ML20197G151

Trip Rept of 831206 Site Visit Re Readiness Review.No Reason Noted to Recommend Delay in or Addl Restrictions Upon Low or Full Power License

ML20197G151
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	12/09/1983
From:	Rowsome F Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-0702, CON-WNP-702 NUDOCS 8312190354
Download: ML20197G151 (2)

Text

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, o crc 0 0 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR: Tom Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM: Frank Rowsome, Assistant Director for Technology Division of Safety Technology

SUBJECT:

WNP-2 READINESS REVIEW On December 6, 1983, I joined you in a trip to WNP-2 to assess the readiness of the plant personnel and hardware for licensing. We toured the plar.t in the morning, visited the E0F at noon, heard and discussed the WPPSS presentations in the afternoon and early evening. My impressions were that the plant is very close to being ready to load fU 1; the applicant's estimate that they might be ready by December 15 uems plausible. The plant I is clean and shipshape. The staff appears to be quite experienced, particularly in BWR startup. Staff morale seems to be sound and dedicated to safety and ccmpliance. In many areas they appear to have gone a step beyond minimum compliance, e.g., they have more than the ninimum complement of licensed operators, their QA and construction verification program seens ,

particularly thorough, and their senior plant management has an unusually high level of BWR startup experience. They are Fighly independent, depending less upon vendor or AE startup eicineers this is commonly the case. The site location and the agreements with other organizations in or around the Hanford Reservation offers unusual advantages in engineering support and emergency response capabilities.

My impressions were not entirely positive, but none of weaknesses I found can be traced to non-compliance. Rather, they* reflect generic thin spots in the regulations and in commonly accepted industry practices. These include the absense of experienced reliability engineers or human factors engineer':

in the WPPSS organization, lack of familiarity with PRA or class nine accident analysis, diagnosis or prognosis. They have not, for example. -

catalogued the blindspots in startup tests or surveillance tests through which faults might escape detection and repair.

Since none of the these weak spots in the WNP-2 preparations for safe startup and operation I observed can be traced to instances of non-compliance, and since all are commonplace in the industry, I believe that they should be addressed in generic reactor safety standards development and should not delay the licensing of WNP-2. g

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D E O 3 1993 I believe the WNP-2 operations and engineering organization: to be better prepared than most utilities who are starting up their first nuclear power plant, and I found no rec e to recommend a delay in or additional restrictions upon a low or rull power license.

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d by Frank H. Rowsome cc: Raj Auluck Themis Speis Warren Minners DISTR ITION:

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