ML20196F931

Application for Amend to License DPR-61,revising Tech Spec 3.6.B.2 Re Renumbering of Manual High Pressure Safety Injection Throttle Valves for Consistency W/Plant Loop Numbering Scheme

ML20196F931
Person / Time
Site:	Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png
Issue date:	02/25/1988
From:	Mroczka E CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
Shared Package
ML20196F935	List: B12828, Proposed Tech Specs,Renumbering Manual High Pressure Safety Injection Throttle Valves for Consistency W/Plant Loop Numbering Scheme ML20196F931
References
B12828, NUDOCS 8803040265
Download: ML20196F931 (4)

Text

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e CONNECTICUT YANKEE AT O MIC POWER COMPANY B E R L I N, CONNECTICUT P O. BOX 270 e HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 061414270 February 25, 1988

' " " Docket No. 50-213 812828 Re: 10CFR50.90 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant Proposed Revision to Technical Specifications Emeraency Core Coolina System Pursuant to 10CFR50.90, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (CYAPCO) hereby proposes to amend its Operating License, DPR-61, by incorporating the attached proposed changes into the technical specifications of the Haddam Neck Plant.

The proposed changes renumber the manual high pressure safety injection (HPSI) throttle valves in Specification 3.6.B.2 to be consistent with the plant loop numbering scheme. The applicability statement for Specification 3.6.B.2 has also been changed from "Prior to startup from cold shutdown (MODE 5)" to "On startup prior to entering MODE 4" in order to be more concise and MODE specific. In addition, the Basis for Specification 3.6 has been clarified.

Discussion The manual valves, SI-V-905, 906, 907, and 908, have been renumbered to be consistent with the plant loop numbering scheme. Specifically, the proposed change would associate valves SI-V-905, 906, 907 and 908 with loops 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Valves SI-V-905, 906, 907 and 908 are currently associated with loops 4, 3,1, 2, respectively. This proposed change has no impact on safety since the valves are identical and their throttle positions have been established by test for the proper loop.

The proposed change in the applicability statement for Specification 3.6.B.2 is essentially the same as the current requirement since in both cases these valves are required to be in their correct position prior to making the transition from HODE 5 to MODE 4. The HPSI throttle valves (SI V-905 through 908) are not required to be OPERABLE until the plant is in MODE 3 while the core deluge valve (SI-V-873) is required for MODE 4 operation. In both cases, this proposed change ensures that the valves are properly positioned and secured before they are required to be OPERABLE. r\0? g i[t 8803040265 800225 W PDR P

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission B12828/Page 2 February 25, 1988 The basis has been revised to describe more accurately the safety limits that must not be exceeded during a loss of coolant accident. The current basis states "Based on the loss of coolant accident analysis melting of the cladding is prevented with only one high pressure safety injection pump and one low pressure safety injection pump in operation." The proposed change revises this to read (core deluge)"Based on the loss of coolant accident analy exceeging the Interim Acceptance Criteria clad temperature safety limit (2300 F) is prevented with only one high pressure safety injection pump and one_ low pressure safety injection (core deluge) pump in operation."

Sionificant Hazards Consideration In accordance with 10CFR50.92, CYAPC0 has reviewed the attached proposed changes and has concluded that they do not involve a significant hazards consideration. The basis for this conclusion is that the three criteria of 10CFR50.92(c) are not compromised; a conclusion which is supported by our determinations discussed below. The proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration because the change would not:

1. Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the Safety Analysis Report is not increased since the proposed changes only renumber the valves and clarify the action statement.

2. Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the Safety Analysis Report is not created since the normal operating conditions of the plant are unaffected. The change to the action statement clarifies that the core deluge valve and HPSI throttle valves are properly positioned and secured before they are required to be OPERA 3LE.

Since no physical plant changes are planned and since the ECCS performance will not be adversely affected, there is no adverse effect on plant response.

There are no failure modes associated with the proposed changes which could represent a new unanalyzed accident. The proposed changes do not adversely impact the probability of any accident.

3. Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The margin of safety, as defined in the basis for any technical specification is not reduced since the proposed changes do not diminish the ECCS accident mitigation capability and thereby do not impact the consequences to the protective boundaries.

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l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission l 812828/Page 3 t February 25, 1988 j Moreover, the Comission has provided guidance concerning the application of l standards set forth in 10CFR50.92 by providing certain examples  !

(March 6, 1986, FR 7751) of mendments that are considered not likely to t involve a significant hazards consideration. The changes proposed herein are  !

most closely enveloped by example (1), a purely administrative change to ,

technical specifications. The proposed changes reword existing requirements ,

and renumber existing valves.

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Since the proposed changes do not change the ECCS configuration, the probability of occurrence of a design basis accident is unchanged. Since the proposed changes neither diminish ECCS LOCA mitigation capability nor affect the normal operating condition of the plant, the safety margin as specified in the basis of the technical specifications remains valid and thus the consequences of the design basis ar.cidents are not impacted. Therefore, the proposed changes would r.ot involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Haddam Neck Plant Nuclear Review Board has reviewed and approved the attached proposed revision and concurs with the above determinations.

In accordance with 10CFR50.91(b), CYAPC0 will provide the State of Connecticut with a copy of this proposed amendment.

Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR170.12(c), enclosed with this amendment request is application fee of $150.00.

Very truly yours, CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY I .D . h oev; E. J. Mroczka Senior Vice President L 4 By: C. F. Sears Vice President cc: Mr. Kevin McCarthy Director, Radiation Control Unit Department of Environmental Protection Hartford, CT 06116 W. T. Russell, Region ! Administrator A. B. Wang, NRC Project Manager, Haddam Neck Plant J. T. Shediosky, Resident inspector, Haddam Neck Plant

. . 1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission B12828/Page 4 February 25, 1988 STATEOFCONNECTICUT)

) ss. Berlin COUNTY OF HARTFORD )

Then personally appeared before me C. F. Sears, who being duly sworn, did state that he is Vice ' President of Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company a Licensee herein, that he is authorized to . execute and file the foregoing information in the name and on behalf of the Licensees herein and that the statements contained in said information are true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.

JAf2Mub

. Notary Putffc xh M?/

My Commission Expires March 31,1988

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