ML20197G160

Forwards Instrumentation & Control Sys Branch Input for Sser Chapter 7.Applicant Identified Four Containment Isolation Valves in Nitrogen Inerting Sys That Do Not Comply W/Ie Bulletin 80-06 Requirements

ML20197G160
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/15/1983
From:	Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0708, CON-WNP-708 IEB-80-06, IEB-80-6, NUDOCS 8312230069
Download: ML20197G160 (4)

Text

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g DEC 15 1983 MEMORAt!Duft FOR: Thomas H. !!ovak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FR0!1: R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Diref. tor for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

W!!P-2: IE BULLETIN H0-06, "EilGIflEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESET C0tiTROL" Plant flame: Wi!P-2 Docket No.: 50-397 Licensing Status: OL Responsible Branch: LB J2 Project !!anager: R. Auluck Responsible Branch: ICSB Review Status: Complete For This Item Enclosed is Instrumentation and Control System Branch (ICSB) input for Chapter 7 (Instrumentation and Controls) of the U lP-2 Supplemental Safe-ty Evaluation Report (SSER). This input addresses SER License Condition 1.9(6) regarding the subject IE Bulletin. Specifically, the applicant was required to conduct preoperational tests to verify that all safety related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actu-ating signal and/or reset. The applicant has perforned the required tests and has documented the results in letters G02-83-1059 dated !!ovem-ber 15, 1983 and G02-83-1131 dated December 9, 1983. Previous correspond-ence regarding these tests was provided by the applicant in letter G02 445 dated May 14, 1982.

As a result of these tests, the applicant has identified four containment i isolation valves in the nitrogen inerting system that do not comply with l the requirments of IE Bulletin 80-06. The applicant has committed to make modifications to the control circuits for these valves to bring them into compliance prior to the time that containment inerting is required (approximately six to eight months after initial criticality). In the interim, the containment isolation function of these valves will be as-sured by leaving them in the closed position with the power removed.

This is acceptable to the staff.

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In order to ensure that the isolation function of these valves (CSP-V-93, 96, 97, and 98) is not compromised prior to completion of the cir-cuit modifications, we recommend that Region V be requested to verify that the applicant has taken a propr.f ate _pr_ecautionary measures to

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ensure that these valves are left in the closed position with the pov.er -

renoved. Additionally, suosequent to the modifications to the valves, Region V should verify that preoperational tests are perfomed to ensure that the valves operate as designe<1 (i.e., will not change position upon a reset).

Origins!S! ned By 11.W2!.ccHad:.7 R. 'tayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

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7.3.2.7 IE BULLETIN 80-06, " ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESET CONTROL" Th'e staff requested that the applicant review schematic level drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions (1) to determine whether or not, upon reset of an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation signal, safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode and (2) to propose corrective action for those which do not. As part of this review the applicant perform-ed preoperational tests to verify whether all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal and/or r'eset' of the various actuating signals. These tests were re-quired by SER License condition 1.9(6).

As a result of these tests, the applicant identified certain valves as not complying with the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-06. The reset control circuitry for these valyes has been modified to prevent them from re-opening upon the reset of the associated actuation signal.

l l During a re-review of balance of plant (BOP) component compliance to IE Bulletin 80-06, four containment isola-tion valves associated with the nitrogen inerting system e

were identified as non-conforming. The applicant has committed to modify the reset control circuitry for these valves prior to the time that inerting is re-quired. In the interim, the applicant has committed to leave each of these valves in the closed position with the power removed. This wiLL ensure that the contain-ment isolation function performed by the valves will not be compromised. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

Based on the staff's review of the preoperational test results provided by the applicant, and the applicant's G

commitments to modify the circuitry for the four remain-ing valves (CSP-V-93, 96, 97, and 98) and to leave these valves closed with power removed in the interim, it is concluded that the provisions of SER license condition 1.9(6) have been met. Therefore, this issue is resolved.

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