ML20196G348
| ML20196G348 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/27/1999 |
| From: | Mcgaffigan E NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Vietticook A NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196G313 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-99-100-C, NUDOCS 9907010132 | |
| Download: ML20196G348 (4) | |
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NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET TO: Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary l
FROM: COMMISSIONER MCGAFFIGAN
SUBJECT:
SECY-99-100 - FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-INFORMED REGULATION IN THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS Approved Y Disapproved Abstain Not Participating i
COMMENTS:
l See attached corraents. ;
I SIGN TURE (f U U
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DATE Entered on"AS" Yes I No l
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Commissioner McGaffiaan's Comments on SECY-99-100 l approve the staff recommendation to begin implementation of a framework for risk-informed regulation of materials uses and I offer the following comments for the staff's consideration.
General Comments:
I share Commissioner Merrifield's concern regarding the potential resource impact associated with reprogramming within the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards to fully support the proposed framework. I also agree with Commissioner Merrifield that the staff should keep the Commission informed of potential delays in or adverse effects to other products identified as high priority by the Commission. l l
Moreover, I have more fundamental concems with applying a risk framework across the materials program and they are as follows.
o First, the paper indicates that the first step in implementing the risk assessment framework will be to identify the specific regulatory applications that are amenable to
- expanded use of risk assessment information and that, as part of the process, consideration will be given to costs versus benefits.- In my opinion, cost versus benefit is a very critical factor in the decision making process, it is conceivable that there are materials uses where the benefit from applying risk assessment information for the purposes of reducing risk or regulatory burden is not obvious or is negligible and the associated cost is unacceptable to NRC or its licensees. I would not expect the staff to blindly apply a new risk management strategy in such cases. Rather, the expected payoff of applying a new strategy must be worth the totalinvestment.
o Secondly, it is conceivable that the existing generation of risk assessment tools, which l were designed primarily for application to nuclear power reactors and nuclear waste repositories, are inadequate to address the unique and wide variety of risks and contributing factors pYcent in the materials use arena. For example, some materials use systems rely almW entirely on the human / device interface with a minimal or no independent verification system to prevent an accident, e.g., portable industrial devices.
o . Third, as the paper points out, the risk associated with reactors derives primarily from ,
low-probability, high-consequence events whereas the risk associated with materials uses and disposal derives primarily from higher probability, low-consequence events.
-This difference could necessitate the use of different risic goals depending on cost-benefit considerations or other factors that may vary from one materials use to another.
The staff should remain ever mindful of this important difference when detennining I whether a specific regulatory application is amenable to the use d risk assessment
- information, particularly in cases where its use has been non-existent or extremely limited in the past.
o Finally, unlike the power reactor program, the national materials program includes an Agreement State component that must be factored into the decision making process to ,
avoid duplication, gaps, or conflicts in the national program.
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1 do not agree with Chairman Jackson's comment that the staff should proceed at this time to develop a materials safety goal to define what " safety" means for the materials program. I strongly believe that developing a materials safety goal is premature due to the lack of staff, 1 industry and Commission experience in this area. Moreover, the use of an enhanced I participatory process to define the safety goal would be extremely resource intensive for a program that must divert significant resources from other materials program areas just to ,
support the framework proposed by the staff. In my opinion, the staff should implement the l proposed framework, gain experience with applying available risk assessment tools and !
analyzing outcomes, and conduct further analyses before making any recommendation to the !
Commission on whether a single safety goal or range of safety goals is appropriate. Hence, this j effort would more appropriately be considered a long-range program goal rather than an I intermediate one. I would also note that the staff effort to develop a safety goal for the reactor program was resource intensive and has not proven to be particularly useful for industry or NRC. In fact, the reactor safety goal policy statement is currently being considered for revision. l an effort that I suspect will prove difficult and controversial. Even NRC's Advisory Committee on l Reactor Safeguards (ACRS), who is the foremost advocate for revising the reactor safety goal, !
in its April 19,1999 letter to the Chairman, expresses concerns over the time and effort involved in revising the reactor safety goal and developing an overarching safety goal that would apply to alllicensees. I also agree with the observation of some ACRS members who would like to see i
" progress that provides practical benefits" before the scope of the policy statement is broadened ;
and who believe that efforts to develop an overarching safety goal would " divert resources from other more important activities, without sufficient likelihood of near-term results." Clearly, it is premature to make development of a safety goal for the materials program a high priority for the risk assessment program.
Specific Comments:
- 1. Transportation - The paper states that the staff intends to encourage more risk-informed decision making with the Department of Transportation (DOT) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). As part of this effort, the staff should work with DOT and IAEA to revise the current IAEA removable contamination standard of 4Bq/cm2 for transportation packages, since it was originally derived for hand-held small packages and not spent nuclear fuel transportation casks, and since it appears to me to go well beyond any health or safety requirement.
- 2. Clearance --It is not clear from reviewing the charts in Attachments 2 and 3 which group of materials uses the current clearancc, rulemaking effort falls into.
- 3. Part 20 -- The paper states that more restrictive Part 20 limits are being considered for speciEc activities or sources. I believe any consideration of Part 20 limits must include a look at implementation of the dose limits and methodologies contained in Report No. 60 of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP). Also, it is clear from the l April 1999 First Review Meeting Summary Report of the Convention on Nuclear Safety
! that the United States is increasingly isolated in not having adopted ICRP 60's recommendations in our rules and practices.
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- 4. Uranium Recovery - The paper states that the Center for Nuclear Waste Regulatory Analyses (CNWRA) is starting a project to assess the risks associated with in-situ leach ;
extraction of uranium and that the risk insights gained will be used to support risk- !
informed rulemaking for such facilities. It is unclear how or when the CNWRA's findings t will be considered by the staff when addressing any Commission direction that may result from a decision on SECY-99-013, " Recommendations on Ways to improve the Efficiency of NRC Regulation at in Sifu Leach Uranium Recovery Facilities" currently ;
before the Commission. !
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