ML20197C655
| ML20197C655 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 12/05/1997 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | NRC |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9712240241 | |
| Download: ML20197C655 (3) | |
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. November 19,1997 M M '
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QENERAL counsel iM MEMORANDUM TO:
Chairman Jackson COMSECY-97-030
%.5f 7 Commissionar Dieus Commissioner Diaz
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Karen D. Cyr -
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SUBJECT:
S.951, THE REGULATORY IMPROV ENT ACT OF 1997 PURPOSE:
The main purpose of this memorandum and its first Attachment is to describe for the Commission the most recent legislative proposal on " regulatory reform," narpely, S. 981, entitled the " Regulatory improvement Act of 1997.' The memorandum also discusses the impact the bill might have on the independence of the NRC and provides a draft of a letter that the Commission could send to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs to urge that the bill be modified to preserve the hidependence of the agency. See Attachment 2. Also attached are the full text of the bill, Senator Thompson's statement in the Senate when he introduced the bill, and testimony on the bill by Sally Katzen, Administraur of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
BACKGROUND AND SUMsM:
Efforts in the last Congress to change the regulatory process in major ways fa::ed in part for lack of bipartisan support of some of the more controversial features of the bills that proponents of reform introduced, such as cost-benefit decision criteria that would in effect have supplarded existing statutory health, safety, and environmental standards. Despite the lack of support for major reform, Congress did enact the more modest Congressional Review Act (CRA), which was e portion of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA), Under the CRA, every " rule"(where " rule"is defined broadly enough to include policy statements and guidance documents) must be sent to Congress before the rule can become eifective, and Congress can use expedited procedures to enact legislation that would modify or repeal" major"
- rules, in the current session, however, there is in the Senate a renewed effort, now bipartisan. to
- aodress long-standing and widely-shared concerns that the regulatory process is too costly;
. tha+ f. overlooks less costly alternatives; that it lacks sufficiently scientific underpinnings; that it does not take risk into account sufficiently; that it lacks centralized oversight of risk considerations; that it too often ignores social values, distributional effects, and equitable
[CO j l concerns; and t'lat it does not provide the public with enough information.
CONTACT:
Steve Crockett, OGC M
(301) 415-1620-lfhllllllll ll Y
9712240241 971205 PDR COMMS NRCC CORRESPONDENCE PDR
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The Honc able Senato Fred Thompson, Chairman Committee on Govemmental Affairs United States Senate Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Mr. Chairmari.'
On behalf of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), I am writing to comment on S.981, the Regulatory Improvement Act of 1997 (RIA), and especially on the new subchapter, " Executive Oversight,which Section 3 of the RIA would add to the Administrative Procedure Act.
The RlA would aim at much that the NRC is working toward in its own regulatory procesh) better cost-benefit analyses and risk assessments for major rules, greater emphasis on science and scientific information, better ways to express risk findings and deal with uncertainties and non-quantifiable factors, and comparison of regulated risks with risks routinely encountered by the public. The NRC would also welcome increased exchange among the regulatory agencies on the subjects of cost benefit analysis and risk assessment. The Commission believes that the agency could both contribute to and learn from such increased exchange.
, the Gommission siioie5-somei>f-the-concernsexpressed by SaffyK5tzen,
[ Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, in testimony before your j
Committee on September 12,1997. We would want to be confident that the potential gains in regulation bast.d on sound science and economics justify the added costs in time, moneyyd persornel, especially in a time of declining resourceF The Commission is most concerne,Molweyer, cLut an i::::
Wffff at M;. I'cizca did not di5 cuss Mw-test 6my, =J tS. if-n&d R mjU upnyhuuiu iiove a negativeJmpact %2chievement 84helegislation's13Udubtergoals Ihe Rl' 's subchapter on executive oversight might be read A
to require that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review the substance of every proposed and final rule ' ued by any of the independent regulatory commissions not excluded by the definition of "rul ' ' the bill. At the very least, such centralized reviews would greatly lengthen the NRC's rule making process, which is already long enough.
Jkdkostimportant a m u nt or s h would weaken the long-standing, statutorily-based, independence of the NRC. That independence, established at the agency's founding oy section 201 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, has permitted the agency to develop the scientific expertise and information necessary for regulatin, (in an effective and timely way,)
the advanced and important set of technologies used in nuc r power and the other uses of radioactive materials.
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For example, in the ast decade alone, the NRC has begun and completed rule makings on retrofitting, nuclear power plant maintenance, nuclear power plant license renewal, standardization oj ew nuclear power plant designs, and decommissioning and decontamination 6 nuclear facilities. All of these rule makings required careful consideration of costs, benefits, and risks. During the same time, the agency has undertaken a number of
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projects aimed at increasing the consideration of risk in the agency's decision making. For example, the agency is engaged in research on probabilistic risk assessment and has worked with several utilities to develop methods of ranking risks. Had the agency been subject to centralized review of every proposed regulation, final regulation, guidance document, and policy statement the agency wanted to issue during that decade, it is doubtful that the agency could have accomplished)p4fjucfi. ) d l '
feAbcM Qg Adding to the agency's rule making the length and cost of OMB eviews of every proposed and final rule is unlikely to increase the scientific content or the eff iveness of NRC regulation, and it will certainly reduce its timeliness. As part of its reinventing ovemment effort, the NRC is striving to reduce the time it takes to complete rule makings. Moreover, rules needed to promote nuclear safety might also be delayed or modified fo unrelated to safety. This legislation would instead prolong an already lengthy proces There are surely other ways to achieve the aims of better and more consistent use of cost-benefit analysis and risk assessment in rennbtory analysis performed by the independent regulatory agencies. An
/findependent regulatory ;taffed and directed by the necessary expertise, as the NRC is, can
. go adopt sound new pra i es more quickly than a regulator subject to continuous central oversight. The RIA seems to have recognized this principle in excluding from its reach several categories of rules issued by some of the indepenrient regulatory agencies that regulate economic matters.
For these reasons, the Commission tnerefore would urge that independent regulatory agencies with public health and safety responsibilities be explicitly excluded from the reach of the RIA's subchapter on executive oveisight.
Sincerely, Shirley Ann Jackson cc: The Honorable John Glenn
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