ML20198F733
| ML20198F733 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Washington Public Power Supply System |
| Issue date: | 05/09/1974 |
| From: | Maccary R US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| To: | Moore V US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC) |
| References | |
| CON-WNP-0975, CON-WNP-975 NUDOCS 8605290065 | |
| Download: ML20198F733 (9) | |
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NAY S 1974 1
V. A. 'foore, Assistant Director for Light Vater Renctors, Group 2 DLrectorate of Licensing SECOND ROU@ RL' VIEW OF PSAR, WP-1 Plant Name: WPPSS Nuclear Project Ilo.1 (WNP-1)
Licensing Sta3 @e:)
CP Docket Uunber Roopensible EP aranen and Project Manager: LWR 2-3, T. Cox Renponsible TR Branch: ME3 Raqacated Coupiction TMte: 4/29/74 Review Status: Avaiting Infortution Adequate responsen to the enclosed list of comments and positions prepared by the itechanical Engineering Branch, Directorate of Licensing, are required before we can, complete our review of the subject application. The review included A'eandment 5 of the PSAR.
The applicant's present position on postulated pipe break locations will require technical jastification or nodification to coincide more cicarly with acceptable criteria. Due to the extent of the infor: nation that must be exchanged we request a meeting with the applicant and his technical representative at the car 11est possible date. A recomtended agenda is attached.
With regard to the correlation of predicted reactor internals vibration with thone measured on test purauant to the provisions of Megulatory Cuide 1.20, the applicant has stipulated in PSAR 3.9.1.4 to the filing of a topical report prior to FSAR submittal. It is important that the need for a timely subnittal of the topical be emphasized to avoid a dalay in evaluation of the FSAR.
A t:tajor deficiency in the PSAR relates to the requirement that the applicant provide an acceptable program for the assurance of the operability of active pumpa and valves. Thia requirement is very well covered for ASME Code Class 2 and 3 cotaponents, even though there remain several questions which are included in the enclosure with this letter. However, the program for Class 1 cociponents is still under development and has not been included in the PSAR to date. As a corollary, missing also are design strces linits for Code Class 1 valves, inactive or active. Unless these open questions are resolved in a (f}f'.l 8605290065 740509 PDR ADOCK 05000460 o,,,c.,
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Pooltions rep.arding those itoms are included in the enclosure.
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- n. R. Maccary R. 4. Maccary, Assistant Director for Eng,ineering Directorate of Licensing cc w/ encl
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S.11. IIansuer, DRTA J. M. Ecadrie, L A. Schwancer. L J. P. Knight, L T. 11. Cor., L S. ;i. Itou, L A. B. Miller, L cc v/o enc 1:
A. Ciambusso, L U. C.' Mcdonald, L s
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t Proposed Meeting Agenda WNP Postulated Pipe Breaks 3.0 Design of Structures, Components, Equipment and Systems 3.6 Protection Against Dynamic Ef fects Associated with the Postulated Rupture of Pipinz 1.
The design criteria presented in PSAR 3.6 do not specifically conform to criteria acceptable to the staff in a number of details.
It is required that the applicant eit.her modify the criteria appropriately or provide technical justification for the apparent differences. The principle areas of difference are the following:
(a) Criteria for postulating break locations and orientations in b
high energy fluid lines inside containment.
(b) Procedures for determining load capacity of pipe following a postulated break and the load which can be transmitted to an anchor point.
(c) Assumption of operating condition prior to a postulated break in design of restraints.
(d) Criteria for postulating break locations in high energy lines outside containment but within an enclosing structure or compartment as compared with such criteria for lines routed alongside, above, or below such structures and compartments.
(e) The avoidance of design features, especially at points of pipe fixity, that would require welding directly to the outer surface of the piping.
2.
In PSAR 3.6.6.1, in the discussion of stress criteria for piping which passes through the primary containment penetration, clarify the 3
meaning of the term, "the outermost isolation valve."
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3.
In PSAR 3.6.1, in stating the assumption of a LOCA on the reactor side of the valve in cases I and IV of Figure 3.6-1, indicate whether a
i the valve referred to is the second valve, not shown in the figure.
4.
In PSAR 3.6.2.1 there is a discussion of piping which passes through primary containment penetrations.
Provide the additional criteria required for such sections of pipe in order to justify the no-break postulate or refer to other parts of the PSAR where such criteria are provided. Modify the answer in Amendment 4 to Question 3.40 to incorporate the criteria for this feature of the design.
5.
PSAR 3.6 states that the design philosophy for pipe breaks outside containment is described in Section 3.6.6.
Indicate specifically all the portions of PSAR Section 3.6 which are applicable to this subject for piping systems outside containnent, and not only those concerned i
with postulated break locations.
6.
In PSAR 3.12/1.46, the statenent that the UNP-1 design utilizes ANS 20.2 in the protection against pipe whip inside containment is not acceptable without specific technical justification as noted above in item 1.
It is required that the applicant either modify the criteria employed or provide said justification for the differences with Regulatory Guide 1.46.
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I MECHANICAL ENGINEERING BRANCH DIRECTORATE OF LICENSING WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 1 DOCKET NO. 50-460 INFORMATION REQUEST AND STAFF POSITIONS 1
3.9 Mechanical systems and Components 4
I 1.
In PSAR 3.9.1.1, it is required that the applicant indicate c1carly that the effects of restraints added to the fluid system as a result of the vibration operational program will be incorporated into the piping analysis.
2.
In PSAR 3.9.1.2, it is required that a description be provided or referenced, at the CP stage, of the program which is being planned for the seismic qualification of Seismic Category.I mechanical equipment such as fans, blowers, filters, pump drives, valve operators, heat exchanger tube bundles, and other mechanical equipment required for safe operation and shutdown of the plant under all plant conditions, j
A program acceptable to the staff is delineated in the attachment entitled " Electrical and Mechanical Equipment Seismic Qualification j
Program." If it is the intention to employ portions of the program
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presented in PSAR 3.10 " Seismic Design of Category I Instrumentation i'
and Electrical Equipment" for the qualification of mechanical equipment as well, as appears to be the case, provide clear, specific references to so indicate.
3.
In PSAR 3.9.1.3, amplify the commitment regarding the qualification of reactor internals to state specifically that confirnatory testing
2-per the provisions of Regulatory Guide 1.20 will be performed if KNP-1 is not the prototype for the 205 Fuel Assembly design.
4.
In PSAR 3.9.1.6, Analytical Methods for ASME Code Class 1 Components, provide assurance that, if inelastic component stress analyses and inelastic design stress limits are used in conjunction with aa clastic dynamic system analysis, the technical bases for these procedures will be submitted to the staff prior to use in design.
5.
Table 3.9-1 provides design stress and rated pressure limits for ASME Code Class 2 and 3 pressure-retaining elements as they relate to primary membranc plus primary bending stress. Also include the limits for primary membrane stress itself.
6.
Add the following to the description of the operability assurance program for Class 2 and 3 active components in PSAR 3.9.2.4:
A.
With respect to the analysis and/or testing of active pumps, indicate that the nozzle loads for the faulted condition shall be considered as the normal (design) condition pump nozzle loads and shall be so specified to the pump manufacturer, who would thereby be expected to supply a pump suitable for normal operation with these end loads.
B.
In PSAR 3.9.2.4/2.d(2), discuss briefly the criteria for mounting the valve for the test therein described, e.g. demonstrating that M
ths test mounting provides acceptable simulation of the actual service mounting.
C.
In PSAR 3.9.2.4, in those instances where the 3g vertical and 3g horizontal accelerations are stipulated, they appear to be adequate at this time. Nevertheless, provide a commitment in the PSAR that the conservatism of these input accelerations will be verified in the FSAR by reference to the seismic evaluation of the as-built structures.
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'4. 0 Reactor 4.2 Mechanical Design 1.
Provide the basis for the faulted condition stress limits for the reactor internals and components shown in the table in PSAR 4.2.2.4.6.
2.
Provide a commitment to estimate faulted condition deformations of the reactor internals and to demon, strate in the FSAR that they do not exceed deformations allowable for the safe shutdown mode.
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B actor Coolant System and Connected Systens 5.0
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1.
Regarding AEC request 5.3, amplify the response to address items f
2 and 3, relative to computer program validity and verification, in I
attachment H of the letter dated August 20, 1973 from A. Giambusso, l
Directorate of Licensing, to Washington Public Power Supply System,
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Attn.
Mr. J. J. Stein.
E 2.
PSAR 3.12/1.48 appears to imply that design limits and loading combinations for ASME Class 1 fluid system components are not provided in this PSAR. Clarify the discussion in this section to reflect the i
fact that information of this type actually is included in the PSAR.
3.
In connection with Table 5.2-4, provide the basis for the faulted l
condition stress limits presented for AS!!E Code Class 1 pressure vessels.
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4.
The staff will require that the PSAR provide design stresc limits j
for all plant conditions for AS!!E Code Class 1 valves, inactive and active in conjunction with an acceptable operability assurance program i
j for active Class 1 components. Acceptabic criteria for operability i
l assurance were contained in the staf f's preliminary review of UNP-1.
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