ML20197A578

Special Rept:On 971117-1214,fire Doors 224,249,266,421 & 443 Inoperable for Period Greater That Seven Days.Doors Opened to Allow Passage of Cables to Support Rwca Mods,Cr & Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room Ventilation Sys Mods

ML20197A578
Person / Time
Site:	LaSalle
Issue date:	12/15/1997
From:	Dacimo F COMMONWEALTH EDISON CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
NUDOCS 9712230097
Download: ML20197A578 (3)

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TrlHi& M ? C 61 December 15,1997 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Documect Control Desk Washington, D.C. %555

Subject:

- Special Report on Fire Detection, Deluge And/Or Sprinkler Systems, and Fire Barriers LaSalle County Station, Units 1 and 2 Facility Operating License NPF-11 and NPF-18 NRC Docket Nos. 50-373 and 50-374

. This Special Report is submitted in accordance with LaSalle County Unit 1 and 2 Operating Licenses NPF-11 and NPF-18 respectively, Appendix A, and Technical Specifications 3.3.7.9, 3.7.5.2, 3.7.6, and 6.6.C.

Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 requires, as a minimum, the fire detection instrumentation for each fire detection zone of Unit 1 and Unit 2 shown in Table 3.3.7.9-1 shall be OPERABLE whenever the equipment protected by the fire detection instrument is required to be OPERABLE, and requires the restoration of the instruments to OPERABLE status within fourteen days.

Technical Specification 3.7.5.2 requires the deluge and sprinkler systems of Unit 1 and Unit 2 shown in Table 3.7.5.2-1 shall be OPERABLE whenever the equipme_nt protected by the deluge / sprinkler system is required to be OPERABLE, and requires the restoration of the instruments to OPERABLE status within fourteen days.

Technical Specification 3.7,6 requires all fire rated assemblies, including walls, floor / ceilings, cable tray enclosures and other fire barriers separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area, and all sealing devices in the fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable ar,u piping penetration seals and ventilation seals) shall be OPERABLE at all times, and requires the restoration of the assembly to an OPERABLE status within seven days.

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During the period of November 17 through December 14,1997, Fire Doors 224,249,266,421, and 443 were inoperable for a period greater than seven days. The doors were opened to allow the passage of cables to support Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) modifications and Control Room (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (VE) Ventilation System modifications. The doors are located on the 710' elevation of the Unit 1 Auxiliary Building, the 710' elevation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, the 731' elevation of the Unit 2 Auxiliary Building, the 761' elevation of the Unit 1 Reactor Building, and the 820' elevation of the Unit 1 Reactor Building, respectively. A fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.6 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected areas at least once per hour while the doors are inoperable. The fire watch patrols, along with OPERABLE fire detection on at taast one side of the affected assembly, minimize the potential for fire to spread beyond the affected barriers while the doors are inoperable.

During the period of November 27 through December 15.1997, the Firc Detection associated with the Control Room (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Roorn (VE) Ventilation Systems, the 761',786', and 820' elevations of the Unit 1 Reactor Building, and the 786' elevation of the Unit 1 and 2 Auxiliary Building were inoperable for a period greater than founeen days. The detection zones were taken out of service to prevent false alarms during hot work activities (i.e., welding, cutting, and grinding), and to facilitate modifications to the Reactor Water Clean Up (RWCU) System and the Control Room (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (VE) Ventilation Systems. False alarms caused by cutting and welding activities have the potential to distract and desensitize workers to valid Gre alarms. A fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.7.9 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected creas at least once per hour while the instruments wero inoperable. The fire watch patro's, along with the additional fire protection measures provided when hot work activities are in progress, ensure detection capability is available while the detectors are inoperable.

During the period of November 27 through December 1,1997, the deluge systems associated with the Control Room (VC) and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room (VE) Charcoal Trains were inoperable for a period greater than fourteen days. The deluge systems were taken out of service to facilitate modifications to the VC and VE Ventilation Systems, A fire watch patrol was established in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.5.2 Action Statement 'a' to inspect the affected areas at least once por hour while the deluge systems are inoperable. The fire watch patrols minimize potential damage to VC and VE Charcoal Trains while the associated deluge systems are inoperable.

The fire watch patrols will remain in place until the fire protection equipment out'ined above is retumed to an OPERABLE condition. It is expected that a majority of the equipment will remain out of service until the completion of the RWCU modification and VC and VE Ventilation System modifications, which are scheduled to be completed prior to Unit 1 startup.

In addition to Technical Specification requirements, the Fire Protection Group has initiated a special fire hazard inspection to heighten awareness and enhance fire prevention. This inspection was initiated by the Fire Protection Group based on the status of fire protection systems and will remain in place until the Fire Protection Group has determined that conditions have significantly improved.

If thoro are any questions or comments conceming this letter, please refer them to me at (815) 357-6761, extension 2212.

Respectfully, Fred Dacimo Plant General Manager LaSalle County Station cc: A. B. Beach, NRC Region 111 Administrator M. P. Huber, NRC Senior Resident Inspector - LaSalle ,

D. M. Skay, Project Manager - NRR LaSalle l F. Niziolek, Office of Nuclear Facility Safety IDNS i

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