ML20195G532
| ML20195G532 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/02/1999 |
| From: | Murphy W Committee To Review Generic Requirements |
| To: | Travers W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9906160097 | |
| Download: ML20195G532 (58) | |
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[. k UNITED STATES l L 2 S NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
! I f- WASHINGTON, D.C. 20556 0001
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,$ June 2, 1999 l
I MEMORANDUM TO: William D. Travers Executive Director for Operations FROM: Joseph A. Murphy, Chairman I I l Committee To Review Generic quir ments
SUBJECT:
MINUTES OF THE CRGR MEETINGS NUMBER 339 AND 340 )
The Committee To Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) met on Tuesday, April 13,1999, i from 10:00 am to 12:00 noon to hold the Committee's 339* meeting. This was a closed session I to discuss the CRGR Charter revision. The proceedings of this meeting were reflected in the I draft Charter submitted to the EDO on April 15,1999. Attachment 1 contains the list of attendees.
l l CRGR met on Tuesday, April 27,1999, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. for the Comrnittee's 340*
l meeting. Attachment 2 contains the list of attendees. The following two topics were discussed at this meeting:
item 1:
1 B. Boger and R. Correia, both of NRR, presented for CRGR review and endorsement the draft final amendments to the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). Attachment 3-a contains the presentation material used by the staff. Pending issuance of these minutes, the Committee informed the EDO on April 29,1999, of the issues raised by the Committee (Attachment 3-b).
While CRGR had no objection to sending forward the version which it reviewed at this meeting, the Committee had several comments which it believed could be resolved by the staff without change in the wording of the proposed amendments. However, the Committee recommended !
that the s'.aff should modify the regulatory analysis before the proposed amendments are !
enacted. Subsequently, the Committee received a memorandum, dated May 5,1999, from the l sponsoring Division Director (Attachment 3-c) expressing agreement with three CRGR I comments and disagreement with two others. The Committee responded via a memorandum, j dated May 13,1999 (Attachment 3-d), by (A) Reenforcing that in the regulatory analysis, the licensee voluntary actions should be addressed per Section 4.1 and 4.3 of the " Regulatory Analysis Guidelines," NUREG/BR- l J
0058, Revision 2, dated November 1995, and Section 5.7 of the " Regulatory Analysis [
l l Technical Evaluation Handbook," Final Report, dated August 1997. The Committee ;
recommended that the analysis of voluntary actions be extended to the consideration of ~
all alternatives evaluated, rather than only to the preferred option.
Ob 9906160097 990602 "1 PDR REVGP fWIGCRGR C ) N_ ] { Qhp-4 l- MEETING 339 PDR ~
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- e (B) Clirifying th t it r:gerd:d a cert in stit: ment in tha incoming m:morandum to mean as the staff's commitment to consider the effect of consistency of assumptions and to consider uncertainties when revising Regulatory Guide 1.160.
Subject to these two assertions, the Committee had no objections.
Item 2:
S. Newberry, L. Marsh, and E. Benner, all of NRR, presented for CRGR review a draft Commission paper on the generic communication program revisions. Attachment 4-a contains the staff's presentation material. Pending issuance of the meeting minutes, the Committee .
Informed the EDO on May 3,1999 (Attachment 4-b), of thp issues addressed by the Committee on the subject Commission paper. Significant CRGR recommendations to the staff on this paper included the following:
(1) Once a generic safety issue is identified, consider the step of first going to the NRR Executive Team before going to the industry; (2) Assess preliminary risk implications of the issue at hand when considering urgency of an issue to strengthen the rationale for a proposed generic action; (3) Address pros and cons of information requests pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), with and without citing this regulation; I (4) Consider the parallel effort related to the DSI-13 initiatives; and (5) Clarify when a generic action should be initiated.
i The Committee also suggested that the staff should clarify when an issue would be elevated to a Generic Safety issue level.
In accordance with the EDO's July 18,1983 directive concerning " Feedback and Closure of CRGR Review," a written response is required from the cognizant office to report agreement or disagreement with the CRGR recommendations in these minutes. The response is to be forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recommendations, to the EDO for decision making.
Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Raji Tripathi (415-7584).
w s Commission (5) SECY M. Knapp, DEDE F.Miraglia, DEDO J. Lieberman, OE H. Bell, OlG K. Cyr, OGC J. Larkins, ACRS H. Miller, R-l L. Reyes, R-il J. Dyer, R-Ill E. Merschoff, R-IV C. Paperiello, NMSS A. Thadani, RES S. Collins, NRR B. Boger D. Matthews Distribution (wlatts.): File Center CRGR SF CRGR CF JJohnson, Ril BSheron MVirgilio MF derline JMoore - JMitchell JTreby SNewberry JTappert HTovmassian LMarsh RCorreia TQuay PBatman WScott MReinhart JJohnson, OCM l
i SWong JSharkey JLyons JShapaker DPersinko EBenner G W cst DISK / DOCUMENT NAME: C:\CRGR99\ MINUTES \MTS-339 340.WPD OFFICIAL RECORD COPY To receive a copy, indicate 'C's Copy w/o attachment / enclosure: 'A*fAopy with attachment / enclosure,"N" a No copy NO MARK s NO COPY'
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1 I. 1 W. D. Travers- (B) Clarifying that it regarded a certain statement in the incoming memorandum to mean as the staff's commitment to consider the effect of consistency of assumptions and to consider uncertainties when revising Regulatory Guide 1.160.
Subject to these two assertions, the Committee had no objections.
Item 2:
l l S. Newberry, L. Marsh, and E. Benner, all of NRR, presented for CRGR review a draft (
l Commission paper on the generic communication program revisions. Attachment 4-a contains I the staff's presentation material. Pending issuance of the meeting minutes, the Committee informed the, EDO on May 3,1999 (Attachment 4-b), of the issues addressed by the Committee on the subject Commission paper. Significant CRGR recommendations to the staff on this paper included the following:
(1) Once a generic safety issue is identified, consider the step of first going to the NRR Executive Team before going to the industry; (2) Assess preliminary risk implications of the issue at hand when considering urgency of an issue to strengthen the rationale for a proposed generic action; (3) Address pros and cons of information requests pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f), with and without citing this regulation; (4) Consider the parallel effort related to the DSI-13 initiatives; and (5) Clarify when a generic action should be initiated.
1 The Committee also suggested that the staff should clarify when an issue would be elevated to a Generic Safety issue level.
In accordance with the EDO's July 18,1983 directive concerning " Feedback and Closure of CRGR Review," a written response is required from the cognizant office to report agreement or disagreement with the CRGR recommendations in these minutes. The response is to be l forwarded to the CRGR Chairman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recommendations, to the EDO for decision making.
Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Raji Tripathi (415-7584).
Attachments: As stated cc w/atts.:
Commission (5) SECY M. Knapp, DEDE
- Miraglia, DEDO J. Lieberman, OE H. Bell, OlG K. Cyr, OGC 2. Larkins, ACRS H. Miller, R-l L. Reyes, R-Il J. Dyer, R-Ill E. Merschoff, R-IV C. Paperiello, NMSS A. Thadani, RES S. Collins, NRR B. Boger, NRR l D. Matthews, NRR i
l
l J
l Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
l Attendance List CRGR No. 339 Meeting l 1 (April 13,1999 - Closed Session)
CRGR MEMBERS OFFICE OF THE EDO J. Murphy (Chairman) M. Knapp J. Johnson (via teleconferencing)
- 8. Sheron E.W. Brach for M. Virgilio M. Federline l J. Moore
\ ,
! CRGR STAFF R. Tripathi G. West (on detail) l l
l l
l l
l l
l ATTACHMENT 1 l
Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
1 1
Attendance List l i CRGR No. 340 Meeting l (April 27,1999) l .
A CRGR MEMBERS NRC Staff J. Murphy (L;1 airman) 8. Boger, NRR J. Johnson (via teleconferencing) , S. Newberry, NRR B. Sheron L. Marsh, NRR M. Virgilio P. Balman, NRR M. Federline R. Correia, NRR J. Rutberg for J. Moore M. Reinhart, NRR l
W. Scott, NRR CRGR STAFF T. Quay, NRR i S. Wong, NRR !
R. Tripathi H. Tovmassian, NRR l G. West (on detail) J. Sharkey OCM/EM ;
J. Lyons, NRR l T. Tappert, NRR l J. Sha'paker, NRR I D. Persinko, NRR E. Benner, NRR ATTACHMENT 2
Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
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CRGR MEMORANDUM TO THE EDO, DATED APRIL 29,1999 I
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April 29,1999 i
MEMORANDUM TO: William J. Travers ,
Executive Director for Operations ,
FROM: Joseph A. Murphy, Chairman Committee to Review Generic Re ire nts
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MAINTENANCE RULE -
The Committee to Review Generiefequirements (CRGR) met on Tuesday, April 27,1999, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. At this meeting, the staff presented for CRGR review and endorse /nent the draft final amendments to the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). Pending issuance of the final meeting minutes, the purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of the issues raised by the Committee.
While CRGR had several comments, we believe they can be resolved by the staff without change in the wording of the proposed amendments to the rule which we reviewed. However, the Regulatory Analysis does need to be modified before the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 50.65 are enacted. Although we had no objection to sending forward the version which the Committee had reviewed at the meeting, it is our understanding that the rule package may have been revised since then, and we have not seen the later draft. The Attachment contains details of the Committee's comments and recommendations on the version which we reviewed at the CRGR meeting.
As always, I am available to discuss this matter further.
Attachment:
As stated cc: F. Miraglia M. Knapp J. Johnson, Ril B. Sheron M. Virgilio M. Federline J. Moore B. Boger I
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CRGR Comments and Recommendations On Draft Final Amendments to 10 CFR 50,65 .
(CRGR Meeting No. 340, April 27,1999)
- 1. The staff did not seek CRGR endorsement of the revised draft Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60. However, without reviewing this guide and the associated inspection guidance, the Committee remains concerned about understanding the impacts associated with implementation of this rule, and the potential for inconsistent decisions on the part of the licensees and NRC inspectors regarding unacceptable configurations. -
Because the detail is in the guidance document, including the scope of the SSCs, CRGR requested the opportunity to review the revised RG 1.60 and the inspection guidance before finalissuance. !
- 2. As presented, the staff has not provided a defensible rationale for a " substantial l increase"in safety. The Coinmittee is especially concerned that the staff did not provide a quantitative safety case. Previous examples have shown that poor configuration control can have a dramatic effect on the instantaneous core damage frequency. The Committee recommends that the staff develop a quantitative cost benefit analysis i supplemented by a qualitative analysis, if necessary. For the latter, the Committee recommends that the staff consider using one or more of the nine factors included in Attachment 3. " Guidance on Application of the ' Substantial increase Standard'," of the CRGR Charter, Revision 6.
- 3. The accompanying regulatory analysis needs to be better organized, especially the discussion related to voluntary actions implemented by thb licensees. The Committee recommended that the staff should weigh merits and demerits of each attemative being considered, both with and without the voluntary actions, make arguments in favor of or against each alternative, and, on the bases of these arguments, justify the selection.
- 4. In the context of assessing the impact of Altemative 2 (Section 3.2.1 of the Regulatory Analysis, page 6, top sentence), the Committee cautioned the staff that sole reliance on plant's Technical Specifications (TS) must be discouraged. Using the TS information may be necessary, but it may not be sufficient for adequately assessing the impact of an SSC being out of service under particular circumstances; e.g., the station blackout emergency diesel generator, which may not be included in the TS.
- 5. In the same Section of the Regulatory Analysis (page 7), the cost estimates included for pre-maintenance assessments, and also those for both using and maintaining the methodologies, need to be better explained. Furthermore, these analyses need to be clear with respect to what it would cost a licensee to develop and implement the risk management process. CRGR also stressed the importance of ensuring consistency of various assumptions used in the pre-maintenance assessments with those used in other key analyses. The Committee further recommended that the staff should address the inherent uncertainties.
ATTACHMENT
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- 6. The wording used in the last sentence of.the third pi,agraph of Section 3.2.2 of the Regulatory Analysis (page 8) suggests adequate protection. However, the staff indicated that it was not the intent. The Committee recommends that this sentence
, should be truncated by deleting the latter part of the sentence as follows: j "It is this risk avoidance feature of this alternative [ Alternative 2) that provides a significant safety benefit over Attemative 1. and pre. ides th; protect en t; th; pub;;; h;;lth and ;;f;ty that th; NCO is ;;qu; red i; rn;;nt;;n."
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l ATTACHMENT (Contd.)
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., i Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
4 MEMORANDUM FROM B. BOGER TO J. MURPHY, DATED MAY 5,1999 4
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MEMORANDUM TO: Joseph A. Murphy, Chairman 4.,
Committee to Review Generic Requirements FROM: ' gruce A. Boger, Director V Division ofInspection Program Managemen
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MAINTENANCE RULE-10 CFR 50.65 My staff has reviewed your memorandum to the Executive Director for Operations dated April 29,1999, on the issues raised by your committee conceming the draft final amendments to the Maintenance Rule (10 CFR 50.65). I recognize that the memorandum was sent for information prior to issuance of your committee's final minutes of the meeting, which was held April 27,1999.
We believe we have addressed those issues. Attached is a document that details our responses to them.
I request your concurrence on the treatment of the issues.
If you have questions, please feel free to contact me at 415-1004 or Richard Correia at 415-1009 Attachments: As stated cc: F. Miraglia l M. Knapp !
J. Johnson, Ril B. Sheron M. Virgilio M. Federline J. Moore W. Travers i
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CRGR COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, WITH STAFF RESPONSES -
Maintenance Rule Briefing, April 27,1999 l
I- 1. CRGR Comment The staff did not seek CRGR endorsement of the revis' ed draft Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.60.
3 However, without reviewing this guide and the associated inspection guidance, the Committee remains concerned about understanding the impacts associated with it'nplementation of this rule, and the potential for inconsistent decisions on the part of the licensees and NRC l
inspectors regarding unacceptable configurations.
l Because the detail is in the guidance document, including the scope of the SSCs, CRGR l requested the opportunity to review the revised RG 1.60 and the inspection guidance before finalissuance.
Staff Response l
Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1,160 and the associated inspection guidance will be provided for CRGR review before they are issued.
- 2. CRGR Comment As presented, the staff has not provided a defensible rationale for a " substantial increase"in safety. The Committee is especially concerned that the staff did not provide a quantitative safety case. Previous examples have shown that poor configuration control can have a dramatic effect on the instantaneous core damage frequency. The Committee recommends that the staff develop a quantitative cost benefit analysis supplemented by a qualitative l
analysis, if necessary. For the latter, the Committee recommends that the staff consider using
! one or more of the nine factors included in Attachment 3," Guidance on Application of the
-' Substantial increase Standard'," of the CRGR Charter, Revision 6.
Staff Response l
l With regard to the rationale for a substantial increase in safety, the Regulatory Analysis now includes a more specific discussion of consequences of not performing the pre-maintenance -
safety assessments. In summary, absent the assessments, the number of challenges to emergency safety systems would increase, as would the number of transients and scrams.
These. conditions would be inimical to the safe operation of the facility. Also, the qualitative
. factor (as cited in Attachment 3 to the CRGR charter) has been added that this rulemaking corrects a significant flaw in the current regulations.
In its SRM to the staff, the Commission advised that limited effort was to be expended in analyzing Altematives 1 and 3. Consequently, neither of those attematives reauire1 further analysis. For example, Alternative 1 is the status quo and would have zero costs AM zero 1
4
Y benefits, while Alternative 3 would have such a broad impact that it would better be a separate rulemaking for risk-informed regulation. For Alternative 2, the dominant costs have been estimated. Other minor costs could possibly be identified, but they would have little or no impact on the recommendations of the analysis.
The Regulatory Analysis for the original rule was a qualitative analysis that covered the concept of pre-maintenance assessments. In this Regulatory Analysis, the benefits of Alternative 2 have a gain been treated qualitatively. With respect to the recommendation for a quantitative
qualitative analysis would be sufficient. To perform quantitative assessments of the benefits l would require detailed probabilistic calculations for bounding conditions for various modes of operation.' Many of these models do not exist'and would be very costly and time consuming to develop. As mentioned before, the CRGR charter gives us grounds for making qualitative i arguments for the substantial increase argument where they apply.
- 3. CRGR Comment The accompanying Regulatory Analysis needs to be better organized, especially the discussion related to voluntary actions implemented by the licensees. The Committee recommended that I the staff should weigh merits and demerits of each alternative being considered, both with and without the voluntary actions, make arguments in favor of or against each alternative, and, on the bases of these arguments, justify the selection.
Staff Response We have added a paragraph in the introductory text of the analysis to provide a brief summary of what the Regulatory Analysis will consider and conclude. That discussion is intended to help readers anticipase the logic and to preclude their being confused.
The organization of the Regulatory Analysis has been prepared following the guidance in NUREGIBR-0184, Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook. NRR does not feel that reorganization of the document is advised or necessary, if the Committee still feels that sections of the analysis should be revised to be clearer, it should advise us of what those sections are and how they may be clarified. During the April 27 meeting, one member indicated that, despite feeling confused while reading the paper, all the pieces were there and that it all came together at the end. If this is the case, we feel that the Regulatory Analysis is adequate.
l 4. CRGR Comment l
In the context of assessing the impact of Alternative 2 (Section 3.2.1 of the Regulatory Analysis, l
page 6, top sentence), the Committee cautioned the staff that sole reliance on the plant's technical specifications (TS) must be discouraged. Using the TS information may be necessary but it may not be sufficient for adequately assessing the impact of an SSC's being out of service i under specific circumstances, e.g., the station blackout emergency diesel generator, which may not be included in the TS.
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Staff Response Throughout the rulemaking package, the issue of taking one SSC only out of service for maintenance relying on TS has been augmented by the phrase "with sound judgement," which would include consideration of operating experience and probabilistic analysis results.
- 5. CRGR Comment in the same Section of the Regulatory Analysis (page 7), the cost estimates included for pre-maintenance assessments, and also those for both using and maintaining the methodologies, need to be better explained. Furthermore, these analyses need to be clear with respect to what {
it would cost a licensee to develop and implement the risk management process. CRGR also 1 stressed the importance of ensuring consistency of various assumptions used in the pre- -
maintenance assessments with those used in other key analyses. The Committee further recommended that the staff should address the inherent uncertainties.
Staff Response The text related to the cost estimates has been modified to indicata that the estimates do not include development of shutdown PRAs and that, even though the risk during shutdown operations is significant, this risk is mitigated due to the tendency towards shorter refueling outages.
Although consistency of the assumptions used in pre-maintenance assessments with those assumptions used in various other applications is an important consideration, it should be recognized that the assumptions used in analyses may differ from one application to the next.
.The regulatory guides developed for the various applications (e.g., RG 1.177 for risk-informed technical specifications) show that the assumptions used may be specific to each application.-
Therefore, the staff may discuss this consideration in Revision 3 to RG 1.160. ,
As with any PRA calculation, the numeric ~al results are subject to uncertainty. The concern, as in every case, is whether the uncertainties alter the decision being made. Regulatory Guide 1.174 discusses the treatment of uncertainty in a general way. The issue related to .
parameter uncertainty is that the so-called state-of-knowledge uncertainty which can result in the true mean, as calculated using a formal uncertainty calculation, is being higher than the point estimate typically calculated. it is believed that setting the threshold for risk-significance demarcation of plant maintenance configurations sufficiently low enough compensates for this impact. However, the user should be aware of what the contributors to the detta CDF are, and when they appear to be significantly impacted by uncertainty, and make an assessment of the impact of those uncertainties. As suggested, the staff may discuss the issue of uncertainties in Revision 3 to Regulatory Guide 1.160 by reference to discussions on this subject in Regulatory Guides 1.174 and 1,177.
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l CRGR Comment l
l The wording used in the*last sentence of the third paragraph of Section 3.2.2 of the Regulatory Analysis (page 8) suggests adequate protection. However, the staff indicated that it was not the intent. The Committee recommends that this sentence should be truncated by deleting the latter part of the sentence as follows:
I "It is this risk avoidance feature of this alternative [ Alternative 2] that provides a significant safety benefit over Alternative 1. :nd prov;d;;; the protect en to th; pub l;; h;;:th and ;;';t, that th; NGO is requ;;;d to .T,;;nt;ln "
Staff Response The staff agrees with the comment and has made the change.
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REGULATORY ANALYSIS 6
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Regulatory Analysis Amendments to 10 CFR 50.65 Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants introduction This, regulatory analysis will examine three options for implementing a requirement that licensees perform assessments of the increases in risk before performing maintenance activities. The assessments are now in the rule as a recommendation; this rulemaking makes the assessments a requirement. The first alternative would maintain the status quo. For that alternative, the basic assumption is that no licensee is performing pre-maintenance assessments. The second altemative would promulgate this rule, which requires some form of pre-maintenance assessment before taking equipment off line for maintenance purposes. The final attemative is to examine the use of a full probabilistic analysis approach to be used anytime equipment is proposed to be taken off line for maintenance. .This regulatory analysis will i conclude that Alternatives 1 and 3 are unacceptable. Alternative 1 would fail to satisfy the NRC's need to make the pre-maintenance assessments a requirement and thereby make them enforceable. Altemative 3 would require very rigorous and costly analyses. Therefore, this regulatory analysis supports the adoption of Alternative 2, which makes pre-maintenance assessments a requirement but allows licensees some level of flexibility in determining the complexity of the assessments to be performed.
This regulatory analysis conforms to the guidance as specified in NUREG\BR-0058, " Regulatory Analysis Guidelines of the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission," and contains the information and analyses that meet the requirements of both 10 CFR 50.109, the backfit rule, and provisions of the Charter for the Committee To Review Generic Requirements (CRGR),' Revision 6, dated
' April 1996. Passages that address the items that must be considered in the backfit analysis have been cross-referenced to the appropriate 10 CFR 50.109 citation. The included backfit analysis demonstrates that the requirements provide a substantial increase in protection to the public health and safety or the common defense and security at a cost that is justified by the substantialincrease.
1.0 Statement of the Problem On July 10,1991 (61 FR 31306), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published 10 g CFR 50.65, " Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants." The Commission took this action because proper maintenance is essential to plant safety and there is a clear link between effective maintenance and safety as it relates to such factors as the number of transients and challenges to safety systems and the associated need for operability, availability, and reliability of safety equipment. Good maintenance is also important in providing assurance that failures of other than safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs) that could initiate, adversely affect, or mitigate a transient or an accident are minimized. Minimizing challenges to safety systems is consistent with the Commission's defense-in-depth philosophy. Maintenance is also important in ensuring that j design assumptions and margins in the original design basis are maintained and are not l
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'degraded. Therefore, nuclear power plant maintenance is clearly important in protecting public i
health and safety.
t in the late 1980s, the NRC's maintenance team inspections found that although licensees had j adequate maintenance programs in place and had shown an improving trend in implementing
]
L those programs, a common weakness in those programs was a lack of consideration of plant risk in the prioritization, planning, and scheduling of maintenance activities. This weakness was one of the major reasons for the pre-maintenance assessment provision in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3),
which states: "In performing monitoririg and preventive maintenance activities, an assessment of the total plant equipment that is out of service should be taken into account to determine the overall effect on performance of safety functions." Because this provision uses the word )
"should" instead of "shall," the legal effect is that the provision serves as a recommendation rather than as a requirement.
During plant visits in mid-1994, several NRC senior managers had concems with the fact that licensees were increasing both the amount and the frequency of maintenance performed during power operations. Some licensees were limiting maintenance activities to a single train of a system, while others would allow multiple equipment in other systems within a single train to be
- out of service as long as it did not violate the plant's technical specifications. However, allowable outage times specified in technical specifications are based upon a random single failure in a system and a judgment as to a reasonable time to effect repairs before plant shutdown is required. In general, technical specifications were not intended to address allowable outage times for multiple equipment being out of service concurrently. Further, it cannot be implied that it is acceptable to voluntarily remove equipment from service to perforrr) on-line maintenance on the assumption that such actions are bounded by a worst-case single failure, which is a plant-specific design requirement that is contained in a number of the general design criteria (GDCs) in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. The NRC senior managers also had concems with the fact that on-shift personnel, planning and scheduling personnel, and licensee management lacked an understanding of the importance of safety systems or combinations of equipment that would have risk significance if taken out of service. It appeared that risk insights from plant-specific individual plant examinations, which were performed to improve licensee understanding of the plant's safety and to address potential vulnerabilities, were not fully used in j the plant's operations and maintenance decision processes. These concems were addressed i in a letter dated October 6,1994, from the Director of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation to'the Executive Vice President of the Nuclear Energy Institute. The growing amount of maintenance performed during power operations and the underutilization of risk insights in plant i
operations and maintenance activities are safety concernsi in SECY-97-055, " Maintenance Rule Status, Results, and Lessons Learned," dated March 4, 1997, the NRC staff described the challenge of inspecting and the NRC staff's inability to enforce the pre-maintenance assessment provision of $50.65(a)(3). The staff notes that, in
. general, licensees have followed the guidance contained in Regulatory Guide 1.160,
" Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," and NUMARC 93-01,
" Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants,"
and, thus, have voluntarily complied with this provision of $50.65(a)(3) because it is obvious that there is a nexus between safety and having equipment out of service. When the maintenance rule was first promulgated in 1991, the NRC staff did not foresee the significant changes I
3 licensees would be making in maintenance practices. Typically, licensees performed significant amounts of maintenance during refueling outages. To enhance operational efficiency in reaction to rate deregulation of the electric utility industry, licensees are shortening their refueling and maintenance outages by performing more maintenance while the plant is at power. At-power maintenance practices have evolved to the point that not'only are major systems and components taken off line, but also multiple systems and components are taken off line concurrently.
However, in the few cases in which the NRC staff has observed weak implementation or plant configurations for which the licensee did not adequately assess the configuration's safety impact, the NRC staff was unable to take actions to ensure that licensees perform appropriate assessments. Under current enforcement guidance, the NRC staff can invoke this provision of paragraph (a)(3) in enforcement actions if the failure to perform an adequate pre-maintenance assessment causes, contributes to the severity of, or complicates recovery from an event.
However, such a failure to perform an assessment can only be used as an escalating factor in enforcement actions otherwise taken as a result of the event, and it cannot be used as a separate violation.
For these reasons, the NRC staff is amending 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) to ensure that licenseet*'
effectively assess and manage the increase in plant risk that may result from maintenance on l SSCs within the scope of the rule. The objective of the rule is to require that licensees use the l assessment of the impact of risk resulting from maintenance activities on equipment to ensure that the increase in risk that may result from maintenance activities does not inadvertently place !
the plant in a risk significant configuration, that is, a configuration for which the contribution to !
I the incremental annual risk is not insignificant, or iry a configuration that would degrade key plant safety functions to an unacceptable level. [950.109(c)(1)] Additionally, in Staff Requirements Memorandum 97-173, dated December 17,1997, the Commission approved the staff's recommendation to develop this rulemaking, provided text for revisions to 10 CFR 50.65, stated l that " extended or protracted regulatory analysis of Alternative 1 (no rule change) is unnecessary," and directed that the regulatory analysis discussion of Alternative 3 (comprehensive rule change) be limited.
2.0 Identification and Preliminary Analysis of Alternative Approaches 2.1 Alternative 1-Make No Change to Paragraph (a)(3) in the Rule The first alternDe considered is to maintain the status quo and not revise paragraph (a)(3). As noted in SECY 97-055, licensees have, for the most part, voluntarily incorporated the paragraph (a)(3) pre-maintenance assessment provision in their maintenance rule implementation programs using Regulatory Guide 1.160 and NUMARC 93-01 because of the obvious connection between safety and maintenance on equipment. Additionally, some licensees have indicated a willingness to improve their programs to address weaknesses identified during inspections. Thus, the existing codified text could be considered sufficient. When inspections identify deficiencies in the programs of individual licensees, the staff could continue to encourage those licensees to improve their performance.
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. The obvious advantage of this alternative is that no additional burden would be placed on licensees or on the NRC staff to conduct such a rulemaking.
The disadvantages of Alternative 1 are that (1) licensees could remove the paragraph (a)(3) assessment provision in their maintenance rule implementation programs at their own discretion; (2) since the performance of an assessment is discretionary and not mandatory, licensees cannot take credit for their assessment programs under other risk-informed initiatives -
(unless they make the assessments a requirement througt) the other initiative); (3) because the assessments are not required, some licensees could view any efforts to encourage the L assessments as a potential backfit; and (4) the NRC staff cannot enforce this provision of the rule.
l 2.2 Altemative 2-Change Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule to Require Assessments
. Under $50.65(a)(4) of the final rule, before performing maintenance activities on SSCs within the scope of the rule, licensees would be required to conduct an assessment of the current plant configuration, as well as of expected changes to the plant configuration that will result from the proposed maintenance activities, to determine the overall effect on performance of key plant safety functions. Licensees would also be required to use the results of the assessment to l manage the risk to ensure that the increase in risk that may result from maintenance activities does not inadvertently place the plant in a risk-significant configuration or a configuration that would degrade key plant safety functions to an unacceptable level. The SSCs that are subject to the requirements of the rule are those that are safety related, and certain non-safety-related SSCs as defined in $50.65(b) and (a)(1). Licensees have programs in place for implementing Regulatory Guide 1.160 and the industry guidance document it endorses, NUMARC 93-01,
' which accepts the existing paragraph (a)(3) recommendation as part of its program._ To comply with this final rule and complete this backfit, licensees would need to incorporate the rule changes into their existing programs. ]
! The final rule will add an introductory sentence to 10 CFR 50.65 clarifying that the rule applies under all conditions of operation, including normal shutdown; will revise the second sentence of paragraph (a)(3) for clarity; will delete the last sentence of paragraph (a)(3) of the rule; will J
!- create a new paragraph, (a)(4), that requires the performance of assessments; will specify that l the assessments are to be performed for all proposed maintenance activities; and will specify that the increase in risk that may occur from the maintenance activity must be managed.
[$50.109(c)(2)]
l The advantages of Alternative 2 are that (1) licensees would retain maximum flexibility to l
operate within configurations allowed by their current license as envisioned when the rule was L originally issued; (2) there would be little or no burden on most licensees because licensees already have voluntary programs in place in accordance with NUMARC 93-01, which the NRC endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.160, and the weaknesses in those programs that led to the failures to perform assessments found during the baseline inspections could be corrected j
relatively easily; (3) if licensees fail to perform an assessment (as was found by 7 of the '
maintenance rule baseline inspections at the 68 operating reactor sites), the NRC staff could use enforcement to require corrective actions that ensure licensees perform the assessments in i
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s the future; and (4), when appropriate, licensees may be able to take credit for their paragraph (a)(4) assessment program in other regulatory initiatives. ,
.The disadvantages of Alternative 2 are that (1) licensees are, in general, exercising their discretion to perform the assessments, and thus, the NRC may be unnecessarily expending resources on a rule change mandating the performance of an assessment already being performed voluntarily and (2) it would not address the weaknesses identified during 35 of the 68 baseline inspections pertaining to the quality and technical adequacy of licensees' methods for performing the assessments.
2.3 Altemative 3-Make Comprehensive Revisions to Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule ,
1
- The Statements of Consideration (SOC) for the maintenance rule noted that the assessments j
would be refined on the basis of technological improvement and experience. Therefore, as the j third attemative, the staff considered a comprehensive revision of the paragraph (a)(3) I assessment provision to incorporate the use of more modern technology and the experience with sophisticated techniques.used by some utilities. To remain performance based, the rule would not prescribe a specific approach. Rather, it would provide considerations that assessment methodologies would have to address, while continuing to give licensees the flexibility to develop specific approaches that best suit the needs of each.
The advantages of Alternative 3 are that it would (1) require licensees to evaluate and control maintenance activities through technically advanced methods, (2) provide specific limits to the risk associated with maintenance activities, and (3) establish a foundation upon which other ris.k-
. informed regulation could build. Thus, Alternative 3 would address the weaknesses pertaining to the quality and technical adequacy of licensees' methods for performing the assessments identified during the baseline inspections and allow the use of the enforcement policy to require corrective actions for any of the weaknesses.
The disadvantages of Alternative 3 are that (1) such a rule would have a broad impact on other l current and future rules and, instead, should be separated from this maintenance rule and l developed as a rule that would be used generically for other risk-informed regulation; (2) since it '
would likely result in the use of probabilistic methods, Alternative 3 would impose a substantial burden on both licensees and the staff; and (3) because of the greater burden on licensees, Attemative 3 may be less likely to have industry support relative to Alternative 2.
3.0 Estimation and Evaluation of Values and impacts 3.1 Alternative 1-Make No Change to Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule :
This attemative is the base case for this regulatory analysis Therefore, the assumption is made.
that no licensee performs the pre-maintenance assessments that are recommended in
$50.65(a)(3). Thus, there would be no impact upon licensees if this attemative is adopted, and ;
there would be no additional resource burden on the NRC. Likewise, there would be no safety benefit to the public.
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6 3.2 Alternative 2-Change Paragraph (a)(3) of the Rule To Require Assessments i
3.2.1 Impact of Altemative 2 If this alternative is adopted, alllicensees would be required to assess and manage the effect that the resulting plant configuration would have on the safe operation of the facility. The degree of complexity of the assessments would be expected to di'fer from plant to plant, as well as from configuration to configuration within a given plant. The characterization of the manpower cost to the licensees is complicated by the fact that the complexity of the assessment will depend upon a number of factors. For example, if a licensee is to take only one or two SSCs off line, the assessment required may involve checking to see that the resulting configuration is not in violation of technical specifications and possesses the capability of adequately performing all required safety functions. Conversely, if the licensee plans to perform maintenance on several SSCs at the same time, a more complex assessment may be required. The complexity of the assessments to be performed will also be governed by other factors, such as plant type, it is envisioned that licensees will develop strategies to minimize the burden resulting from these pssessments. One such strategy might be to develop sets of pre-analyzed configurations.
Once an analysis has been made of a configuration in which a number of SSCs are to be taken off line and it is shown that this configuration does not unacceptably increase the overall risk, this same set of SSCs may be taken off line in future maintenance outages if it can be shown that the resulting and the previously analyzed configurations are the same.
In Section 2.2 of this regulatory analysis, six modifications to the existing requirements in $50.65 l are identified. Because of the nature of these existing requirements and the proposed modifications, the costs and impacts of these amendments are being treated together. For example, item (1), which adds a preamble to the rule, clarifies that the requirements apply to all conditions of operation, including normal shutdown. Since the existing language of the rule was already applicable to power reactors in all modes, the amendatory language has no effect. Item (2) revises the second sentence in paragraph (a)(3) for clarity only and has no regulatory impact. Item (3) deletes the last sentence in paragraph (a)(3). Because the last s.entence of paragraph (a)(3) does not specify a requirement, its deletion has no effect. Item (4) creates a new paragraph, (a)(4), that requires the pre maintenance performance of assessments. Items (4), (5), and (6) provide definition of the scope and timing of the requirements, and their costs and benefits are included in-the analysis to follow. Using the results of the pre-maintenance assessments to manage the risk that may result from the proposed maintenance activities, as required in, item (6), will have an impact on plant operations. There will be times that the assessments will reveal that certain maintenance activities should not be performed simultaneously and, thus, maintenance schedules will need to be modified accordingly it is difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the effects, if any, of these modified maintenance activities without information concerning the equipment involved. However, the benefit of operating the facility in a risk-managed erivironment is seen to outweigh any apparent inefficiencies that may result from the occasional need to perform maintenance at a less than optimal schedule in order to lessen overall plant risk, that is, reducing the instantaneous risk but extending the time.
To estimate the burden of this alternative to the industry, two types of costs have been considered: the costs associeted with developing the assessment methodologies and the cost of using and maintaining them. This analysis assumes three levels of sophistication for the l l
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assessment methodologies. The first would be a basic deterministic type of analysis performed )
by plant operations, maintenance, or engineering, or one that might involve cross-checking predetermined non-complex matrices of SSCs to ascertain whether the proposed maintenance i would be detrimental to safety. The second would consider an intermediate level of analysis j that would involve small groups of SSCs or equipment. It is possible that these intermediate-level assessments may also be performed in a deterministic fashion but would require far more analysis of the interrelationships between SSCs and the role they play in safety. In the event that larger numbers of SSCs are to be taken off line for maintenance, a higher level of assessment, which takes into account the increase, if any, in risk, may be required. This level vf assessment may require quantification of risk using probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques. Thus, this regulatory analysis considers the costs associated with three levels of complexity related to the assessment.
The first cost considered is the one-time' cost of developing the methodologies and the procedures for carrying out the various assessments. Estimates received from industry indicate that the cost of developing the basic assessment tools is approximately $20,000, and the cost of implementing the high-complexity, PRA-type approach is approximately $300,000.2 it should be noted that this cost estimate is for the installation of risk monitors which use the existing plant- l specific PRA models for risk analyses. Some plants do not have such PRA models for risk analyses of the shutdown mode of operation. Studies show that the risk to the public is considerable during the shutdown mode of operation. However, the practice of performing on-line maintenance has reduced the duration of plant refueling outages and, thus, the risk during the shutdown condition is reduced. Accordingly, this cost analysis did not include the cost of performing probabilistic risk assessments using a shutdown PRA model. For the purpose of this analysis, it is assumed that the costs for the intermediate assessment development are approximately the same as the basic assessment. Another assumption is that each facility initially developed either a basic or an intermediate methodology. Although many facilities appear to be finding a benefit from moving to the high-complexity methodology, an estimate of the number that will move to the high level is difficult to acquire. Therefore, this analysis will develop the upper bound of costs, assuming alllicensees will upgrade. Thus, assuming a total of 68 maintenance assessment programs' will be developed industry-wide at
$320,000 per facility, this activity would incur a one-time cost of $22 million across the industry.
It is anticipated that the aforementioned methodologies will require some modifications over time because of the possibility of changes in plant equipment and the availability of improved technologies and up-to-date PRA data. Industry estimates to both use and maintain the
'The recurrent costs of updating the methodologies to account for new information and improved technologies will be accounted for separately.
2Unless otherwise noted or assumed, cost estimates are based upon direct NRC staff communications with licensee management.
'There are approximately 100 operating reactors in the United States. However, many of these units will share maintenance assessment programs because they reside in mu!tiple-reactor sites. The assumption is that only 68 programs will need to be developed.
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methodologies are $50,000 and $25,000 for the basic and high-complexity assessments, respectively. The higher cost for the basic assessments reflects the need to follow up with PRA-type assessments in the event that a more basic matrix approach is not sufficient. Again, it is ,
assumed that the cost for basic and intermediate assessments is the same. The NRC staff l estimates that currently one-third of its licensees use and maintain a high-complexity assessment methodology and two-thirds use a basic or intermediate-level technique. However, to bound the impacts on the conservative side, this analysis assumes that all 68 facilities will a utilize either a basic or intermediate-level assessment methodology augmented by a high-complexity methodology. Therefore, the use and maintenance cost for each facility would be
$75,000 per program, or $5.1 million across the industry, annually. If we assume that the average life expectancy of existing nuclear power plants is 20 additional years per facility, the discounted flow of funds at a 7-percent real discount rate is $54 million. As an attemative analysis, using a 3-percent discounted rate, the value,would be $75.6 million. .
Another impact considered was differences in facility type, design, and age. Facility type and design will have an impact on the amount of maintenance needed and, thus, the number of pre-maintenance assessments that a facility would be required to perform. The larger or more complex facility designs will have more SSCs and, thus, require more maintenance. However, these designs also have larger electrical outputs and, thus, the impact of the differences in plant design and complexity would have a negligible effect when considered across the rate-paying population. [$50.iO9(c)(8)]
For the most part, however, the aforementioned costs are sunk costs already expended in '
voluntary compliance with the original version of 10 CFR 50.65 as issued in 1991. The principal cost associated with implementation of this rulemaking will be administrative in nature, dealing with changes to procedures and other documents to indicate the shift to and changes in paragraph (a)(4) and the modest retraining necessary for the appropriate personnel. l
[$50.109(c)(5)]
3.2.2 Value of Alternative 2 Maintenance of plant SSCs is necessary even if a pre maintenance assessment of the resulting configuration is not required. Thus, the value of such a requirement is found in improvement in safety that results from performing the assessments. If a plant is put in an unsafe configuration because equipment is off line for maintenance, demands may be made on safety and recovery l
I systems that cannot be met. This circumstance may result in damage to the plant and possibly offsite releases of radioactive material to the public, or it could cause excessive actuation of safety system SSCs that are rarely called upon.
l The final rule does not require any change in the design or construction of any nuclear power l plant. Neither does the final rule apply to activities associated with the planning, design, or installation of plant modifications. Therefore, there would be no plant installation, downtime, or construction costs associated with the final rule to be borne by licensees, [$50.109(c)(5)]
When the maintenance rule was first promulgated in 1991, the NRC staff did not foresee the L
l significant changes licensees would be making in maintenance practices. To enhance l
operational efficiency in reaction to the rate deregulation of the electric utility industry, licensees l
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9 are shortening their refueling and maintenance outages by performing more maintenance while the plant is at power. At-power maintenance practices have evolved to the point that not only are major systems and components taken off line, but also multiple systems and components are taken off line simultaneously. This maintenance practice could result in an increased likelihood of an accident or transient while the equipment is rendered unavailable, compared to risk that occurs from expected random equipment failures. The pre-maintenance assessments, along with the specifications regarding their scope and their use, are intended to cause licensees to manage the risk associated with removing SSCs from service to perform maintenance by ensuring their plants are not inadvertently placed in risk-significant conditions or conditions in which the performance of key plant safety functions are degraded to unacceptable levels. It is this risk aversion feature of this alternative that provides a significant safety benefit j over Alternative 1. [$50.109(c)(6)] !
Maintenance of plant equipment while the plant is operating at power (i.e., on-line maintenance) has become a common practice in the nuclear power industry. This practice has been caused, 'l in large part, by the licensees' desire to maximize plant availability by minimizing plant refueling and maintenance outage durations. During on-line maintenance activities, the plant risk i associated with an accident that would result in damage to the reactor fuel or the release of fission products to the environment would increase because of the unavailability of the ,
equipment taken out of service. Pilot studies by tne NRC as well as the industry's maintenance rule implementation assessments have shown that the risk impact of maintenance activities can vary substantially, depending on the duration of the activities and the combinations of equipment allowed to be out of service concurrently. Since imprudently planned and managed maintenance activities have the potential for subjecting a plant to an unacceptable incremental contribution to the annual risk, it is important that the provisions of this final rule be implemented to ensure that on-line maintenance is carefully managed to achieve a balance between the benefits of the maintenance and the potential impacts on safety. Hence, the final rule requires that the on-line maintenance process be carefully managed to avoid unintentional entry into risk-significant configurations, or configurations that would degrade key plant safety functions to an unacceptable level, and thereby ensure an acceptable margin of safety. Furthermore, the final rule focuses attention on methods to evaluate, both prospectively and in real time, the risk impacts of plant configurations so that undesirable risk impacts from maintenance are avoided.
Because this is a performance-based rule, licensees would have flexibility in their selection of evaluation methods and decision criteria as long as they meet the requirement to manage the increase in risk that may arise from maintenance activities. However, the staff would provide guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.160, Revision 3, that would describe methods acceptable to the staff for meeting the requirements of this final rule. [550109(c)(3)1 Similarly, because there is a potential risk to the public from an accidental offsite release of radioactive material during shutdown operations, maintenance performed during those operations, too, must be carefully managed. Even though the power level in the reactor is essentially zero, used fuel and contaminated materials present a potential hazard.
The maintenance rule does not prescribe the type, frequency, or duration of maintenance activities but rather requires assessments and management of risk before the performance of maintenance. However, the assessment requirement is expected to greatly reduce the
m o, 4
'O f 10 possibility of the plant's being operated in an unsafe configurationc This is likely to result in an overall reduction in occupational exposures. [650.109(c)(4)]
In addition to the benefit to public health and safeiy; other effects such as potential damage to plant SSCs and the possible need for the purchase of replacement energy would be avoided.
This step would result in a cost savings to the industry that in some measure would offset the
- increase in costs' discussed in Section 3.2.1, While it is irnpractical to calculate the potential risk benefits of the final rule revision because of the variability, frequency, and repetitiveness of maintenance tasks associated with each plant configuration, the staff's qualitative assessment supports the beneficial impacts of the final rule change because of risk-aversion strategies resulting from the final change. - This qualitative assessment is based on the fact that several conditions inimical tu safety would be expected to occur if equipment is taken off line without pre-maintenance assessments. The number of challenges to safety systems would be expected
- to increase and the number of plant transients and emergency shutdowns would be expected to I
escalate, in ac'dition, Alternative 2 meets the " substantial increase in safety" standard of 10 CFR 50.109 in that it corrects a significant flaw in the current requirements, i.e., that 10 CFR 50.65 does not require pre-maintenance assessments because, to be legally binding, the regulations must use the word" shall."
3.2.3 Impact of Attemative 2 on the NRC The impact of Alternative 2 on the NRC would be twofold. The first impact would be the cost of implementing a rule change. On average, the NRC estimates that a rule change requires 1 person-year per year for 2 years. Although Alternative 2 appears to be a relatively straightforward amendment, it nonetheless would require about 2 NRC staff-years to complete.
The deterministic analyses required by the basic and intermediate-complexity assessments should require little additional guidance to the licensees. However, additional guidance in the form of a regulatory guide is planned to provide licensees with insights on NRC's expectations for the high-complexity assessments that may require PRA techniques. There is currently a large body of PRA literature available to the public, and the development of NRC-approved guidance from this body of literature should not require more than 0.25 staff-year of effort.
The second impact would be the inspection and oversight of the assessments, both of which should be straightforward and require minimum extra resources. In actuality, the inspection of licensees' implementation of the paragraph (a)(3) assessments is already part of the NRC resident inspector core inspection program. Therefore, similar to the actual impact on the industry, the principal impact on the NRC would be administrative in nature and would deal with
- changes to inspection procedures and guidance documents to indicate the shift to, and changes
- in, paragraph (a)(4) and the modest retraining necessary for the appropriate personnel.
Nevertheless, the NRC staff is considering the inspection of the implementation of the final rulemaking at about 20 licensee sites selected from those licensees that had assessment weaknesses during initialinspections of maintenance rule implementation. These approximately 20 proposed inspections would cost 1 staff-year and $400,000 in contractual support.
Thus, the impacts on the NRC are estimated to be a one-time cost for rule and guidance development of 2.25 staff-years plus 1 staff-year and $400,000 for implementation inspection.
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11 These resources have been accounted for in the regional and Headquaders budget estimates.
[g60.109(c)(7)]
E 3.3 Altemative 3--Make Comprehensive' Revisions to Paragraph (a)(3) of the' Rule 3' .3.1 impact of Alternative 3 Alternative 3 is derived as a consequence of the originalintent of the maintenance rule. The 1 SOC for 10 CFR 50.65 stated that the expectation was that the assessments required by l paragraph (a)(3) would be refined on the basis of improvements in technology and experience.
, Because an approach like this requires the broad use of probabilistic techniques, it is envisioned l' '
that the approach would take on a performance-based character. This approach would mandate specific limits on the risk associated with maintenance activities, such as limits on total f risk, incremental risk per maintenance outage, or limits 'on cumulative risk per time period.'
' Because this would be a non-prescriptive approach, it is not feasible to estimate the cost to the industry or to the NRC with any degree of certainty. Licensees will likely take varying I approaches to implement such technologies, each requiring sophisticated methodologies and ' j highly trained individuals to perform the assessments. . j J
Although the specific impacts of Alternative 3 have not been quantified, the burden to the licensee is believed to be much greater than Alternative 2.- The NRC would promulgate the limits within which the risk of resultant plant configurations could be increased for maintenance 5 activities intnad of specifying the probabilistic techniques to be used. The licensee would need -
to research and evaluate various alternatives and determine which is suitable for its facility. A i fair amount of trial and error is expected as various configurations are evaluated and certain j maintenance activities are found to exceed NRC-specified limits. This trial and error, in tum, 4 may cause delays in maintenance activities and increase the likelihood of component failures.
3.3.2 Value of Alternative 3 Although it is impractical to calculate the potential risk benefits of this'attemative, several ;
qualitative values have been considered. Altemative 3 would limit maintenance activities j through the use of mostly risk-based criteria and would require licensees to evaluate and control i maintenance activities through much more rigorous, technically advanced methods. Also, it ,
would establish a regulatory precedent for other risk based requirements.
i l 3.3.3 Impact of Altemative 3 on the NRC.
The resource burden to'the NRC of Altemative 3 is expected to be significantly greater than for ;
the two lower options of Altemative 2. The NRC would need to develop the risk parameters to l be used for setting the limits that risk may be increased while continuing to operate the facility safely. The specific limits must be developed, evaluated, and approved. Assessment I methodologies used to estimate the change in risk parameters must be evaluated and approved by the NRC staff to assure their accuracy and reliability. Implementation of such a rule is expected to require extensive interactions between the staffs of the licensee and the NRC to !
. fully understand and evaluate each methodology. Fudher, the burden of inspecting i implementation and compliance with the regulation would be likewise complicated. For _
i
- 5 e 1 12 example,in a time of shrinking resources, Alternative 3 would necessitate extensive PRA training for region-based inspectors. Because the NRC continues to be a fully fee-recoverable agency, the increased burden would be transferred to the licensee.
Because of the burden that such an approach would place upon licensees, it is unlikely that the industry would support such an approach. Thus, the rulemaking process would be greatly affected, which would result in many industry NRC interactions and many counter proposals by the industry requiring staff evaluation and Commission action. The resources required for such a rulemaking should be balanced against the incremental benefits. The NRC inspection program has demonstrated that, by and large, licensees are complying with an Alternative 2 type of approach even though it is recommended and not required.
I 4.0 Discussion of Voluntary Compliance With the Assessment Provision of 10 CFR 5.0.65(a)(3)
NRC's Regulatory Analysis Guidelines direct the NRC staff to not consider the cost of voluntary licensee actions as the cost basis for decisions concerning contemplated regulatory actions. In accordance with the Guideline, the costs of this rule as analyzes above in this regulatory analysis do not consider any expenditures by licensees for voluntary compliance with the non-mandatory provision in paragraph (a)(3) of the current maintenance rule.
However, the guidance also indicates that a sensitivity analysis should be performed to estimate the actualincremental burden that would result from the action. The following discussion represents the sensitivity analysis for the proposed approach (Alternative 2). Alllicensees have !'
some form of pre-maintenance assessment program as recommended in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(3) and as addressed in NUMARC 93-01, which is endorsed by Regulatory Guide 1.160. The NRC ,
maintenance rule baseline inspections, conducted in 1996 through 1998 at every operating j power plant, found that all licensees have programs in place with methodologies for performing ]'
the assessments. At about half of the power plants, the inspectors found either programs with minor weaknesses or instances of failure to perform the recommended assessments as specified in the programs. Since all licensees have developed methodologies for performing the q assessments to be required under Alternative 2, and at approximately half the licensees' .
methodologies have been found acceptable, the NRC's assumption that every facility would be !
required to incur the one-time $320,000 cost per facility for methodology development and the annual $75,000 per facility for use and maintenance would seem to overstate the actual increase in cost to individual licensees and the nuclear power industry as a whole attributable to this rulemaking.
i 5.0 Decision Rationale i l
Alternative 2 is judged to present a substantialincrease in safety as opposed to Alternat;ve 1.
The NRC's qualitative assessment supports the beneficial impacts of the final rule change because of its risk-aversion strategies. This qualitative assessment is based on the fact that several conditions inimical to safety would be expected to occur if equipment is taken offline without pre-maintenance assessments. The number of challenges to safety systems would be expected to increase and the number of plant transients and emergency shutdowns would be e
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l 13 expected to escalate. In addition, Alternative 2 meets the "substantialincrease in safety" standard of 10 CFR 50.109 in that it corrects a significant flaw in the current requirements (i.e ,
that 10 CFR 50.65 does not require pre-maintenance assessments because, to be legally binding, the regulations must use the word" shril"). Although Alternative 2 has a non-trivial burden if voluntary compliance is disregarded, its burden is not nearly as great as that of Alternative 3, and the program to be implemented is, in large measure, already in place. Also, l
! fullimplementation of Alternative 2 should be straightforward. Attemative 1, clearly the least
! burdensome of the choices considered, will not correct the NRC's principal concern, which is that licensees would not perform pre-maintenance assessments and could remove the paragraph (a)(3) assessment provision in their maintenance rule implementation progrr.ms at '
their own discretion. Altemative 3 is the most comprehensive of the altematives, but it would ,
create a serious increase in the burden to the licensees and the NRC (which would likewise be {
bome by the industry). Thus, the NRC is publishing Attemative 2 as a final rule. [$50.109(c)(9)]
6.0 Implementation .]
The action evaluated in this regulatory analysis will be implemented through the promulga} ion of a final regulation. A regulation has been selected as the appropriate mechanism for this implementation because regulatory guides do not constitute requirements and, with NRC orders, the benefit of public participation and comment are not utilized. The notice that publishes the final rule will specify that the rule will be effective 120 days after the issuance of regulatory guidance that is currently being developed.
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? s Minutes of CRGH Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
, 1 l
1 CRGR RESPONSE TO B. BOGER, ;
DATED MAY 13,1999 l
4 ATTACHMENT 3-d
4 star y % UNITED STATES j
I j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
- WASHINGTON, D.C. 30666-0001
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1 May 13,1999 !
l j MsMORANDUM TO: Bruce A. Boger, Director I Division of inspection Program Management FROM: Joseph A. Murphy, Chairman Committee To Review Generic eq rements [
l
SUBJECT:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE MAINTENANCE RULE -
in reference to your close out memorandum, dated May 5,1999, responding to CRGR i comments on the subject amendments and requesting CRGR concurrence with your counter ,
I arguments to the Committee's recommendations (attached), we concur subject to the following: l
- Comment 3: In the regulatory analysis, the licensee voluntary actions should be addressed per Section 4.1 and 4.3 of the
- Regulatory Analysis Guidelines," NUREG/BR-0058, Revision 2, dated November 1995, and Section 5.7 of the " Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook,"
Final Report, dated August 1997. The Committee recommends that the analysis of voluntary actions be extended to ttle consideration of all attematives evaluated, rather than only to the preferred option.
- Comment 5: If the phrase "may discuss" in your memorandum is interpreted as the staff's commitment to consider the effect of consistency of assumptions and to consider uncertainties when revising Regulatory Guide 1.60, the CRGR has no objection.
Your staff has agreed to these considerations. If you have any questions, feel free to call me at 415-5670.
Attachment:
As stated.
cc: W. Travers F. Miraglia M. Knapp J. Johnson, Ril B. Sheron M. Virgilio M. Federline J. Moore J. Rutberg
Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
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4 Minutes of CRGR Meeting Nos. 339 and 341, April 13 and 27,1999, resp.
i CRGR MEMORANDUM TO THE EDO, DATED MAY 3,1999 1
1 i
ATTACHMENT 4-b e