ML20195D087

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Forwards Draft Info Notice Re Inservice Testing of A-4 Multimatic Deluge Valve
ML20195D087
Person / Time
Site: Farley  Southern Nuclear icon.png
Issue date: 11/13/1998
From: Berkow H
NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned)
To: Dennis Morey
SOUTHERN NUCLEAR OPERATING CO.
References
NUDOCS 9811170289
Download: ML20195D087 (11)


Text

. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ -- . . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _

g, 3 November 13, 1998 Mr. D. N. Moray Vice President - Farley Project Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR A TECHNICAL REVIEW OF A DRAFT INFORMATION NOTICE REGARDING INSERVICE TESTING OF THE A-4 MULTIMATIC DELUGE VALVE

Dear Mr. Morey:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is planning to issue an information notice (iN) discussing the failure of several preaction sprinkler system deluge valves at Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. We request that you review the enclosed draft IN to ensure the 1 technical information regarding the event is accurate. Your cooperation in this matter is I appreciated.

The enclosed IN has been discussed with Mark Ajiuni of your staff. A target date for your  ;

written comments has been agreed upon to be November 27,1998. Should a situation occur l that prevents you from meeting the target date, ;please contact Jacob 1. Zimmerman at  !

(301)415-2426.

Sincerely,  !

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY:

Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate ll-2 Division of Reactor Projects - 1/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl: See next page f

DISTRIBUTION t Docket File JZwolinski PSkinner,Rll . MSalley g' l l PUBLIC HBerkow TJohnson, Ril JRoe t I

PDil-2 RF LBerry .GHolahan JStolz ACRS JZimmerman TMarsh RDennig ,

OGC' LRPlisco,Ril SWest - WBurton . I DOCUMENT NAME: G:\FARLEY\lN_DELUG.WPD

~

k OFFICE PDil-2/P PDll-2/U -

PEC8/C h SPLB/C PDil-NAME J.ZIMMEhkN:cn L. BERRY \ ) J STh T MARSH H.BERKOW hL DATE- #/ I /98 - A/0$ /98 k .Mt 11 198 V / l*/98 0 / l3 /9

COPY h NO YESkO) J NO YES NO YES NO 9811170289 981113 e O

, PDR ADOCK 05000348 '( V '

j

! G PDR .

1""^.D33

-" r e fw., G n@ mm @ l

.gu v Ra w

. . - . ._ . - -. .- - . . ~ _ _ , . . . ~ .. . - . - . . - . . - - - -

e p gG Miuq a UNITED STATES g j 2

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION o WASHINGTON, D.C. 20086 4 001

%*****p November 13, 1998 Mr. D. N. Morey Vice President - Farley Project ,

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.

Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295

SUBJECT:

REQUEST FOR A TECHNICAL REVIEW OF A DRAFT INFORMATION NOTICE REGARDING INSERVICE TESTING OF THE A-4 MULTIMATIC DELUGE VALVE

Dear Mr. Morey:

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is planning to issue an information notice (lN) discussing the failure of several preaction sprinkler system deluge valves at Joseph M. Farley .

Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2. We request that you review the enclosed draft IN to ensure the technical information regarding the event is accurate. Your cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

The enclosed IN has been discussed with Mark Ajtuni of your staff. A target date for your written comments has been agreed upon to be November 27,1998. Should a situation occur that prevents you from meeting the target date, please contact Jacob 1. Zimmerman at (301) 415-2426.

Sincerely, Ck Herbert N. Berkow, Director Project Directorate ll-2 Division of Reactor Projects - l/II Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos. 50-348 and 50-364

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/ encl: See next page

.. -. . . . _ _ _ _ _ - _ - . . . ~ . _ _ - . _ . _ . _ _ . _

~

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant cc:

Mr. L. M. Stinson Rebecca V. Badham General Manager- . SAER Supervisor Southem Nuclear Operating Company Southem Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 470 - P. O. Box 470 -

Ashford, Alabama 36312 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Mr. Mark Ajiuni, Licensing Manager I

. Southern Nuclear Operating Company

Post Office Box 1295

. Birmingham, Alabama 35201-1295 "

Mr. M. Stanford Blanton Balch and Bingham Law Firm Post Office Box 306 1710 Sixth Avenue North Birmingham, Alabama 35201

- Mr. J. D. Woodard Executive Vice President Southern Nuclear Operating Company Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, Alabama 35201 1

State Health Officer Alabama Department of Public Health l 434 Monroe Street .

Montgomery, Alabama 36130-1701 l Chairman

}

Houston County Commission Post Office Box 6406 Dothan, Alabama 36302 Regional Administrator, Region 11 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commicslon l

Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, S.W., Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Resident inspector

- U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7388 N.' State Highway 95

. Columbia, Alabama 36319 c.

,m- - - - -- , , , -

l OFFICIAL RECORD COPY UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFIC'E OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION )

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 November xx,1998 k;

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 98-XX: FAILED FIRE PROTECTION# DELUGE VALVES AND POTENTIAL TESTING DEFICIENCIES IN PREACTION S INKLER S 8 jr S%;.A

%a /

.#y Q.

4hy,.  %?@Q Addressees QF All NRC licensees.

DS% . >Q

- .,8% j Mkh Puroost

/T% &;syk The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this inforntation notice to alert addressees to test methodologies for fire protection' deluge valves.thirlmay not adequately demonstrate valve operability. It is expecte'd that re'cipients will rsview the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions,#as app'ropriate[to avoid similar problems.

However, suggestions contained in this ~information notice are not NRC requirements; therefore,

/

no specific action or written M resp @orise'is

  1. requiried.

Backaround, 4y r Jef A p~ m by af ~

Valves for sprinkler system autonsatic conttol (SSAC) valves are used in fire protection systems

~

that protect areas housing" safety-related equipment and that also protect non-safety-related equipment Osed for safe shutdown.;Many of these systems are used to provide primary fire protection and to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.G. Poor -

design, deficient ma.intenance, or inadequate testing of SSAC valves and associated solenoid valves can lead to a common-mode failure of the valves to perform their design function of providing' adequate and; reliable fire protection. This, in tum, can result in the failure of safety-

~

l relataid equipment and the inability to achieve and maintain a safe reactor shutdown condition if a fire ~ occurs. ]*

kN $

The Model A-4 Multimatic Valve manufactured by Grinnell is a deluge valve designed for use in fire Molection systems. It is used as a system control valve in deluge, preaction, and special types of fire piotection systems dnd may also provide for actuation of fire alarms when the systems' operate.

! Preaction valves contain connections for monitoring pressure in the diaphragm chamber and in

. the main water supply, for providing valve drainage and for supplying water to the diaphragm
chamber. All required components for these connections are typically provided by the valve i manufacturer as " trim packages" and are included as part of the Underwriters Laboratories (UL)
and Factory Mutual, Inc (FM) certifications of the valves.

l _ _ __ _ . . - -

- - . ~ - - ~ - - - - . - - - - - - . . - . - - - . - _ . - - . . - -

l l

l IN 98-XX November XX,1998 i Page 2 of 5 l

Descriotion of Circumstances During the week of March 4,1996, while of reaction sprinkler systems in the Farley Unit 1 fire 3

protection system were being tested,5 of 11 SSAC valves (Grinnell Model A4 deluge valves) l failed to trip open when water pressure was vented out of the diaphragrn' chamber. During additional testing, the licensee found that several more SSAC, valves failed. TA root cause team, formed after the initial valve failures, concluded that the diaphragm w,asl sticking,to its retainerp and push rod disk, that the push rod assembly was worn (pits and er,odedplating), and that the' associated solenoid valves were not properly bleeding stater pressure out of the diaphragm 7 area.

$y [i ypg7gy  :

The investigators found that the licensee was using an (abrasive cleaning pad to clean the l

chrome-plated push rod and the push rod guide in the diaphragm retainers. The team theorized that this activity may have created rust particles that caused the sticking. Abrasives were also used to clean the solenoid valves, this could'.cause the plunger assembly to stick.

Grinnell does not recommend using any abrasives that remove metal beca0se the solvents attack the valve seats and the main orifice. Grinnell recommends cleaning the push rods and guides with only soap, water, and clean gaf y  ?'

The root cause team also found that the solenoid valves were

  • designed for operating pressures of approximately 150 psig (UL maxirnum rated pressure is 175 psig), whereas the actual operating pressures often exceeded;150 psig (sometimes as high as 225 psig). The valves may not be able to open against this pressure) Finally,;the team found that the licensee i lubricated the diaphragm and retainer to keep the retainer from sticking. Grinnell does not l recommend the use of any lubricant on this diaphragm or the retainer.

f x  %. ~ A ~

we During sLbseq'uent walkdo'wns, the team found that the piping for the deluge valve control drain lines Wasl 3/8 inch, the % inch normally supplied as part of the trim package provided by l

the manufacturer and listed by the iridependent testing laboratory (i.e., UL or FM). The use of a smaller drain line could potentially inhibit the bleedoff of water from the diaphragm chamber

~

resulting in increasea pressure in the chamber. This condition, in tum, could prevent the clapper

from opening. The licensee used its own trim in lieu of the package provided by Grinnell.

l

// WQf Although the team did r)ot reach any conclusion about the root cause of the valve failures, it recommended (1) repla'cing the diaphragms and solenoid valves, (2) installing new solenoid palves with a design pssure of 200 psi (and factory tested to 300 psi), (3) flushing the solenoid valve piping and diaphragm chamber when cleaning the solenoids, (4) requiring the use of soap,'w,ater and a clean cloth when cleaning the solenoid valves, (5) cleaning the l solenoid and SSAC valves more frequently, and (6) testing the valves more often every 12 modths iristead of 18 months (in the short term, the licensee increased testing to every 2,6, and 12 months after resetting the valves to improve reliability).

IN 98-XX November XX,1998 l '

Page 3 of 5 l

In mid-February 1998, the licensee performed a scheduled surveillance test on several deluge valves in the preaction sprinkler system deluge valves. One valve failed to trip and was manually tripped by forcing the push rod back. Inspection of the rubber diaphragrn showed a

" dimple" near the diaphragm chamber supply inlet. The valve had beeri left in the tripped condition for about 22 days in May 1997, then it was reset and left in this position for about 9 months until this surveillance. As a result of this failure, the 'icensde l tested ^a sample of six

- additional valves that had been left in a tripped condition'for'long periods 40ne of these failedf to trip electrically, inspection of this valve indicated that the push rod'was misaligned in the/

retainer ring slot and that some corrosion had formed where the r6d slides thirough theiing."

Also, the diaphragm w,'s stuck to the face of the push ' rod. In t6ta' l, five of the six sample valves and one other valve failed to trip properly. The licensee's description of the diaphragm problems are shown in Attachment 1, Figures 1- 3. M 4 in June 1998, as part of the ongoing testing program, $ne o&~

g f the deluge" valves was manually actuated from its pull station, it failed to operate. An investigation' indicated that the pull station housing had rotated and was preventing cornplete travel (i.e., fully o'pen) of the valve handle.

After adjusting the pull station housing, the handle was actuated again and the deluge valve successfully tripped.

JV(7 f7g N5\g@V '

The staff is continuing to monitor the' licensee's investigation into the valve failures.

d f j Discussion Wy f fj

,, A ty Several potential problems were identifie as a result of this event. First, as discussed above, when deluge valves weis lett _in trie tripped condition for long periods, the rubber diaphragm could bo' rid to the push rod and the flange. When the valves are reset, the diaphragm may remain partially bonded to the' flange,' restricting flow from the diaphragm chamber, thus keeping the valve from operating.(Bondirig raay be particularly pronounced in systems using i well water or raw river wateruit is a common practice for many plants to keep their preaction sprinkler syst'em deluge valves in a tripped condition for long periods, usually during outages when welding or other activities;are occurring, which increases the likelihood of spurious system actuation. Grinnell recommends that the valve be reset within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of any valve operation and triat the internal comporients of valves be cleaned and inspected after any valve operation.

Nf N Second, the use of plant-supplied or plant-designed trim packages instead of the UL- or FM-6ertified packages and designs provided by the valve manufacturer may result in issues such as undersized drain lines, which may restrict the bleedoff from the diaphragm chamber and f0ftherinhibit valve actuation.

m .-

Third, an evaluation by Grinnell concluded that the valve release mechanism may be jamming from the high pressure and surging conditions in the deluge system. The jamming may be related to deep indentations on the valve latch. Cleaning and inspection of the valves intemal .

components should identify these potential problems.

IN 98-XX November XX,1998 Page 4 of 5 Finally, while reviewing this event, the staff noted a potential weakness in the testing methodology for preaction deluge valves, which may mask the actuation problems identified above. Many plants isolate the deluge valves from the main water supply during v~ alve testing.

^

With the deluge valve isolated, a limited volume of water is trapped in,both the' main line and the diaphragm chamber supply line. The water in the diaphragm chamber is slowly bled off until the clapper opens. If the diaphragm has bonded to the flange, the' inlet to the diaphragm chamber could be partially blocked, inhibiting (but not preventing) bleadoff from the, diaphragm,r

~

chamber during testing. However, during normal operation with full flow fr'om the diaphragm /

chamber supply line, the primary flow path would be froni the sup5fy line to tNe drain, tiius' trapping water in the diaphragm chamber and preventing valve' actuation. Note'that National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 25, " Standard for the inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Water-Based Fire Protection Systems,"

"Each deluge or preaction valve shall be trip ally'at tested fullannb,1995 edition, flow (emphasis added)section in 9-4.3.2.2 state warm weather and in accordance with the manufactureir's instructions." The valve manufacturer may also have special requirements for inservice testing. Y "f j% - . < h N/

A similar event, which took place at Grand Gulf in 1983, is' discussed in Information Notice (IN) 84-16, " Failure of Automatic Sprinkler System Valves to Operate." While the licensee was performing an operational test of the emergency. diesel generator'(EDG), a fire occurred in the diesel. The automatic deluge valve (6-inch Model C valve' manufactured by the Automatic ,

Sprinkler Company of America (ASCO)) failed to open. , Approximately 3 months later, a Model C valve in a preaction sprinkler system for the EDG room at Grand Gulf failed to operate during a test. In both cases, scoring was found ir) the actuation weight upper guide collar and in the box that encloses the weight guide bushing l; g ,7N  % . 4 w f Another instance of repeated failures of a preaction dewge valve occurred in 1997 at Limerick Unit 1. A Star Model"D" 6-inch de! age valve did not actuate during a surveillance test. The frequency of te' sting had been increased because of earlie- failures due to suspected mechanical problems. Continued troubleshooting of the valve failures identified a potential voltage mismatch between the deluge valve and the Chemetron release control panel, resulting in marginal power available to operate the valve. The Model "D" valves were subsequently replaced with Star Model"G"qvalves.

M H

.m -y s

( p a

sgfqcQY gy

l e .,

l IN 98-XX November XX,1998 Page 5 of 5 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. However, recipients are  ;

reminded that they are required to consider industry-wide operating experience (including NRC information notices) where practical, when setting goals and performing periodic evaluations under 10 CFR 50.65, " Requirement for monitoring the effectiveness of mainteriarice at nuclear l power plants." If you have any questions about the information in this notice,, please contact the technical contacts one by listed below or the appropriate Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager. 7 4_ [ @&@;s,7 h o/

  1. W: ?p  ;.*
k. Ng ki85[

p5 5 /.

r ,.

Ny w

Jack W. Roe,' Acting Director Division of Reactor Program Management Office of N0 clear Reactor Regulation Technical contacts: Mark H. Salley, NRR

[ NS . ."%

' Ril #

301-415-2840 .. Robert

- Q334-899-3386 Caldwell,Y E-mail: mxs3@nrc. gov 3 E-mail: rkc1 j& j/ N.wr g@nte. ir gov l William F. Burton /NRR y Od7 l 301-415-2853/$f f j E-mail: wfb@nrc. gov ff //

lsf _d ff

Attachment:

$% j List of d Recently 4d lssued NRCinformation' Notices fc - A w %yA iQf'

-p QJ.,; i. ,-

F .,3 {. " 5..%

1

%Q@kQ $'%

yi ji vg sp y  ;,

../

LQ;;

g$, 'V l, bg-4 e

/f

,~j

/

y lee nK %l l

x ._ a f

% . d!

' lhd@l g;,pM

<R:n:;JbS,>7f y3s t-I f

i

(

-/\ /\ /\ /\

( a- - -a - - O- - -O I

Area Smoke Detectors , l  !

Closed Sprinkler Heads l- I Electric Pull Station (if Provided) p

. l Q l--------~ Conrol Panel (FACP) i l

___g l l l I i 1 1

__ _ ____ _ _ _ _I I l Alarm Pressure Switch I

! n----- J l l Alarm Test Valve i

Alarm Control Valve i f Solenoid b sh R d j Valve -

Latch Mechanism 1 _ t.

Fa plate Y b

Manual Pull

-K .

b c Station hw Orifice gyy, '

Ct.APPER

~g

> @. \

(Diaphragm Chamber s ,?

Ball Drip Valve 1.

( /

pnn r stem M*I"fa Normally 1 5 psi

~ I Check Valve j h Diaphragm Chamber

...L.W i

Supply ControlValve j ,,,

.. a ,,,,

I Main isolation Valve Drain l e .

Figure 1, General Arrangement Sketch Grinnell Multimatic A-4 Deluge Valve

- x a Normalin-Service Condition

- For Illustrative Purposes Only-

l

-/\ /\ /\ /\ l

( o- - -o - - o- - -c .

I  !

Area Smoke Detectors ,\

Closed Sprinkler Heads l--

( Electdc Pull Station Of Provided) ,

I "

y l------- _ _ _ ,,, _,

Cno a el (FACP) l 1

] l l l l

_ _ _ _ ___ _ _I I I Alarm Pressure Switch 1 l G------ J j l Alarm Test Valve i e Alarm ControlValv i o E*T_O"$.,.1,D

! Diaphrag N O Solenoid ] gq g Retainer Push Rod Ring ,

g Valve Latch Mechanism 1 _  ;

  1. ' L Fa plate 3 Manual Pull

, A

  1. " =.x

/

Q $

15 U

Station hwOrifice CLAPPER 5

> & en (Diaph gm ..

Cham er 0' Ball Drip Valve Og( ate f To ) Main

[pgn((Su , .

Normally 125 psi CheckValve /) i

(

(-) Diaphrabm Chamber Supply ontrolValve ,,,,,,,,...,,,,,,,,,{

t l

, Main isolation Valv/e \ _

Figure 2, General Arrangement Sketch Grinnell Multirnatic A-4 Deluge Valve - e a Possible Extrusion Condition

- For illustrative Purposes Only-

l .

4 g7 \ /\ /\ /\

l f D- - -D - - O- - -Q 1 i < 1 l Area Smoke Detectors , l

Closed Sprinkler Heads l--

1 Electric Pull Station Of Provided)

Fire Alarrn

! l l-~~~------- Conrol Panel

% i

_____ FACP)

I __ l I I

I I

! I I l _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _I I

{ l Alarm Pressure Switch l l l p3- _ _ ._ _ _ _ J

! l Alarm Test Valve

! i Alarm ControlValv i

! R.C#*= 6a M.u l

I Diaphrag g Retainer Rin%g O_ ,

I g

Solenoid l Push Rod g l

Valve Latch Mechanism g j 1 _

I

Faceplate E b

Manual Pu!!

k

)

- b Station E

' how orifice CLAPPER 5a

> O -

(Diaphragm o, Chamber N,

[ ,;k k g(

Ball Drip Valva Water Su lyTo Sprinkler stem Main Drain

' Valve Normally 1 5 pal Check Valve Diaphragm Chamber l

Supply control Valve } ,, ,,.

,. L , , ,,

,, J ,'1 i I Drain Main isolationValv\ e l

Figure.3, General A rrangement Sketch Grinnell Multimatic A-4 Deluge Valve 2 ,

Possible Bubble Condition

- For illustrative Purposas Only - .

-