be completed.
2.
On September 16,1997, an e mail was forwarded to the employees working in the CSRs and laboratory requiring the CSR doors to be secured utilizing the three-position combination lock. Additionally, employees may work in the CSR only when a CSR custodian is present.
3.
On September 17,1997, the combination to the CSR door was changed.
4.
On September 17,1997, an action plan that addresses a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) relative to the security program was approved for implementation. The action plan, although not initiated as a result of this incident, includes a plant wide resiew of the many f acets of security including areas relevant to this incident such as security education / awareness, effectiveness of security procedures, effectiveness of self-assessments, and enforcement of security requirements.
5.
During the period September 22-23,1997, Required Reading reemphasized the necessity for locking the CSR doors, and utilizing the combination lock, when leaving the area unattended. Additionally, personnel on the laboratory access list may only work in the CSR when a CSR custodian is present.
6.
On October 13,1997, the site agreed to evaluate the controlling of classified matter in the C-710 Barrier Lab at the container level versus the current "CSR" designation.
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