ML20197D118

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Amend 101 to License DPR-20,changing Tech Specs to Delete Out of Date Footnotes & Incorrect Refs to Motor Control Ctr
ML20197D118
Person / Time
Site: Palisades Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 02/10/1987
From: Thadani A
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Consumers Power Co
Shared Package
ML20197D122 List:
References
DPR-20-A-101 NUDOCS 8702180099
Download: ML20197D118 (7)


Text

-

.8

'o UNITED STATES

~g E

J NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20655 r.,

j

\\*****/

CONSUMERS POWER COMPANY PALISADES PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-255 AMENDMENT TO PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.101 License No. DPR-20 1.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Consumers Power Company (the licensee) dated December 19, 1985 complies with the' standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public; and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

e e

i 8702180099 870210 PDR ADOCK 05000255 P

PDR

u 2.

Accordingly,' the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in.the attachment to this license amendment and Paragraph 3.B. of Provisional Operating License No. DPR-20 is hereby amended to read as follows:

B.

Technical Specifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B, as revised through Amendment No.101, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION h h />t <)W Ashok C. Thadani, Director PWR Project Directorate #8 Division of PWR Licensing-B

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance: February 10, 1987 l

o-ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.101 PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO.' DPR-20 DOCKET NO. 50-255 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the enclosed pages.

The revised pages are identified by the captioned amendment number and contain marginal lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE INSERT 3-29 3-29 3-30 3-30 3-33 3-33 4-8 4-8 i

)

\\

i i

e i

1 I

-~

l

.l 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM i

Applicability Applies to the operating status of the emergency core cooling system.

Objective To assure operability of equipment required to remove decay heat from.

the core in either. emergency or normal shutdown situations.

Specifications Safety Injection and Shutdown Cooling Systems 3.3.1 The reactor shall not be made critical, except for low-temperature physics tests, unless all of the following conditions are met:

a.

The.SIRW tank contains not less than 250,000 gallons of water with a boron concentration of et least 1720 ppm but not :nore than 2000 ppm at,a temperature not less than 40*F.

b.

All four Safety Injection tanks are operable and pressurized to at least 200 psig with a tank liquid level of at least 186 inches (55.5%) and a maximum level of 198 inches (59%) with a boron concentration of at least 1720 ppm but not more than 2000 ppm.

I

c. - One low-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

d.

One high-pressure Safety Injection pump is operable on each bus.

e.

Both shutdown heat exchangers and both component cooling heat exchangers are operable, f.

Piping and valves shall be operable to provide two flow paths from the SIRW tank to the primary cooling system.

g.

All valves, piping and interlocks associated with the above components and required to function during accident conditions are operable.

h.

The Low-Pressure Safety Injection Flow Control Valve CV-3006 shall be opened and disabled (by isolating the air supply) to prevent spurious closure.

i. The Safety Injection bottle motor-operated isolation valves shall be opened with the electric power supply to the valve motor disconnected.
j. The Safety Injection miniflow valves CV-3027'and 3056 shall be opened with HS-3027 and 3056 positions to maintain them open.

3-29 Amendment No. U,M,101, L

3 JEMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM (Cont'd) g.

A maximum of one high-pressure safety injection pump shall be OPERABLE whenever the temperature of one or more of the PCS cold legs is < 250*F.

3.3' Prior to returning to the Power Operation Condition after ev'ery time

'I the plant has been placed in the Refueling Shutdown Condition, or the Cold Shutdown Condition for more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and testing of Specifica-tion 4.3.h has not been accomplished in the previous'9 months, or prior to returning the check valves in Table 4.3.1 to service after maintenance -

repair or replacement, the following conditions shall be met:

a.

All pressure isolation valves listed in Table 4.3.1 shall be functional as a pressure isolation device, except as'specified in b.

Valve leak-age shall not exceed the amounts indicated.

b.

In the event that integrity of any pressure isolation valve specified in Table 4.3.1 cannot be demonstrated, at least two valves in each high pressure line having a non-functional valve must be in and remain in, the mode corresponding to the isolated condition. U) c.

If Specifications a. and b. cannot be met, an orderly shutdown shall be initiated and the reactor shall be in hot shutdown condition within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, and cold shutdown within the next 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Basis The normal procedure for starting the reactor is, first, to heat the primary coolant to near operating temperature by running the primary coolant pumps. The reactor is then made critical by withdrawing control rods a1d diluting boron in the primary coolant.U) With this mode of start-up, the energy stored in the primary coolant during the approach to criticality is substantially equal to that during power operation and, therefore, all engineered safety features and auxiliary cooling systems are required to be fully operable. During low-temperature physics tests, there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the primary coolant; therefore, an accident comparable in I

1 Motor operated valves shall be placed in the closed position and power supplies deenergized.

3-30 Amendment No. 57, 9/Hf #19/SJ, #

$6ftHtH 5/1HBJ,101,

l 3.3 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM L(' Con).'d)

~ ~ ~ "

that 25% of their combined discharge rate is lost from.the primary coolant system out the break. >The transient hot spot fuel clad '

temperatures for the break sizes' considered are shown on FSAR Figures.14.17.9 to 14.17.13. These demonstrate that the maximum-fuel clad temperatures that could occur over the break size spec-trum are well below the melting temperature of zirconium (3300*F).

[

Malfunction of the Low Pressure Safety Injection Flow control valve could defeat the Low Pressure Injection-feature of the ECCS; there-fore it is ' disabled in the 'open' mode (by isolating the air.' supply) during plant operation. This action assures that it will not block flow during Safety Injection.

The inadvertent closing of any one of the Safety Injection bottle I

isolation valves in conjunction with a LOCA has not been analyzed.

]

To provide assurance that this will not' occur, these valves _are-electrically locked open by a key' switch in the control room.

In addition, prior to critical the valves are checked open, and then I

the 480 volt breakers are opened. Thus, a failure of a breaker t

and a switch are required for any of the valves to close.

I

)

The limitation for a maximum of one high pressure safety injection l

pump to be operable, and the Surveillance Requirement to verify all-high pressure safety injection pumps except the required operable pump to be inoperable below 250*F, prov' ides assurance'that a mass addition pressure transient can be relieved by the operation of a single PORV.

l 1

j.

References (1) FSAR, N ction 9.10.3.

(2) FSAR, Section 6.1.

4 3-33 Amenenent No. 7J,5J,101,

)

i I

TAK E 4.1.2 Minimm Fr-nMes for Gecks, Calibrations and Testing of Bgineered safety Feature Instnamtation Gmtmls (Contd)

Surveillance Omnnel Descriptim Ibnction Frequmcy Surveillance Etfux!

13. Safety Injecticn Tank level a.

meck S

a.

Verify that level and presmre indica-ticn is between independent high high/

and Presmre Instnments low alarus for level and pressure, b.

calibrate R

b.

Known pressure and differential e applied to pressure sul 1 sensors.

14. Boric Acid Tank level Siitches a.

Test R

a.

Ramp tank below low-level alann point to verify switch operation.

?

15. Boric Acid Heat Tracing Systen a.

Oeck D

a.

Eserve temperature recorders for proper readites cn

16. min Steam Isolation Valve a.

Onck S

a.

ev re four independent pressure indications.

Circuits b.

Test (3)

R b.

Signal to meter relay adjusted with test device to verify EIV circuit logic.

17. SIlw Ta k Tamperature a.

Onck M

a.

Qupare independent temperature readouts.

g TadNHm and Alarms b.

calibrate R

b.

Known resistance applied to indicatirg loop.

s m

18. Iow-Pressure Safety Injection a.

Onck P

a.

E serve valve is open with air sigply 5

Flow Control Valve CV-3006 isolated.

a.

Oeck P

a.

Ihsure each valve open by observing valve g

19. Safety Injection Bottle ition indication and valve itself.

Isolatica Valves lock open breakers and control power 4

key switches.

u

.s E

20. Safety Injection Miniflow a.

Oeck P

a.

Verify valves open and 16-3027 and 3056 Valves CV-3027, 3056 positioned to maintain thegi open.

5U I calibraticn of the sensors is performed durirg calibration of Itase 5(b), Table 4.1.1.

MMS:

2 All monthly tests will be done on only one chsenel at a time to prewnt protectice systema actuation.

3 tice of the sensors is perfonned calibration of Itemn 7(b), Table 4.1.1.

4 Ihe 1981 surveillance ftsrtion say be def until the end of the 1961 refueling outage.

i i

I 1

a