ML20197F748

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Ack Receipt of in Response to Exercise Weakness Noted in Insp Rept 50-416/97-15 on 971009.Implementation of Corrective Actions Will Be Reviewed During Future Insp
ML20197F748
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 12/24/1997
From: Murray B
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
To: Hagan J
ENTERGY OPERATIONS, INC.
References
50-416-97-15, NUDOCS 9712300286
Download: ML20197F748 (5)


See also: IR 05000416/1997015

Text

~.

.

_

-

s# "880G

UNITED STATES

o.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'

j

?

e

REoloN IV

611 RYAN PLAZA DRIVE, EUITE 400

4

.

AR UNGToN, T ExAS 79011-a064

.9

,

Decernber 24, 1997

Joseph J. Hagan, Vice President

Operations - Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

SUBJECT: NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-416/97-15

Dear Mr. Hagan:

Thank you for your letter of November 14,1997, in response to the exercise

weaknesses identifiert in NRC Inspection Report 50-416/97-15, dated October 9,1997.

We have reviewed your reply and find it responsive to the concerns raised in our inspection

report. We will review the implementation of your corrective actions during a future

inspection.

Sincerely,

Blaine Murray, Chiet

Plant Support Branch

Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No.: 50-416

License No.: NPF 29

cc:

' Executive Vice President

and Chief Operating Officer

' Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 31995

Jackson, Mississippi 39286-1995

Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway

P.O. Box 651

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

ll I.I l.ill.iI.IH,il.I1.1

.

9712300286 971224

PDR

ADOCK 05000416

G

PDR

a

p

.

.

. ..

_ ..

._

.

.

. . . _ . _. _.. -.- _

,

x

_.

.

,,

m

---

iEntergy Operations,Inc.

2--

-

' -

,

,

.Winston & Strewn'

L1400 L Street, N.W.;- 12th Floor;-

~

5 Washington, D.C. - 20005-3502 =

.

1

. Sam Mabry, Director

q

'

Division of Solid Waste Management

r

'

Mississippi Department of Natural

_

z Resources-

P.O. Box 10385 -

Jackson, Mississippi 39209<

-

,

.

_

,

PresidrA

. _

~

i

_Ci4icorne County Board of Supervisors -

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

,

.-

Manager of Operations

^

J

Bechtel Power Corporation =

.

P.O. Box 2166

Houston, Texas.77252 2166

-

General Manager

. _

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 756

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

e-

l--

The Honorable Richard leyoub

l Attorney General--

' Department of Justice.

- i

. State of Louisiana

P.0; Box 94005 -

. Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70804-9005

!

Office of the Govemor

LState'of Mississippi-

1 Jackson, Mississippi 39201

F

Mike Moore, Attomey General-

~

Frank Spencer, Asst. Attomey General .

~

State of Mississippi

P;C. Box 22947-

.

Jackson, Mississippi 39225.'

<

.

,

a+-

.

.

<n-

- =

.

e

W

-a

m.

a

- . - ,. -

.e.-..

, -

-

r.e sw ,- .

,w-.-

,s-

+

-

er.

.

a

.

-

-

.

. . .

..

- --.... .

.

. --

.

. . . ~

.

,

<

~

.

,

_

t

~ 4. .

-

.,

,

. -

3.'

!

. Entergy Operations, Inc.

'-

Dr. F. E. Thompson, Jr.

~ -

l-

_

18 tate Health _ Officer -

'

a

State Board of Health .

l

P.O. Box 1100 :

q

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

!

F

- Robert W.LGoff, Director. ~

-State Liaison Officer

_ ,

Division of Radiation Health

Mississippi Department of Health

'

P.O.' Box 1700 .

.

Jackson, Mississippi 39215-1700--

,

.m

VK:e President -

Operations Support

Entergy. Operations, Inc.-

,

F.O. Box 31995

.

Jackson, Mississippi 39286 1995-

Director, Nuclear Safety

and Regulatory Affairs-

Entergy Operations, Inc.

P.0; Box 756

Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

Vice President, Operations

Grand Gulf Nuclear Station

Entergy Operations, Inc.

g

P.O. Box 756

.

- Port Gibson, Mississippi 39150

,

4

+

t

4

...

.6

,

4

L

-

I

-

-

.-$

w

y

hgg

r..m

E

r-

H

-"-+MT-

T

e

F#"-

.

.

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-4

DISTRIBUTION w/ cooy of licensee's letter dated November 14.1997:

DCD (IE35)

Regional Administrator

Senior Resident inspector (River Bend)

DRS Director

DRS Deputy Director

DRP Director

DRS PSB

Branch Chief (DRP/G)

Project Engineer (DRP/G)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Senior Resident inspector (Grand Gulf)

MIS System

RIV File

DRS Action item File (97-G-169)

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ REPORTS \\GG715AK.GMG

Al 97-G-169

To receive copy of document, indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "*." = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy

RIV:PSB

6

C:DRS\\PSQ

GMGood:nh ( h6 BMurray })

12/2)97

124@7

7'

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

.

y

Entergy Operations, Inc.

-4

DISTRIBUTION w/ coov of licensee's letter dated November 14.1997:

DCD (IE35)-

Regional Administrator

Senior Resident inspector (River Bend)

DRS Director

DRS Deputy 0; rector

DRP Director

DRS PSB

Branch Chief (DRP/G)

Projed Engineer (DRP/G)

Branch Chief (DRP/TSS)

Senior Resident inspector (Grand Gulf)

MIS System

RIV File

DRS Action item File (97-G 169)

t

1'

300039

DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\ REPORTS \\GG715AK.GMG

Al 97-G-169

To receive copy of document, Indicate in box:"C" = Copy without enclosures "E" = Copy with enclosures "N" = No copy

RIV:PSB

6

C:DRS\\PSQ

l

l

GMGood:nh-(MV BMurra/ })

12 @ 7

124@7

F

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY

.

.

-

- - -

.

~ = - . . .

...

.

,.

fC

kk

DEC l 1 RE[TD

'

-

yEnterav

~ " ~

Entergy operations,Inc.

'

~

C7/

Port Geson. MS 39150

Tel 001437 6470

,

&

W.K.Hughey

Descts

4 & $dfWy & R(94at&Y

772 h

M

Eovember.14,1997

'*

'

.

l'

[

IIR 2 0 BUT

l

%

,-

~ . - .

-

-

, - .

.

.

.--

. - -..- .-. _ .-

-.-.-

.

.

=..

_ Attachment 1 to CNRO-97/00111-

1 .'

=*-

_

Page 1 of 2'

l

"

l Corrective Actions Pursuant to Emergency Preparidness

3-

,

i

Inspection Report 50-418/9715

,

>

L50-416/9715 41; Exercise Weakness ~ Failure to monitor and replenish supplies of respiratory -

-

l

- protection equipment

.

i

~ issue:

.

.:

,

!

. During the 1997 Exercise l inspectors from the Nuclear Reguistory Commission (NRC)-

2

= determined that there was inadequate adherence to 10-S 01-29, Step 6.3.1.a(2) with regard to

the monitoring of Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air supply reserves to affect an -

,

.

adequate supply of breathing air for response teams.

_

? Also, inspectors determined that there appeared to be insufficient control of SCBA facopiece

'

usage.

.

- Analysis

'

SCBA Air Reserves

i -

The SCBA equipment and supplies are inspected and maintained on a regular schedule to

- ensure adequate supplies are available when needed. There are approximately 100 one-hour

'

bottles, located at various locations in the protected area and hside the power block, that are

,

available for immediate use in an actual event.

In accordance with 10-S-01-29, the OSC Coordinator is tasked with ensuring that SCBA air

supplies are monitored and replenished as necessary, Also, he must ensure that response

teams know what supplies are available and where those supplies are located at any given time

during the event to facilitate the exchange of air bottles when needed. However, there is no

I

programmatic mechanism in place to provide the OSC Coordinator with the information

regarding what air supplies are available.

Facepiece Rouse -

1

The SCBA facepeeces were not 'left at the stepoff pad as would normally occur in an actual

event. Personnel are trained in Radiological Respirator Training to place their respirator in' the ;

'

receptacles designated by HP or place them in the same receptacle that is available for used -

1

protective clothing. This action prevents their re-use and re-issue until such time that the

respirator facepiece has been properly sanitized, inspected, arid returned to service in

--accordance with GGNS procedures,

- , . . . . _ ,

, , _ ,

.

, . . . , , . , _

- , _ . . _ _ . .

. -

. --

- .

. -

--

__ _

.-__.

_ _. _ _ _ _ _ .

_ _ _

__

_ _ _ . _

. _ _ _ _ .

_ . .

, -; w

.

,

Attachment 1 to CNRO 97/00111

-

,

Page 2 of 2

While realism is important during exercises, GGNS must still maintain the abinty to respond to

an actual event. To ensure equipment svailability would not be significantly impacted in case of

an actual event, the respirators facepieces were not used. Therefore, during the exercise team

player briefings, the responders were told that SCBA usage would be limited to donning the

equipment, but not bresthing though the mask.- As a result, the facepieces were not removed

from their bags. (The facepiece is placed in a bag after inspections to indicate that it is available

for use.) This is done so as not to decrease the ability of the OSC to respond to an actual event,

should it occur at the same time that the exercice is in progrctss.

,

Results

1. Based on the above information on SCBA air reserves, GGNS agrees that there was

inadequate adherence to 10-S-0129, Step 6.3.1.a(2) with regard to the monitoring of Self

Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) air supply reserves to affect an adequate supply of

breathing air for response teams.

The lack of a programmatic method for tracking the air reserves is the apparent cause for

the inadequate procedural compliance.

2. Based on the above information on thefperceived inadequate.facep'iece tracking GGNS

does not agree that there was inadequate controliif facepiece usa D0rir5 actual event,

the facepieces would have been left at the stepoff pad and been no longe

4,

Also, it is prudent to not remove the protective covering for the facepiece during drills

]W

because it reduces the ability of the OSC to respond to an actual event, should it occur Jk

during the exercise,

eig,

Corrective Measures to be Applied to Resolve issue and Prevent Recurrence

N

The following actions wiil be taken to remedy this issue:

,

1. GGNS Emergency Plan implementing procedures will be enhanced to ensure that the air

reserves and supporting equipment are tracked more accurately.

2. Information will be maintained, in the OSC, that provides the cunent status of those air

reserves designated for emergency use.

3. GGNS will ensure that future exercises simulate, in the manner consistent witil GGNS

procedures, the depletion of SCBA facepieces for response team personnel due to their

disposal at the point of removal of the equipment.

,

-.iin

. . . .

-

_

__-

.-

- - .

---

- - - .

. _ . -

_

-

_.

-.

.

.

.

Attachment 2 to GNROc97/00111

'

Page 1 of 2

Corrective Actions Pursuant to Emergency Preparedness

inspection Report 50416/9715

50416/9715 02; Exercise Weakness Failure to provide protective mes:,ures for personnel

located in the security island.

Issue

During the 1997 Exercise, inspectors from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission determined that

there was a failure to provide protective measures for perst anellocated in the Security Island.

Analysis

A review of GGNS procedures found that the Security Plan implementing procedures indicate

that safeguards may be suspended in a radiological emergency and that security personnel

outside the Protected Area, including Security Island, will be evacuated with the rest of the plant

population. The expanded security barrier will be maintained at whatever distance is deemed

safe by the Emergency Director, if possible, Security personnelinside the Protected Area,

including CAS and personnel inside the power block, will relocate to the Control Room

envelope. Otherwise, they will evacuate to a location determined by the Emergency Director.

Also, the Security Plan implementing procedures do not provide for the actions of the guard

force or suspension of safeguards during simulated radiological emergencies such as drills and

exercises.

Results

GGNS agrees that there was inadequate discussion between the Security Coordinator and the

Emergency Director, and there may be a lack of general procedural guidance on what

[(\\ p

, habitability surveys must be conducted.

q \\k j

However, GGNS does not agree that there were inadequate protective measures taken for

y

Security Island personnel because under a real evacuation, they would have been moved to a

safe location as directed by the Emergency Director; thus, not requiring habitually st.rveys to b

completed.

J

Corrective Measures to be Applied to Resolve issue and Prevent Recurrence

The following actions will be taken to resolve this issue:

1. GGNS Emergency Plan implementing procedures will be enhanced to ensure that there is

better communication between the Security Coordinator and the Emergency Director.

-

-

-

-

-

-

__

_

. . .

.__

_ ._ _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _

__.. _ ._.

_.

_~

_.

. .'

Attachment 2 to CNRO 97/00111

- .

, '

Page 2 of 2 -

)

'

2. GGNS procedures will be onhanced so that during a site evacuation, any required duty

station, such as Security Point of Entry, radiological monitoring will be performed. Should

the location require evacuation they will be moved to a new location and e iodic monitonng

will be resumed, if required.

.

3. Any procedural discrepancies between GGNS Emergency Plan implementing procedures

and those procedures used to implement the Security Plan will be reconciled to ensure that

they are consistent with each other.

.

4

L

i

I

l

,

I

!

t :-

I

i

. -

.

-

,.

.

. . -

, . . , - . . . ,

,. .

'

.

.

,

Attachment 3 to CNRi>97/00111

.

,

Page 1 of 1

Corrective Actions Pursuant to Emergency Preparedness

inspection Roport 50416/9715

50416/9715-03: Exercise Weakness - Failure to properly formulate protective action

recommendations.

Issue

During the 1997 Exercise, inspectors from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

determined that there was a failure to properly formulate Protective Action Recommendation

(PARS) when several sectors that were downwind of the simulated radiological release were

omitted from an Emergency Notification issued to offsite agencies.

Analysis

The scenario specified rapidly shifting whd di;ections that resulted in the rapid change of

affected downwind sectors. State briefings were occurring during the wind shift that caused the

radiological assessment personnel to become distracted and by the time the personnel were

able to fill in the portion of the Emergency Notification Form, the affected sectors had again

changed.

Since the GGNS Emergency Plan requires that PARS be made only on projected dose that can

be avoided, the radiological assessment personnel did not feel that they should pt! the }

previously affected sectors on the current Emergency Notification Form. Radiological -

Assessment personnel should have recognized the wind direction changes immediately when

they occurred and made the appropriate notifications for those affected sectors.

Results

Based on the above information, GGNS agrees that there was a failure to make PARS for

several sectors which were subject to short term releases during the rapid wind shift.

Corrective Measures to be Applied to be Resolve issue and Prevent Recurrence

The following actions will be taken.

1. Training will be enhanced for personnel responsibie for the formulation of protective action

recommendations to ensure that there will be proper management of meteorological

changes during a radiological release.

2. GGNS Emergency Plan procedures will be enhanced to include more specific guidance on

the formulation of Protective Action Recommendations and the proper management of

meteorological changes during a radiological release.