ML20196K118
| ML20196K118 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 11/06/1998 |
| From: | Isom J NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196K123 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9812140205 | |
| Download: ML20196K118 (11) | |
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No'vember 6, 1998 k l
l MEMORANDUM TO: File FROM: James A. Isom, Operations Engineer Inspection Program Branch Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF THE OCTOBER 28,1998 MEETINGS WITH THE NUCLEAR ENERGY INSTITUTE TO DISCUSS OPTIONS FOR REVISING THE REGULATORY OVERSIGHT PROCESS On October 28,1998, the NRC met with NEl and others to discuss the progress made by the Framework and Inspection Baseline teams and to obtain feedback on the validation and verification efforts by NEl. The attached materials were presented and discussed.
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9812140205 981106
, PDR REVGP ERGNUMRC
! PDR 7) l CONTACT: James A. Isom 3
'- 301-415-1109 '/d g ty fly af fwy y g p g-vyey L
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l 2 i-i i Attachments: 1. Agenda L , 2. List of Attendees
- 3. Performance Indicators for Power Operations . l
- 4. Results of the NRC's Performance Assessment Public Workshop -
DRAFT l
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- DISTRIBUTION
PUBLIC
!- Central Files.
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- PlPB R/F '
F. Gillespie M. Johnson
' C. Holden A. Madison
. J. Isom T. Frye J.Jacobson D. Gamberoni R. Barrett P. ' Baranowsky j B. Mallet i
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l DOCUMENT NAME: MTG1028. SUM To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without enclosures *E" = Copy with enclosures
- "N" = No copy . i i.
OFFICE PIPB: DISP - l PIPB: DISP l5 l l l-NAME JAlsom M MRJohnsonh DATE- 11/ C6 /98 / 11/ 4 198 Q
, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
1 AGENDA FOR NRC/NEl MEETING ON OCTOBER 28,1998 i .
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- 1. Welcome and Introduction Alan Madison ll. Progress On Framework Development Pat Baranowsky i Ill. Progress on Inspection Baseline Bruce Mallet IV. Feedback On Validation and Verification Steve Floyd V. Future Interactions General Discussion l
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l Attachment 1
OCTOBER 28,1998, NRC/NEl MEETING ON PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT PROCESSIMPROVEMENTS .
l SIGN-IN SHEET l
NAME ORGANIZATION PHONE NUMBER Donna Alexander Carolina Power & Light 919-546-6901 Pat Baranowsky NRC/AEOD 301-415-1111 RobertW. Boyce PECO Energy 610-640-5620 Doug Coe NRC/NRR 301-415-1244 Jim Chase OPPD 402-533-6615 John Flack NRC/RES 301-415-6436 Stephen Floyd Nuclear Energy Institute 202-739-8078 David Garchow PSEG 609-339-3250 Frank Gillespie NRC/NRR 301-415-1275 Sandy Hastie INPO 770-644-8207 Don Hickman NRC/AEOD 301-415-6829 Cornelius Holden NRC/NRR 301-415-1037 Tom Houghton NEl 202-739-8107 James A. Isom NRC/NRR 301-415-1109 Jeffrey Jacobson NRC/NRR 301-415-2977 Bill Johnson NRC/R-IV Michael Johnson NRC/NRR 301-415-1241 Ron Lloyd NRC/AEOD 301-415-7479 Alan Madison NRC/NRR 301-415-6412 Bruce Mallet NRC/R-Il 301-415-1425 Sam Malur NRC/NRR 301-415-2963 Mark McBurnett STP NOC 512-972-7206 Jim McCarthy Virginia Power 804-273-2699 Scott Morris NRC/NRR 301-415-1370 Kevin Neitmann BG&E 410-495-4491 Bob Palla NRC/NRR 301-415-1095 Garreth Parry NRC/NRR 301-415-1464 Peter Prescott NRC/AEOD 301-415-7591 Ann Ramey-Smith NRC/RES 301-415-6877 Bill Ruland NRC/R-l Leon Russell BG&E 410-495-2718 Steven Stein NRC/NRR 301-415-1296 J. D. Wilcox NRC/NRR 301-415-1262 Barry Westreich NRC/NRR 301-415-3456 Attachment 2 i
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l Pls for Power Operations:
- Each use two measures
- a long-term measure (,ver about one operating cycle
- a short-term measure over [TBD) months Provides responsiveness to oeveloping as well as continuing problems Using Lessons Learned frem the NRC's current P1 program Reduces the effects of reactor mode on Pts Provide indication of the frequency of operating events which challenge safety functions or precursors to such events, and the more risk important events
- Definitions
- 1. Total Scrams - unplanned manual and automatic scrams while critical
- 3. Operating Transients > 20% - unplanned transients not included in total scrams which result in a change in reactor power of greater than 20 percent
- 4. Forced Outages - forced outages (those initiated before the end of the next weekend) not included in scram indicators
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Pls for Shutdown Operations:
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- Provides indication of the frequency of risk-important shutdown events
- Definition
- 1. Shutdown Events - the total number of decreases in the safety margins of reactor coolant level, reactor coolant temperature, and reactivity during reactor shutdown 10(z1/f7 arma,-ou r 3
Initiating Ev:;nt p[ l DRdl l
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External Human Procedure Equipment Configuration Factors Quality Design Performance Performance Control I
I y ir if if if if FIXd Meterd Protection Procedure Operating Equipment Compilence Avoliebilsty seneup We;ther Procedure Design KsA edequacy Adequacy Reliebihty Modifications off-normallineups FiO (maint, te st, Environmental ops) Maintenance Post instellation Frequency of Heat sank p ,g,,, gestin0 Configuration Traic Hazard s, s+(T. s, s+ 7 :
s, s+,pT MR s, s+,p 7
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Grr0 w t ec>u @
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5 UTA 6 NR. AA45 5' : P,sg- IM Pon.7AMT bCA AM S T= Opritariuc- MAustrar-s F= foa.ce6 Doun s I: TNSPEcTroD3 MR. = Mature.a>Ah>CA NULK l
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- l. WHY DO WE INSPECT i
! e Baseline inspectable items .
e Verify Pls !
- Fill areas where voids in Pls l
- 11. INSPECTABLE ITEMS !
Basis
- Risk information ,
-Link to cornerstone and desired characteristic l
-Link to Pl
-Risk hierarchy / ruler ,
-Consequence l
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f Ill. PROCESS (How to Apply) e Generic vs. Specific site e Type ofinspection (depth)
- Frequency e Documentation link to assessment l 1 l
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. d DESIRED RESULT - MAINTAIN FUNCTIONALITY OF CONTAINMENT KEY ATTRIBUTE AREAS TO MEASURE INFORMATION NEEDED DESIGN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY Information is needed pertaining to the quality of modifications which can impact the functionality of the containment.
Deficient modifications could impact equipment performance in a s su al Ha an una ausejahm OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY to satisfy the assumed capability in the design basis or nsk assessment. It is assumed that the original design of the containment was confirmed through performance of a baseline MODIFICATION integrated leak rate test for structuralintegrity and tests such as suppression pool bypass for operational capability.
HUMAN PERFORMANCE ROUTINE Routine operations and maintenance human performance data is needed to provide assurance that those routine activities which affect functionality of the containment are performed in a manner so as to maintain the continued functionality. Poor performance in this area would potentially increase risk if errors affect configuration control or equipment / barrier availability or reliability.
Data is needed to provide assurance that post-accident human performance would be at a level to maintain the functionality of POST-ACCIDENT the containment. Risk studies indicate that certain operator actions such as manual depressurization, containment venting, aligning containment or suppression pool cooling, level control in ATWS, inhibiting ADS, and alignment for the recirculation phase can have risk significance. It is assumed that performance during training will provide an indication of performance during an accident.
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PROCEDURE QUALITY RISK-lMPORTANT OPS, Data is needed to provide assurance that the risk-significant MAINT. AND SURs procedures for routine operation, maintenance, and testing of PROCEDURES systems and cow.penents which are important for maintaining the functionality of containment are of sufficently high quality.
Inadequate procedure quality would potentially increase risk through adverse impact on configuration control or ,
equipment / barrier availability or reliability. .
Data is needed to provide assurance that the quality of EMERGENCY OPERATING changes to emergency operating procedures is sufficier 'lly high PROCEDURES to provide appropriate guidance to operators for maintaloing the functionality of the containment. Certain operator actons in the emergency operating piecedures have risk significance. It is assumed that the baseline quality of the procedures has been verified and that information is needed only on risk-significant changes to the procedures.
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.3 CONFIGURATION CONTAINMENT BOUNDARY Ensuring that the containment structure (includmg support MANAGEMENT PRESERVED systems and ccTvmc-nts) is maintained in a condition ready to accept a design basis or severe accident is paramount to ensuring that risk from plant operation (power and shut down) is minimized. As such, it is important to assess licensee performance with respect to maintaining the risk-signiisnt ;
containment SSC's in their proper (assumed) condition. ,
Licensee personnel must ensure that routme conduct of activities (operations, maintenance, surveillance) does not result in equipment configurations outside of that which is required or assumed in the risk assessment. Procedures CONTAINMENT DESIGN which when Whd have h potential to aM PARAMETERS required / assumed configurations must also be carefully ,
PRESERVED developed to ensure that misalignment of containment :
systems / penetrations does not result. .
Must ensure that containment design parameters such as :
suppression pool level and temperature, drywell ambient temperature, containment pressure and inerted environment are maintained in a condition ready to accept a DBA or severe !
I accident. !
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EOUlPMENT/ BARRIER CONTAINMENT LEAK Specific measurement is not needed to conclude that PERFORMANCE TIGHT INTEGRITY containment structural integrity, in conjunction with containment .
isolation provisions, will limit containment leakage to a level :
which represents a small frachon of plant risti.
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION information is neoded to confirm that there is a high probability SYSTEMS AND that the containment will be successfully isolated when called .
COMPONENTS upon during an event. This includes automatic isolation and
' RELIABILITY AND manual actions to effect closure. ,
AVAILABILITY Information is needed to confirm that there is a high probability RISK IMPORTANT that the systems required to maintain containment integrity will I SUPPORT SYSTEMS be avai'.able and will function when called upon during an r FUNCTION WHEN event. i CHALLENGED j t
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