ML20197J568

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-327/86-16 & 50-328/86-16.Denies Violation Re Incorrect Installation of Concrete Anchor Bolts Based on Program Developed Per IE Bulletin 79-02

ML20197J568
Person / Time
Site:	Sequoyah
Issue date:	04/30/1986
From:	White S TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
To:	Grace J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
References
IEB-79-02, IEB-79-2, NUDOCS 8605200074
Download: ML20197J568 (3)

Text

,g.- ])M 6 TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA. TENNESSEE 37401 6N 38A Lookout Place April)5....r0,i1386 a10 : 58 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II ATTN: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator 101 Marietta Street. NH. Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

Dear Dr. Grace:

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNITS 1 AND 2 - NRC-0IE REGION II INSPECTION REPORT 50-327/86-16 AND 50-328/86 RESPONSE TO VIOLATION Enclosed is TVA's response to J. A. Olshinski's March 26, 1986 letter to me transmitting IE Inspection Report Nos. 50-327/86-16 and 50-328/86-16 for the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) which cited TVA with one Severity Level IV Violation.

TVA denies the violation. Please see the enclosure for our explanation which in summary states that the program developed as a consequence of IE Bulletin 79-02 provided assurance that anchor bolts used in safety-related systems were designed and verified to be properly installed through an acceptable sample test program, as documented in the SQN Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-00ll, Supplement 2) dated August 1980. Further, this is supported by your inspection which did not identify discrepancies with the unit 2 anchor bolt installations and identified discrepancies in anchor bolts installed before the 79-02 inspection program but not included in the initial test sample for unit 1. He conclude that TVA has effectively complied with IE Bulletin 79-02. Further, it is important to note that the ongoing ASME Section XI program of inservice inspection of equivalent class I, 2, and 3 systems piping and supports includes support base plates at SQN. This program results in the enhancement of support conditions as it continues.

If you have any questions, please get in touch with R. E. Alsup at FTS 858-2725.

To the best of my knowledge, I declare the statements contained herein are complete and true.

Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY 8605200074 e6043037 DR ADOCK 05 Q Manager of Nuclear Power Enclosure cc: Mr. James Taylor, Director (Enclosure)

Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 x

An Equal Opportunity Employer  ; l k 'd

r ENCLOSURE RESPONSE - NRC-0IE INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-327/86-16 AND 50-328/86-16 JOHN A. OLSHINSKI'S LETTER TO S. A. WHITE DATED MARCH 26, 1986 J4 Violation 50-327/86-16-01 and 50-328/86-16-01 Appendix B, Criterion V of 10 CFR 50, requires that activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions and procedures, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions and procedures.

TVA Sequoyah Nuclear Plant 79-02 Anchor Bolt inspection procedure requires that correct installation of self-drilling concrete anchor bolts in safety-related systems per General Construction Specification G-32. Paragraph 3.2.5 of Specification G-32 states that the installers are to be instructed to tighten the bolts between 1/8 and 1/4 turn after the bolt head comes into contact with the attachment or baseplate.

Contrary to the above, between February 24-28, 1986, activities affecting quality had not been accomplished in accordance with documented instructions and procedure in that the 11tensee's QC inspectors failed to detect the anchor bolt deficiencies for nine pipe supports and one pump support platform baseplate during their inspections. The deficiencies were the gaps between the bolt heads and the baseplates.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

1. Admission or Denial of Alleged Violation TVA dentes the violation.

2. Reason for Denial Attachment A of Workplan 4996 and Attachment Al of Workplan S-1206 incorporated a sample. Inspection program which met the requirements of IE Bulletin 79-02. The results of the IE Bulletin 79-02 program for SQN were reviewed and accepted as stated in section 3.9.2 of Supplement 2 of the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated August 1980. The anchor bolts identified during the February 24-28, 1986 inspection were installed before the performance of the 79-02 inspection program, but were not inspected by the workplans referenced above. The equipment platform base plates, such as for the pump platform, are not within the scope of the bulletin.

P Following are the observations and dispositions for each of the base plates with anchor bolt discrepancies identified during your inspection.

Component Identifier Observations and Dispositions 1067HPABERCWH-230 Floor-mounted bolt bound in

, place. Penetrating oil used to

{g- free threads. Bolt tightened to requirements.

1067HPABERCH-235 Floor-mounted bolt in place and penetrating oil used to free the threads. Bolt tightened to requirements. ,

1070HPABCCH-1141 Floor-mounted bolt bound in palce. Removed, cleaned, and reinstalled to requirements.

1070HPABCCH-1142 Floor-mounted bolt. Removed, cleaned, and reinstalled to requirements.

1070HPABCCT-041-06 Wall-mounted bolt, tightened to contact base plate.

0-067-2015 This support is on ERCH replacement stainless steel pipe and has not been placed in service. No action taken.

1031HPABAVAC-9114 Floor-mounted bolt. Removed bolt, cleaned grit from shell, and reinstalled bolt to requirements.

1031HPABAVAC-9115 Floor-mounted bolt. Tightened bolt to requirements.

- 0059HPAB-47W91-3-8 Floor-mounted bolts. Removed bolts, cleaned grit from shall, and tightened bolts to requirements except one bolt which was broken and in process of being replaced.

0-ASSMAB721A1010W000 Platform column base plate for thermal barrier booster pump for RCS pump. Bolt replaced to requirements.

Where corrective action was considered necessary, the bolts were tightened or reinstalled to the requirements of plant instruction M&AI-9 by April 11, 1986, with one exception. The broken bolt is expected to be replaced by May 30, 1986.

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