ML20197E182
| ML20197E182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 06/18/1979 |
| From: | Martin J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Harold Denton, Deyoung R, Krager W NRC - NRC THREE MILE ISLAND TASK FORCE, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20197E186 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-185, TASK-TF, TASK-TMM NUDOCS 7907120789 | |
| Download: ML20197E182 (3) | |
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UNITED STATES I
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M 1 $ 197) s Richard C. DeYoung Deputy Interim Director MEMORANDUM FOR:
NRC/TMI Special Investigation Group William E. Kreger, Assistant Director for Site Analysis Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Harold R. Denton, Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation James A. Martin, Jr.
FROM:
Accident Analysis Branch, DSE TMI-2 ACTIVITIES - PERSONAL RECOLLECTIONS
SUBJECT:
This is in response to your recent memo requesting a description of personal involvements during the TMI-2 incident and recollection liy involvement was predominantly in the area of off-site effects, doses, man-rem, evacuation plans, etc.
CHRONOLOGY First informed (via grapevine) at 10 a.m.
March 28, 1979 -
March 29,1979 - 10 a.m. - 5 p.m. Telecons with PA Rad Health BNL RAT NY Rad Health 01 & E REG. I, ORNL, USEPA, RES(NRC).
Subject:
What's going Some I called, some called me.9:30p.m.-10:30p.m.Stello on?
10:30 p.m. (March 28) - 3:00 p.m. (March 29) 01 & E Calculate individual and Incident Management Center.
Sort and collective doses (man-ren) due to releases.
Touch assess import of environmental monitoring data.
bases with ARAC (LLL) and 00E (IRAP).
Provide March 30,1979 - April 6,1979 - OI & E Incident Management Center.o general support, re:cally involved in analyses of doses and I
equipment areas in the containment building.
,j in analyses of doses and dose rates in equipment areas I
Coordinated with RES, re:
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(core inventories, possible release fractions, and shelter Helped set up and vs. evacuation options and criteria.)
f coordinate with EPA, HEW at IMC.
Thereafter - Support for health effects task force and answering those cards and letters.
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... M 181979 RECOLLECTIONS Six recollections are dominant:
Everybody wanted to look for I-131-and in the plu 1.
Finally convinced RMS (00E) heli-line was swamped by noble gas lines).
copter to obtain a gama scan over a pasture where the plume was, bu 29, 1979-early a.m.) wasn't.So went home (3:00 p.m.-March 29 sently (March thus, no iodine problem.
Was flabbergasted to hear weeks later that NRC top management was not aw You simply cannot have a 2.
until Friday that the core was badly damaged. sustained 50 damaged.
The IMC became The pressure to generate numbers during the first few days.We'd 3.
a random number factory.
I especially recall be requested to generate an " answer" within minutes.
being asked to provide the attenuation afforded by the co of magnitude per inch near 48".
I was assured the concrete was 48".
I (48" concrete).
Two weeks later (or so) provided a factor, with which "they" were happy.I found out abou That thing might as well be considered infinitely thick.
30, 1979.
I was just leaving Jim The 1200 mR/hr burst on Friday, MarchSniezek's office when t 4.
I imediately turned and of 1200 mR/hr., 600 ft. above the containment.The answer was " Dead Calm yelled "What's the wind speed?"
I said " Big deal!"
rates at ground level at the trailer were a few mR/hr. Weeks a
Not immediately and left.
scale evacuation on the basis of the 1200 mR/hr num Mea Culpal the worst mistake I made during the incident.
there was much discussioi On Friday, March 28, 1979, Some were looking at WASH-The fetish for evacuationi 5.
of evacuation, and out to large distances to boot.I was looking at in 2
740, some at WASH-1403.
It was obvious that shelter (i.e. stay home) was a very viable protective action option beyond a few miles-no ma (presented in some SARs).
I called Saul I.evine (RES) and request'ed ORIGEN and CRAC
~
ed.
for the TMI-2 core, which he said he'd do.
calculations I understand, but this call was st Even these decisions over.
the IMC.
for evacuation decisions-not WASH-740 or WASH-1400.
~
emphasized, evacuation, but they were better than wha i
from the national news services.
Keeping our re-were talking about 2-5 miles, when TV was saying 20-50 miles.We missed i
suits to ourselves (NRC) was the worst part of our l
uation).
l!
- JUN 181979 6.
The professional manner in which the " systems desk" at the IMC was run.
Several of us in the emergency planning business were very concerned beforehand of the plans to get involved in running a plant from Bethesda in an emergency. Contrary to my own visions, the " systems desk" (there may be another name for it) was most impressively run. Throughout the first several days it was the calm in the eye of the hurricane - a pleasure to watch.
For completeness, a copy of r:ty morning report of March 29, 1979 is a ttached.
I've already responded to a F0IA request for it.
J, /
ames A. Martin, J.
Accident Analysis Branch Division of Site Safety and Environmental Analysis Attachment cci R. W. Houston L. Soffer t
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