ML20198G622
| ML20198G622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1997 |
| From: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20198G619 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9801130080 | |
| Download: ML20198G622 (3) | |
Text
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.o. -8 aaa1
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SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATED TO AMENDMENT NO.154 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-49 MQ8THEAST NUCLEAR EN gr,Y COMPANY. ET AL, MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION. UNIT NO. 3 DOCKET NO. 50-423
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated October 7, 1997, as supplemented December 17, 1997, the Northr.st Nuclear Energy Company, et al. (the licensee), submitted a request for uanges to the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3 Technical Specifications (TS). TS 4.6.1.1, 3/4.6.1.2, and 3/4.6.1.3 require the testing of the containment to verify leakage limits at a specified test pressure.
The proposed amendment would (1) modify the list of valves that can be opened in Modes 1 through 4, (2) remove a footnote on Type A testing, and (3) make editorial changes to the Technical Specifications and associated Bases sections.
The December 17, 1997, letter provided clarifying information that did not change the October 7, 1997, application and the initial proposed no significant hazards consideration determination.
2.0 EVALUATION 2.1 Modify List of Valves - TS 4.6.1.1 TS 4.6.1.1 currently requires verification that all containment penetrations not capable of being closed by operable containment automatic isolation valves or operator action during periods when containment isolation valves are opened under administrative control, and required to be closed during accident conditions, are closed by valves, blind flanges, or deactivated automatic valves secured in their positions. A footnote fsr TS 4.6.1.1 lists the valves that may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative control.
In its letter dated October 7, 1997, the licensee stated that valves 3FPW-V661, 3FPW-V666, 3SAS-V875, 3SAS-V50, 3CCP-V886, 3CCP-887, and 3CVS-V13 are in lines that penetrate containment where either the inside containment isolation valve is a manual valve, or the line communicates with conta'nment atmosphere, or has minimal operattonal need to be opened under administrative control.
The licensee stated that deleting these valves from the list of valves that are allowed to be opened-under administrative control means that the valves will remain closed (locked closed) and, therefore, cannot affect the failure probability of a containment isolation valve to close.
The licensee further l
stated that deleting the valves from the list does not modify plant response to or mitigation strategy for any accident.
l 9001130000 971218 DR ADOCR 05000423
0 In addition, the licensee proposed adding seven valves (3 MSS *V885, 3 MSS *V886, 3 MSS *V887, 3RHS*MV8701A/B, and 3RHS*MV8702A/B) to the Inst of valves allowed to be opened under administrative control.
These valves are in the steam lines to the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system and the residual heat removal (RHR) system.
The licensee stated that valves 3 MSS *V885, 3 MSS *V886, and 3 MSS *V887 are opened to warm L'e steam-driven AFW pump and were recently reclassified as containment isolation valves.
The licensee stated that RHR valves (3RHS*MV8701A/B and 3RHS*MV8702A/8) are opened during cooldown and heatup in Mode 4.-
The NRC staff has reviewed the deletions to the list of valves (3FPW-V661, 3FPW-V666, 3SAS-V875, 3SAS-V50, 3CCP-V886, 3CCP-887, ar.d 3CVS-V13) that may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.
The staff has determined that the deletions from the list are acceptable since the valves can no longer be opened in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4 and will continue to be verified closed in accordance with TS 4.6.1.1.
The staff reviewed the additions to the list (3 MSS *V885, 3 MSS *V886, 3 MSS *V887, 3RHS*MV8701A/B, and 3RHS*MV8702A/B) and has determined that the additions are acceptable since valves 3 MSS *V885, 3 MSS *V886, and 3 MSS *V887 are required to be opened to warm the steam lines prior to testing the steam-driven AFW pump and valves 3RHS*MV8701A/B ani 3RHS*MV8702A/B are opened during cooldown and heatup in Mode 4.
In addition, the licensee stated that the opening of containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative controls includes (1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with the control room, at the valve controls, (2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and (3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment.
The licensee proposed to add the definition of administrative controls to the appropriate Bases section, which is acceptable to the staff.
Therefore, the administrative controls provide assurance that these valves will be closed and allowing them to be opened will not adversely impact the consequences of the analyzed Final Safety Analysis Report Chapter 15 events.
2.2 Footnote Deletion - TS 4.6.1.2 In its letter dated October 7,1997, the licensee proposed deleting the footnote associated with TS 4.6.1.2.a.
The footnote referred to an exemption granted by the NRC by "B15220, Forwards Addl Info Requested in NRC Re Proposed Rev to TS Re EDG Fuel Oil Supply Transmitted in . Rev 1 to Calculation 91-BOP-813,ES, MP2 EDG Operating Time W/24,000 Gallons Diesel Fuel Oil... & [[procedure" contains a listed "[" character as part of the property label and has therefore been classified as invalid. Pages Also Encl|letter dated May 8,1995]], which permitted the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Type A test to be delayed until the sixth refueling outage. However, in its vetober 7, 1997, letter, the licensee stated that it intends to perform the Type A test during the current extended shutdown; therefore, the footnote is not needed. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's request and finds it acceptable.
2.3 Editorial and Bases Changes in its letter dated October 7, 1997, the licensee requested the following editorial changes (1) that the " " be replaced with a "*" for a nuraber of containment isolation valves in a footnote to TS 4.6.1.1; (2) the word
o.
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. " manual" be moved to before the list of manual valves and "reinote manual" be added before the list of remote manual valves in a footnote to TS 4.6.1.1; and (3) that in TS 3.6.1.2.e. 3.6.1.3.b 4.6.1.1.c, 4.6.1.2,a, 4.6.1.2.d.
4.6.1.2.e, 4.6.1.3.a. and 4.6.1.3.b where words similar to "P,t, where 53.27 psia (38.57 psig)" are used, be changed to "P 38.57 psig" and tha a)propriate,wordssimilarto"notlessI,han"areused,bechangedto" greater tian or equal to."
The NRC staff has reviewed the )roposed editorial changes and finds them acceptable.
In addition, the staff 1as reviewed the associated Bases changes and has no objection to the wording.
3.0 STATE CONSULTATION
fn accordance with the Commission's regulations, the Connecticut State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment.
The State official had no comments.
4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERQLQB The amendment changes requirements with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes surveillance requirements. The NRC staff ha determined that the amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment in7olves no significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment on such finding (62 FR 59917).
Accordingly, the amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sl.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
5.0 CONCltlSION The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1)thereisreasonableassurancethatthehealthandsafetyofthe public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will bs conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributor:
J. Andersen Date: December 18, 1997 l
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