ML20197J764
| ML20197J764 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Hatch  |
| Issue date: | 04/29/1986 |
| From: | Gucwa L GEORGIA POWER CO. |
| To: | Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| References | |
| 2667N, SL-633, NUDOCS 8605200163 | |
| Download: ML20197J764 (4) | |
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Georgia Fbwer Company 7
333 Piedmont Avenue c,.
Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526 Maihng Ad&ess.
Post Othee Box 4545 g *, h g Atlanta, Georgia 30302 l
jgk Georgia Power L T. Gucwa
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Manager Nut! ear Safety and Licensing SL-633 2667N April 29, 1986 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
REFERENCE:
Office of Inspection and Enforcement RII:
RDW Region II - Suite 2900 50-321/50-366 101 Marietta Street, NW Inspection Report Atlanta, Georgia 30323 86-03 ATTENTION: Dr. J. Nelson Grace Gentlemen:
The following information is submitted in response to Inspection Report 86-03, which resulted from the inspection conducted by Messrs. P. Holmes-Ray and G.
M. Nejfelt of your office from January 18 to February 21, 1986 Three apparent violations were identified:
VIOLATION 1:
" Technical Specification 3.7.C.l.b requires that the Unit 1 secondary containment be maintained, while Unit 2 is at power operation.
Technical Specification 6.8.1.a. requires the licensee to implement approved procedures covering the areas recommended in Appendix "A"
of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2,
February 1978, which includes administrative procedures for equipment control and access to containment.
Section 8.15 of administrative control procedure 30AC-0PS-003-0S, Revision 0, specifies the required controls of the air lock system for secondary containment integrity.
Contrary to the above, on January 29, 1986, with Unit 2 at power operation, the licensee failed to implement the requirements of administrative control procedure 30AC-0PS-003-0S, in that the inspector observed both air lock doors to be open of the Unit 1 Reactor Building while workers were exiting through this passage way and ignoring the interlock lights.
This resulted in a loss of Unit 1 secondary containment integrity.
In addition, the licensee identified Unit 1 secondary containment integrity breach in different locations on January 15 and 21,1986 and on February 17, 1986.
This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) for Unit 1 only."
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r Georgia Power d U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 April 29, 1986 Page Two RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 1:
Admission or denial of alleged violation: The violation occurred.
Reason for violation:
The violation occurred as a result of two separate events.
The interlock which normally prevents the simultaneous opening of both airlock doors had failed.
In addition, the personnel involved in the January 29, 1986, violation failed to attach the appropriate significance to controls designed to assure secondary containment integrity.
Corrective actions which have been taken and the results achieved:
The mal functioning secondary containment airlock interlocks were repaired through Maintenance Work Order (MW0) 1-86-906.
These interlocks are tested monthly in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 52PM-L48-001-lS.
The individuals rasnonsible for the January 29 violation were released from employment bu se of the event.
Supervisors of both contract and permanent maintenance and retrofit personnel have counselled their subordinates on the importance of maintaining secondary containment integrity.
Signs have been placed on all secondary containment airlock doors to remind personnel that the simultaneous opening of both doors of an airlock is prohibited.
Corrective ste)s which will be taken to avoid further violations:
The
' actions descri)ed above are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the violation.
Date when full compliance was achieved:
The actual breaches of secondary containment which occurred were momentary in nature and were terminated with the closing of either airlock door.
Full compliance with Technical Specifications was assured when interlock repairs were completed on January 30, 1986.
VIOLATION 2:
" Technical Specification 6.8.1.c requires that written procedures shall be implemented for surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
Contrary to the above, on January 28, 1986, safety-related procedure, 42IT-TET-001-0S, Revision 1, to pneumatically test the integrity of tubing installed between the drywell and drywell pressure transmitters, was not
-followed in that the pneumatic air source was connected to the system prior to verifying the isolation of the drywell pressure transmitters, as specified respectively in steps 7.2.7.4 and 7.2.7.1 of the procedure.
This error resulted in an unplanned initiation of the Emergency [ sic] Safety Features (ESF) equipment.
This is a Seferity Level IV violation (Supplement I) for Unit 1 only."
700775
Georgia Powerb U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 April 29,1986 Page Three RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 2:
Admission or denial of alleged violation: The violation occurred.
Reason for violation:
The violation was the result of a failure of the involved personnel to perform the procedure steps in the correct sequence.
Corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved:
Immediately following the event, the actuation signal was removed and the affected systems returned to their normal status.
The responsible personnel were disciplined. The incident was reviewed with those personnel and others who may perform functional tests for future modifications to stress th6 importance of verbatim compliance with procedures and strict attention to detail.
Pre-test briefings were instituted to ensure that test crews performing such functional tests knew the exact sequence of steps to be followed and the effect of the test on the plant.
Corrective ste)s which will be taken to avoid further violations:
The actions descri bed above are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the violation.
Date when full compliance was achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on January 28, 1986, when the affected systems were returned to their normal status.
VIOLATION 3:
" Technical Specification 6.8.1.c for Unit 1 and Unit 2 requires that written procedures shall be established for surveillance and test activities of safety-related equipment.
Contrary to the above, the Jumper and Lifted Wire (J&LW) sheet, 1-86-016, to modi fy the Unit 1 Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) and procedure, 57SV-E41-003-2, to calibrate the Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) steam line pressure transmitters were both inadequately written.
The use of these procedures resulted in unplanned Engineering Safety Features (ESF) equipment actuation on February 13, 1986 This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I) for Unit 1 and Unit 2."
700775
r Georgia Power 1 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II Suite 2900 April 29,1986 Page Four RESPONSE TO VIOLATION 3:
Admission or denial of alleged violation: The violation occurred.
Reason for violation:
The generation of the incorrect Lifted Wire and Jumper (LW&J) sheet was the result of an inadequate utility review of a contractor-prepared temporary modification work instruction.
The erroneous calibration procedure was caused by a failure of the procedure writer to use the available reference materials to ensure its accuracy.
Corrective actions which have been taken and the resul ts achieved:
Immediately following the ESF actuations, the affected equipment was returned to its normal status.
The contract personnel who wrote and reviewed the incorrect LW&J sheet were reprimanded.
Non-utility personnel were instructed to have LW8J sheets reviewed and approved by Georgia Power Company Instrumentation and Controls (I&C) supervision when safety-related equipment is involved.
Use of the incorrect calibration procedure, 57SV-E41-003-2, was discontinued.
Procedure 57SV-CAL-002-2S provides the correct calibration instructions and is now in use.
I&C personnel were instructed to use both elementary diagrams and wiring diagrams to prepare procedures.
This will ensure that the proper sequence of events is developed and the correct circuits are used.
Corrective steps which will be taken to prevent further violations:
The steps described above are sufficient to prevent a recurrence of the violation.
Date when full compliance was achieved:
Full compliance was achieved on February 13, 1986, when the affected aquipment was returned to its normal status.
Please contact this office if you have any questions.
Very truly yours, clT &
L. T. Gucwa JH/mb xc:
Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
Senior Resident Inspector GO-NORMS i
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