ML20196J572
| ML20196J572 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Millstone  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/1998 |
| From: | Travers W NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Kenyon B NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY CO. |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196J576 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-423-97-206, EA-97-562, NUDOCS 9812100132 | |
| Download: ML20196J572 (5) | |
See also: IR 05000423/1997206
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 300eMem
March 9,1998
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EA 97-562
Mr. Bruce D. Kenyon
President and Chief Executive Officer
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
P.O. Box 128
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Waterford, CT 06385
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SUBJECT:
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENAL
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$55,000 and EXERCISE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION
(NRC Inspection Report No. 50-423/97-206)
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Dear Mr. Kenyon:
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This letter refers to the NRC inspection conducted between August 18-29 and September 8-19,
1997, at Millstone Unit 3, the findings of which were discussed with your staff during an exit
n'eeting on September 24,1997. The inspection included a safety system functional inspection
(S'iF1) of the emergency core cooling and sealinjection functions of the chemical volume and
cor trol system to review the capability of the system to perform the safety functions required by
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it; design basis. The inspection also assessed whether the system adhered to its design and
licensing bases, whether the as-built configuration was consistent with the Final Safety Analysis
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Report, and whether system operations were in accordance with the plant technical
specifications. The inspection report was sent to you on December 5,1997.
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You have been conducting assessments, principally through the Millstone Unit 3 Configuration
Management Plan (CMP), to provide assurance that Unit 3 is in conformance with its design
and licensing bases. On August 14,1996, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Northeast
Nuclear Energy Company requiring that an independent organization conduct a multi-
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disciplinary review of Millstone Units 1,2, and 3. The review is to provide independent
verification that the CMP has identified and resolved existing problems and put into place
effective programs and processes for effective configuration management. Sargent and Lundy
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has been conducting this independent review for Unit 3. The inspection resulting in the findings
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described below was conducted as part of the NRC review of the Millstone Unit 3 restart review
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process, as described in SECY 97 003 dated January 3,1997. The inspection was one of
several planned to verify the effectiveness of your CMP efforts.
' During the inspection, several violations of NRC's requirements were identified and forwarded
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to you with the Notice of Violation that was included with the NRC's December 5,1997, letter
transmitting the inspection report. In addition, enforcement action for two apparent violations of
NRC requirements was held in abeyance pending the conduct of an open Predecisional
Enforcement Conference with you and members of your staff on January 13,1998, to discuss
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the apparent violations, their causes, and your' corrective actions.
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Based on the information developed during the inspections, and the information provided during
the conference, the NRC has concluded that both of the apparent violations set forth in the
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9812100132 980309
ADOCK 05000423
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inspection report constitute violations of NRC requirements. Both violations involvo your failure
to take adequate action to correct conditions adverse to quality at your facility. However, as
described further in this letter, only one of the two violations is being cited and is described in
the enclosed Notice of Violation. With respect to the violation being cited, the NRC determined
that you failed to identify, despite prior opportunities, the potential for air in certain portions of
the recirculation spray system (RSS) to be swept into the suction of the charging and safety
injection pumps during the recirculation phase of a loss-of-coolant accident. This required an
evaluation to determine whether reduced pump performance or even air binding of the pumps
could have resulted. With respect to the second violation, the NRC determined that you did not
identify, until June 1997, an inadequacy in your Technical Specification-required program to
minimize leakage outside the containment. Specifically, your program did not account for
potential valve leakage from systems which could carry highly radioactive water to the refueling
water storage tank following a postulated accident.
With respect to the first violation, you contended at the enforcement conference that the actual
safety significance of the violation was low, noting your determination that the pumps would
have performed satisfactorily. This determination was based on your recent assessment which
indicated that the total volume of air was small; the predicted void fractions were also small and
would occur over a short duration; and the air entrainment would be well below void fraction
acceptance criteria. Your assessment included a detailed analytical evaluation, and one-
quarter scale model testing. Based on our assessment of your analysis and testing, the NRC
staff has determined that this issue does net impact the functionality of the system, but does
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involve a nonconformance with the Unit 3 licensing bases.
This violation is of regulatory concem because, as you acknowledged at the conference, you
missed prior opportunities, both in the past as well as more recently, to identify this condition.
On August 22,1985, you initiated Design Deficiency Report (DDR) No. 641. That DDR
discussed the potential for air in the recirculation spray system to be injected into the suction of
the charging and safety injection pumps. However, due to the limited scope of the DDR, it did
not result in the identification of the piping of concem.
NRC Information Notice (IN) 88-23, " Potential for Gas Binding of High Pressure Safety injection
Pumps," and its supplements thoroughly discussed the potential for, and the adverse effect of,
gas /alr being trapped in safety systems and subsequently entrained, including the suction
piping of emergency core cooling pumps. However, your evaluation of IN 88-23, including
Supplements 1 through 4, did not identify that there was air in the RSS pump discharge and
suction piping of the charging and high-pressure safety injection pamps. Although the IN and
its supplements did not specifically address the Unit 3 configuration, a thorough review of the
system based on the IN should have identified this issue.
Additionally, your CMP, which was specifica!!y designed to identify such issues, did not do so in
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this case. At the conference, you recognized the significance of this regulatory concem and
indicated that you did not adequately consider, as part of your efforts, the interaction of standby
safety systems on normally operating systems. The failure to identify and correct conditions
advarse to quality was, in part, the basis for the $2,100,000 civil penalty issued by the NRC to
Northeast Nuclear Energy Company on December 10,1997. Given the regulatory significance
of your failure to identify this condition, the violation is classified at Severity Level ill in
accordance with the " General Statement of Policy and Procedures for NRC Enforcement
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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Action, (NUREG-1600) (Enforcement Policy). This violation could have been classified at
Severity Level 11 if it were determined that the pumps would not perform satisfactorily.
In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, th's base civil penalty amount for this Severity Level
lli violation is $55,000. Your facility has been the subject of escalated enforcement actions
within the last two years, as already noted herein; therefore, the NRC considered whether credit
was warranted for /dentification and Conective Action in accordance with the civil penalty
assessment process in Section VI.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Credit is not warranted for
identification since the violation was identified by the NRC, and you had opportunities to identify
the violation sooner. With respect to your corrective actions, a number of actions have been
taken, including (1) performance of an integrated system functional review and revision to
appropriate procedures; (2) a review of the system to determine any further possibility of
air / filling and venting problems; (3) a detailed engineering analysis of the impact of air
entrapment on system operation; and (4) a horizontal review to check that air binding would not
adversely affect the operability of other safety systems. In addition, you supplemented the
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information presented at the conference in your letter dated February 2/1998, regarding
actions to more completely address consideration of industry experience, including NRC ins.
Our understanding of the commitment made in that letter is that the screening of ins and actual
review of those found noteworthy will be completed before Unit 3 enters mode 2. The above
corrective actions, which included reviews to determine if other safety systems could be
impacted, have been determined to be effective by the NRC staff. Thus, the promptness ai
comprehensiveness of these actions preceding entry into mode 2 are appropriate to warra'
corrective action credit. Additionally, based on the effective corrective actions taken in
response to this NRC finding, the staff has decided not to expand the scope of our ongoing
review of Unit 3 licensing and design bases conformance. This determination is consistent with
the process being used by the NRC staff as described in my letter to you dated January 30,
1998. Our ongoing reviews of Unit 3 licensing and design bases conformance willinclude
continued assessments to determine if any expansion in the scope of our reviews is warranted.
Therefore, to emphasize the significance that the NRC attaches to this issue, as well se te
importance of ensuring prompt and comprehensive identification and correction of conditions
adverse to quality when they exist, I have been authorized, after consultation with the Director,
Office of Enforcement, to issue a civil penalty in the amount of $55,000 for the violation in the
enclosed Notice. The NRC did consider whether to exercise discretion and not issue a penalty
in this case in view of the NRC issuance of the $2,100,000 civil penalty on December 10,1997,
and the fact that you are in a shutdown condition and will not be authorized to restart until the
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NRC is satisfied with your CMP efforts. Nonetheless, given the regulatory significance of your
failure to identify the aforementioned condition through your recent CMP reviews, I have
decided that such discretion should not be exercised.
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With respect to the second violation, since the violation was identified by your staff prior to the
NRC inspection, and it involves an old design issue that precedes the shutdown, I have
decided, after consultation with the Director, Office of Enforcement, to exercise discretion in
accordance with Section Vll.B.2 of the Enforcement Policy and not issue a Notice of Violation or
a civil penalty for that vietation. However, the NRC is concemed that although the NRC also
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identified this concem in September 1997, it took until December for you to recognize that your
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staff had previously identified this problem in June 1997, and had already placed it in the
corrective action process to be completed before restart.
You are required to respond to this letter and should follow the instructions specified in the
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enclosed Notice when preparing your response. The NRC will use your response, in part, to
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determine whether further enforcement action is necessary to ensure compliance with
regulatory requirements.
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In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's " Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter, and its
enclosure, and your response, will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR).
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Sincerely,
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William D. Travers, Director
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Special Projects Office
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
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Docket No. 50423
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License No. NPF-49
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Enclosure:
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1. Notice of Violation and
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Proposed imposition of Civil Penalty
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Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
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ccw/enci:
P. Loftus, Director- Regulatory Affairs
M. Brothers, Vice President - Operations
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J. McElwain, Acting Vice President - Millstone Unit 3
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J. Streeter, Vice President, Nuclear Oversight
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G. Hicks, Unit Director- Millstone Unit 3
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M. Ross, Manager - Nuclear Training Assessment Group
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D. Amerine, Vice President for Engineering and Support Services
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F. Rothen, Vice President, Work Services
J. Stankiewicz, Training Recovery Manager
R. Johannes, Director - Nuclear Training
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S. Sherman, Audits and Evaluation
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L. Cuoco. Esquire
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J. Egan, Esquire
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V. Juliano, Waterford Library
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J. Buckingham, Department of Public Utility Control
S. B. Comley, We The People
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State of Connecticut SLO Designee
D. Katz, Citizens Awareness Network (CAN)
R. Bassilakis, CAN
J. Block, Attomey, CAN
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S. Luxton, Citizens Regulatory Commission (CRC)
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Representative T. Concannon
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E. Woollacott, Co-Chairman, NEAC
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