ML20195D137

USEC Proposed Changes,Certificate Amend Request,Update Application Sar,Detailed Description of Change, Revised Pages to SAR Update Previously Transmitted

ML20195D137
Person / Time
Site:	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Issue date:	06/01/1999
From:	UNITED STATES ENRICHMENT CORP. (USEC)
To:
Shared Package
ML20195D121	List: ML20195D112 ML20195D137
References
NUDOCS 9906090089
Download: ML20195D137 (63)

Text

i 1

1

'Q th i

GDP 99-0084 Page 1 of 2 United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC)

Proposed Changes Certificate Amendment Request Update the Application Safety Analysis Report Detailed Description of Change 1.0 Purpose The purpo,e of this submittal is to provide revised pages to the Safety Analysis Report Update (SARUP) previously transmitted in USEC letters GDP 97-0189, dated October 31,1997 (Reference 1), GDP 98-0096, dated April 30,1998 (Reference 2), GDP 98-0212, dated October 19,1998 (Reference 3), GDP 98-0251, dated November 20,1998 (Reference 4), and GDP 99-0076, dated May 10,1999 (Reference 5) for NRC review and approval.

2.0 Description of Submittal The following changes are included in this submittal which modify the latest version of the SAR Update certificate amendment request. The revised pages are included in Enclosure 3.

A.

The Revision Log has been updated to reflect the changes included in this revision.

B.

The List of Effective Pages has been updated to reflect the changes included in this resicion.

C.

The proposed changes in Reference 5 and herein replace the original SARUP TSRs with revisions of current TSRs that are included in Volume 4 of USEC's Certification Application (USEC-02). This is the second set of"new" SARUP TSRs which includes TSRs, similar to the first set, that have only minor changes to the Basis section to correct SAR references and minor inconsistencies.

3.0 Basis for the Revision As discussed in Reference 6, USEC presented in a February 12,1999 meeting between USEC and NRC, USEC's intention to delete the original SARUP TSRs and adopt a revised version of the current TSRs. The TSRs in this second set of"new" SARUP TFW include TSRs not submitted in Reference 5 that were changed to correct SAR references and n ' inconsistencies in the Basis.

References 1.

Letter from James H. Miller (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report, USEC Letter GDP 97-0189, 1

October 31,1997.

9906090089 990601

~

PDR ADOCK 07007002 C

PDR j

?

h y

t

• ~

GDP 99-0084 Page 2 of 2

2. -

Letter from James H. Miller (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report - Proposed Changes, USEC Letter GDP 98-0096, April 30,1998.

3.

' Letter from Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to. Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report - Proposed Changes, USEC Letter GDP 98-0212, October 19,1998.

4.

Letter from Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report - Proposed Changes, USEC Letter GDP 98-0251, November 20,1998.

5.

Letter from Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report - Proposed Changes, USEC Letter GDP 99-0076, May 10,1999.

6.

Letter from Steven A. Toelle (USEC) to Dr. Carl J. Paperiello (NRC), Certificate Amendment Request - Update the Application Safety Analysis Report - Adoption of Current 1

Application Technical Safety Requirements, USEC Letter GDP 99-0042, February 26,1999.

l 1

t l

l i

1

I i.

GDP 98-0084 l

l Page1of60 I

l 4

e...

.. /:.,.

f i

" f SAFETY: ANALYSIS REPORT UPDATEi ECERTIFICATE AMENDMENT REQUESly g;

4

! JUNE 14.1999 REVISIONi '

f j.

4; Remove Pages Insert Pages i

SARUP Revision Log SARUP Revision Log i

i, ii l

SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP-1,9,10 SARUP-1,9,10 SARUP TSRs SARUP TSR l

None 2.1-8,2.1-10,2.1-14,2.1-15,2.1-17,2.1-18, 2.1 -20a, 2.1 -22, 2.1 -24, 2.1 -27, 2.1 -28, 2.1 -

l 29,2.1-30,2.1-31,2.1-32,2.1-33,2.2-5,2.2-11,2.2-12,2.2-13,2.2-14,2.2-19,2.2-20,2.2-21,2.2-23,2.3-3,2.3-5,2.3-7,2.4-7,2.4-11, 2.5-3,2.5-7,2.5-8,2.5-16,2.5.I7,2.5-18, 2.5-20,2.5-21,2.5-22,2.5-23,2.5-24,2.5-25, 2.7-4, 2.7-8a, 2.7-9, 2.7-10, 2.7-1 1, 2.7-13, 2.7-14,2.7-15,2.7-16,2.7-17,2.7-19,2.7-21 l

r

~.,,

GDP 98-0084 1

Page 1 of 60

~

?.

t s

t

.. =,

aSAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT UPDATE

[~

J,..

JUNE 1,1999 REVISIONf; (CERTIFICATE AMENDMENT REQUESTT e

Remove Pages Insert Pages SARUP Revision Log SARUP Revision Log i

i, ii SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP List of Effective Pages SARUP-1,9,10 SARUP-1,9,10 SARUP TSRs SARUP TSR None 2.1-8,2.1-10,2.1-14,2.1-15,2.1-17,2.1-18, 2.1 -20a, 2.1 -22, 2.1 -24, 2.1 -27, 2.1 -28, 2.1 -

29,2.1-30,2.1-31,2.1-32,2.1-33,2.2-5,2.2-11,2.2-12,2.2-13,2.2-14,2.2-19,2.2-20,2.2-21,2.2-23,2.3-3,2.3-5,2.3-7, 2.4-7, 2.4-11, 2.5-3,2.5-7,2.5-8,2.5-16,2.5-17,2.5-18, 2.5-20,2.5-21,2.5-22,2.5-23,2.5-24,2.5-25, 2.7-4, 2.7-8a, 2.7-9, 2.7-10, 2.7-1 1, 2,7-13, 2.7-14,2.7-15,2.7-16,2.7-17,2.7-19,2.7-21 i

l

m l

i

'f*

June 1,1999 United States Enrichment Corporation Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Update i

REVISION LOG Date Description

'8/18/97 Initial Issue. Included: changes to SAR Chapter 2 (changed pages only); new SARUP Sections 4.1,4.2.1 through 4.2.5,4.3.1,4.4.

10/31/97 Submittal of complete SARUP (including 8/18/97 sections unchanged), with the exception of changes to Application SAR Chapter 3. Included: changes to SAR Chapters 1 and 2 and Sections 5.2, 5.4, and 5.6 (changed pages only);

complete replacement of Section 3.8, Chapter 4, and the TSRs; new Section 5.2, Appendix A.

4/30/98 Submittal to remove the fixed fire suppression sprinkler systems within the X-324-A and X-344-A facilities and the sanitary and fire water system (SFWS),

including its distribution and elevated storage tank as safety (AQ) systems.

Sections revised include: Section 3.8.7.2, Table 3.8-2, Table 4.2-5 Table 4.2-11, Section 4.3.2.2.16, TSR Table of Contents, TSR 2.2.3.3, TSR 2.4.3.1.b, TSR 2.4.3.2.a, and TSR 2.4.3.2.b. A SARUP List of Effective Pages is added.

10/19/98 Submittal to incorporate modifications to install additional handswitches at building exits for remote manual isolation of the remote feed isolation system in Building X-342-A; add a clarification to the Technical Safety Requirements, Section 2.1.3.6, Basis regarding draining raw cooling water (RCW) from process gas coolant condensers as a method to preclude introduction of a moderator (RCW) to the process system; add a reference to carbon dioxide ice blasting as an additional controlled means of field removal of uranium contamination from process equipment and facilities; make corrections to AQ-NCS boundary definitions regarding the high pressure venting system; revises the highest fire system sprinkler flow demand requirements; adds

/

commitments to certain codes and standards for process building cranes; corrects a standard edition date error; and clarifies the conunitment to codes and standards for liquid UF cylinder handling cranes, 11/20/98 Submittal to include a description of the Q boundary for rail cars. Revised Section 3.8.6.3.3 and Table 3.8-1.

F 1

y; i

?

June 1,1999 United States Enrichment Corporation Postsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Safety Analysis Report Update REVISION LOG (continued) 5/10/99 Submittal to remove entire set of SARUP TSRs and replace with modified versions of USEC-0 TSRs. This first set of "new" SARUP TSRs includes 2

LCOs related to nuclear criticality safety that have only minor changes to the basis to update SAR references.

6/01/99 Submittal to insert additional modified versions of USEC-02 TSRs. This second set of "new" SARUP TSRs includes LCOs that have only minor changes to the basis to update SAR references and to correct minor inconsistencies with the SARUP analysis.

I l

1 ii l

p I

?

SARUP-PORTS June 1,1999

)

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES l

l REVISION LOG CIIAPTER 2 (Continued) l Eggg RAC/ Revision /Date Eagg l'AC/ Revision i

June 1,1999 2.3-7 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) il June 1,1999 2.3-8 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-9 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) l CHAPTER 1, APPENDIX A 2.3-10 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-11 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

Pagg RAC/ Revision 2.3-12 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-1 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-13 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-2 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-14 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-3 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-15 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-4 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-16 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) i RAC 98-X0130 (RO) 2.3-17 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-5 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-18 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

RAC 98-X0130 (RO) 2.3-19 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-6 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-20 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-7 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.3-21 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-8 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.4-2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-9 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.4-6 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-10 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.4-7 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

A-11 RAC 97-X05% (RO) 2.4-8 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 1 A-12 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.4-9 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.4 11 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

CIIAPTER 2, CONTENTS 2.6-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

Eagg RAC/ Revision 2.6-3 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) ii RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-4 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) lii RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-5 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) iv RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-6 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) v RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-7 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-8 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

CIIAPTER 2 2.6-9 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-10 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

Pagg RAC/ Revision 2.6-11 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2,1-6 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-12 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.6-13 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.7-1 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-3 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.7-2 RAC 97-X0248 (RO)

.2.3-4 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-5 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) 2.3-6 RAC 97-X0248 (RO) l J

l SARUP-1

Y - SA$ TUP-PORTS June 1,1999 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES CHAPTER 5 (Continued)

TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS Eagg RAC/ Revision Eagg RAC/ Revision 5.2A-15 RAC 97-X0314 (RI)

Cover Page RAC 97-X0505 (R2) 5.2A-16 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-4b RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-17 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-8 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-18 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-10 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) l 5.2A-19 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-14 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-20 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-21 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.1-17 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-22 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-23 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2A-24 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.1-20a RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-25 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-22 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-26 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-24 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-27 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.1-27 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A 28 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.1-28 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-29 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.1-29 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-30 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-30 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2 A-31 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-31 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-32 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-32 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.2 A-33 RAC 97-X0314 (RI)

RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-34 RAC 97-X0314 (RI) 2.1-33 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2 A-35 RAC 97-X0314 -(RI) 2.2-5 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-36 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.2-7a RAC 97-X0505 (R3)

RAC 98-X0037 (RO) 2.2-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-37 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.2-12 RAC 97-X0505 (R4)

RAC 98-X0037 (RO) 2.2-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.2A-38 RAC 97-X0314 (R1) 2.2-14 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.4-2 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-3 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.4-6 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.4-7 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-20 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.6-1 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-21 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.6-6 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-23 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 5.6-7 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2-30 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 5.6-8 RAC 97-X0506 (RO) 2.2 '2 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.2-33 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.3-3 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.3-5 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.3-6 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.3-7 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.4-4b RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.4-7 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.4-8 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.4-9 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.4-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R4)

SARUP-9

W

[ ~ ***

SAkUP-PORTS June 1,1999 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES TECHNICAL SAFETY REQTS (continued)

TECHNICAL SAFETY REQTS (continued) l Eggg RAC/ Revision Eagg RAC/ Revision 2.5-3 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-21 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.5-Sa RAC 97-X0505 (R3) -

2.7-25 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.5 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-27 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.5-8 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-28 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.5-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.8-5a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.5-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 3 2.5-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.5-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) f 2.5-17 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) j 2.5-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.5 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.5-21 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 1 2.5-22 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) j 2.5-23 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.5-24 RAC 97-X0505 (R3)

RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.5-25 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.6-5 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-6 RAC 97-X0505 (R3)

)

2.6-7 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) q 2.6-9a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-14 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6 17 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-18 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.6-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.7-4 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 1 2.7-6a RAC 97-X0505 (R3) 2.7-8a RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-9 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-10 RAC 97-X0505 (R4)

.2.7-11 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-13 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7 14 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-15 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-16 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-17 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) 2.7-19 RAC 97-X0505 (R4) l i

i SARUP-10

[

,f_

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

'RAC 97X0505 (R4) l SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES l

2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE'ITINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.3 UF, Cylinder High Temperature Autoclave Steam Shutoff (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Quarterly SR 2.1.3.3.1 Perform each channel functional test to verify the autoclave steam supply valve will close when temperature exceeds set point.

)

Note: Allowable test tolerance to cover instrument drift and uncertainties during normal operation = + 5 F Semiannually SR 2.1.3.3.2 Calibrate cylinder high temperature shutoff instrumentation to a setpoint which coincides with the LCS i

for the applicable cylinder category.

j Note: Allowable test tolerance to cover instrument drift and uncertainties during normal operation = + 5 F 1

Prior to entering Mode VI SR 2.1.3.3.3 Calibrate high temperature shutoff instrumentation set point to s 145 F Note: Allowable test tolerance to cover instrument drift and uncertainties during normal operation = + 2.3 F BASIS:

Fill limits for UF cylinders are established to allow adequate room for yF expansion upon 6

heating. Uranium hexafluoride exhibits a significant expansion when undergoing the phase change from solid to liquid. The expansion factor from a solid at 70 F to a liquid at 235 F is approximately a 53% increase in volume. The desired void volume is dependent upon whether the internal volume is certified to exceed a specified minimum as shown by its water weight i

stamped on the nameplate or uncertified in which a minimum design volume is used for the determination. Various cylinder models are placed in designated heating categories A, B to maintain at least a 5% void volume for certified volume cylinders containing feed and product and 3% void volume with depleted material. Uncertified volume cylinders are categorized to maintain at least a 7% void volume with product and 5% void volume with depleted material. This system maintains the initial condition of an acceptable temperature inside the cylinder within the parameters assumed in the accident analysis. The maintaining of temperature control will ensure that the cylinder hydrostatic or zero ullage limitation will not be exceeded or in the case of Controlled Feeding will ensure that the UF is not liquefied. The LCS value corresponds to the 6

trip set point established under DOE 5481.1B in 1985 and amended by DOE approval in 1995 to allow a 5 F tolerance to comply with the definition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988. For Controlled Feeding (Mode VI) purposes, the shutoff system must be calibrated to a lower set point (145 *F a with a tolerance of 2.3 F) to assure that the UF does not liquify. [SAR Sections 3.8.2.7, 3.8.5.7, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.4, 4.3.2.2.10, 4.3.2.2.13, 4.3.2.2.14, and l

4.3.2.2.15].

l 2.1-8

l,..-

,TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

'RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.I SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.I.3 ~ LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.4 Autoclave Shell High Steam Pressure Shutdown (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

)

Frequency Surveillance i

Quarterly SR 2.1.3.4.1 Perform channel functional test to i

verify the autoclave steam supply valves will close when the pressure exceeds the LCS set point.

Semiannually SR 2.1.3.4.2 Calibrate shell high pressure steam shutdown instrumentation at the installed LCS set i

point.

J Each time set point is changed SR 2.1.3.4.3 Calibrate shell high pressure steam shutdown instrumentation at new LCS set point.

BASIS:

The autoclave shell high pressure steam shutdown is a " defense-indepth" system that supports the UF. Cylinder High Temperature Autoclave Steam Shutoff System. The liigh Steam Pressure Shutdown system consists of pressure sensing channels and two channels of isolation valves. If one of the channels is found to be inoperable and the affected autoclave is in a " feeding" mode (Modes IV or VI), it is permissible to continue to feed since the cylinder is open to the cascade or another container and is at little or no risk of over pressurizing. In Mode II (Heating),

. however, the cylinder has the potential to be over pressurized. Therefore the loss of a protective channel presents enough of a risk to require that further heating be halted (place autoclave in Mode VII).

The accident of concern involves the prevention of a "0" ullage condition in a UF cylinder and therefore the prevention of the resultant hydraulic rupture of the cylinder. The LCS set points of 8 psig and 2.5 psig as they correspond to cylinder categories were established such that when the instrument drift and other calibration uncertainties (2 psig) associated with the installed instrumentation is added to the LCS set point (10 psig = 240 F and 4.5 psig = 226 F) there is an adequate safety margin of 35 F and 49 F respectively below the lowest cylinder temperature of 275 'F at which there can be "0" ullage.

l The 10 psig and 4.5 psig values correspond to the " Allowable Value" as defined in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988.

2.1-10

i

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

'?

'RAC 97X0505 (R4) l l

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES

' 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SErflNGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 4

2.1.3.6 Autoclave Shell High Pressure Relief System (continued) i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each autoclave startup SR 2.1.3.6.1 Verify isolation block valve sealed open and pressure indicator in the cavity between the rupture disk and relief valve reads s 2 psig once steam has been introduced into the autoclave Annually SR 2 (.3.6.2 Calibrate the relief valve BASIS:

The ASME code (1995 ASME Pressure Vessel Code,Section VIII. Division I, Part UG, General Requirements) requires that over pressure relief be provided by a device stamped at or below the MAWP and sized such that the subsequent transient pressure will be limited to a maximum of 110% of MAWP when a single relief path is used. ASME code allows rupture disks to have a 5%

burst tolerance. Rupture disks stamped at MAWP and rated at 72 F will therefore burst at or below 105% of MAWP thus, the LCS is set at 100% MAWP. To comply with these standards, pressure relief devices are purchased and installed on the autoclaves with stamped ratings at or below the LCS [SAR Sections 3.8.2.10 and 3.8.5.10].

l l

l

)

l 2.1-14 L

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

'RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.7 High Condensate Level Shutoff APPLICABILITY:

Autoclave Operational Modes II, IV, VI LCO:

Both channels of the high condensate level shutoff system shall be operable.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

One channel A.1 Restore operability. May Prior to initiating a inoperable continue operating in Modes IV new cylinder heating or VI cycle B. Both channels B.1 Place autoclave in Mode VII 1 Hour inoperable SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Semiannually SR 2.1.3.7.1 Perform each channel functional test to verify the autoclave steam supply valve will close when i

probes are contacted with water.

BASIS:

The Condensate level shutoff system is provided to prevent over pressurization or a nuclear criticality in an autoclave following a postulated UF release. Excess water is undesirable in the 6

event of a UF release from the cylinder that could cause either high HF pressure as the result of 6

-the reaction between UF and water or the excessive moderation of an unsafe mass of uranium 6

thereby causing a criticality within the autoclave.

When the autoclaves were initially installed and the probes were in a fixed location, a design based acceptance water inventory test was conducted. This quantified the total amount of water retained (surfaces, pools, drain lines, etc.) in the autoclave. The successful completion of the water inventory. tests verified that an undesirable accumulation of water in the autoclave would not occur.

The system function is to detect either a drain line plug or restriction and to shut off the steam flow to the autoclave. The undetected plugging of the drain line while the autoclave is in service, regardless of the probe location, would result in the rapid buildup of water inventory and thereby potentially providing the conditions necessary for a release of radioactive materials to the atmosphere or a criticality within the autoclave [SAR Sections 3.8.2.5,3.8.5.5,4.3.2.2.13, and l

4.3.2.2.14].

l 2.1-15 L:-

ev

\\

l

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 l

Y ltAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.8 Cylinder Heating (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cylinder heating SR 2.1.3.8.1 Verify cylinder accountability weight is s standard cylinder fill weight Prior to initial heating under SR 2.1.3.8.2 Verify the autoclave has been calibrated

.LCO 2.1.3.8 Required Actions for the proper cylinder category Annually SR 2.1.3.8.3 Calibrate scales used for accountability weignts Prior to use at the beginning of SR 2.1.3.8.4 Perfonn functional test of accountability each shift scale BASIS:

Minimum void volume requirements are established to prevent cylinder hydraulic rupture if temperature limits are exceeded. The standard fill weight of UF if heated to 250 F will meet the 6

identified void volume criteria. The heating of cylinders to a maximum of 235 F would provide approximately a 6.75% void volume which is an additional 35% safety factor. The proper heating of a cylinder regardless of its weight can be achieved if the net weight of the cylinder and the minimum volume of the cylinder are known such that the maximum heating temperature to meet the void volume criteria can be calculated. The TSR controlled temperature control systems provided the added assurance that the hydrostatic or hydraulic limitation will not be exceeded

[SAR Sections 3.8.6.1, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.14, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 2.1-17

r?

1 F

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) s.

SECTION 2.1~ SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES l

2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,

- SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.9 Low Cylinder Pressure Shutoff

- APPLICABILITY:

Autoclave Operational Mode II LCO:

Low Cylinder Pressure Shutoff system shall be operable.

j ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Low cylinder pressure A.1 Place autoclave in Mode 1 Hour shutoff system inoperable VII SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Quarterly SR 2.1.3.9.1 Perform a channel functional test to verify steam isolation to the autoclave when after the initial allowable time of cylinder heating the cylinder pressure does not exceed the allowable value.

Semiannually SR 2.1.3.9.2 Perform calibration with allowable values of >_15.0 psia and X 65 minutes.

BASIS:

i The heating of a UF cylinder having a closed or plugged cylinder valve and/or pigtail would 6

negate the protection afforded by the cylinder high pressure shutoff system due to the isolation of the cylinder from the high pressure instrumentation. A UF. cylinder should not be heated if its pressure cannot be measured because excessive internal cylinder pressures could potentially rupture the cylinder. The low cylinder pressure shutoff system will isolate the steam supply to an autoclave when after the initial nominal hour (165 minutes allowable value) of cylinder heating the cylinder pressure does not equal or exceed the allowable value of 15.0 psia. UF cylinders are not heated unless their cold pressure is A 10 psia which provides a 5.0 psia margin to the allowable value for the purpose of ensuring valve and line clarity to the cylinder pressure instrumentation. Setpoints established shall be consistent with ANSI /ISA-S67.04-Part I-1994 "Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instmmentation" and ISA-RP67.04-Part 11-1994 i

" Methodologies for the Determination of Setpoints for Nuclear Safety Related Instrumentation."

The exception is that 2S sample cylinders heated to 235 'F would have a void volume of over 9%

with the cylinder valve closed. This system only provides protection during initial heating and not at another time [SAR Sections 3.8.2.9 and 3.8.5.9].

l 2.1-18 t.

{

l F

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) 4 L.

{

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES l

2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,

. SURVEILLANCES.

I 2.1.3.11 Autoclave Smoke Detection System (Continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance J

Semiannually SR 2.1.3.11.1 Test active smoke heads to ensure alarm indication will occur when smoke head is exposed to a simulated smoke condition.

BASIS:

In the event of a UP. release in the autoclave area a local indicator will sound notifying operating

)

personnel that immediate investigation and action must occur. The smoke detection system and

{

subsequent personnel actions will mitigate the consequences of any UF release. The detection l

components used are ionization type fire detectors designed to detect not only smoke but invisible combustion products. Due to their operating principle these detectors will also actuate in the presence of steam and vehicle exhaust, etc. Therefore prompt investigation of the actuation source is required. This LCO ensures that at least one smoke detector alarm circuit, covering the area above each autoclave that is not shut down, is operable. For autoclaves in the X-343 building, an autoclave smoke detector alarm circuit is required to have at least one operable smoke detector head above each respective autoclave pair (i.e., autoclave No. I and 2; 3 and 4; 5 and 6) and above autoclave No. 7, in order to be considered operable.

Additionally, a minimum of four (4) smoke detector heads (total) mounted on the ceiling are required to be operable in X-343 to alleviate any potential adverse effects on the smoke detector

. heads from wind inside the building when one or both crane doors are open. If this condition is

- not satisfied, the "affected autoclaves" referenced in Action B.2 encompasses all autoclaves in X-

343, Furthermore, a single smoke w 'h is adequate to implement Action B.1, regardless of how many autoclaves may be affected. Because of the physical layout of the autoclaves and the smoke i

detector heads in the X-342 and X-344 buildings, an autoclave smoke detector alarm circuit in either of these two buildings is required to have both smoke detector heads operable in order to

~

be considered operable. Other smoke detectors (and their associated alarm circuits) located in these facilities but not physically above the autoclaves are not covered by this TSR and shall not be used l

to satisfy the LCO requirements [SAR Section 3.8.7.3].

l l

l h

i i

2.1-20a i

n

1. .e

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) j SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,.

SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.12 Liquid UF, Handling Cranes (continued) i BASIS:

Failure of the crane lifting components or load braking system while lifting a liquid UF. cylinder i

could result in the uncontrolled dropping of the cylinder resulting in the rupture of the cylinder

]

and the release of up to 28,000 pounds of UF. The assurance of operability is provided by the -

)

6 ongoing inspection and tests and enhanced by the configuration management program that addresses component quality and change control [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4, and l

4.3.2.2.15]. The OSIIA test requirements are contained in 29 CFR 1910.

l 1

2.1-22

'.e TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.14 Liquid UF Movement 6

APPLICABILITY:

Autoclave Operational Mode I LCO:

Cylinders containing liquid UF shall be moved by overhead cranes, scale carts and 6

railcars.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to cylinder movement by forklift SR 2.1.3.14.1 Verify the cylinder cooling or straddle carrier time for solidification has been met BASIS:

A liquid UF release is significantly more severe than a release from a solid UF source.

6 6

Equipment reliability of straddle carriers and forklifts and road traffic conditions increase the risk of having a liquid UF release. The handling ofliquid UF cylinders with cranes, scale carts, 6

6 and railcars (X-330 Tails operations only) is more reliable and therefore represents a lower risk.

In the event a cylinder containing solid UF is dropped, while the cylinder integrity may be 6

compromised the rate of escaping UF is sufficiently low enough to limit the release to several 6

pounds upon taking emergency actions. SAR Section 3.2.7 provides the general guidelines used in determining UF solidification [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 3.8.6.3,4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 6

Solidification Criteria 48-inch cylinders containing less than 4000 pounds ofliquid UF must cool for at least 6

24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

48-inch cylinders containing 4000-8000 pounds of liquid UF must cool for at least 48 6

hours.

48-inch cylinders containing more than 8000 pounds of liquid UF must cool for at least 6

5 days.

30-inch cylinders (all assumed to be filled to limit) must cool for at least 3 days.

5-inch, 8-inch, and 12-inch cylinders must cool for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

4 2.1-24

.p TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.15 Receiving Cylinder Fill Weights (continued)

BASIS:

A safe fill limit must accommodate the internal volume of the cylinder, the density of the UF at 6

a specific temperature and an allowance for ullage or th: gas volume above the liquid in the cylinder. The standard fill weight is based on providing a 5% ullage or void volume at a heati.1g temperature of 250 "F [SAR Sections 3.8.6.1, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.14, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 1

I 2.1-27

f

}

i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 f

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES j

2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE1 TINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.16 UF. Cylinder Crane Movement APPLICABILITY:

Autoclave Operational Mode I LCO:

No UF cylinder shall be moved over another cylinder if one of the cylinders contains liquid UF.,

ACTIONS:

Condition,

Required Action Completion Time A.

UF cylinders lifted one A.1 Move the lifted Immediately over the other when at cylinder such that the least one of the cylinders LCO statement is contains liquid UFs.

satisfied.

]

BASIS:

The cylinder drop and puncture scenarios in the accident analysis involving liquid UF cylinders l

assume a release source term of 28,000 pounds of UF. The prohibition oflifting one cylinder l

j 6

over another if one of the cylinders contains liquid UF preserves the accident analysis assumption l

l of only one cylinder contributing to the release source term. [SAR Section 4.3.2.2.15].

l 2.1-28

i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 91X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.1.3.17 UF Cylinder Weight Discrepancy APPLICABILITY:

Autoclave Operational Mode IV LCO:

UF cylinders shall not be filled with QF when there is > 40 pound discrepancy i

6 between shipper UF cylinder weight and received cylinder weight until the weight 6

discrepancy is explained.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time

\\

A.

UF cylinder weight A.1

. Reject the cylinder Immediately 6

discrepancy > 40 AND pounds between shipper UF cylinder A.2 Verify the reason for Prior to removal of the 6

weight and received the weight rejection tag cylinder weight discrepancy l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance j

Prior to entry of UF into the cylinder SR 2.1.3.17.1 Verify difference between 6

shipped UF cylinder weight and received UF.

6 cylinder weight is X 40 pounds BASIS:

Liquid UF. will react explosively with hydrocarbon oil. The filling of a UF gylinder that contains hydrocarbon oil with liquid UF could result in the over pressuring of the cylinder to the point of 6

its rupturing. The amount of UF. release could be as high as 28,000 lbs, of UF. Verification (by weight difference) that no unknown materials have been added to a UF. cylinder while in transit between plant or building cylinder handling operations conducted just prior to filling the cylinder with UF. increases the assurance that the cylinder does not contain any materials violently reactive with UF [SAR Sections 4.3.2.2.10 and 4.3.2.2.11].

l 2.1-29 L

l TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

- RAC 97X0505 (R4) i SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES l

2.1.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, J

SURVEILLANCES l

i 2.1.3.18 UF. Plugs APPLICABILITY:

Operational Modes: All LCO:

Direct heat sources shall not be applied to solid UF plugs until line clarity in the system has been assured.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Direct heat source A.1 Discontinue direct heat Immediately being applied to a application to the UF6 solid UF plug plug 6

AND A.2 Ensure line clarity Prior to reapplying direct heat BASIS:

The application of an external heat source directly to a UF plug can liquify the UF within the center of the plug and thereby cause sufficient hydraulic forces to rupture the pipe containing the plug.E The primary concern over the direct application of heat (i.e., steam tracing, heat tape, etc.)

to the plug versus indirect heating (i.e., heated housings) is due to the fact that the energy is added to the plug at such a high rate that it is not evenly distributed over the entire plug and therefore does not allow for the sublimation of the plug before a portion of it liquefies. The secondary concern is that even though the UF. plug stays as a solid it must have room to expand. The consequences of a release of UF from this type of failure mechanism would be minimal due to 6

the fact that the UF. plug would remain as a solid and therefore, the release rate would be slow as the UF sublimes into the atmosphere.

l r

6 l

l i

2.1-30 L

]

n i

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 L,*

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES

-2.1.4.1 UF. Cylinder Lifting Fixtures DF:

UF. cylinder lifting fixtures are designed with a safety factor of 5 to 1.

SURVEILLANCE:

1 Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.1.4.1.1 Perform load test at a minimum of -

100% rated capacity Prior to first time use during shift SR 2.1.4.1.2 Perform inspection of cylinder lifting fixture BASIS:

Lifting fixtures used to handle liquid filled UF cylinders are credited for prevention of the liquid 6

cylinder drop and rupture accident scenario [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 2.1.4.2 UF. Cylinders DF:

Large UF (2.5 Ton and greater) cylinders are as a minimum designed to a MAWP of 100 psig SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance 5 Year SR 2.1.4.2.1 Perform hydrostatic test on large UF.

cylinders with the following exception; cylinders that are full of UF but have an expired hydrostatic test date may be heated for removal of the UF but shall be hydrostatic tested prior to refilling.

Prior to cylinder filling or heating SR 2.1.4.2.2 Inspect cylinder for defects BASIS:

UF. cylinder MAWP)_.100 psig is a basic assumption in the accident analysis and relates to the l

I overall structural integrity of the UF containment barrier [SAR Sections 3.8.6.1,4.3.2.2.2, l

4.3.2.2.4, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.7, 4.3.2.2.9, 4.3.7.2.10, and 4.3.2.2.14].

l 2.1-31

y TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R3),97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES 2.1.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES

'2.1.4.3 UF. Cylinder Pigtails DF: Newly fabricated pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to initial use SR 2.1.4.3.1 Inspect and perform hydrostatic test at least to 400 psig and ensure inspection tag is attached to the pigtail.

HASIS:

Structural integrity of the pigtail significantly reduces the likely hood of a catastrophic rupture

[SAR Sections 3.8 2.4, 3.8.5.4,4.3.2.2.2,4.3.2.2.4,4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.7, 4.3.2.2.9, 4.3.2.2.10, l

and 4.3.2.2.13].

l 2.1.4.4 X-342 Condensate Sump and Oil Interceptor DF: Condensate sump and oil interceptor shall contain Borosilicate glass Raschig Rings SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.1.4.4.1 Verify that the surveillance requirements contained in ANSI Standard 8.5 are satisfied.

BASIS:

X-342A sump and oil interceptor are of an unfavorable geometry and Raschig rings are used to enhance criticality prevention [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, sections 2.3 and 2.4].

l 2.1-32 J

i

!l, TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 t

~

RAC 97X0505 (R4) l SECTION 2.1 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-342, X-343, AND X-344 FACILITIES l

2.1.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES i

l 2.1.4.5 Autoclave Shell l

DF: The autoclave shell Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP) shall be at least 150 psig.

SURVEILLANCE:

i Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.1.4.5.1 Perform visual inspection of autoclave shell and head according to the National Board Inspection Code j

U-110.1 Inspection of Shells and Heads.

j l

BASIS:

The autoclave shell, valves and external piping out to the second isolation valve were credited i.n the cylinder rupture inside an operating autoclave scenario for containing the rer; tion products resulting from the release and its reaction with autoclave steam and water [SAR Sections 3.8.2.3, l

3.8.5.3, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.4, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.7, 4.3.2.2.9, 4.3.2.2.10. 4.3.2.2.13, and l

4.3.2.2.14].

l 2.1.4.6 Overhead Crane Capacity DF: Cranes that transport cylinders contair?ng liquid UF are designed with a minimum lifting capacity of 18 tons.

SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance 1

l Annually SR 2.1.4.6.1 Perform surveillance in l

accordance with SR 2.1.3.12.2.

l-BASIS:

Cranes used to handle liquid UF cylinders are credited for prevention of a liquid cylinder drop 6

and rupture [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l l

2.1-33

\\

i L.

1';,,.

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) l SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.1 Coolant High Pressure Relief System (continued)

LCO: Coolant high pressure relief system shall be operable.

ACTIONS:

Conditions Required Actions Completion Time A.

Rupture disk inoperable A.1 Place cell / equipment in 30 Minutes Mode VI B.

Cavity between double B.1 Restore vent to 8 Hours rupture disks blocked atmosphere C.

Isolation block valve C.1 Open or verify open Immediately closed and/or seal broken valve AND C.2 Reseal valve 8 Hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Annually and prior to entering Modes SR 2.2.3.1.1 Verify isolation block valve sealed II or III from either Modes I, IV, or open and cavity between rupture disks, if present, VI is vented to atmosphere.

BASIS; The 1995 ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Division I,Section VIII requires that overpressure relief be provided by a device stamped at or below the MAWP and sized such that the subsequent transient pressure will be limited to a maximum of 110% of MAWP. ASME Code allows rupture disks to have a 5% burst tolerance. Rupture disks stamped at MAWP will therefore burst at or below 105% of MAWP. The LCS is set at 100% of MAWP. To comply with these standards, pressure relief devices are purchased and installed on the Cascade cell coolant condensers with stamped ratings at or below the MAWP [SAR Sections 3.8.3.4 and 4.3.2.1.6].

l 1

2.2-5 l

l l

l

p I~

TSR-PORTS -

PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.4 High Pressure Fire Water System (continued)

BASIS:

The fire protection system is provided to mitigate a fire that could cause structural damage to roof purlins, trusses and columns followed by localized collapse of the roof with potential onsite and off-site consequences due to the breach of the UF containment boundary and the resulting UF.

6 release. Surveillances for fire water pump testing apply to those pumps relied upon to meet required flow rates. These systems are designed to meet the intent of the insurance industry

" improved risk" criteria as interpreted by the Authority IIaving Jurisdiction (AIU) as described i

in SAR Section 5.4. The sprinkler system will minimize the potential for, and mitigate the effects j

of a large fire. The fire water system flow requirement is conservative with respect to the system evaluation presented in the SAR. [SAR Sections 3.8.7.2 and 4.3.2.1.9]

i l

1 l

2.2-11

• L:

?.

- TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES i

2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.5 Coolant Removal APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV LCO:

Cell and applicable Freezer Sublimer (F/S) coolant systems shall be drained of coolant before addition of oxidants for cell treatment.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time

-i A.

Failure to drain coolant prior A.1 Evacuate cell contents 1 Hour to adding oxidants and there are no indications of a l

reaction B.

Failure to drain coolant prior B.1 Stop cell / equipment Immediately l

to adding oxidants and there motors are indications of a reaction AND B.2 Drain coolant 1 Hour i

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell treatment SR 2.2.3.5.1 Verify and document the removal of cell l

coolant prior to the initial charge of oxidants.

BASIS:

l In the event of a leak from the coolant system to process, the failure to control the concentrations of coolant and CIF /F within the cell can form explosive mixtures that in the presence of an 3 2 ignition source could over pressure the cell and release toxic materials. The draining of coolant includes the evacuating of the coolant system to between 18 and 30 inches of Hg for the X-27 and X-29 size equipment. The other equipment sizes have no specific coolant evacuation requirement other than for the system pressure to be below atmospheric pressure. The indications of an exothermic reaction are usually rapid pressure spikes and/or a rapid increase in temperature. A leaking block valve between a F/S that has a leaking cooler and the host cell could allow coolant and treat:nent gases to mix and therefore potentially form a highly exothermic reaction mixture.

l 2.2-12

q 1

~

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 i

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,

{

SURVEILLANCES j

2.2.3.6 Cell Treatment Monitoring APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV 1

LCO:

Cell treatments shall be monitored with an Infrared Analyzer.

ACTIONS:

Note: TSR 1.6.2.2(d) does not apply Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Infrared Analyzer inoperable A.1 Initiate sampling for.

30 Minutes l

free CIF and the 3

l presence of hydrocarbons B.

Above condition required B.1 Evacuate cell 30 Minutes l

actions and/or completion contents l

time are not accomplished j

SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell treatment SR 2.2.3.6.1 Verify and document the installation of an Infrared Analyzer prior to the initial charge of treatment gas BASIS:

1 Failure to maintain an adequate amount of CIF within the cell can lead to the formation of 3

reaction products that will result in highly exothermic reactions upon the re-introduction of CIF /F. In addition, the Infrared Analyzer is used to detect the presence of hydrocarbon l

3 2 materials, that could also react violently with CIF /F under the right conditions. Replacing an l

3 2 inoperable analyzer can take up to three hours. For this reason sampling is initiated within thirty minutes and continued until an operable analyzer is hooked up and operating properly.

l L

1 2.2-13

rs.

,g

.j l.

I

~

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 i

RAC 97X0505 (R4) 1 SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.7-Cell Inverse Recycle Treatment APPLICAHILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV LCO:

Individual cells shall be isolated from each other when the cell inverse recycle treatment method is used.

SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell inverse recycle treatment SR 2.2.3.7.1 Verify and document that an inverse recycle treatment cell is not tied together with any other cell prior to the initial charge of treatment gas BASIS:

Due to the inverse recycle treatment method there is no assurance that an adequate supply of CIF3 would be present in the second cell tied to the parent cell. The lack of a sufficient amount of CIF 3 allows the formation of ClO on the interior cell surfaces that upon contact with a new supply of j

2 CIF will react violently and could cause a breach in the cell containment; thereby releasing toxic 3

materials and spreading contamination.

l l

2.2-14 i-

i TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES

'2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.10 Crane Movement of Cascade Equipment APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Modes II & V LCO:

Area Control Room operator shall know time and travel path of cascade equipment moved overhead of cells.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Equipment being A.1 Place equipment on the Immediately moved without prior floor at the first closest notification of the ACR location operator AND A.2 Inform ACR operator Prior to resuming j

of equipment movement equipment movement time and travel path SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

None BASIS:

In the event a piece of equipment is dropped on a cell / equipment operating above atmosphere the amount of UF released could be reduced significantly by the prompt action to de-energize the 6

motors which reduces the internal pressure of the cell / equipment to below atmosphere, thereby stopping the release of UF.. An ACR operator that knows the travel path of the equipment could respond more quickly to the affected location upon receiving less than specific indications of a major problem [SAR Section 4.3.2.1.8].

l l

f 2.2-19

.t TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,

' SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.11 Evacuation Booster Station Oxidant Limit APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode II LCO:

EBS shall not pump material with a CIF and/or F concentration 2 8 mole %.

3 2

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

CIF /F concentration A.1 Close EBS suction valve 30 Minutes 3 2 exceeded and evacuate SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to transfer of material containing SR 2.2.3.11.1 Review sample or infrared CIF /F analyzer results of material to be pumped to 3 2 ensure LCO is not exceeded BASIS:

Failure to control the concentrations of CLF /F within the EBS could result in highly reactive 3 2 mixtures if there was a simultaneous coolant leak in the EBS cooler. The resultant mixture in the presence of an ignition source could over pressure the EBS and cause the spread of contamination.

l 2.2-20

'.g TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

I SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.12 UF. Plugs APPLICABILITY: Operational Modes: All LCO:

Direct heat sources shall not be applied to solid UF plugs until line clarity in the system has been assured.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Direct heat source A.1 Discontinue direct heat Immediately being applied to a solid application to the UF.

UF plug plug AND A.2 Ensure line clarity Prior to reapplying direct heat BASIS:

The application of an external heat source directly to a UF plug can liquify the UF. within the center of the plug and thereby cause sufficient hydraulic forces to rupture the pipe containing the plug. The primary concern over the direct application of heat (i.e., steam tracing, heat tape, etc.)

to the plug versus indirect heating (i.e., heated housings) is due to the fact that the energy is added to the plug at such a high rate that it is not evenly distributed over the entire plug and therefore does not allow for the sublimation of the plug before a portion of it liquefies. The secondary concern is that even though the UF plug stays as a solid it must have room to expand. The 6

consequences of a release of UF. from this type of failure mechanism would be minimal due to the fact that the UP plug would remain as a solid and therefore, the release rate would be slow as the UF. sublimes into the atmosphere.

l l

l 2.2-21

'f, l.

TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) l SECTION 2.2 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 FACILITIES 2.2.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.2.3.13 Cascade Pressure Limitation (continued)

BASIS:-

The accident analysis provided in SAR Section 4.3.2 assumes that cascade high pressure accidents promd to their conclusion which, in some cases, results in some form of breach in the cascade system. It is at this point that the consequences are evaluated and the identification of any mitigating actions takes place. The cascade was not designed to directly measure cell pressures l

in the ACR or to measure pressures that approach 40 psia. Motor load and other process indicators in the ACR alert the operator to significant cascade transients which require appropriate actions to be taken, including cell shutdown, to preclude cascade pressures from exceeding 40 psia which is the postulated rupture pressure of cascade piping. The monitoring of cell pressures from the local cell panels is sufficient to ensure that the steady state pressures do not exceed 25 psia.

Due to the ability to perform a channel check across the 8 to 10 stage pressure indicating controllers (PICS) per cell and the fact that within an operating cell any stage high side pressure increase will quickly cascade through the cell (i.e., raise the other stage high side pressure), it is not necessary that all the PICS are functional to determine the cell pressure. The calibration of

^ the unit and cell datums will ensure an adequate level of accuracy (cell averaging) and therefore

-the calibration of individual PICS is not necessary. As part of the level of accuracy (cell averaging) and therefore the calibration ofindividual PICS is not necessary. As part of the cascade inventories there are several data comparisons made that provide the information needed to identify any out of tolerance PIC without doing a calibration. The cascade inventory data comparison includes analyzing stage compression ratios and the comparison of motor amperage versus stage high pressure against known process relationships.

2.2-23 I

e

r

• 4 TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-333 FREEZER SUBLIMERS 2.3.2 SAFETY LIMITS APPLICABILITY: All F/S Operational Modes 2.3.2.1 SL:

Shall not exceed 11,900 pounds of UF. in F/S vessel.

BASIS:

The original design of the Freezer / Sublimer system considered the potential for UF bridging between fins or adjoining coolant tubes that could cause mechanical stress rupture of the coolant tubes inside the F/S vessel when heated. The release of the coolant to the interior of the F/S could result in over-pressuring an expansion joint in the piping to the Cascade and a subsequent crack would release the mixture of coolant and UF. A safety limit of 11,900 lbs. UF was established 6

in the original design for the amount of UF at which the onset of bridging could occur !SAR Section 3.8.3.5].

l i

1 2.3-3

)

h

~

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

.c RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-333 FREEZER SUBLIMERS 2.3.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.3.3.1 Freezer / Sublimer UF High-High Weight Trip System (continued) 6 BASIS:

The UF Iligh-Iligh Weight Trip System prevents the rupture of the F/S vessel due to excess UF, 6

The vessel weight is monitored by two independent measuring systems and is activated by weight ~

trip switches. The F/S weighing system measures the combined weight of the UF. and R-114 in the vessel. The amount of R-114 in the system is maintained at 2,000 lbs. i 200 lbs. The trip occurs when the UF weight in the F/S vessel reaches 9,000 lbs. In this case, the F/S vessel is 6

not isolated, but is placed in the modified hot standby mode, which is the trip mode for the system, with the weight control valve (FV3600) open to the cascade "A" stream, thus reducing the UF 6 inventory in the F/S vessel.

The original design of the Freezer / Sublimer system considered the potential for UF bridging 6

between fins or adjoining coolant tubes that could cause mechanical stress rupture when heated.

Applying heat to an overfilled vessel could result in a rupture in the form of a crack and subsequent UF release. The Limiting Control Setting (LCS) is s'et at 9,000 lbs, of Up which 6

with a potential weighing system tolerance of an additional 200 lbs. of UF. provides an adequate safety margin of 2,700 lbs. of UF to prevent <essel damage due to tube bridging. The set point 6

value corresponds to the trip point established under DOE 5481.1B in 1985 and provide a test tolerance to comply with the definition of " Allowable Value" in ANSI /ISA-S67.04-1988 [SAR Section 3.8.3.5].

l l

2.3-5 l

l u'

4

.i

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED RAC 97X0505 (R4)

June I,1999 SECTION 2.3 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-333 FREEZER SUBLIMERS l

2.3.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.3.3.3 Freezer / Sublimer Venting APPLICABILITY: F/S Operational Modes I, II, III, IV LCO: F/S vent block valve shall be sealed open ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Units 2,3,5,7 A.1 Open or verify valve Immediately AFS(unit)C(cell) VI open valve closed and/or seal AND broken A.2 Seal valve open 8 Hours B.

Units 4 and 6 B.1 Open or verify open Immediately AFS(unit)C(cell)VI and one of the vent valves AFS(unit)C6V2 valve AND closed and/or seal broken B.2 Seal valve open 8 Hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to entering Modes I,II,III,IV from Mode SR 2.3.3.3.1 Verify that the vent valve V

is sealed open BASIS:

l Provide a relief path for any F/S system high pressure to the cascade in order to not over pressure i

the vessel. The source of high pressure would be from a ruptured coolant tube (s) [SAR Section 3.8.3.4].

i l

l l

l 2.3-7

g

.t

.TSR-PORTS

' PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

]

TCTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 COLD RECOVERY 2.4.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCE 2.4.3.2 Cold Trap Pressure Relief System (continued)

BASIS:

]

In order to prevent a cold trap rupture due to excessive internal trap pressure, a pressure relief valve set to open at approximately 30 psig and a rupture disk are installed. The rupture disk is 4

to be nominally rated at s 61.1 psig at a coincident temperature of 72 F (equivalent to 54.4 psig at 190 *F) which is s the cold trap MAWP and in accordance with the manufacturer's range as i

specified by Section VIII of the ASME Pressure Vessel Code. To ensure the design differential across the rupture disk is not exceeded, the relief drum pressure is evacuated to s 0.3 psia prior to the cold trap flashing operation. Rupture of the cold trap could result in the release of UF. and other toxic gases such as CIF [SAR Section 3.8.3.4].

l 3

i 2.4-7 1

y.

.'TSR-PORTS 4

PROPOSED RAC 97X0505 (R4)

June 1,1999 SECTION 2.4 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-330 AND X-333 COLD RECOVE i

j 2.4.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCE 2.4.3.5 Reaction Products (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to entering Mode II SR 2.4.3.5.1 Verify sample or Infrared Analyzer results of drum bank material be trapped are with in LCO limitations Twice a shift, after entering Mode II SR 2.4.3.5.2 Monitor cold trap inlet pressure and upper shell temperature BASIS:

Failure to control the concentrations of various mixtures of c liquification of these materials in the cold trap and formation of violently re 3

esult in the release of toxic gases into the cold trap room can res that to operate [SAR Section 3.8.3.4].

relief system fails l

k 2.4-11

--~~

E

)

1

' i '.4

'.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS

' WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.2 SAFETY LIMITS APPLICAHILITY:

All Withdrawal Operational Modes 2.5.2.1 SL:

Coolant pressures shall not exceed the values contained in the Safety Limit column of the table below:

LOCATION VERSUS SAFETY LIMIT LAW STATION 330 PSIG

' ERP STATION 440 PSIG BASIS:

Overpressurization and rupture (multiple tubes) of the coolant system into the UF system could 6

result in the subsequent release of UF due to overpressurization of the UF enrichment system.

6 6

The Safety Limit has been established at 110% of the MAWP based on the ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Division I,Section VIII. While not directly applicable to this application, the 110%

overpressurization value does indicate that there is a high degree of confidence that the vessel pressure boundary will not fail at 110% of the stated MAWP. [SAR Section 3.8.3.4]

l l

l 1

2.5-3 L

A

.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 s

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE'ITINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.2 Coolant High Pressure Relief System (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each withdrawal loop post SR 2.5.3.2.1 Verify isolation block valve sealed maintenancejtartup open BASIS:

The 1995 ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Division I,Section VIII requires that overpressure relief be provided by a device stamped at or below the MAWP and sized such that the subsequent transient pressure will be limited to a maximum of 110% of MAWP. ASME Code allows rupture disks to have a 5% burst tolerance. Rupture disks stamped at MAWP will therefore burst at or below 105% of MAWP. The LCS is set at 100% of MAWP. To comply with these standards, pressure relief devices are purchased and installed on the Cascade cell coolant condensers with stamped ratings at or below the MAWP [SAR Section 3.8.3.4]. The Tails Withdrawal uses a heat l

transfer medium with a much lower vapor pressure that remains as a liquid. As a result, there cannot be a catastrophic failure of the equipment.

1 2.5-7 L

r

• o

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

- RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.3 UF, Smoke Detection APPLICABILITY:

Withdrawal Operational Modes II, III, IV LCO:

Compressor / Accumulator UF. Smoke Detectors shall be operable.

ACTIONS:

Note: TFR 1.6.2.2(d) does not apply ConditL.,

Required Actions Completion Time A. Smoke detectors operable laration ERP LAW TAILS A.1 Provide a continuous 1Ilour Inside Compressor

<2

<2

<2 Housing Outside Compressor

<1

<1

<1 Ilousing per Compressor Condenser / Accumulator

<2

<2

<2 Area SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

1 Frequency Surveillance

Monthl, SR 2.5.3.3.1 Perform test of active CADP smoke detectors to verify that the smoke detectors have provided an alarm condition in the ACR.

Quarterly SR 2.5.3.3.2 Test active smoke heads to ensure alarm indication will occur when smoke head is exposed to a simulated smoke condition.

' BASIS:

In the event of a UF release in the compressor area or withdrawal room, an alarm will sound in the ACR notifying operating personnel that immediate investigation and action must occur. The smoke detection system is sensitive enough to detect very minor out gassings of UF and therefore will prompt the operator actions necessary to minimize the amount of UF released [SAR Sections 3.8.7.3, 4.3.2.2.1, and 4.3.2.2.12].

2.5-8

i.

UfSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.8 UF. Cylinder Cart Movement APPLICABILITY:

Withdrawal Operational Mode III LCO:

Movement of the cylinder cart, shall be prohibited while the cylinder is connected to the withdrawal manifold.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Air interlock key not A.1 Tag out the air supply to Immediately over pigtail or air cylinder cart hose not disconnected OR

' * "I A.2 Stop UF withdrawal and 1 Hour disconnect pigtail SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each pigtail connection SR 2.5.3.8.1 Verify air interlock key is over pigtail prior to starting UF, withdrawal BASIS:

Movement of the cylinder cart while a UF cylinder is connected to the withdrawal manifold and boundary valves are open, may lead to a large UF release [SAR Section 4.3.2.2.11].

l 6

2.5-16

IEw

.' rSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.9 Liquid UF. Cylinder Movement APPLICABILITY:

Withdrawal Operational Modes III, V LCO:

Cylinders containing liquid UF. shall be moved by overhead cranes, scale carts and railcars.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cylinder disconnection SR 2.5.3.9.1 Verify the cylinder valve protector has been installed prior to removing cylinder from withdrawal cart Prior to cylinder movement by SR 2.5.3.9.2 Verify the cylinder cooling time for forklift or straddle carrier solidification has been met.

HASIS:

A liquid UF. release is significantly more severe than a release from a sol 41 UF source.

Equipment reliability of straddle carriers and forklifts and road traffic conditions increase the risk of having a liquid UF release. The handling of liquid UF. cylinders with cranes, scale carts, and railcars (X-330 Tails operations only) is more reliable and therefore represents a lower risk.

In the event a cylinder containing solid UF is dropped, while the cylinder integrity may be l

compromised the rate of escaping UF. is sufficiently low enough to limit the release to several pounds upon taking emergency actions. SAR Section 3.2.7 provides the general guidelines used in determining UF solidification [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 3.8.6.3, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l Solidification Criteria l

48-inch cylinders containing less than 4000 pounds of liquid UF must cool for at least i

l-24 hours.

l 48-inch cylinders containing 4000-8000 pounds of liquid UF must cool for at least 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br />.

48-inch cylinders containing more than 8000 pounds ofliquid UF must cool for at least 5 days.

30-inch cylinders (all assumed to be filled to limit) must cool for at least 3 days.

5-inch, 8-inch, and 12-inch cylinders must cool for at least 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, 2.5-17

v

! '.t '

.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS

)

WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.10 Liquid UF. Handling Cranes APPLICABILITY:

Withdrawal Operational Mode III LCO:

Cranes shall be operable prior to lifting a cylinder containing liquid UP.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Crane inoperable (hoist A.1 Tag crane out of service 1 Hour brakes, upper / lower-limit switches, hook,

- cable)

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to first time use during shift SR 2.5.3.10.1 Perform Operator functional crane inspection of: hoist, trolley, bridge,stop button and upper limit switch Annually SR 2.5.3.10.2 Perform load test (100% of rated capacity)

Monthly SR 2.5.3.10.3 Perform OSHA required monthly hands on inspection Annually SR 2.5.3.10.4 Perform OSHA required annual hands on inspection BASIS:

Failure of the crane lifting components or load braking system while lifting a liquid UF cylinder could result in the uncontrolled dropping of the cylinder resulting in a rupture of the cylinder and the release of up to 28,000 pounds UF.. The OSHA test requirements are contained in 29 CFR

}

1910. The assurance of operability is provided by the ongoing inspections and tests and enhanced L

by the Configuration Management Program that addresses component quality and change control

[SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l l

2.5-18 i

F

• l.

. TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES i

2.5.3.11 Cylinder Fill Weights (continued)

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Fill weight > Standard A.1 Evacuate excess UF NA 6

fill weight and cylinder prior to cylinder still on scale cart removal from scale cart B.

Fill weight > Standard B.1 Tag cylinder as having Immediately fill weight and UF been over filled 6

cylinder removed from AND B.2 Transport cylinder with NA solidified UF for 6

accountability weighing and handling under autoclave specific LCO 2.1.3.8 " Required Actions" SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cylinder disconnection SR 2.5.3.11.1 Verify final cylinder fill weight.

Prior to placing cylinder in the SR 2.5.3.11.2 Perform a functional test of the withdrawal position scale.

BASIS:

A safe fill limit must accommodate the internal volume of the cylinder, the density of the UF at 6

a specific temperature and an allowance for ullage or the gas volume above the liquid in the cylinder. The operational fill weight is based on providing a 5% ullage or void volume at a heating temperature of 250 *F. The functional test of the scale will consist of obtaining a cylinder l tare weight and comparing it to the accountability tare weight to verify that the two weights are within 40 pounds. [SAR Sections 3.8.6.1, 4.3.2.2.2, 4.3.2.2.6, 4.3.2.2.14, and 4.3.2.2.15]

l 2.5-20

I I

PROPOSED June 1,1999

..t

.TSR-PORTS RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS f

WITHDRAWAL STATIONS

)

2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.12 UF Cylinder Crane Movement 6

APPLICABILITY:

Withdrawal Operational Mode I, III

{

LCO:

No UF cylinder shall be moved over another cylinder if one of the cylinders contains 6

liquid UF.

6 ACTIONS:

Condition Required Action Completion Time A.

UF cylinders lifted A.1 Move the lifted Immediately 6

one over the other cylinder such that the when at least one of LCO statement is the cylinders contains satisfied, liquid UFs.

BASIS:

4 The cylinder drop and puncture scenarios in the accident analysis involving liquid UF cylinders 6

assume a release source term of 28,000 pounds of UF. The prohibition oflifting one cylinder 6

over another if one of the cylinders contains liquid UF preserves'the accident analysis assumption j

6 of only one cylinder contributing to the release source term. [SAR Section 4.3.2.2.15].

i 1

2.5-21

e'

,'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED RAC 97X0505 (R4)

June 1,1999 SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITIIDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.3 LIMITING CONTROL SE'ITINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERAT SURVEILLANCES 2.5.3.13 UF, Plugs APPLICABILITY:

All Withdrawal Operational Modes LCO:

Direct heat sources shall not be applied to solid UF plugs until line clarity in has been assured.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Direct heat source A.1 Discontinue direct Immediately being applied to a heat application to the solid UF plug UF plug 6

6 AND A.2 Ensure line clarity Prior to reapplying direct heat BASIS:

The application of an external heat source directly to a UF. plug can liquify the UF center of the plug and thereby cause sufficient hydraulic forces to rupture the pipe 6

plug. The primary concern over the direct application of heat (i.e., steam traci to the plug versus indirect heating (i.e., heated housings) is due to the fact that the to the plug at such a high rate that it is not evenly distributed over the entire plug and e

t does not allow for the sublimation of the plug before a portion of it liquefies.

e concern is that even though the UF. plug stays as a solid it must have room to expan consequences of a release of UF from this type of failure mechanism would be minimal du 6

the fact that the UF plug would remain as a solid and therefore, the release rate wou 6

as the UF sublimes into the atmosphere.

6 l

t 2.5-22

i 1.i

.'i'SR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) 3ECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WIT 11DRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.5.4.1 UF Cylinder Lifting Fixtures 6

DF:

UF cylinder lifting fixtures are designed with a safety factor of 5 to 1.

6 SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.5.4.1.1 Perform load test (100% of rated capacity)

Prior to first time use during shift SR 2.5.4.1.2 Perform inspection of cylinder lifting fixture BASIS:

Lifting fixtures used to handle liquid filled UF cylinders are credited for prevention of the liquid 6

cylinder drop and rupture accident scenario [SAR Sections 3.8.6.2, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 2.5.4.2 UF Cylinders 6

DF:

Large UF (2.5 Ton and greater) cylinders are as a minimum designed to a 6

MAWP of 100 psig SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance 5 Years SR 2.5.4.2.1 Perform hydrostatic test on large UF cylinder 6

with the following exception; cylinders that are full of UF6 but have an expired hydrostatic test date may be heated for removal of the UF but shall be hydrostatic tested prior to 6

refilling.

Prior to cylinder filling SR 2.5.4.2.2 Inspect cylinder for defects BASIS:

UF cylinder MAWP 2.100 psig is a basic assumption in the accident analysis and relates to the 6

overall structural integrity of the UF containment barrier. [SAR Sections 3.8.6.1,4.3.2.2.4, and 6

4.3.2.2.11]

2.5-23 r

m

.' fSR-PORTS.

. PROPOSED June 1,1999

.t -

RAC 97X0505 (R3),97X0505 (R4)'

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.4 GENERAL DESIGN FEATURES 2.5.4.3 UF, Cylinder Pigtails DF:

Newly fabricated pigtails are designed to withstand at least 400 psig SURVEILLANCE:

j Frequency Surveillance Prior to initial use SR 2.5.4.3.1 Inspect and perform hydrostatic test at least to 400 psig and ensure inspection tag is attached to the pigtail BASIS:

Structural integrity of the pigtail significantly reduces the likelihood of a catastrophic rupture [SAR j

Sections 3.8.4.5, 4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.11].

l 2.5.4.4 Scale Pit'Raschig Rings

- DF:

ERP, LAW and Tails scale pits shall contain Borosilicate glass Raschig rings to a minimum depth of 6 inches.

SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.5.4.4.1 Verify that the surveillance requirements contained in ANSI Standard 8.5 are satisfied.

BASIS:

The scale pits contain Raschig Rings to enhance nuclear criticality safety [SAR Section 5.2, Appendix A, section 1.4].

2.5-24

=.

.1

.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.5 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 ERP, X-333 LAW, AND X-330 TAILS WITHDRAWAL STATIONS 2.5.4.5 Overhead Crane Capacity DF:

Cranes that transport cylinders containing liquid UF. are designed with a minimum lifting capacity of 18 tons.

SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.5.4.5.1 Perform surveillance in accordance with SR 2.5.3.10.2.

BASIS:

J Cranes used to handle liquid UF cylinders are credited for prevention of a liquid cylinder drop 6

and rupture [SAR Sections 3.S.6.2,4.3.2.2.4, and 4.3.2.2.15].

l 1

j l

l 2.5-25 1

p1 l

.t

.TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY

- 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.1 Coolant High Pressure Relief System APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Modes II, III LCS: 5: 400 PSIG.

LCO: Coolant high pressure relief system shall be operable.

ACTIONS:

Conditions Required Actions Completion Time -

A.

Rupture disk inoperable A.1 Place cell / equipment 30 Minutes in Mode VI B.

Isolation block valve B.1 Open or verify open hnmediately closed or seal broken valve AND B.2 Reseal valve 8 Hours SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to entering Mode II or III from SR 2.7.3.1.1 Verify isolation block valve sealed any of Modes I, IV, or VI open BASIS:

The 1995 ASME Pressure Vessel Code, Division I,Section VIII requires that overpressure relief be provided by a device stamped at or below the MAWP and sized such that the subsequent transient pressure will be limited to a maximum of 110% of MAWP. ASME Code allows rupture disks to have a 5% burst tolerance. Rupture disks stamped at MAWP will therefore burst at or below 105% of MAWP. The LCS is set at 100% of MAWP. To comply with these standards, pressure relief devices are purchased and installed on the Cascade cell coolant condensers with stamped ratings at or below the MAWP [SAR Sections 3.8.3.4 and 4.3.2.1.6].

l 2.7-4

1 k,e

.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) l SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY

~

2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEfLLANCES 2.7.3.3 High Pressure Fire Water System (continued)

BASIS:

The fire protectica sys tem is provided to mitigate a fire that could cause stmetural damage to roof purlins, trusses and cclumns followed by localized collapse of the roof with potential onsite and off-site consequences due to the breach of the UF containment boundary and the resulting UF 6

l release.

Surveillances for fire water pump testing apply to those pumps relied upon to meet required flow rates. These systems are designed to meet the intent of the insurance industry

" improved risk" criteria as interpreted by the Authority llaving Jurisdiction (AIU) as described in SAR Section 5.4. The sprinkler system will minimize the potential for, and mitigate the effects l

' of a large fire. The fire water system flow requirement is conservative with respect to the system evaluation presented in the SAR [SAR Sections 3.8.7.2 and 4.3.2.1.9].

l i

l l

2.7-8a

( -

l'fSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97XO505 (R4)

~

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.4 Coolant Removal APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV LCO:

Cell coolant systems shall be drained of coolant before addition of oxidants for cell treatment.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Failure to drain coolant prior A.1 Evacuate cell contents 1 Hour to adding oxidants and there are no indications of a reaction B.

Failure to drain coolant prior B.1 Stop cell / equipment Immediately to adding oxidants and there motors are indications of a reaction AND B.2 Drain coolant 1 Hour SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell treatment SR 2.7.3.4.1 Verify and document the removal of cell coolant prior to the initial charge of oxidants.

BASIS:

In the event of a leak from the coolant system to the process gas, the failure to control the concentrations of coolant and CIF /F within the cell can form explosive mixtures that in the 3 2 presence of an ignition source could over pressure the cell and release toxic materials. The draining of coolant includes the evacuating of the coolant system to between 18 and 30 inches of l

Hg for the X-27 and X-29 size equipment. The other equipment sizes have no specific coolant evacuation requirement other than for the system pressure to be below atmospheric pressure. The indications of an exothermic reaction are usually rapid pressure spikes and/or a rapid increase in temperature.

l 2.7-9 i

[

ITSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 i

l

> RAC 97X0505 (R4) 1 SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY

~

i 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION,' SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.4 Coolant Removal APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV l

LCO:

Cell coolant systems shall be drained of coolant before addition of oxidants for cell treatment.

ACTIONS:

i l

l Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Failure to drain coolant prior A.1 Evacuate cell contents 1 Hour to adding oxidants and there are no indications of a reaction

{

B.

Failure to drain coolant prior B.1 Stop cell / equipment Immediately to adding oxidants and there motors i

are indications of a reaction AND B.2 Drain coolant 1 Hour SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell treatment SR 2.7.3.4.1' Verify and document the removal of cell coolant prior to the initial charge of oxidants.

BASIS:

In the event of a leak from the coolant system to the process gas, the failure to control the concentrations of coolant and CIF /F within the cell can form explosive mixtures that in the 3 2 presence of an ignition source could over pressure the cell and release toxic materials. The draining of coolant includes the evacuating of the coolant system to between 18 and 30 inches of Hg for the X-27 and X-29 size equipment. The other equipment sizes have no specific coolant evacuation requirement other than for the system pressure to be below atmospheric pressure. The indications of an exothermic reaction are usually rapid pressure spikes and/or a rapid increase in j

temperature.

l l

l 2.7-9 L

r

- J TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.5 Cell Treatment Monitoring i

APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV l

l LCO:

Cell treatments shall be monitored with an Infrared Analyzer.

J ACTIONS:

Note: ' TSR 1.6.2.2(d) does not apply Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Infrared Analyzer inoperable A.1 Initiate sampling for 30 Minutes free CIF and the 3

presence of hydrocarbons B.

Above condition required B.1 Evacuate cell 30 Minutes actions and/or completion contents time are not accomplished SURVEILLANCE:

Frequency Surveillance Each cell treatment SR 2.2.3.5.1 Verify and document the installation of an Infrared Analyzer prior to the initial charge of treatment gas BASIS:

Failure to maintain an adequate amount of CIF within the cell can lead to the formation of 3

reaction products that will result in highly exothermic reactions upon the re-introduction of CIF /F. In addition, the Infrared Analyzer is used to detect the presence of hydrocarbon materials 3 2 that could also react violently with CIF /F under the right conditions. Replacing an inoperable l

3 2 analyzer can take up to three hours. For this reason sampling is initiated within thirty minutes and continued until an operable analyzer is hooked up and operating properly.

2.7-10

c t

.'TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1.1999

{

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY l

2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATI 'N, SURVEILLANCES f

2.7.3.6 Cell Inverse Recycle Treatment APPLICABILITY: Cascade Operational Mode IV l

LCO:

Individual cells shall be isolated from each other when the cell inverse recycle treatment method is used.

SURVEILLANCE:

l Frequency Surveillance Each cell inverse recycle treatment SR 2.7.3.6.1 Verify and document an inverse recycle treatment cell is not tied together with any other cell prior to the initial charge of treatment gas BASIS:

l Due to the inverse recycle treatment method there is no assurance that an adequate supply of CIF3 would be present in the second cell tied to the parent cell. The lack of a sufficient amount of CIF i

3 allows the formation of ClO on the interior cell surfaces that upon contact with a new supply of 2

CIF will react violently and could cause a breach in the cell containment; thereby releasing toxic 3

materials and spreading contamination.

l 2.7-11

'J

.4SR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.7 Oxidant Control (continued)

BASIS:

Failure to control the concentrations of CIF /F within the Cascade can result in the formation of 3 2 highly exothermic mixtures with coolant, that in the presence of an ignition source may have the potential to cause a breach in the cell containment; thereby releasing toxic materials and spreading contamination.

The prevention of these highly exothermic reactions is based on controlling the amount of oxidants that are available to react with the coolant that is always present in the Cascade flow. The following study, K/ET-302, Safety Guidelines For Cascade Treatment Materials, established the safe concentrations for CIF /F.

An administrative control /model for ensuring oxidant 3 2 concentrations stay below the reactive level is used and has been validated through plant operations. The basic premise of the model is to maintain the CIF /F concentrations in the Top 3 2 Purge Cascade to s 16 mole %. This is achieved by controlling drum bleed back (LCO 2.7.3.7) and Freon Degrader operations (LCO 2.7.3.8 & 2.7.3.9) and by ensuring proper operation of the Side Purge (venting).

Previous and current studies have determined that a potentially reactive mixture is not achieved until the oxidant concentrations exceed 19 mole % at 2.9 psia.

l 2.7-13

r j

.(

l'I'SR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 l

RAC 97X0505 (R4)

~

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY l

2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.8 Freon Degrader APPLICABILITY: X-326 Cascade Operational Mode II (i.e., F and coolant flow into reactor) 2 LCO:

No more than 1 Freon Degrader in operation at a time.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Once per shift SR 2.7.3.8.1 Verify and document that no more than one Freon Degrader is operating BASIS:

The combined addition of unreacted F from 2 Freon Degraders on the Cascade is not an 2

assumption in the administrative modeling method for ensuring safe oxidant concentrations and therefore could cause the exceedance of the safe oxidant limit.

l 2.7-14

)

r:

1 t.

• l'I'5R-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC 97X0505 (R4) i- ;

, SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 l LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR j

OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES J

2.7.3.9 Freon Degrader Fluorine Flow

)

)

APPLICABILITY: X-326 Cascade Operational Mode II (i.e., F and coolant flow into reactor) 2 LCO:

Fluorine addition to Freon Degrader shall be s 400 scfd.

i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Annually SR 2.7.3.9.1 Calibrate four Cell Floor Freon Degrader F2 supply capillaries to 25,50,100,200 scfd, respectively, at 5.0 psig fore pressure Annually SR 2.7.3.9.2 Calibrate one Operating Floor Freon Degrader F supply capillary to 265 scfd at 0 psig fore pressure 2

Annually SR 2.7.3.9.3 Perform functional test of the Cell Floor Freon Degrader to verify that F high high pressure will 2

shutoff F, supply to the Freon Degrader

]

Semiannually SR 2.7.3.9.4 Calibrate the Cell Floor Freon Degrader high high pressure F trip at s 5.0 psig 2

Annually SR 2.7.3.9.5 Perform functional test of the Operating Floor i

Freon Degrader to verify that F high pressure will shutoff 2

F supply to the Freon Degrader 2

Semiannually SR 2.7.3.9.6 Calibrate the Operating Floor Freon Degrader high pressure F trip at _( 0 psig 2

BASIS:

Oxidant concentration can build up in the Top Purge and therefore could form a highly exothermic reacting mixture that in the presence of an ignition source will ceact and has the potential to create an overpressure situation that may result in breaching the process cystem and the release of process gas to the environment. Previous studies have determined that an the highly exothermic reaction is not achieved until the oxidant concentration exceeds 19 mole %.

The addition of 400 scfd unreacted F on the cascade would not exceed the assumptions made in 2

' the administrative model for ensuring safe oxidant concentrations in the Purge Cascade.

l 2.7-15

E..

I

" t. *

• l'fSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 j

RAC 97-X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.10 Side Feed Cylinders APPLICABILITY: X-326 Cascade Operational Mode II, side feeding of 5,8 and 12 inch cylinders containing LEU material.

' LCO:

IIcat applied to cylinder body shall not exceed 500 watts SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS:

Frequency Surveillance Prior to side feed cylinder being fed in SR 2.7.3.10.1 Verify that the heater rating which heat is being utilized is s'500 watts BASIS:

The limiting of the heating rate to 500 watts provides the assurance that the' solid UF will not 6

liquify. Side feed operations may use a heat lamp, a heat ring, or no heat.

l i

2.7-16

o

~

• J,4.*."I'SR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

,?

RAC 97X0505 (R4).

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.11 UF, Plugs APPLICABILITY: All Cascade Operational Modes LCO:

Direct heat sources shall not be applied to solid UF plugs until line clarity in the 6

system has been assured.

ACTIONS:

Condition Required Actions Completion Time A.

Direct heat source A.1 Discontinue direct heat Immediately being applied to a solid application to the UF6 UF plug plug 6

AND A.2 Ensure line clarity Prior to reapplying direct heat BASIS:

The application of an external heat source directly to a UF. plug can liquify the UF within the center of the plug and thereby cause sufficient hydraulic forces to rupture the pipe containing the plug. The primary concern over the direct application of heat (i.e., steam tracing, heat tape, etc.)

to the plug versus indirect heating (i.e., heated housings) is due to the fact that the energy is added to the plug at such a high rate that it is not evenly distributed over the entire plug and therefore does not allow for the sublimation of the plug before a portion of it liquefies. The secondary concern is that even though the UF plug stays as a solid it must have room to expand. The 6

consequences of a release of UF from this type of failure mechanism would be minimal due to 6

the fact that the UF plug would remain as a solid and therefore, the release rate would be slow 6

as the UF sublimes into the atmosphere.

l 2.7-17

4 e4

• >, '. ' #fSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999 RAC:97X0505 (R4)

SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.12 Cascade Wessure Limitation (continued)

BASIS:

The accident analysis provided in SAR Section 4.3.2 assumes that cascade high pressure accidents proceed to their conclusion which, in some cases, results in some form of breach in the cascade system. It is at this point that the consequences are evaluated and the identification -of any mitigating actions takes place. Maintaining cascade steady state pressure at or below 14.45 psia establishes an initial condition assumed in the evaluation of scenario consequences. The cascade was not designed to directly measure cell pressures in the ACR or to measure pressures that approach 40 psia. Motor load and other process indicators in the ACR alert the operator to significant cascade transients which require appropriate actions be taken, including cell shutdown, to preclude cascade pressures from exceeding 40 psia which is the postulated rupture pressure of cascade piping. The monitoring of cell pressures from the local cell panels is sufficient to ensure that the steady state pressures do not exceed 14.45 psia. Due to the ability to perform a channel check across the 12 stage pressure indicating controllers (PICS) per cell and the fact that within an operating cell any stage high side pressure increase will quickly cascade through the cell (i.e.,

raise the other stage high side pressure), it is not necessary that all the PICS are functional to determine the cell pressure. The calibration of the unit and cell datums will ensure an adequate level of accuracy (cell averaging) and therefore the calibration of individual PICS is not necessary.

As part of the cascade inventories there are several data comparisons made that provide the information needed to identify any out of tolerance PIC without doing a calibration. The cascade j

inventory data comparison includes analyzing stage compression ratios and the comparison of d

motor amperage verses stage high side pressure against known process relationships.

l 2.7-19 I

Iy_...*

I J. V 1*TSR-PORTS PROPOSED June 1,1999

. RAC 97X0505 (R4)

( a SECTION 2.7 SPECIFIC TSRs FOR X-326 CASCADE FACILITY 2.7.3 LIMITING CONTROL SETTINGS, LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION, SURVEILLANCES 2.7.3.13 Cascade DC Control Power (continued)

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENI'S:

Frequency Surveillance Daily SR 2.7.3.13.1 Verify cascade unit DC voltage 2200 Each scheduled cell trip SR 2.7.3.13.2 Utilize the ACR " motor stop" button for each scheduled cell trip. Monitor expected cell block valve closures and any required recycle valve actuation.

Quarterly SR 2.7.3.13.3 Inspect battery terminals and racks for evidence of corrosion and for cell leakage of electrolyte.

SR 2.7.3.13.4 Check that the specific gravity of the pilot cell is 21.180 SR 2.7.3.13.5 Verify battery charger output is > 0 DC amps.

SR 2.7.3.13.6 Visually check the cell electrolyte levels to verify the level is above the low level indication line and no more than 0.25 inches above the high level indication line.

Annually SR 2.7.3.13.7 Check that the specific gravity of the cells is 21.180.

BASIS:

The accident analysis discusses the fact that large UF release scenarios from the cascade can be 6

mitigated or terminated by stopping the cell motors which allow the cascade systems to go to subatmospheric pressure [SAR Sections 3.8.3.2, 4.3.2.1.1, 4.3.2.1.2, 4.3.2.1.3, 4.3.2.1.7, and 4.3.2.1.8].

If during a release situation, this rapid reduction in cell pressure causes an

. underloading" in this part of the cascade. It is at this time coupled with the internal resistance of the cascade equipment (control valves, barrier, piping, etc.) that there will be inleakage into the cascade which will mitigate the release until the necessary valve evolutions can take place to isolate the system from any additional supply of UF and to prepare the system for compensatory 6

l actions and repair. The operator in response to process alarms and indications such as, two simultaneous smoke alarms in the same cell or a cell deblade will take action to shutdown the affected cell. In order to initiate a cell shutdown the t

2.7-21