ML20196A698
| ML20196A698 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 04/18/1999 |
| From: | Shirley Ann Jackson, The Chairman NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | Vietticook A NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196A689 | List: |
| References | |
| SECY-99-007-C, SECY-99-7-C, NUDOCS 9906220289 | |
| Download: ML20196A698 (4) | |
Text
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NOTATION VOTE RESPONSE SHEET
' TO:
Annette Vietti-Cook, Secretary FROM:
CHAIRMAN JACKSON
SUBJECT:
SECY-99-007A - RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS (FOLLOW-UP TO SECY-99-007) w/ comment Approved x
Disapproved Abstain Not Participating COMMENTS:
i SEE ATTACHED COMMENT i
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SIGNA 14JRE
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Alifl99 DATE Entered on "AS" Yes X
No 9906220289 990618
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Eo"nnes N oe$ e*POR i
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n Chairman Jackson's Comments on SECY-99-007A I again congratulate the staff for the progress made to date in the development of a new reactor oversight program. I approve of the scope and concepts of the recommended changes to the process and its continued development; in addition to the comments I provided in my vote on SECY-99-007, I would l
offer the following comments on the staff proposal for a new reactor oversight program:
I share the concerns expressed by Commissioner McGaffigan at the March 26,1999, Commission briefing on this subject regarding the amount of time which may be required for a satisfactory pilot program to be completed. While it is important that the staff meet the
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- milestones. established for the development of this key program, timeliness can not be more
. important than' ensuring that the proposed program has been properly evaluated. Therefore, the staff should notify the Commission if it is determined that additional time is required to execute '
the pilot program.
While the Significance Detennination Process (SDP) developed by the staff represents a laudable first attempt to incorporate risk into the assessment ofinspection findings, it is clearly limited in utility due to the failure of the process to consider the deterministic component of a risk-informed regulatory approach (evidenced amply by the numbers ofinspection findings which were not amenable to the SDP in the feasibility study described by the staff). Other limitations include:
' The process can only assess hardware issues or, possibly, issues which impact hardware. Issues such as sleeping or inattentive operators, programmatic breakdowns, and corrective actions do not appear to be covered by this methodology.
The risk tables included in the paper appear to be generic in nature. Actual plant-specific risk does not appear to be addressed.
- It is unclear to me from a reading of SECY-99-007A and its predecessor SECY-99-007 how a f particular inspection finding will impact the NRC assessment oflicensee performance under a
. particular cornerstone. While the feasibility study results demonstrated recommended agency
' actions for a number of significant inspection findings, the paper did not explain how a single inspection finding impacted the overall rating for a particular cornerstone or how long the impact of the particular finding would impact the overall assessment (e.g. would a single " red" inspection finding only impact the assessment for a particular cornerstone until the condition was corrected, until the next assessment, until the end of the assessment cycle, or for some other period?). The staff should continue the development of the assessment process and inform the Commission on how this ' aspect of the process will be treated.
The proposed changes to the enforcement policy appear to lack an ability to address a
programmatic breakdowns (e:g. breakdown of a corrective actions program or aspects of a particular quality assurance program). As such problems could occur exclusive of performance indicator declines, the staff should consider ways to address these breakdowns in both the
. assessment and enforcement programs. I view these issues as different from issues involving many minor findings. For example, identifying design errors which indicate a lack of proper configuration management on a broad scale may demand agency actions before performance
. indicator data reflect this condition. The assessment and enforcement programs must be sufficiently robust to address these issues.
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The proposed treatment of violations involving " actions that may impact the NRC's ability for
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oversight of licensee activities" (defined as reporting issues, failures under 50.59, 50.54(a),
50.54(p), and failure to provide NRC with complete and accurate information or to maintain I
accurate records) appears sound. However, a potential exists that this class of violations may become the " regulatory significance" category of the new process. To ensure predictability,.
' objectivity, and scrutability, the staff should ensure that violations included under this provision are defined explicitly.
The staff states that, while there will be a significant reduction in the number of civil penalties issued under the proposed plan, the staff may wish to issue civil penalties for "particularly significant violations." The staff should provide explicit criteria for determining what falls into this category.
' In my view, the staff proposals on changes to the enforcement process relating to the significance of a particular violation complicates, rather than simplifies, the process. Instead of having four levels of significance for violations of agency requirements (five if non-cited violations are considered), the staff essentially proposes six categories, depending upon how significance is established. If the SDP process is utilized, the staff describes "significant violations"(which may actually have four, color coded, subcategories)," violations," and "non-cited violations." If the traditional approach is utilized (for issues not amenable to the SDP process), the staff proposes violations involving the traditional severity levels and non-cited violations. While I do not dispute the staff contention that ascribing significance to issues such as willful violations will, necessarily, be different from ascribing significance to violations which can be considered in a risk-informed analysis, I do not see the need for characterizing the ultimate agency action differently for the two cases. If a willful violation is characterized as being significant by
- whatever means ofsigmficance determination the stafapplies, there appears to be no reason why it can not be formally characterized as a "significant violation" in a manner similar to that offered
- for SDP-related violations. The staff should reconsider the proposed violation categories with the goal of making the ultimate statement of significance for a particular violation cor.sistent and understandable to all of our stakeholders and address this issue when changes to the enforcement
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policy are submitted to the Commission.
1 While the staff has provided assurances that the appropriate agency-level action meetings will be conducted on an as-needed basis for significant performance declines which are identified within an assessment cycle, such an explanation begs the question of why a scheduled meeting is necessary at all. This practice (annual meetings) seems analogous to the placement of a plant on j
the Watch List - by the time the plant is on the list, the level of NRC activity has already escalated to the point that the Watch List designator adds little to the overall agency response.
Because this meeting is focused on plants with severely degraded performance (indicating that
. only a few plants, if any, would be considered), the staff should consider an approach which would convene such a meeting whenever needed to affirm an intended agency-level action as a practice, rather than conducting the meeting on a regular periodicity. Such a meeting could be part of, or in addition to, an annual meeting which could accomplish additional management and i
coordination objectives.
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.With respect to the noteworthy changes to SECY-99-007:
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The alignment of performance goals to industry performance goals (described in the context of green-white thresholds for the BWR RHR and the PWR HPSI systems) does not appear risk-informed. NRC should develop its own performance goals based on risk information.
l The change in the green-white threshold for emergency ac power due to the granting of J
limited two-week allowed outage times (AOTs) by the NRC fails to recognize that not.
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all licensees have justified such AOTs. This performance threshold should be risk-informed and made plant-specific.
The performance indicator table remains generic in nature. The significance of'the 4
safety systems chosen for monitoring and the thresholds established do not necessarily -
reflect the reality found in the field. Staff should consider, as part of the pilot, the need for developing plant-specific performance indicator tables, taking into account plant-specific vulnerabilities. Other applicable aspects of the proposed oversight program should similarly be made plant-specific (e.g., SDP tables).
'With respect to success criteria associated with pilot programs:
Resource expenditures are to be within a 25% spread at 8 of the 9 sites selected to indicate one aspect of program success. The staff should ensure that inspectors (who may be well-acquainted with hourly goals for a given inspection procedure) do not create a self-fulfilling prophesy by limiting their efforts to the target hours for a given procedure. The ultimate goal of the risk-informed baseline inspection program must be the acqcisition of sufficient licensee performance information (bot'. in terms of indicators and inspection findings) for the 14RC to conclude imlependently that reasonable assurance of safety exists for a particular site. Therefore, it is the attainment of this objective, and not meeting resource goals, that will derme success.
A criterion is establithed for resources expended with success dermed as a 15%
reduction in expenditures over the core program. This presupposes that a reduction in resources is a goal of the program. An original goal in the development of this program was that resource dema'nds would be defined by a risk-informed baseline program. Establishing resource demands artificially is inconsistent with this goal. If a risk-informed approach is to be employed, the staff should be as willing to accept, for example, a 15% increase in re ources as it is to accept a 15% decrease.
The staff has prepared.an impressive plan to communicate with both internal and external stakeholders. In addition to the plans documented in the subject paper, the staff should consider involving citizens local to the pilot program plant as a test of
- whether the staff communication efforts are having their intended effects. Specifically, the staff should consider involving representatives of local governments or emergency planning agencies to ensure that the NRC is communicating effectively with these important stakeholders. It may be desirable to conduct facilitated information exchange (e.g., round table meetings) with local stakeholders to solicit, in a consistent manner, structured feedback on the pilot.