ML20196A965
| ML20196A965 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/03/1999 |
| From: | Diaz N NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Hoyle J NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196A940 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-99-007-C, SECY-99-7-C, NUDOCS 9906230048 | |
| Download: ML20196A965 (2) | |
Text
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NOTATION VOTE i
RESPONSE SHEET TO:
John C. Hoyle, Secretary FROM:
COMMISSIONER DIAZ
SUBJECT:
SECY-99-007 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS j
Approved xx 0 Disapproved Abstain Not Participating COMMENTS:
See attached comments.
J SIGNATUR$ M
/
2/ 3 /99 DATE Entered on "AS" Yes No 1
9904230048 990618 RESP DE E PDR
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COMMISSIONER DIAZ'S COMMENTS ON SECY-99-007 - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS 1 commend the staff for the effort that they have put into this significant upgrade of the NRC's inspection, assessment, and enforcement (IA&E) processes. The proposals contained in SECY-99-007 are sound, and, when implemented, will become a driving force in moving the i
NRO toward being a more risk-informad agency, recasting the regulatory environment into a more transparent, stable, and predicta. ole construct providing due process. I approve the staff's proposal in SECY-99-007, and urge them to vigorously proceed with the prograrn's implementation, including the pilots. As it further refines the IA&E processes, the staff should I
consider the following:
A.
In implementing the program, the staff and stakeholders should remain cognizant of the
_ potential conflict between the risk-informed and deterministic components'of this proposal. The risk-informed component will, by its nature, be relatively pret. ictable and self-limiting; in contrast, experience has shown that deterministic elements tend to grow beyond their original botmds. This conflict could establish conditions for deterministic drivers to eventually ove; whelm the risk-informed base, to the detriment of the gains achieved by the staff and stakeholder efforts thus far. Everyone should recognize that this hybrid proposal is a good, solid and necessary ;.sp, but it is not the end of the evolution that is taking place. Only when risk-infon ed regulations are embedded in the regulatory fabric can stability be preserved. Therefore, the development of this process must be paired with that of making the regulatory structure for all reactor regulation (10 CFR Part 50) risk-informed; this way, we can ensure consistency between the regulations on the books and tnose we enforce. The staff and stakeholders must continue the effort along this path to ensure that, when we are finished, the restructured IA&E processes are based on a risk-informed Part 50; stability, balance and consistency will then be achieved.
t B.
As it refines the Conceptual Model for Evaluating Licensee Performance Indicators, the staff should define the terms " acceptable performance" and " unacceptable. performance" with precision to ensure consistency with our regulatory mandate. Additionally, the fifth, and lowest, performance category (" unsafe") is not germane to IA&E, since the NRC will
. not permit unsafe plants to operate.
C.
The staff should use the April,1999 Senior Management Meeting as a pilot for the Agency Action Review proposed in SECY-99-007. This meeting will provide a significant opportunity to,begin using the new approach at the highest levels without' adverse impact on safety. Concurrently, the SALP program should be finally terminated, since this j
proposal, if approved by the Commission, no longer needs the SALP processes for assessing plant performance.
' D.
The current efforts to revise the enforcement policy, particularly regarding regulatory significance and minor violations, thould be closely harmonized with the process changes thet will be made as a result of SECY-99-007.
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