ML20195D925
| ML20195D925 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Calvert Cliffs  |
| Issue date: | 06/17/1988 |
| From: | Tiernan J BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC CO. |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8806230249 | |
| Download: ML20195D925 (2) | |
Text
1 B ALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC CHARLES CENTER R O. BOX 1475 BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21203 JOSEPH A.TitRNAN Wet PatsIDENT NucLean ENERGY June 17,1988 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 ATTENTION:
Document Control Desk
SUBJECT:
Calvert Cliffc Nuclear Power Plant Unit Nos.1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318 NRC Insoection Reoort Nos. 50-317/88 v5: 50-318/88-06
REFERENCES:
(a) Letter from Mr. J. T. Wiggins (NRC) to hfr. J. A. Tiernan (BG&E),
dated May 11, 1988, same subject Gentlemen:
Reference (a) transmitted the subject inspi. tion report and requested information concerning an unresolved item involving a high pressurizer spray line/ pressurizer differential temperature. That information is provided in Enclosure (1).
Should you have any further questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.
Very truly yourn
/
A ML JAT/DLS/ dim Attachment cc:
D. A. Brune, Esquire J.
E.
Silberg, Esquire R. A.Capra, NRC S. A.McNeil, NRC W. T. Russell, NRC D. C. Trimble, NRC
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T. Magette, DNR
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8806230249 880617 PDR ADOCK 05000317 O
ENCLOSURE (1)
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REPLY to NRC INSPECrlON REPORT 50-317/88-05; 50-318/88-06 NRC Reauest Please provide an assessment of the root cause of the pressurizer / spray line differential temperature problem together with your final list of corrective actions with implementation schedule.
BG&E Response The root cause of the event was operator error in that operators believed that the large differential temperature was permitted by a test procedure since the procedure involved shutting the spray bypass valves. Since the 400 F temperature differential limit would not be exceeded unless spray was initiated, they consciously decided not to initiate spray while above a differential of 400 F.
Corrective actions completed include:
1.
Discussion of the event with each operating crew by the General Supervisor -
Operations or the Assistant General Supervisor Operations.
These crew discussions emphasized the need for maintaining a questioning attitude during all conditions of plant operation.
2.
Revising the start-up checklist to require that the spray valve bypasses be at least half open prior to heating up the plant.
Operations Training intends to cover this event and its consequences during operator requalification training, then incorporate the event into the next initial operator licensing training.
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