ML20198F447

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Forwards Tabulation of FSAR Commitments for Aug,Sept & Oct 1985 & Corresponding Resolution for Each Commitment.Fsar Amend 22 Expected to Be Issued by 851122
ML20198F447
Person / Time
Site: Hope Creek PSEG icon.png
Issue date: 11/12/1985
From: Mittl R
Public Service Enterprise Group
To: Butler W
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
NUDOCS 8511140358
Download: ML20198F447 (33)
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Text

{{#Wiki_filter:. 7 O PS G Cornpany Putac S2rwce Ek'ctnc and Gas 80 Park Plaza Newark, NJ 07101/ 201430 8217 MAILING ADDRESS / P.O. Box 570, Newark, NJ 07101 Robert L. Mitti General Manager Nucicar Assurance and Regulation November 12, 1985 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Attention: Mr. Walter Butler, Claief Licensing Branch 2 Division of Licensing Gentlemen: FSAR COMMITMENT STATUS TIIROUGH OCTOBER 1985 Il0PE CREEK GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-354 Public Service Electric & Gas Company presently plans to issuo Amendment No. 13 to the llope Creek Generating Station Final Safety Analysis Report by November 22, 1985. Accord-ingly, this letter is provided to document the status of liope Creek Generating Station responses to FSAR commitments which were forecasted to be responded to by August, September and October 1985. Attachment I is a tabulation of the llope Creek Generating Station Final Safety Analysis Report commitments for August, September and October.1985, and the corresponding resolution for each commitment. Attachments II through IX provide responses to commitments forecasted to be responded to in August, September and October 1985. 0511140350 051112 \\ PDR ADOCK O 3]4 \\ \\ The Energy People { wem m.m

Director of Nuclear 2 11/12/85 Reactor Regulation Should you have any questions in this regard, please contact us. Very truly yours, ll a l I il,'1 j es. L_. +f , M s_ Attachment I - Hope Creek Generating Station - FSAR Commitment Status Through October 1985 Attachment II - Response to Question 640.12 Attachment III - Response to Question 440.10 Attachment IV - Response to FSAR Tables 3.10-3 and 3.10-4 Attachment V - Reeponse to Questions 271.1 and 271.6 Attachment VI - Response to Question 480.2 l Attachment VII - Response to Question 220.10 Attachment VIII - Response to Question 460.4 l Attachment IX - Response to Question 421.13 C D.H. Wagner USNRC Licensing Project Manager A.R. Blough USNRC Senior Resident Inspector l l l l 1

ATTACHMENT I Page 1 of 4 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FSAR COMMITMENT STATUS THROUGH OCTOBER 1985 FSAR COMMITMENT LOCATION COMMITMENT RESOLUTION FSAR' COMMITMENTS FOR AUGUST 1985 1. -Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 640.12 testing the communication systems required by 10CFR50, Appendix E, and NRC G.L. 82-33 via implementing procedures of the Hope . Creek Emergency Plan. This information is provided in Attachment IT and will be included in Amendment 13 to the HCGS FSAR. FSAR COMMITMENTS PAST DUE AND REFORECASTED TO AUGUST 1985 2. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 440.10 providing trip settings for the leak detection ~ system. This information 'is provided in Attachment III and will be included in Amendment 14 to the HCGS FSAR. FSAR COMMITMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 1985 3. FSAR Section 3.11.2.6 This commitment concerns providing results of analysis of non-metallic subcomponents for qualified life in the EQ Summary Report. This information has been provided in Amendment 12 to the HCGS FSAR and is a part of l the response to HCGS SER Open Issue 2. I f e

L ATTACHMENT I Page 2 of 4 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FSAR COMMITMENT STATUS THROUGH OCTOBER 1985 \\ FSAR COMMITMENT LOCATION COMMITMENT RESOLUTION FSAR COMMITMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 1985'(Continued) 4. FSAR Section 3.11.6.2 This commitment concerns l providing complete and auditable EQ records for the EQ audit prior to fuel load. Information was provided via letter, R.L. Mittl (PSE&G) to W. Butler (NRC), dated June 25, 1985, to support the July 15-18, 1985 EQ audit. The final l complete EQ information l will be provided by December 1985. 5. FSAR Tables 3.10-3 and This commitment concerns 3.10-4 completing information in HCGS FSAR Tables 3.10-3 and 3.10-4. This information l is provided in Attachment l IV and will be included in Amendment 13 to the HCGS FSAR. 6. FSAR Section 9.5.1.1.5 This commitment concerns having the Fire Protection Program for all plant areas in the power block fully operational before fuel arrives at the site. 3 This information has been provided in Amendment 12 to the HCGS FSAR and i fulfills a HCGS SNM License i commitment. l. 7. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 100.6 providing maintenance (TMI Item II.K.3.16) procedures. This information was provided in Amendment 11 to the HCGS FSAR. I

ATTACHMENT I Page 3 of 4 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FSAR COMMITMENT STATUS THROUGH OCTOBER 1985 FSAR COMMITMENT LOCATION COMMITMENT RESOLUTION FSAR COMMITMENTS FOR SEPTEMBER 1915 (Continued) 8. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Questions 271.1 and 271.6 providing required infor-mation in HCGS FSAR Table 3.10-3. The information has been provided in Table 3.10-3 and Attachment V is provided to reference this and will be included in Amendment 14 to the HCGS FSAR. 9. Question / Response Appendix: This ccamitment concerns Question 480.2 providing missing infor-mation in FSAR Table 6.2-16 for penetrations P-34A thru 34G. This information is provided in Attachment VI and will be incli'd. d in Amend-ment 13 to th JGS FSAR. FSAR COMMIMTENTS PAST DUE AND REFORECASTED TO SEPTEMBER 1985 10. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 220.10 providing detailed procedures for functional testing, channel checks and calibration of seismic instrumentation. Reference to this information is provided in Attachment VII and will be included in Amendment 14 to the HCGS FSAR.

m ATTACHMENT I Page 4 of 4 HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION FSAR COMMITMENT STATUS THROUGH OCTOBER 1985 FSAR COMMITMENT LOCATION COMMITMENT RESOLUTION FSAR COMMITMENTS PAST-DUE AND REFORECASTED TO SEPTEMBER 1985 (continued) 11. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 460.4 providing inforuation regarding laboratory testing and records involved in the process control program. This information is provided in Attachment VIII and will be included in Amendment 13 of the HCGS FSAR. FSAR COMMITMENTS PAST DUE AND REFORCASTED TO OCTOBER 1985 12. Question / Response Appendix: This commitment concerns Question 421.13 providing test results for Non-NSSS and NSSS l isolation devices. Attach-ment IX provides partial response regarding test results of NSSS devices and will be included i in Amendment 13 of the HCGS FSAR. The information regarding Non-NSSS devices will be provided by December 1985. 13. Question /Responso Appendix: This commitment concerns Questions 210.21 and 210.24 updating FSAR Section L 3.6 tables and figures for final stress analysis results. Approval to eliminato pipe break locations was received by NRC letter dated September l 20, 1985. This information will be provided by December 1985. i l

ATTACHMENT II

HCGS FSAR 10/83 00ESTION 640.12 (SECTION 14.2.12) Modify FSAR Subsection 14.2.12.1.38 (OF-In-Plant Communication) to provide a description of the testing to be performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix E.IV.E, I&E Bulletin No. 80-15, and Generic Letter 82-33, or provide additional test abstracts or cross-references to describe such tests.*

RESPONSE

The In-Plant Communication preoperational test does not verify the communication networks required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and Generic Letter 82-33. Thcx co;..mnic tion n:tuad; ::: cerifid n --b'- "is the imple enti.; precedur;; ef th; :::p: C c c c k 4mc ;r " y D12n,.hirb '*i11 ha ub.!tted n: later thar 2i. m; a t s._ ,- 4 a r te fcel 1;;tJ The impIcm:nting pr::cdure; ef the Hope Creek Emeroency Pla w ;11 tcst the communication systems required by 10 CFR 50, Appendix E, and Generic Letter 82-33.g

  • HAdditionally, the emergency notification system (ENS) is powered by a station invertor as described in Section 9.5.2.2.2, which meets the intent of NRC I&E Bulletin 80-15. Cm+

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O 6 e e ATTACHMEtlT III i 4

HCGS FSAR 10/84 OUESTION 440. 6 (SECTION 5.4.6) 8 BWR operating experience has shown that HPCI and RCIC systems have been rendered inoperable because of inadvertent leak detection isolations caused by equipment room high differential temperature signals. The events occurred when there was a relat~1vely sharp drop in outside temperature. As noted in Section 5.4.6.1.1.1, HCGS incorporates this type of RCIC and RHR (steam) isolation. Proviie a discuss' ion of the modifications that-have been or will be made to present inadvertent isolations of this type which effect the availability and reliability of the RCIC and the RHR systems. i Secondly, provide the trip settings for isolation of the RHR and RCIC systems due to high temperature in terms of degrees above, ambient temperature. Also, discuss the method of specification that would be applied. Show that the setting could not be set too low and cause inadvertent isolation when the system is needed. RESPONSF. General Electric is not aware of any inadvertent isolations attributable to the leak detection / differential temperature monitors sensing a sudden drop in outside temperatures. The HVAC system would have to fail to allow a. sudden change in outside temperature to result in the sudd'en change in inside temperature. It is highly unlikely that both the temperatures would drop suddenly and the HVAC would fail at the same time that the RCIC or RHR system was required to function. The trip settings for the plant leak detection system hSEE $U

  • ya* been estrblished.

The; e!!! be suai!-b!: by January !^SL l I w he. ']/C4 5 Tecln.'c4./ Spels6'ca.Urx5.. In order to prevent inadvertent isolation when the RHR and RCIC systems are needed, HCGS ubbF considendthe potential for changes in outdoor temperatures causing system isolation and considered minimum room air supply temperature in establishing the differential temperature setpoint. 7Ae kHR 333 fem ;,..i f,,f /./ % Mgi em Lwr *Y" t *** Mh(delk $44 . Th< 4l) f4,.d. < J 6k Ma tymLe p.ade lar., 13 , a u ) :, u :, n,c,2. r ) / 440.10-1 Amendment B ~,

/ ATTACHMENT IV e l e n ~A

{ , ' ~T i HCCS FSAR TABI.E 3.10-3 NS$5 SEISMIC CATECr)RY I Elf CyRIrAl. AND INP.7RUMENTATION Er)tilpMF4T rFAl.lt trA7MW Histit.ts [9Ylf.M[y{ METHOD REStil.TS Teorereture Elreents The temperature elements are quotified by both dyneele trating ea t analysis. The temperature elements designated es having an active safety f unction have been dynamically tested demonstrating qualiferetion. The apolicable standard is IFFE 144-1975. Mounted samstar to field conditions, they have 1.cen subjes trJ to SNV vibration agann, chugging, seismic, and hydro.lynamic Inade. Biasially testing, over the f requency range of I to 100 lir, was arceeplished in three outually perpendirular ases wsth Test Hesponse Spect ra (THS) enveloping the Required Proponse Spectre IRRS). The te=rerat ure ele.ent s es e nt ained t hei r tunitinaal f" .nd structeeral integrity during testing. Those elceents having a pascive safety fourtion sete analyac t to show st ructural integrity when suPjer ted to pros cas.t.sensures and los.le in escens of the requirement for their loc at inn. Tc=rereture Switch The temperature switch is shown to be quellfled by an snelysis of its structural The safety function of the troperature suitch is passive. An= lysis showe that capability, it esceeds its structural requircrrate when subjected to required sciseic and hydrodynamic loads, falaulatione in.ficate a high natural frequency mening it a riald body in the range of interest and ate impability far exceeds its ettres requirements. Preseure Treneeltters, The transmitters are qualified by dynamic Differential, tboolute, testing perting th* guidelinee al IFEE The transmitters can be subjected to both seismic and hy.trodynesic Ineds during their installed life. Testing an an as-installed condition includcJ an.1 Cause 344-1975. random frequency excitation to ocet SEV aging. upset end faulted 6eismic. and chugging requirements. Tests were performed in three outually perpendicular During testing the t ransmit ters maint ained st ructural integrit y and set ance. functional requirceents. O Level Transettters level trans=lttere are shnwn to be qualific.I The level transmitters have hath en active or passiv? Falety function for their application by hath enelysis a n.1 depending on their applitstion. Those transmittres with a possive oefety s testing. Testing was rerfor=e4 ta *-et he function have been shown to ecet struttural r quirement by analysis. They guidelines of IFEE 144-1175. have natural f requencies higher than the rande at interest and have beco shown to have st ructural integrit y to wit hst and t he required epismir en.1 dynamic conditions. Those transeitters whose safety function is active were tested in their salcty-related operating ea.le and sete continunuely conitored. They esintained their structural intrarity an.1 oct accurary regularmente derens testing five ORE anel nee SSE testa were perforced in three autually perpendettslar awes. Ise it al inst w e applee.1 ley asially aver a f r e-equenc y tange of I In 100 Hr. Il-71%% I of 5 j

~ HCCS FSAR TARII 1.10-1 (ContinueI) EQUIPNFMT NETHOD RESULTS 1.evel Switch The switches are shnwn to be qualified for The level switch has an active safety function and can he subjected to their installed location by testing pertareed seismic and hydrodynamic loads during its plant life. Vibration aging, to meet the guidelines of IFFE 144-1975. Shi', ORE, SSE, and sine beat testing was performed in three outually perpendicular axes to levels greater than required f or their installed location. During test ing the swit e hes act structural an.1 functinual requirements. Pressure Switch The pressure switch is qualified by dynamic This switch has an active safety function and can be subjected to seismic testing to meet the applicable stan,fsrds of loads during its plant life. Five OBE and onc SSE eultifrequency, biasial IEEE 344-1975. seismic tests were performed on the switch at Icvels enreeding the requirements. Escitation was applied in three outually perpendicular ases. The switch met its functional structural requirements. Stop Valve Switch This switch is qualified based on dynamic This device has an active safety function and has demonstrated structural testing at levels greater than its requirement, and functional integrity when subjected to seismic conditions in excess of the Fk (gS -99Gerequircoent. It dessonstrated no oatural frequencies below the ZPA point. Discrete frequency dwelle were applied, blasially, to a samieue level of 5.5 g f rom I to 35112 in three outually perpenificular esca. Pressure Indicators The pressure indicators have been qualified Indicators can have an active or passive safety function. The indicators by dynamic testing secting the guidelines of sounted in an as installed condition were subjected to blasial randoe testing IIEE 344-1975. over a frequency range of I to 250 Ifr. Five ORE and one SSE tests were applied in three outually perpen.ficular ones. TRS that included both seismic and hydrodynamic loads enveloped the ras. The indicator enintained structural integrity throughout testing. Insulated Detectors The detectors have been quellfied by dynamic Detectors have an active safety function and wet structural and functional testing to meet the guidelines nf IFFE requirements when subjected to seismic testing at amplitudes greater than 344-1975. required. Five OBE and one SSE hissint randne tests were performed in three a outually perpendicular ases over a f requency range of I to 100 Hr. Functional performance was demonstrated before, during, and after seismic excitetton. IBM Detector A combinetton of test and analyste deennstrates The IRN detector movement during a selsele event is controlled by the fuel qualification of the detertars f ar thair bundle and eenious escitation occurs at the natural frequency of the bundle.' installed location. The detector was tested at discrete frequencies in the horirontal ases and analyzed for vertical loads. Capabilitics, both tested and analyred, escred the requirements, deconstrating qualification. Conduct ivit y Element The conductivity cell was analyred to The safety function of the cell is passive, however, it must enintain its withstand seiselc loads signifirently structural integrity. Analysis inticates no resonances in any amis below greater than required. 100 Hz and the nhility to withstand inade more than 15 times geester then H C_ cgs 'equired. Condensing Chasher This equipment is qualified by analysis to Stress enelysis indicates that the condensing chsaber ocets the requirements meet the seismic requirement applying of the ASNE code and thet the lowest calculatcJ alloweble soment remet ton the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Cnde curreds t he easione moment of any enn lenging chamber inat ellat ion. Sertion Ill. g J

IICCS FSAR TAfti.E 3.10-3 (Continued) Equipment /Hanufacturer Cross-Reference Purchased Equipment (,) Part guipment Temperature Element _ Drawing _ Code 133D9679 Manu f a ct u re r P Traperature Element Pyco 145C3224 A Temperature Element Pyco 159C4520 P Terperature Element Rosemount 117C3485 P Temperature Indicator California Alloy 145C3103 P Testperature Indicator Weed, Inc. 169C3974 P Temperature Switch Weed, Inc. 157C4629 P Pressure Transmitter Weed, Inc. 189C7360 A,P Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 163C1563 A Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 163C1564 P Rosemount Pressure Transmitter 188C7360 A,P Rosemount Pressure Indicator 163C1184 A,P Robert Shaw Diff Press Indicator 163C1181 P Robert Shaw Level Transmitter 18CC7360 A Roacmount 1.evel Transmitter 184C4775 A could 12-2762 3 of 5

HCGS FSAR TARLE 3.10-3 (Cratinued) Equipment / Manufacturer Cross-Reference Purchased 7; Part Equipment Ep peent

Drawing, Code Manufacturer level Transmitter 169C8392 A

Rosemount level Transmitter 163C1973 P Rosemount Level Transmitter 163C1560 P Rosemount Level Switch 184C4776 A Magnetrol Level Switch 159C4361 A,P Hagnetrol Pressure Switch 184C4770 A Barksdale TSV Limit Switch 163Cl303 A Namco Detcetor 237X731 A CE Detector 112C3144 A CE Detector 163C1154 A CE Conductivity Element 163C1544 P Balshaugh Condensing Chamber 204R7269 P CE Flow Transmitter 188C7360 A Rosemount flow Transmitter 163C1560 P Rosemount flow Transmitter 169C8392 P Ronemount Flow Element 169C8733 P Vickery Simms Power Supply 184C4571 A CE 12-2762 4 of 5

HCGS FSAR TAh!.E 3.10-3 (C:ntinued) Equipment /Hanufacturer Cross-Reference Purchased (l) Part Equipment Equipment _ Drawing, Code Ma nu f a ctu re r Power' Supply 164C5660 A CE Diff Press Transmitter 163C1560 P CE Diff Press Transmitter 188C7360 A Rosemount Hester Trip Unit 164C5150 A Rosemount Slave Trip Unit 164C5150 A Rosemount Voltage Preamp - IRH 163Cl263 A CE Intermediate Range Monitor 368X102AA A CE Power Range Instr. 328X105AC A CE Log Rad Monitor 238X660 A CE Sq. Root Converter 159C4486 H liailey Heter inverter 184C4723 A Topaz Summer 159C4659 A CE Alarm Unit 159C4660 A Bailey Heter I,ocal Panels A CE Control Room Panels A CE (a) pa lbsive Class lE, A = AeMue Cla ss 1E, M = %oo.( cla,3 15 12-2762 5 of 5 i t

IICCS FSAR TAel.E 3.10-4 NSSS SEISNIC QtfALIFICATION TEST

SUMMARY

CLASS IE CON 1ROI. PANFl.S AND 1.OCAL PANEL.S AND RACKS Lncel renele Panel qualification is hy similarity to The local instrument cancis are qualified for structurel integrity based uran tested equivalent panels and devices by comparisons of sleiter panet Tent Respanne spectra (TRS) to an enveinpe of SQRT program methodology. The applicable Required Desponse Spectre (RRS) f or the Hope Crech reactor building. The standard is IEEE 344 1975. panels were installed in an equivalent manner to those tested. The panels were tested to a spectre of Inade more severe then the Dreign Basse Event (DBE) and the inputs consist of sciseic (SSE) loads. Nulti-frequency, biasial testing was performed by applying five OHE and two SSE level tests in each of three mutually perpendicular ases. Functional performance and structural integrity were monitored through the test series. In the Ud 4 instansefweee-instruments were not tested on the panel, the response et the ~ device lac etion was determined by eultiplying the RRS and 7pA by the amplification f actor for that device location on the panel and comparing the result with individual instrument test data. Qualification of panels is ensured since the TRS enveloped the RRS, and functional and sisuctural requirements were met. Cnntral Rnne Penels The control room panels are qualified by Control room panels and essential devices are selenically qualified to the sintlerity to tested equivalent pencia an1 IEEE 344-1975 criteria by comparing thene panels to almilar panels that have devices by SQRT progeom metho.lology. The been qualilled by test. The panele were tested to a spectra of loads in the applicable standard it IFFE 144-117%. frequency range of I-45 Hr. The dreign inputs are seismic (SSE) loads. Por individual Class IE devices in the panels, the selfunction limit is obtained by single amis, single frequency testing in the 1-33 Hz range. The design of :he panels is representative of a generic CE rentrol room panel design. These control room pancis are vertical Laerds consisting of 2 or more baye. T.ach bay is 24 or 30 inches wide by 36 inches deep by 90 inches high. Each vertical board is a squared corner enclosure (tahinct) manu-factured from 0.18 inch carbon steel with engle iron brechet attached top and hottom. Vertical hoards santain steel channels as stilleners, located generally in the vicinit y of t he inst rumentat ion, in anme renes, the channel is used as an instrument counting structure. Most Hnpe Creek vertical boards are structurally identical tn *ertical boards that have been tested to IFFE 344-1975. Three tested vertical hoards were used for comparison purpnece. The mechanical characteristice that af f ett the st ructural response such as damping, section modulus, st if f ness, and mass dist ribut ion were con-sidered as a basis for similarity. Thenectical relationships demonstrate that the smaller width structures, heights and depth tcing ronstant, have higher natural frequencies and manimum peak accelerations. Higher resonant frequenties indtrate a more rigid structure. In a few caers, test data for a given structure deviates from the theoretical. In these cases, esamination reveals additional stiffening, more massive equipment or esistence of a local ende. [5pg)g, Redundant reactivity control panels C77-p001 and,7 were qualified laseI l upon the sat is f artary f unr t ional operat ion nf t he equipment durens testans. 17 77%% 1 af 5

HCCS FSAR TABLE 3.10-4 (Centinued) Class IE Panel Description Type Equipment _ Description till-P608 Power range neut ron monitor Inst rument Panel APRN, TCPS, RBH finv i comp, Horgan power supply lill-P609 Reactor protection system Vertical Board HFA & IINA relays, Division 1 & 3 logic CR 105 contactor lill-P611 Reactor protect ion system Vertical Boarel llFA & !!NA relays, Division 2 & 4 logic Cit 105 contactor till-P617 Division I RliR relay Vert ical Board ifFA & !!NA relays. lill-P618 Division 11 RIIR relay Vertical Board IIFA & IfMA relays lill-P620 llPCI relay Vertical Board IIFA & KMA relays lill-P621 RCIC relays Vertical Board ilFA & IINA relays lil l-I'622 Reactor core Inboard Vertical Board IIFA & IIMA relays isolation valve relays lill-P623 Reactor core outboard Vertical Board IIFA & IINA relays isolation valve relays Illi-P628 ADS Division II relay Vertical Board IIFA & IIMA relays lill-P631 ADS Division IV relay Vertical Board ilFA & ilMA relays lil l-l'635 Division A radiation Instrument Panel Neutron monitoring i mon. instrument panel electronics lill-P636 Division B radiation inntrument Panel Neutron monitoring. mon. instrument panel elect ronics / ,i 11-1917 2 of 5 e

HCGS FSAR TABLE 3.10-4 (Centinued) i Panci Description Class lE Type E nipment Description 3 Hil-P640 Division 4 RHR relay Vertical Board HFA & IINA relays Hil-P641 Division 3 RifR relay Vertical Board ilFA & llHA relays II21-P001 Core spray A & ADS Local Panel Pressure switches D Panel H21-P002 Reactor water cleanup Local Panel Pressure transmitters ll21-P004 Reactor vessel level Local Panel & press A Pressure switches, level indicator /transmittern H21-P005 Reactor vessel level I,ocal Panel & press C Pressure switches, level indicator / transmitter H21-P006 Recirculation pump A Local Panel Pressure transmitters ll21-P009 Jet pump A I.ocal Panel Pressure transmitters ll21-P010 Jet pump B Local Panel Pressure transmittern l H21-P0ll Standby liquid control Local Panel CR2940 switches ll21-P014 IIPCI Penel A Local Panel Pressure trannmitters/ switches H21-P015 Main steam flow A/B !.ocal Panel Pressure switch Il21-P016 IfPCI Panel C

i. oral Panel Pressure transmitters /

switches ll21-P017 RCIC division panel B Local Panel Pressure transmitter / switches II21-P018 RiiR A panel J. oral Panel Pressure trannmit ter/ nwitch l 11-1917 3 of 5 - - + - - -

ItCGS FSAR TABLE 3.10-4 (C::ntinued) Class IE Panel Description Type o E uipment Descr_iption 3 i H21-P019 Core spray B & ADS B Local Panel Pressure transmitter / switch Il21-P021 RHR B Panel-Local Panel Pressure transmitter / switch Il21-P022 Recirculation pump B Local Panel Pressure transmitters ll21-P025 Main steam flow C/D Local Panel Pressure switches H21-P026 Reactor vessel level Local Panel Pressure switches / & press D transmitters il21-P027 Reactor vessel level Local Panel Pressure switchen/ & Press B transmitters ll21-P030 SRM & IRM preamp A-D NEMA 12-SRM-IRM preampiifiers enclosures ll21-P031 SRM & IRM preamp A-D NEMA 12-SRM-IRM preampiifiers enclosures il21-P032 SRM & IRM preamp A-D NEMA 12-SRM-IRM preamplifiers enclosures ll21-P033 SRM & IRM preamp A-D NEMA 12-SRM-IRM preampli fiers enclosures I ll21-P037 RCIC Panel D 1.ncal Panel Pressure Transmitter / Switchea Il21-PO41 Main steam flow A/B Local Panel Transmittern 1121-P042 Main steam flow C/D Local Panel Transmittern 11-1917 4 of 5

llCCS FSAR TABI.E 3.10-4 (C:ati'ruid)- Class 1E Panel Description Type Equipment Description i ll21-P055 RHR C panel Local Panel Pressure transmitter / switch it21-P069 RIIR D panel. Iocal Panel Pressure transmitter / switch 1 11-1917 5 of 5 - --s--1--

f G 9 m O e ATTACHMENT V .__m U .3

HCGS FSAR 4/84 i OUESTION 271.1 (SECTICt; 3.10) Provide the date that.the information identified as "later" in Tables 3.10-2 and 3.10-3 will be submitted.

RESPONSE

Table 3.10-2 has been revised to incorporate the information identified as "later". -That infer etier identificd c: "Ictc " ir inb1c 2.'0-3 -.11 vc c.'"^4 Ta.bfe, 3 1 0 - 3 has 4- '^or s by1 ftNised -fo yrovidg M d ( 9 ared 't 4,m & *m, 271.1-1 Amendment 5 . =...

HCGS FSAR 7/85 l OUESTION 271.6 (Section 3.10) The equipment listed in Table 3.10-3 is qualified by analysis only. Describe what test data and experience data is used in support of the qualification analysis. (Pages 3.10-4; 43.10.2.1).

RESPONSE

-There may bc : misundcc5tanding as to the extcnt af the "latcc" 4dentification unduc the "Scicmic Cualification" hecding on Table -4r+e-3. --shc "le tec " dcs i gnat ion applico Lv all of thc dc.-iccc ~J4stcd in Tabic 2.10 2 and accc not indicat; tha' ail deviccc - -uccc 'vu -ill bc} qualifica '...Ly analynic only hAcThe date necccc:ry to replace the "later"- decignation ir Table 2.10 2 -ill-ha ccailable ir September, 1005. The qualification of the devices listed in Table 3.10-3-vi1F adhere to the seismic qualification requirements applicable to HCGS. The equipment 15 uill 50 qualified by analysis, test, and/or prior experience. -The analytical qualificatien will be by an engineering analysis .=nd -ry nnt raly nn any tant anta ana/er experience data.- practical m2tter, tact and e pecience data, if " ~ - ~ - - - an a v eveilable, vill be used in canjunctica with the engineering .% nslysic t M ualify a particuler de"ic"

T'Me 3.10
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4 e e w ATTACHMEflT VII

HCGS FSAR 7/85 l OUESTION 220.10 (SECTION 3.7.4) Provide details of a seismic instrumentation inservice surveillance program. The staff's position is outlined in NUREG 0800, SRP Section 3.7.4-II.S. Any deviation from the position should be justified.

.~

RESPONSE

HCGS complies with requirements of SRP Section 3.7.4-II.5, as stated in Section 3.7.4.5. The requirements of the Technical Specifications (Chapter 16) will be in accordance with NUREG-0123. A comparison of NUREG-0123 and SRP Section 3.7.4, Table 3.7.4-2 shows no differences in requirements for inservice surveillance. Detailed procedures for functional testing, aa c r channel checks, and calibration of seismic instrumentation 4444-Jun available, July 1995. D 220.10-1 Amendment 11 l \\' _. _ _ -, - ~

q t e ATTACHMENT VIII L --.~

  • .4,

HCGS FSAR 6/84 ( OUESTION 460.4 (SECTION 11.4) Acceptance Criterion II.2 of SRP 11.4 requires a process control program (PCP) for the solidification of solid radwaste. Section 11.4 of the FSAR states that the topical report WPC-VRS-001 (Rev. 1) dated May 1978, which has been approved by the NRC, will be used. Page 77 of this topical report states that the feedstream chemical composition and percent of solids in the feedstream are required to determine the end product. Tables V-1, V-2 and V-3 provide maximum radioactivity limits for the feedstream. In Section 1.8 of the FSAR, you take exception to Regulatory Guide 1.21 for determining the quantity and composition of solid waste. Provide the information on laboratory tests that will be conducted under the PCP to assure that the feedstream will be within the parameters in WPC-VRS-001 (Rev. 1) for chemical, physical, and nuclide quantity and composition; the frequency of feed sample testing; and the method that will be used to establish feed conditions. What type of laboratory / field instruction record sheet will be used within the PCP at HCGS. Address the 1% of oil limit on the feedstream. Specify the program to be used wnenever a batch fails to solidify. Address the fire protection measures recommended by the topical report.

RESPONSE

In clarification of Tables V-1, V-2 and V-3 of the Topical Report WPC-VRS-001 (Rev 1) dated May 1978, the values provided are typical chemical and weight percent compositions, and maximimum estimated cu'rie contents, and are not maximum limits. The information on laboratory tests that will be conducted under the PCP to assure that the feedstream is within the parameters in WPC-VRS-001 (Rev 1) for chemical, physical, and nuclide quantity and composition and thc frequency cf fccd campic testing will be provided by Osr.semy 1901. W fch I 'l8b To assure that the feedstream will be within the parameters of the PCP, a grab sample will be taken prior to processing each batch of liquid waste. This sample will be analyzed by the system operator for weight percent solids and specific gravity. The initial waste processing conditions are then determined by knowing the waste type (e.g., resin slurry or concentrates), the specific gravity and weight percent solids. ad Reaaewh o.f Seed SwPh OU.} The laboratory / field instruction record sheetat}o be used within the PCP at HCGS(will be provided by 22nuary !005. l The one percent oil limit on the feedstream is addressed in WPC-VRS-001 (Rev. 1) dated May 1978, pages 88-89. ha.5 been sobrv6-bicci via. IcA4ee frorvi R.L.. E41 (PSE dG) 4o h/. Sdler(Wc), 460.4-1 Amendment 6 I

m 4 9 e l m ATTACHMEllT IX I e m -- ~-

HCGS FSAR 10/84 l Where the isolation / separation between divisional circuits and between divisional and nondivisional circuits is achieved with optical isolators, the input and output cards are comprised of semiconductors, resistors, and capacitors and are separated by a 1-inch-long quartz rod through a metal barrier. The optical isolators for the RRCS also have current-limiting resistors on the input circuits. The enclosures for both types of isolators are designed to hold either four or eight isolator cards; only cards for circuits from the same division are contained in the same enclosure. A worst-h case failure would cause loss of function to only one division; a safety function would not be lost because of the redundance of the other divisions. V O Specifications control the type of testing and qualification for 9 the isolators. Line-to-line tests (140-Vdc for two minutes and 400-V, one-millisecond pulses) have been successfully performed on the RRCS isolators. A 5-KV line-to-ground test 'fil? b e WGS 0 4 performed on the input circuit of the non-RRCS isolators. -h-d -recultc cf the 5 KV tcct will b reported ir '-and-on* tc thic E rerpe re h; " arch 1000. G,k WaS No degradation of the card on the other side of the barrier *t+t-C a 4pe-used as a criterion for a successful test. Since the same O C type of enclosures are used for both types of isolators and since U 5-KV f ar exceeds both the voltage of the RRCS isolator tests and / the maximum postulated credible " hot short" voltage for all NSSS applications, the 5-KV test _.1; car. fir-thecapabilitiesofthe/ barrier and enclosure to prohibit detriac..; to the cards on tne other side of the barrier, k ny cleAyi mh j e f,fecff_s a b a rr., o The test plans, procedures, and reports % ill be available on file for audit at GE. The :: ' *: 4 o,p+ie d iSclit-Fo r -{es+ ve-por t num %W [$ Mg pg - 309 77, 9 An additional test of the optical isolators to verify that they can withstand the maximum credible fault current / voltage applied in the transverse mode has been perforred. This test dcTcnstrated that the maximum credible voltage applied to the optical isolators in the transverse mode will not be propagated through the quartz barrier to the other side of the device. 1( (, 421.13-9 Amendment 8 l x - -}}

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