ML20197J345
| ML20197J345 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 05/14/1986 |
| From: | Kober R ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8605200002 | |
| Download: ML20197J345 (18) | |
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION e 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y.1464b0001 ~ y ROGER W. KOERER vtg pitf;58DE NT T f L 8 PMO*eE Etzcimc a s rtAna pnooucnON aME A 000f 7e6 546 2700 May 14, 1986 Dr. Thomas E. Murley, Regional Administrator U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Subject:
IE Balletin 85-03, 180 Day Response R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Dr. Murley:
Attached is our 180 day response to IB Bulletin No. 85-03 dated November 15, 1985 which requested that licensees develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings on motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant injection and emergency feedwater systems are set properly.
Vr truly yours, Or Ye Roger W. Kober Subscribed and sworn to me on this 14th day of May 1986.
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Response to IE Bulletin 85-03 INTRODUCTION j
On Novemb<2r 15, 1985, the NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued IE Bulletin 85-03: " Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients Due to Improper Switch Settings".
The purpose of the bulletin was to request licensees to develop and implement a program to ensure that switch settings on motor-operated valves in the high pressure coolant injection and emergency feedwater systems are selected, set, and maintained correctly to accommodate the maximum differential pressures expected on these valves during both normal and abnormal events within the design basis.
Bulletin 85-03 (IEB 85-03) focuses on the MOVs in two systems; the high pressure coolant injection system and emergency feedwater system.
IEB 85-03 contain six actions,.briefly summarized here:
(a). Determine and document the maximum differential pressure across the subject MOVs.
(b)
Using the differential pressures from (a) establish motor opera tor switch settings.
(c)
Demons tra te the valve's operability by testing the valve at maximum differential conditions - if feasible or unless an alternative can be justified.
(d)
Revise the switch setting procedures if necessary.
(e)
Submit a written report documenting (a) and containing a program schedule to address (b) through (d).
(f)
Submit a final report upon program completion.
2-The purpose of this report is to provide the response required by item (e) above.
The following sections define the valves included in the scope of the program, provide an evaluation for each of the included valves and describe the program established to complete items (b) through (d) above.
A.
High Pressure Coolant Injection Definition i
For this response, "high pressure coolant" injection (HPI) is defined as the Safety Injection (SI) System from the water source to the injection points and includes:
1.
Those portions of the SI system necessary to establish a flowpath(s) from the Refueling Water Storage Tank to the RCS and from the Boric Acid Storage Tanks to the RCS.
2.
Those portions of the SI system required during the cold leg injection phase, up to the transfer to recirculation injection from the containment sump af ter the RWST empties.
The SI motor-operated valves (MOVs) whose operation or inadvertent operation would affect the above flow pa ths are evaluated in this response.
B.
Emergency Feedwater System Definition For Ginna the emergency feedwater system consists of the Auxiliary Feedwater System and as a backup the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The MOVs evaluated are those valves whose operation or inadvertent operation would af f ect the flow path f rom the water source (condensate storage tank and service water) to the steam genera tors.
?
3-C.
Fluid Systems Evaluation The fluid systems evaluation determined the maximum opening or closing APs for the selected MOVs for normal operation and for inadvertent or abnormal operation.
Normal operation is defined as the maximum AP that exists across the valve when the system is providing its intended function.
Abnormal operation is defined. as the maximum AP that exists across the valve when the system is operating under the worst postulated conditions and the valve is inadvertently closed and needs to be reopened or the valve needs to be closed for-some reason.
These conditions bound the conditions that would be postulated by any FSAR analysis or encountered during execution of any emergency operation procedure.
The scenarios used in the evaluations and the results of the evaluation are presented in the following sections.
A review of the accompanying tables illustrates the logic used and conditions postulated for this evaluation.
The APs presented in this document _ may be revised as further
. engineering evaluations are completed.throughout the course of the IE Bulletin 85-03 program.
Revisions may also result from design verifications or refined analyses.
D.
High Pressure Injection Evaluation The High Pressure Injection System is illustrated on Figure
-6.3-1gof the R.
E.
Ginna Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
T Table 1 lists the MOVs evaluated for HPI.
The table,gives the following information:
1.
Ginna valve number 2.
Description of the valve f unction and operation 4 'i 7
', 3.
Condition analyzed 4.
Maximum operating 6P The maximum operating AP is used to establish operator switch settings and will be used to demonstrate valve operability when feasible.
E.
Auxiliary Feedwater Evaluation The Auxiliary Feedwater System is illustrated on Figure 10.5-1 of the R.
E.
Ginna UFSAR.
Table 2 lists the MOVs evaluated for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The table provides the same information as Table 1.
F.
Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Evaluation
)
The Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System is illustrated on Figure 10.5-2 of the R.
E. Ginna UFSAR.
Table 3 lists the MOVs evaluated for'the Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System.
The table provides the same information as Table 1.
G.
Motor Operator Switch Settings Program Design documents (such as specifications, data sheets and drawings) for eacn valve will be reviewed to obtain pertinent detailed design information and to confirm that the design bases included values for maximum differential pressure comparable to those given in Tables 1 throug~n 3.
Where necessary, valve vendors will be contacted for additional design information and for operator sizing methodology.
The IE Bulletin 85-03 item (a) values for maximum differential pressure will be used, together with the pertinent valve design information, to analytically determine the required valve stem thrust, or torque, for opening and closing.
l
Motor-operator suppliers will then be contacted to confirm correct operator sizing and to provide recommended switch settings.
Valves that can only be tested during shutdowns will be evaluated first.
Torque requirements for all valves listed in this response are expected to be established by the end of 1986, and switch settings are to be determined by the end of April 1987.
H.
Demonstration of Valve Operability A test pregram will be established to demonstrate valve j
i operability at the maximum differential pressure determined l
in response to IE Bulletin 85-03 item (a) to the extent practical.
The first stage of the program will be to determine which valves can be tested at the maximum l
differential pressure listed.
The second stage of the program will be to determine the maximum differential pressure that can practically be developed for testing any remaining valves and a justification for testing at reduced differential will be developed.
The Staff will be informed of the test conditions for the MOVs listed in IE Bulletin 85-03 item (a) and provided with the justification for testing at reduced pressures where necessary.
y The preliminary results from IE Bulletin 85-03 item (b) program to determine switch settings are expected to be available by the end of 1986.
The preliminary results will be compared to the existing switch settings.
If major differences exist, the calculations of the new setting will be reviewed to determine the appropriateness of the new value and the bases for the existing setting.
Once the appropriate setting is determined, the valve will be tested with this setting at the maximum differential pressures which can practically be developed.
Valve testing will be scheduled based on plant conditions which allow development of the specified differential pressure and isolation of equipment when required.
Some valves can be tested.during normal plant operation.
Others can and must only be tested during shutdown conditions.
It is intended to complete the program within two years from the date of-the bulletin, however, testing of valves that require a shutdown may not be completed until the Spring 1988 refueling outage.
I.
Switch Setting Procedures Control configuration drawings will be used to establish and control torque switch settings on all Ginna Station motor ope ra tors.
The torque switch setting should be at or above the recommended value but less than the maximum allowable for the operator.
The existing switch settings are based upon the original design and uere provided by the actuator manufacturer, Limitorque.
If new design bases and switch settings are established with the IE Bulletin 85-03 program, the torque switches will be reset, if required.
All new settings will be integrated into the MOV schedules (a control configuration drawing) and the actual settings changed.
In an effort to insure that the actual settings are at or above the recommended values, a surveillance program will be developed and will be performed concurrent with the MOV maintenance activities.
The surveillance program and revised MOV schedules will be fully implemented at the completion of the test program described in H above.
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. TABLE I-HIGH PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION-Valve #
. Description
. Condition Analyzed Max. &P to Open Max. Pressure to Close-826Ag 8, C, D o Si pump suction from boric acid tanks Normal Opening 17 psid o 2 parallel paths, 2 valves per path o 1 valve per path is normally open Note 1 o all valves open on St If not open Normal Closing 9.2 psid o all valves close when boric acid tanks Note 2 reach 10%
Abnormal Operation i
Note 3' 13 psid 13 psid I
825A,B o Si pump suction from RWST Normal Opening o 2 parallel paths,1 valve per path Note 4 35 psid o normally closed; open automatically Normal Closing if 826s do not open in 5 seconds o Valves opened for Si switchover from valves are not required to close BASTS to RWST when level in either during normal system operation BAST reaches 105.
Abnormal Operation Note 5 35 psid
s 4
Descri ption Condition Analyzed Max. 6P to Open.
~ Max. Pressure to Close 1815A,8 Si pump C suction valves o ' Valves are normally open, it closed Note 6 35 psid they will automatically open on Si signal.
Normal Closing Note 7 140 psid Abnormal Operation Note B 140 psid 140 psid 871A, B Si pump header isolation Normal Closing I
o Valves normally open; if A pump Note 9 O psid 03 falls to start, 871B will close; 8
If B pump falls to start, 871A will close.
I Normal Opening Valve is not required to open during normal operation of the valve.
Abnormal Operation Note 10 1535 psid 1535 psid i
. _ _. _ - _ _ _ _ _ = _. _ - _ _ _ _ - _. - _ _ _ _ _. _ -
d
DeserIptIon Condition Analyzed Max. AP to Open Max. Pressure to Close 878Ao 8, C, D Si pump discharge Since power Is removed. from 878ts & D wIth the valves open, the valves cannot o valves 878A & C are normally closed unintentionally be closed, therefore, with AC power removed no analysis is required. Valves 878A & C are closed with power removed and are not.
o valves 878B & D are normally open required to be opened for any transient.
with AC power removed RV nozzles are relled upon to prevent boron precipitation, no analysis is required.
896A, B RWST outlet valves o normally open with DC power removed Since DC power is removed with valves open by key switch and valve operation is not required for high pressure injection, these valves are not evaluated at this time.
g e
o valves must be closed before 857s can Because of the low dif ferential pressure i
be open to allow high head recircula-associated with recirculation, recircula-tion tion has not been addressed in the response to IE Bulletin 85-03
TABLE 1 NOTES 1.
.The maximum opening AP is due to elevation head f rom the BAST on one side and elevation head of the RWST on the other side.
Since a check valve maintains RWST pressure on the SI piping, the maximum AP across the closed valve occurs with maximum RWST level and minimum BAST level.
2.
The valve automatically closes when the BAST level reaches l
10%.
The AP is calculated assuming negligible pump suction pressure (0 psig) and the BAST at 10% level.
l-3.
The valves are configured in two parallel paths with two f
series valves per path.
Assuming inadvertent operation is a single failure, i.e.,
only one valve is assumed to be inadvertently operated, the worst case AP is bounded by the Note 1 scenario.
4.
The maximum opening AP occurs when negligible pump suction pressure exists on the downstream side and maximum level in the RWST.
5.
Since tre valves are configured in parallel paths, each controlled by separate switches on the control board, only inadvertent operation is assumed to occur (similar to the one single failure criteria).
Therefore, the maximum abnormal AP across an inadvertently closed valve is the AP developed across the parallel valve under full flow.
This pressure is bounded by the Note 4 scenario.
6.
The maximum opening 6P is due to elevation head of the RWST at maximum level pressurizing through a check valve and negligible C SI pump suction pressure.
~
7.
The maximum pressure for closing would occur during high head recirculation when the 1815s are used to isolate the normal high head recirculation path and the C SI pump is operating at minimum flow.
8.
Two cases were evaluated.
Case 1, the valve was inadvertently closed while supplying water from the RWST.
Case 2, the valve was inadvertently closed while supplying water from RHR pumps.
Bounding AP resulted from Case 2.
The valve must close or open against RHR pump shutoff head.
9.
Two cases were evaluated.
Case 1, valve is required to close during small LOCA because SI pump fails to start.
Case 2, valve is required to close during large LOCA because SI pump fails to start.
In both cases check valves prevent the 871s from seeing the operating pump's pressure.
Since the pipe downstream of the valve is pressurizing as the valve is closing, the AP across the valve is negligible.
10.
Two cases were evaluated Case 1, valve opening AP after the valve was inadvertently closed.
Case 2, valve closing AP to isola te the C SI pump.
Case 1 assumed the valve was inadvertently closed with the A or B SI pump not operating, the piping downstream of 871 was depressurized, and the C SI pump was operating at shutoff head with maximum RWST level.
The bounding AP across the valve to open is the pump shutoff head plus RWST elevation head.
Case 2 assumed the valve must be closed while the C SI pump is running with maximum RWST level.
TABLE 2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER Max. Static and Valve #-
Descri ption Condition Analyzed Max. &P to Open Dynamic to Close 4013 SW to TDAFW pump Nncmal Opening and Closing o normally closed - open to supply SW Note 1 75 psid 75 psid to TDAFW pump 1
o normally closed - open to supply l
SW to MDAFW pump Abnormal Operation l
H Note 2 75 psid 75 psid w
I
,3996 TDAFW pump discharge Notmal Opening o normally open check valve prevents any downstream pressure on valve, valve not required to open for normal operation Normal Closing Note 3 1644 psid Abnormal Operation I
bounded by the above cases 1644 psid 1644 psid 3504A, 3505A TDAFW steam inlet Normal Opening and Closing o normally closed - automatically opens Note 4 1005 psid 1005 psid on signal l
I i
1 Valve #
Description Condition Analyzed Max.dP to Open Dynamic to Close 3504A, 3505A Abnormal Operation (continued)
Note 5 1118 psid 1118 psid 4007, 4008 MDAFW discharge Normal Operation o valve Initially goes full open design analysis for valve 1450 psid 1450 psid then closes to maintain 200 gpm Abnormal Operation Note 6 1475 psid
'1475 psid a
4000A, 40008 MOAFW cross connect Normal Opening o valve normally closed, opened to Note 7 1475 psid cross connect pumps Normal Closing Note 8 1475 psid Abnormal Operation 1475 psid 1475 psia l
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TABLE 2 NOTES 1.
Normal opening assumes service water design pressure on upstream side and empty condensate tank and lines on downstream side.
Normal closing assumes closing against service water design pressure.
2.
If the valve is inadvertently opened, the closing AP is bounded by Note 1.
3.
Since check valve prevents reverse pressure, the maximum closing pressure approaches TDAFW pump discharge pressure at 100 gpm bypass flow with negligible SG pressure and design service water pressure at the pump suction.
4.
Normal opening and closing assumes SG at HZP condition and the turbine at atmospheric pressure.
5.
Assumes the valve is inadvertently closed or opened with SG pressure at the first safety setpoint with 3% accumulation and the turbine at atmospheric pressure.
6.
Assumes the valve is inadvertently closed or opened with MDAFW pump discharge pressure at bypass head with negligible SG pressure and design service water pressure at the pump suction.
7.
Maximum normal opening AP occurs when downstream pump fails to start, check valve prevents downstream piping from seeing SG pressure, operating pump near shutoff head with design service water pressure at operating pump suction.
8.
Maximum normal closing 4P occurs under the same conditions as Note 7 except the SG is assumed to have negligible pressure.
, e..
TABLE 3-STANDBY AUXILIARY FEEDWATER Mex. Static and Valve i Description Condition Analyzed Mox. AP to Open Dynamic to Close 4615, 4616 SW 20a header valve - Isolates SAF system Normal Operation o normally open - valve closes Note 1 75 ' p sid 75 psid automatically on Si and loss of bus.
power Abnormal Operation bounded by above cases 75 psid 75 psid 9629A, 8 SW to SAFW pump suction Normal Operation I
o normally closed - no automatic action, pressure is bounded by SW design 75 psid 75 psid only opened when SW is supplied to SG pressure vi 1
Abnormal Operation any inadvertent valve operation is 75 psid 75 psid bounded by the above case 9701A, 8 SAFW pump discharge Normal Operation o normally open, as flow increases valve Note 2 1441 psid 1441 psid throttles flow to 200 gpm 9704A, B SAFW discharge Isolation Abnormal Operation o normally open bounded by above case 1441 psid 1441 psid o closed when flow is diverted to one SG via the crossconnect
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TABLE 3 NOTES 1.
Mexirmm opening or closing pressure is SW design pressure.
- 2.
Maximum pressure occurs with pump at shutoff head, negligible SG pressure and suction pressure at design SW pressure.
3.
Maximum normal opening AP occurs when pump fails to start, check valve prevents downstream piping from seeing SG pressure, SG with operating pump at HZP pressure and 50 psi flow losses.
4.
Maximum closing pressure occurs with one SG being fed while operating at safety valve pressure plus 3% accumulation, 50 psi flow losses and a break occurs in the loop of the inoperable pump.
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