ML20196L046
| ML20196L046 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant |
| Issue date: | 05/10/1999 |
| From: | UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196L045 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9905210079 | |
| Download: ML20196L046 (40) | |
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GDP 98-0076 Page1of40 1
, SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT. UPDATE eCERTIFICATE AMENDMENT REQUEST i i MAY.10,1999 REV. ISION.,
m Remove Pages Insert Pages SARUP Revision Log SARUP Revision Log i
i
)
SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP List of Effective Pages j
SARUP-1,9,10 SARUP-1,9,10 i
SARUP TSRs SARUP TSR All 2.1 -4b, 2.1 - 19, 2.1 -32, 2.2-7a, 2.2-16, 2.2-18, 2.2-30, 2.2-32, 2.2-33, 2.3-6, 2.4-4 b, 2.4-8, 2.4-9, 2.5-5 a, 2.5-1 1, 2.5-13, 2.5-15, 2.5-24, 2.6-5, 2.6-6, 2.6-7, 2.6-9a, 2.6-1 1, 2.6-13, 2.6-14,2.6-15,2.6-16,2.6-17,2.6-18,2.6-19,2.7-6a, 2.7-25, 2.7-27, 2.7-28, 2.8-Sa 1
9905210079 990510
PDR ADOCK 07007002 C
pq
May 10,1999 -
United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Update REVISION LOG Ilate Description 8/18/97 InitialIssue. Included: changes to SAR Chapter 2 (changed pages only); new SARUP Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1,4.4.
10/31/97 Submittal of complete SARUP (including 8/18/97 sections unchanged), with the exception of changes to Application SAR Chapter 3. Included: changes to SAR Chapters 1 and 2 and Sections 5.2,5.4, and 5.6 (changed pages only);
complete replacement of Section 3.8, Chapter 4, and the TSRs; new Section 5.2, Appendix A.
4/30/98 Submittal to remove the fixed fire suppression sprinkler systems within the X-324-A and X-344-A facilities and the sanitary and fire water system (SFWS),
including its distribution and elevated storage tank as safety (AQ) systems.
Sections revised include: Section 3.8.7.2, Table 3.8-2, Table 4.2-5, Table 4.2-11, Section 4.3.2.2.16, TSR Table of Contents, TSR 2.2.3.3, TSR 2.4.3.1.b, TSR 2.4.3.2.a. and TSR 2.4.3.2.b. A SARUP List of Effective Pages is added.
J 10/19/98 Submittal to incorporate modifications to install additional handswitches at building exits for remote manual isolation of the remote feed isolation system in Building X-342-A; add a clarification to the Technical Safety Requirements, Section 2.1.3.6, Basis regarding draining raw cooling water (RCW) from process gas coolant condensers as a method to preclude introduction of a moderator (RCW) to the process system; add a reference to carbon dioxide ice blasting as an additional controlled means of field removal of uranium contamination from process equipment and facilities; make corrections to AQ-NCS boundary definitions regarding the high pressure venting system; revises the highest fire system sprinkler flow demand requirements; adds -
commitments to certain codes and standards for process building cranes; corrects a standard edition date error; and clarifies the commitment to codes and standards for liquid UF. cylinder handling cranes.
11/20/98 Submittal to include a description of the Q boundary for rail cars. Revised Section 3.8.6.3.3 and Table 3.8-1.
l 5/10/99 Submittal to remove entire set of SARUP TSRs and replace with modified l
versions of USEC-02 TSRs. This first set of "new" SARUP TSRs includes l
LCOs related to nuclear criticality safety that have only minor changes to the l
basis to update SAR references.
i
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l SARUP-PORTS May 10,1999 '
LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES REVISION LOG CHAPTER 2 (Continued) -
Eagg RAC/ Revision /Date >
Eage RAC/ Revision i
May 10,1999 -
2.3-7 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) j 2.3-8
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Easc RAC/ Revision 2.3 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
A-1 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-12 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
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L A RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-19 '
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2.3-20 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)'
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A-12 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.4-8 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.4-9 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
CHAPTER 2, CONTENTS 2.4-11 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
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RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-5 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) y RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-6 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-7 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
CHAPTER 2 2.6-8 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-9 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
Eage BAC/ Revision 2.6-10 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.1-6.
RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-11 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-12 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3 2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-13 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-3 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.7-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-4 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
-2.7-2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-5 :
RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
. 2.3 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)
SARUP-1
SARUP-PORTS May 10,1999 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES l-CHAPTER 5 (Continued)
TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS Eagg RAC/ Revision Eagg RAC/Revisicm i
5.2A-15 RAC 97-X0314 (RI)
Cover Page RAC 97-X0505 (R2) 5.2A-16 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-4b RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-17 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-l 8 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-32 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-19 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.2-7a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-20 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.2-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-21 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.2-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-22 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.7-30 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) l 5.2A-23
. RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.2-32 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) l 5.2A-24 RAC 97-X0314 (R1).
2.2-33 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-25 RAC 97-XO314 (R1) 2.3-6 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-26 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.4-4b RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-27 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.4-8 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-28 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.4-9 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-29 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.5-5a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-30 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.5-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-31 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.5-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-32 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.5-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-33 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.5-24 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) l 5.2A-34 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.6-5 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) l 5.2A-35 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.6-6 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-36 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.6-7 RAC 97-X0505 (R3)
RAC 98-X0037 (RO) 2.6-9a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-37 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.6-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R3)
RAC 98-X0037 (RO) -
2.6-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-38 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.6-14 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-2 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.6-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-3 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.6-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-6 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.6-17 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-7 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.6-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.6-1 RAC 97 X0506 (RO) 2.6-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.6-6 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.7-6a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.6-7 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.7-25 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.6-8 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.7-27 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.7-28 RAC 97-X0505 (R3)
~2.8-Sa RAC 97-X0505 (R3) l l
l SARUP-9 l
SARUP-PORTS May 10,1999 Blank Page l
SARUP-10
.. ~ TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
. SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.1. Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alann Systems (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.1.3.1.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air.
SR 2.1.3.1.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen l
horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.1.3.1.3 Verify nitrogen supply pressure is at least 900 psig for each CAAS horn.
BASIS:
Each cluster consists of three neutron-sensitive detection units. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defm' ed as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads, in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes. [SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
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l 2.1-4b
p TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3).
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.I.3.10 Cylinder Assay Limitation APPLICABILITY:
Autoclave Operational Mode II, IV, VI LCO:
No cylinder with a calculated or known assay value above 5% shall be placed in an autoclave for heating.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Suneillance Prior to entering Mode II SR 2.1.3.10.1 Verify cylinder assay -
(calculated) contained on the materials transfer log or other transfer authorizing documents is s 5%
BASIS:
1 The Autoclave Criticality Analysis dated February 21,1991 (POEF-T-3544), limits the assay in 25 a cylinder to 5% U or less before the cylinder can be heated in a autoclave. The autoclave analysis also demonstrates that double contingency exists against a criticality occurring for cylinders with assays up to 5 % [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 2.2].
l 2.1-19
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED
. May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.1.4.3 UF, Cylinder Pigtails DF: Newly fabricated pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance
- Prior to initial use SR 2.1.4.3.1 Inspect and perform hydrostatic test at least to 400 psig and ensure inspection tag is attached to the pigtail.
BASIS:
Structural integrity of the pigtail significantly reduces the likely hood of a catastrophic rupture
[SAR Section 4.2.3.2 & Case R-28].
2.1.4.4 X-342 Condensate Sump and Oil Interceptor DF: Condensate sump and oil interceptor shall contain Borosilicate glass Raschig Rings SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.1.4.4.1 Verify that the surveillance requirements contained in ANSI Standard 8.5 are satisfied.
BASIS:
X-342A sump and oil interceptor are of an unfavorable geometry and Raschig rings are used to enhance criticality prevention [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, sections 2.3 and 2.4].
l l
2.1-32
i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.2 Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alarm System (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.2.3.2.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air.
SR 2.2.3.2.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.2.3.2.3 Verify nitrogen supply pressure is at least 900 psig for each CAAS horn.
BASIS:
Each cluster consists of three neutron-sensitive detection units. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads, in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes. [SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
l i
2.2-7a
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMYTING CONTROL SE1 TINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION' SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.8' Seal Exhaust Station Enrichment (continued)
BASIS:
To process UF with an enrichment greater than the given limitations through the Seal Exhaust Station could result in a criticality involving the Alumina Trags. The Area Ill seal exhaust station has been analyzed to be safe at an enrichment of 15% U2. For this event to occur numerous j
compressor seals are required to be leaking and the alumina traps must trap the minimum mass required at a particular assay for a criticality (SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.3].
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2.2-16 l
I TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 kAC 97X0505 (R3)
' SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 4
2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE'ITINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.9 Evacuation Booster Station (EBS) Enrichment (continued)
BASIS:
The X-330 EBS has been analyzed to be safe at an enrichment of 15 % U 35 when the seal exhaust 2
2 4
is valved in. : Both EBSs are safe up to an enrichment of 54% U 35, assuming the seal exhaust is valved off. Due to the possible interaction of the X-333 EBS via the seal exhaust, the enrichment is limited unless the seal exhaust is valved off, reference DM-620 [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix
.A, section 1.6].
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I 2.2-18 I
L
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.15 Moderation Control (continued)
If the cascade component (s) with the deposit are removed from the cascade, the control of the component (s) is in accordance with the provisions of the cascade TSR addressing removed equipment with deposits [SAR sections 5.2, Appendix A, sections 1.1 and 1.2],
l t
2.2-30
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3).
SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES
. 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES l
2.2.3.16 Removed Equipment With Deposits (continued)
SURVEIILANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance l
Daily SR 2.2.3.16.1 Inspect equipment for closed I
or covered openings Prior to equipment exiting building SR 2.2.3.16.2 Inspect equipment for closed or covered openings l
BASIS:
For a criticality to occur in a piece of equipment with a uranium deposit that has been removed from the cascade would require that the deposit be moderated. Cascade deposits in operating equipment regardless of their size, at the enrichment level of s 7% will remain safe as long as the deposit is unmoderated. For unmoderated deposits (II/U=0) > 7% assay but s 20% assay the l
mass required for a criticality would exceed the amount of UF available in the cascade at this 6
enrichment range. As used in this TSR the term " safe mass" is defm' ed as being 43.5% of the minimum fissionable mass for the assay of concern in a fully moderated and fully reflected system whether these specific conditions actually exist or not. In addition, determining the mass of any uranium deposit in the equipment allows segregation and controlled handling of equipment containing amounts of U235 that require additional controls to prevent the formation of an unsafe mass / geometry. It is not likely based on the chemistry of UO F deposits for this potential mass 2 2 to be moderated by diffusion of ambient air to greater than a H/U ratio of 4. The loss of moderation control as described in the SAR requires that the equipment be dropped such that an
{
opening is tilted upwards to receive fire water (i.e. water in liquid state) ar;d that a fire must occur simultaneously in order to actuate the sprinkler system (i.e. probability of a false actuation is 1x 104per year, Factory Mutual) and this accident scenario meets Double Contingency. The defense in depth action that shall occur to further reduce the probability of a criticality, especially when the equipment is moved outside the facility is the covering of the equipment openings [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.11].
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2.2-32 l'
l
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.2 dPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES l
2.2.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.2.4.1 Seal Exhaust Pump Overflows DF: Seal exhaust pumps shall contain an overflow that limits the oil inventory in the pump.
SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to pump startup SR 2.2.4.1.1. Verify that the oil overflow is in place and that the effluent valve if present is open BASIS:
l
' The seal exhaust pump cavities are of an unfavorable geometry in the presence of an oil moderator. The pump overflow lines ensure that the oil volume does not exceed the safe quantity when' mixed with uranium of a limited enrichment that is documented in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation and Approvals [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.3].
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l t-i 2.2-33
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999
' RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.3 "
SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-333 FREEZER SUBLIMERS 2.3.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.3.3.2 Assay Limitations APPLICABILITY: F/S Operational Modes I, II, III, IV, V LCO: No F/S unit shall freeze out or contain UF. of an enrichment greater than 3.0% U233,
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.
Freezing out UF of A.1 Place F/S in Mode IV Immediately enrichment > 3.0% U235 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to Mode I SR 2.3.3.2.1 Determine enrichment of material to be 235 frozen out is 13.0% U BASIS:
"ORNL/CSD/TM-288 (Calculational Criticality Analyses of 10- and 20-MW UF.
Freezer / Sublimer Vessels, W. C. Jordan of ORNL Computing and Telecommunications Division, February 1993) document states that if the F/S vessel is filled with solid UF at an H/U of 0.33 and the R-114 tubes are filled with water, the F/S system will be subcritical when the UF is at 6
an enrichment of 3.0% U2'5 or less [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.2].
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2.3-6 l
l L
TSR-PO' TS PROPOSED May 10,1999 R
RAC 97X0505 (R3) 2.4.3 ' LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCE 2.4.3.1. Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alarm System (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.4.3.1.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air.
SR 2.4.3.1.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen
)
horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.4.3.1.3 Verify nitrogen supply pressure is at least 900 psig for each CAAS horn.
BASIS:
Each cluster consists of three neutron-sensitive detection units. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads. in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes. [SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
l 2.4-4b
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 COLD RECOVERY 2.4.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCE 2.4.3.3 Cold Recovery Enrichment APPLICABILITY: Cold Recovery Operational Mode 11 LCO:
The U " enrichment of a gas mixture to be cold trapped shall not exceed:
2 1.
5.0% in X-333 Cold Recovery 2.
10% in X-330 Cold Recovery SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to entering Mode 11 SR 2.4.3.3.1 Verify by Cascade location of material source or sample res@ the U n 2
enrichment to be :
s 5.0% in X-333 OR s 10.0% in X-330 BASIS:
The cold trapping gas mixtures of a U2" enrichment greater than the stated limitations under optimum reflection could result in a critical reaction within the Cold Recovery system [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.8]. The X-330 Cold Recovery operation has been analyzed l
to be safe at an enrichment of 27% U2u,
2.4-8
TSR-PORTS -
PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 COLD RECOVERY 2.4.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCE 2.4.3.4 X-333 Wet Air Evacuation Enrichment APPLICABILITY: Cold Recovery Operational Mode V LCO:
U235 enrichment of gas mixture to be vented through Wet Air Alumina traps shall not exceed 3.0%.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Sur' eillance v
Prior to entering Mode V SR 2.4.3.4.1 Verify U235 enrichment by sampling or source location BASIS:
The venting of wet air mixtures of a U235 enrichment greater than the stated limitations under
. optimum reflection could result in a critical reaction within the X-333 Alumina traps. There is not a limiting enrichment for the X-330 wet air operation due to the use of 5 inch traps. Although there is a "T" section in the vent line that has a enrichment limitation of 27% U235 the plant limitation of 10% enrichment addresses this situation [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.3].
l 2,4-9
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
EECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITIIDRAWAL STATIONS 1
2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE1 TINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 1
l 2.5.3.1 Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alarm System (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
i Frequency Surveillance Semiannually.
SR 2.5.3.1.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air SR 2.5.3.1.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen horn and the X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.5.3.1.3 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
i BASIS:
Within the cluster, three neutron-sensitive detection units are provided to detect radiation from a criticality accident. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads.
j in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal i
in the event of a criticality that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes [SAR Section 4
- 3. 8.7.1].
l r
2.5-5a
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITIIDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 - LIMITING CONTROL SErflNGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.5 Assay Monitoring l
APPLICABILITY:
Withdrawal Operational Modes II, III LCO:
Assay monitoring shall be required when withdrawing > 1.0% U2" material.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.
Assay and Gamma A.1 Initiate 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> sampling 2 Hours spectrometer with assay result in 4 inoperable hours OR A.2 Place the affected 2 Hours I
withdrawal loop in Mode IV SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Daily SR 2.5.3.5.1 Perform a comparison of the assay spectrometer reading against a known assay controller sample and make any necessary assay spectrometer adjustments.
BASIS:
Enrichment monitoring of the UF withdrawn into shipping containers is essential to ensuring that 6
the maximum enrichment, as it relates to the other necessary parameters (geometry, moderation, mass, etc.), required for a critical reaction is not exceeded. This monitoring is essential for the Tails area to ensure the enriched assay of the accumulators is not exceeded. The monitoring at the ERP and LAW stations enhance the controls necessary to ensure that enrichment limitation for the autoclave are not exceeded [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.4].
l j
2.5-11
L TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETflNGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.6 Withdrawal Accumulator Enrichment (continued)
BASIS:
Storing UF. of a U " enrichment greater than the stated limitations in the Withdrawal Area 2
accumulators could result in a critical reaction. The ERP-1 accumulator has been analyzed to be safe at an enrichment of 100% U ". [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.4].
l 2
l l
2.5-13
i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 i
RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE'ITINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.7 UF. Cylinder Enrichment (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Every 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> SR 2.5.3.7.1 Monitor assay spectrometer and/or samples to verify enrichment limitations are being met Once per shift SR 2.5.3.7.2 Monitor the condenser pressure to ensure s 45 psig BASIS:
2 Filling a UF. cylinder with a U " enrichment greater than the stated limitations eliminates one of the two constraints assumed to be present to prevent a criticality. Three nuclear criticality safety reports (POEF-T-3597, POEF-T-3563, and GAT-DM-1333) provide the justification for the the acceptability of filling 14-ton cylinders with 5.25% material and 10-ton cylinders with 10%
material. The maximum assay values are predicated on the liquid filling of the cylinders under moderation control. Moderation control is based on maintaining a H/U ratio s.088. High concentrations of HF cannot enter the condensation /liquification stations from the cascade since, as a light gas, HF preferentially proceeds toward the cascade top to be removed by either the Top or Side Purge Cascade. The controlling of the condenser pressure s 45 psig will provide added assurance that what HF is present will not condense [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.4J.
l 2.5-15
7 TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3) -
.SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.5.4.3 UF. Cylinder Pigtails DF:
Newly fabricated pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig l
SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to initial use SR 2.5.4.3.1 Inspect and perform hydrostatic test at least to 400 psig and ensure inspection tag is attached to the pigtail BASIS:
Structural integrity of the pigtail significantly reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic rupture
[SAR Section 4.2.3.2].
2.5.4.4' Scale Pit Raschig Rings DF:
ERP, LAW and Tails scale pits shall contain Borosilicate glass Raschig rings to a minimum depth of 6 inches.
l SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.5.4.4.1 Verify that the surveillance requirements contained in ANSI Standard 8.5 are satisfied.
u BASIS:
The scale pits contain Raschig Rings to enhance nuclear criticality safety [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.4].
i 2.5-24
I.
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY l
2.6.3 ' LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.1 Calciner Iligh Iligh Temperature Shutoff System (continued)
. BASIS:
The calciner high high temperature limiting set point of 1800 "F will prevent the exceedance of the safety limit. The 200 *F safety margin takes into account instrument loop inaccuracies, drift etc. and any residual heat added to the calciner during the system response time to de-energize the i
heaters. When taking the calciner out of service under normal conditions it is necessary to allow the heaters to remain energized after the inlet feed valve is closed in order to facilitate the emptying of the calciner tube. This will facilitate *he holdup solution conversion to oxide and subsequent collection in the re.nving can. Once the tube is emptied the heaters will be de-energized [SAR Section 3.8.10.4.4 and 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.9]. The LCS - value l
corresponds to the trip set point established under DOE 5481.lB in 1985 with a 36 "F(2% of scale) tolerance that complies with the definition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988.
2.6-5
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES
{
2.6.3.2 Calciner Discharge Collector Probe Detection APPLICABILITY:
X-705 Operational Modes II, III LCO: Both channels of the calciner discharge collector probe detection system shall be operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.
One channel inoperable A.1 Complete the batch Prior to initiating a calciner operation and new heat cycle restore operability B.
Both channels B.1 Close inlet feed valve 30 Minutes inoperable SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
f Frequency Surveillance Quarterly SR 2.6.3.2.1 Perform channel functional test to verify that the inlet feed valve closes and the alarm sounds when the probe is contacted with oxide material or i
substitute BASIS:
If the uranium oxide leaving the calciner would back up into the calciner discharge throat which 235 is an unfavorable geometry, a criticality could occur if the U assay and the amount of moderation were high enough [SAR Sections 3.8.10.4.5 and 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.9].
l 2.6-6
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
.SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.3 Calciner Can Level Probe Detection APPLICABILITY:
X-705 Operational Modes II, III, except when calciner discharge chute l
valve is closed LCO:
Calciner can level probe detection system shall be operable.
ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.
Can level probe A.1 Close the inlet feed 30 Minutes system inoperable valve 1
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Each calciner startup SR 2.6.3.3.1 Verify the receiving can is in place
)
prior to introducing flow into the calciner
{
l Quarterly SR 2.6.3.3.2 Perform channel functional test to J
verify that the inlet feed valve closes and the alarm sounds when probe is contacted with oxide material or substitute Semiannually SR 2.6.3.3.3 Verify probe actuates at a can height of 80%.
BASIS:
i If the uranium oxide would overflow out of the can collar into an unfavorable geometry in the glove box, a criticality could occur if the U* assay and the moderation were high enough [SAR Sections 3.8.10.4.6 and 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.9].
l 2.6-7
r TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999
' RAC 97X0505 (R3)
,SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.4 Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alann Systems (continued)
SURVEILLANCE fQ_UlREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.6.3.4.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air.
SR 2.6.3.4.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.6.3.4.3 Verify nitrogen supply pressure is at least 900 psig for each CAAS horn.
BASIS:
Each cluster consists of three neutron-sensitive detection units. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads, in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality that will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes. [SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
l I
i I
2.6-9a
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3) l
..SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES l
2.6.3.5 Microfiltration pII Shutdown System (continued)
BASIS:
The LCS pH value of.7.0 was established at a point sufficiently below the optimum operating range to prevent false trips yet above the breakpoint where no precipitation will occur. While the solution pH is between 7.0 and 6.5 there is not a sufficient amount of uranium contained in the effluent stream entering the effluent tank to cause a critical reaction [SAR Sections 3.8.10.4.1 and 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.5]. The LCS value corresponds to the trip set point. established under DOE 5481.1B in 1985 with a -0.2 pH tolerance that complies with the definition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988.
j 2.6-11
e'
=.
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)-
,SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY I
2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.6 Microfiltration Permeate Effluent Bag Filter System (continued)
BASIS:
1 As the effluent bag filter collects solids the differential pressure will increase and at the LCS a filter discharge valve will close to prevent solids from reaching the effluent tank.
The LCS is based on a differential pressure that will prevent the exceedance of the safety limit and is still above the highest expected differential pressure due to solution flow, without solids, through the filter [SAR Sections 3.8.10.4.2 and 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.5]. The LCS value l
corresponds to the trip set point established under DOE 5481.1B in 1985 with a + 0.4 psi (2%
of scale) tolerance that complies with the defm' ition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988.
I 1
2.6-13
f
- a. ' '
D TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
,SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.7 Calciner Tube Rotation Interlock APPLICABILITY:
X-705 Operational Mode III LCO: Calciner tube rotation interlock shall be operable.
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Quarterly SR 2.6.3.7.1 Perform channel functional test to l
verify that the tube rotation interlock will de-energize the heaters and close the inlet valve when j
tube rotation stops BASIS:
The calciner tubes are heated electrically to temperatures in excess of 1500 *F.
If the tube would 1
stop rotating, uneven heating would be placed on one location of the tube and a crack could develop due to warpage, resulting in a leak of concentrated uranyl nitrate and uranium oxide into the geometrically unfavorable calciner heating cavity that could lead to a criticality [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.9].
l 2.6-14
r.
y g>
4 TSR-PORTS PROPOSED' May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES
- 2.6.3.8 Truck Alley Oil and Grease Removal Unit (OGRU)
APPLICABILITY:-
X-705 Operational Modes II, III c
LCO:
A.
Each batch to be processed shall contain s 350 grams U235 B.
OGRU waste receiving container shall contain s 350 grams U235 ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.
Processed batch A.1 Enter Mode II or Immediately potentially contains IV j
> 350 grams U-235 OR AND The receiving
)
container plus the A.2 Initiate action to Immediately processed batch restore OGRU to potentially contain a safe condition
> 350 crnmc II ?M SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance
- Each batch to be processed prior SR 2.6.3.8.1 Inspect OGRU permeate tray for to entering Mode III
_ material buildup AND remove SR 2.6.3.8.2 Double sample batch AND calculate 235 total amount of U 235 SR 2.6.3.8.3 Verify batch U total PLUS receiving 238 235 container U accumulation is s 350 grams U SR 2.6.3.8.4 Verify additional solutions have not been added to the batch for the OGRU after sampling BASIS:
235 The OGRU and waste container are not of favorable geometry. The NCS limit of 350 grams U which corresponds to the Maximum Safe Mass for 100% enrichment (per GAT 225 R4, table 1),
must be verified and maintained [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.14].
l 2.6-15
m TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 ~ LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVF.ILLANCES 2.6.3.9 Microfiltration Effluent Filter Press Operation
- APPLICABILITY
X-705 Operational Modes II, III -
LCO:
A.
Each batch to be processed shall contain s 350 grams U235,
' B.'
Effluent filter press waste receiving container shall contain s 350 grams U2u, ACTIONS:
Condition Required Actions Completion Time
'A.
Processed batch A.1 Enter Mode II or Immediately l
potentially contains IV
> 350 grams U-235 l
OR AND The receiving l
container plus the A,2 Initiate action to Immediately processed batch restore filter press l
potentially contain to a safe condition
{
>350 ornms II 71s i
I SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
l Frequency Surveillance Each batch to be processed prior SR 2.6.3.9.1 Inspect filter press for material buildup to entering Mode III AND remove SR 2.6.3.9.2 Double sample batch AND calculate total amount of U2n SR 2.6.3.9.3 Verify batch U " total PLUS receiving 2
l container U " accumulation is s 350 grams U2n 2
BASIS:
The filter presses and waste container are not of favorable geometry, the NCS limit of 350 grams U2", which corresponds to the Maximum Safe Mass for 100% enrichment (per GAT 225 R4, table 1), must be verified and maintained [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.5].
l l
2.6-16
s ;s o
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
, SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 FACILITY 2.6.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR
. OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.6.3.10 Moderation Control APPLICABILITY:
Upon receipt of a PEH component LCO:
Equipment classified as PEH shall be decontaminated to s safe mass within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of removal and post PEH classification ACTIONS:
I Conditions Required Actions Completion Time A.
PEH equipment not.
A.1 Ensure openings remain Immediately L
decontaminated to s covered or closed I
safe mass within 72 except during the actual hours decontamination evolution AND A.2 Reinitiate a dry air or Immediately nitrogen atmosphere i
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency-Surveillance Daily SR 2.6.3.10.1 Inspect equipment to ensure openings are covered or closed except when being decontaminated BASIS i
This control minimizes the potential for exposure of the uranium deposits to external moderating sources such as water that could res'ilt in a critical reaction by ensuring that there exists a barrier to any external water sources. The decontamination evolution involves any actual disassembly and deposit removal that can be temporarily interrupted due to work area levels of HF but will proceed to completion once initiated. {SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.11]
l 2.6-17
se.i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY 2.6.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.6.4.1 Handtable Overflows DF:
Handtables shall have a s 1.5 inch high overflow.
SURVEILLANCE:
1 Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.6.4.1.1 Verify that s 1.5 inch high overflow is not obstructed and that a 5 inch overflow receiving container is used I
BASIS:
Potential solution criticality from an " unsafe" slab thickness in a handtable is prevented by overflow drains [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.4].
l 2.6.4.2 Air Gaps DF:
Air gaps shall be installed at all "B" area drains and water-to-process connections that connect to geometrically unsafe systems as required by a NCSA SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.6.4.2.1 Verify and document the presence of air gaps required by NCSAs.
f i
BASIS:
Air gaps are used by design for piping to drains to prevent backflow to geometrically unsafe systems [SAR Secuon 5.2, Appendix A, section 3.20].
l 2.6-18
y L o' '
. TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3) y SECTION 2.6 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-705 DECONTAMINATION FACILITY 2.6.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.6.4.3 Diked Areas DF:
Dike height surrounding storaga of uranium bearing solutions shall not exceed 1.5 inches SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.6.4.3.1 Verify and document that dike height i
does not exceed a height of 1.5 inches BASIS:
l Potential solution criticality from an " unsafe" slab thickness in a containment dike is prevented l
by limiting dike height to 1.5 inches [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 2.4].
l 2.6.4.4 Tank Covers l
DF: -
Tanks T-100, T-104, T-105, T-106 AND T-107 shall have covers closed, except during l
inspections or other manned activities l
I SURVEILLANCE:-
1 Frequency Surveillance Annually -
SR 2.6.4.4.1 Verify tank covers are in place BASIS:
l Tanks of an unfavorable geometry which are open to the atmosphere are susceptible to receiving l
either uranium bearing or moderating solutions from over head lines that might leak and therefore result in a criticality. The tank covers, which are normally to be closed, will reduce the likely hood of any contaminants entering the tanks and causing a criticality [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, sections 1.11, 3.6, 7.5].
l l
)
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1 2.6-19
>4 e
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
, SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.2 Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alarm Systems (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.7.3.2.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air SR 2.7.3.2.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.7.3.2.3 Verify that the nitrogen supply pressure to the cluster horns is at least 900 psig.
BASIS:
Within the cluster, three neutron-sensitive detection units are provided to detect radiation from a criticality accident. Clusters will actuate an alarm within 0.5 seconds after activation by a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads. in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality which will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes
[SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
l i
2.7-6a 1
e
- ,/...
.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
SECTION 2.7. SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 ~
LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,.S'URVEILLANCES 2.7.3.14 Moderation Control (continued) surging, etc.), continued fluorination of the deposit provides nuclear criticality safety by preventing moderation of the deposit. Cell chemical treatment processes also provide the same level of moderation control.
The fact that a UO F deposit in an operating cell is not a nuclear criticality safety concern also 2 2 explains the limited scope of an frequency for the surveillance requirement. Wet air in-leakage
.in an operating cell would readily announce itself (in the form of changing motor loads, compressor surging, line recorders, stage control valve positions, A-suction pressures, etc.).
- Since larger wet air in-leakages announce themselves readily, and continuously fluorinated UO F 2 2 deposits is appropriate for early detection of such deposits and followup surveys for prudent remediation.
. Once identified, the growth of a deposit is monitored quarterly to assure that the deposit does not become sufficiently large to become an operational problem. The maximum allowable size of the deposit is primarily dependent on its location and will be determined as a part of the surveillance of the deposit. Operational experience suggests that quarterly surveillance by NDA methods is adequate to monitor the size of the deposit in process piping, expansion joints and valves. NDA is oflimited value (e.g., quantification of deposit size) for compressors, converters, and process gas coolers. Deposits in centrifugal compressors are detected by the damage the deposits cause to the impeller. Deposits in the converters are determined by the impact of the deposit on the pressure drop across the converter. Deposits in the process gas cooler are identified by the operator as degraded performance and are located by radiation surveys.
For shutdown cells moderation control can also be provided by a dry gas (plant air or nitrogen) blanket over the deposit. Once a system has been isolated from the cascade and filled to atmospheric pressure with a dry gas blanket, normal atmospheric pressure fluctuations will cause minor in and out flow through any existing system leaks.; Analyses have demonstrated that this
" breathing" of the cell will not significantly affect deposit moderation, even over a period much longer than the 180 days to which this condition is limited. The daily surveillance demonstrates that the gas blanket is maintained as assumed in the analyses.
The potential for moderation from RCW system water is precluded by the two physical barriers (RCW to coolant and coolant to cascade) and either by maintaining the coolaut system pressure I
greater than the RCW pressure or by draining the coolant condenser.
if the cascade component (s) with the deposit are removed from the cascade, the control of the component (s) is in accordance with the provisions of the cascade TSR addressing removed equipment with deposits [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, sections 1.1 and 1.2].
l 2.7 25
p,e o
[
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3)
, SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY l
2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 1
2.7.3.15 Removed Equipment With Deposits (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance Daily SR 2.7.3.15.1 Inspect equipment for closed or covered openings Prior to equipment exiting building SR 2.7.3.15.2 Inspect equipment for closed or covered openings l
BASIS:
1 For a criticality to occur in a piece of equipment with a uranium deposit that has been removed from the cascade would require that the deposit be moderated. Cascade deposits in operating equipment regardless of their size, at the enrichment level of s 7% will remain safe as long as the deposit is unmoderated. For unmoderated deposits (II/U=0) > 7% assay but s 20% assay the mass required for a criticality would exceed the amount of UF available in the cascade at this enrichment range. As used in this TSR the term " safe mass" is defined as being 43.5 % of the minimum fissionable mass for the assay of concern in a fully moderated and fully reflected system whether these specific conditions actually exist or not. In addition, determining the mass of any i
4 l
uranium deposit in the equipment allows segregation and controlled handling of equipment containing amounts of U* that require :dditional controls to prevent the formation of an unsafe l
mass / geometry. It is not likely based on the chemistry of UO F deposits for this potential mass 2 2 to be moderated by diffusion of ambient air to greater than a li/U ratio of 4 The loss of moderation control as described in the SAR requires that the equipment be dropped such that an opening is tilted upwards to receive fire water (i.e. water in liquid state) and that a fire must occur simultaneously in order to actuate the sprinkler system (i.e. probability of a false actuation is lx 4
10 per year, Factory Mutual) and this accident scenario meets Double Contingency. The defense in depth action that shall occur to funher reduce the probability of a criticality, especially when I
the equipment is moved outside the facility is the covering of the equipment openings [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.11].
l 2.7-27 m
\\
j o
- l TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999 l _
RAC 97X0505 (R3) l
, SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY l
2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.7.4.1 Seal Exhaust Pump Overflows DF: Seal exhaust pumps shall contain an overflow that limits the oil inventory in the pump SURVEILLANCE:
Frequency Surveillance Prior to pump startup SR 2.7.4.1.1 Verify that the oil overflow is in l
place and that the effluent valve if present is open L
BASIS:
The seal exhaust pump cavities are of an unfavorable geometry in the presence of an oil I
moderator. The pump overflow lines ensure that the oil volume does not exceed the safe quantity when mixed with uranium of a limited enrichment that is documented in Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations and Approvals. [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.3]
l i
i l
l 2.7-28 m
=
, +.:
TSR-PORTS PROPOSED May 10,1999.
RAC 97X0505 (R3) i
, SECTION 2.8 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR MISCELLANEOUS FACILITIES (X-700, X-710, X-720, X-760, XT-847) 2.8.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.8.3.1 - Criticality Accident (Radiation) Alarm Systems (continued)
SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:
Frequency Surveillance
)
Semiannually SR 2.8.3.1.1 Calibrate radiation clusters to a set point of 5 mrad /hr. in air.
SR 2.8.3.1.2 Verify that the cluster nitrogen horn and X-300 alarm sounds when two out of three channels in a cluster are tripped.
Quarterly SR 2.8.3.1.3 Verify nitrogen supply pressure is at least 900 psig for each CAAS horn.
i BASIS:
' Each cluster consists of three neutron-sensitive detection units. Clusters are designed and calibrated to detect and alarm on a minimum credible criticality accident of concern, defined as producing an integrated total dose of 20 Rads in one minute at two meters from the reacting material. This system will provide an audible signal in the event of a criticality which will alert personnel to evacuate the immediate work areas. The minimum acceptable length of time for the CAAS horn to sound is 2 minutes. [SAR Section 3.8.7.1].
l l
i 2.8-5a i