ML20169A688

Transcript of Public Meeting on Security Oversight for Nuclear Power Plants in Relation to the COVID-19 Public Health Emergency

ML20169A688
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Issue date:	06/24/2020
From:	Dante Johnson Security Performance Evaluation Branch
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TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC MEETING - CONSIDERATIONS SURROUNDING SECURITY OVERSIGHT FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IN RELATION TO THE COVID-19 THE PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY Opening Remarks Brian Holian - The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC):

• The NRC has taken many actions, both in safety and security, (delayed onsite inspections, developed enforcement guidance memorandums (EGMs), etc.) to minimize potential onsite effects of the Public Health Emergency (PHE).

• However, since the PHE is ongoing, the NRC is looking at criteria for the resumption of major NRC inspections, including force-on-force (FOF).

• On June 5, a public letter was sent to Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), NextEra, and Entergy with draft criteria for resuming FOF inspections; looking for industry and public comments during this meeting.

NRC Presentation (found here)

Sabrina Atack:

• Overview of the purpose and agenda

• Discussion on the NRC response to the PHE, including background on EGM 20-002.

o Note: the EGM does not include an exemption of the triennial NRC-conducted FOF exercises.

Todd Keene:

• Overview of the Baseline Security Inspection Program.

o Note: NRC Regional inspectors are coordinating resumption of on-site inspections starting in June.

Danté Johnson:

• Overview of NRC actions taken regarding FOF inspections during the PHE

• Discussion on the considerations for resuming NRC FOF inspections, including benchmarking with Department of Energy (DOE) and international regulatory agencies

• Current NRC plan includes:

o Rolling 6-8 week look at the site-specific PHE conditions o Modified A week activities o Resumption of B week activities once conditions permit (some may be rescheduled in CY2021)

• Review of the table listing the local considerations taken into account prior to scheduling an inspection

• Summary of Path Forward Industry Presentation Ken Peters:

• Opening remarks on the unprecedented nature of this PHE and recognition that all utilities have taken significant steps to ensure the safety of their employees while still being able to maintain a reasonable assurance of adequate protection

• Introduction to the NEI member perspective on the resumption of FOF exercises o FOF exercises are singularly unique due to the size and scope.

o Industry believes that the nationwide recommendation to social distance and/or wear masks would prohibit FOF exercises at this time.

• Discussion on the unique characteristics of the FOF inspection 1

o Although some aspects could be completed safely, the actual exercise poses significant risk.

Glen Kaegi:

• Discussion on current security training, inspections, and elements that collectively inform the NRCs reasonable assurance determination Ken Peters:

• Discussion on the 3 parts recommended by NEI o Part 1: Entry Criteria to resume FOF Inspections o Part 2: Conditions following Entrance Criteria o Part 3: Specific Criteria for Conduct of IP71130.03, Contingency Response -

Force on Force Testing Aldo Capristo:

• Current practices onsite are working. Industry is concerned that if changes are made too soon, the health risk to employees will increase (like a resurgence in positive cases as communities start to open).

• Current practices have been informed by talking to the security personnel about the best ways to mitigate the risks while still maintaining adequate protection. If an NRC inspection forces a licensee to change those practices, how will the morale or security/safety culture be impacted?

AJ Clore:

• Industry feels that exercise play is the main problem when implementing social distancing and/or masks. Controller issues can lead to indeterminate exercises which arent helpful for anyone. The NRC cant make a determination about the adequacy of a sites protective strategy and a licensee will have increased the risk to their employees with no outcome.

Ken Peters:

• Conclusion - FOF exercises pose a risk to a significant number of critical station employees unlike any other inspection. Since FOF exercises are only one part of the security baseline inspection, industry does not feel it is worth the risk.

Open Discussion/Questions Comment (Brian Holian - NRC)

• NRC welcomes this open discussion and will include all this input in the evaluation of the resumption of NRC-conducted FOF exercises.

• No decisions will be made today.

• NRC recognized that FOF inspections have a large impact onsite which is why these inspections were initially delayed but site-specific conditions and certain small changes could be made which would allow FOFs to resume.

• In addition, FOFs have a large impact because they are an important inspection - the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), specifically highlights that this is a performance-based inspection which cannot be accomplished through paperwork review or tabletop exercises.

• Comment on NEI Slide 2: The NRCs EGM 20-002 is quoted and while the NRC recognizes the importance and validity of the words, it is essential to understand that an EGM looks at the back end of the process regarding enforcement and potential exemptions. This does not dictate when to complete inspections.

Question (Brian Holian - NRC): As part of NEI Slide 3, a description of the Bullet Resistant Enclosure (BRE) contact/numbers during FOF was provided. Industry is concerned about 2

cross-contaminating their previously set up pods of officers that maintain isolation from other pods onsite. Although more security officers than normal would be within the BRE, why cant a pod be used to staff the required positions within each BRE, thereby maintaining the same level of isolation?

Answer (Aldo Capristo - Industry): To the extent that we could keep the pods together, we would. However, there are a lot of factors that go into maintaining the fragile balance of keeping employees safe while still maintaining all the necessary site functions. FOF inspections use at least 75% of the sites security assets and include interactions with offsite visitors, including the inspection team and DOE MILES staff. It is unknown what impact a small change in the safety processes could have onsite.

Comment (Brian Holian - NRC): NEI Slide 9 states that FOF exercises should not resume until the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommendations and U.S. Department of Labor guidelines are relaxed or rescinded. The NRC is an independent regulator so political or economic factors that may delay/impact other Federal decisions are not applicable to the NRCs decisions. In addition, national standards may not be applicable to certain areas due to site-specific and local conditions.

Question (Sabrina Atack - NRC): Earlier, NEI stated that there could be a negative impact on site morale or safety culture if NRC inspections resumed during this PHE. On the contrary, I believe that NRC inspectors presence on-site has, and will continue to improve safety and security culture. Other activities, such as outages and license operator exams, have continued with some adjustments for individual health safety. Why should FOFs be different? Cant lessons-learned from these activities be utilized for FOF exercises?

Answer (Glen Kaegi - Industry): For all activities, personal protective equipment (PPE) is used when social distancing cannot be achieved. It is imperative to make sure that COVID-19 doesnt take out many critical employees. For operator licensing exams, if someone does get sick, they are not licensed yet so the impact on critical tasks is limited. For outages, critical employees/areas are isolated as much as possible. For example, the control room was isolated, and access was limited to operators. All communication was done electronically or via other means. However, FOF brings different challenges that lead to a higher possibility of cross-contamination of a critical group of employees.

Answer Continued (Ken Peters - Industry) Additionally, all outage activities were reviewed and determined to be critical to the safety of the plant before moving forward. The biggest difference between outages and B week FOF exercises is the proximity and need to accurately and efficiently communicate between controllers and players.

Question (Brian Holian - NRC): Earlier, a concern was broached about heat issues while wearing masks. Are you proposing that conditions must exist where no masks, even cloth masks, are needed before resuming FOF conditions?

Answer (AJ Clore - NEI): Yes, because information can be muffled which leads to miscommunication and potentially indeterminate exercises.

Comment (Brian Holian - NRC): Slide 13 has circular logic. The EGM gave an exemption for the annual site-conducted FOF exercises, not the triennial NRC-conducted FOF exercises. Just because the practice exercises are exempted, does not mean the actual exercise should also be exempted.

Question (Steven Dolley - Member of the Public): Since the NRC and industry did not feel the need to delay outage activities, why should FOF exercises be delayed?

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Answer (Brian Holian - NRC): Power reactors were determined to be critical infrastructure and necessary to remain open. Outages are part of safely operating a power reactor and extra safety precautions were taken onsite to reduce the added risk. Similarly, the NRC is working towards resuming FOF inspections in a safe and effective method.

Question (Steven Dolley - Member of the Public): Why would running an FOF exercise using PPE be unrealistic? Will a PHE stop an adversary from attacking a plant?

Answer (Brian Holian - NRC): A site being able to respond to an actual contingency event is not the concern. The additional artificialities that may be introduced to an exercise due to PPE, social distancing, and other potential measures could lead to an indeterminate exercise.

Question (Steven Dolley - Member of the Public): Is the NRC waiting for all states to be open before resuming inspections?

Answer (Brian Holian - NRC): No. The NRC is evaluating site-specific and local conditions.

Question (Ed Lyman - UCS): NEI stated that 90% of security inspections, with modifications, are being completed but the NRC stated 40-45% of baseline security inspections have been completed. Why the difference?

Answer (Brian Holian - NRC): The NRC number is the amount of security inspections completed so far this year. The NEI number is because throughout the industry 9 out of 10 baseline security inspections have been accomplished during the PHE using alternative means (documentation review, limited onsite time for individual or small inspection teams, etc.).

Question (Sabrina Atack - NRC): NEI Slide 7 states tabletop command and control drills demonstrate proficiency in detection and assessment, patrols, searches, and defensive operations. How?

Answer (Glen Kaegi - Industry): The tabletop exercises provide officers a chance to review command and control and refresh how to move individuals during a contingency event. The overall protective strategy ensures adequate defense and response.

Question (Josh Berry - NRC): The NEI presentation discusses the potential impacts of medically qualified facemasks on FOF exercises. However, none of the site pandemic plans reviewed have required such a mask so why is it listed as a factor?

Answer (Aldo Capristo - Industry): Cloth masks are used to protect others, but medically qualified masks also protect the wearer. In an environment like an FOF exercise, industry is trying to protect their employees to the maximum extent possible.

Question (Josh Berry - NRC): What specific CDC recommendations or Department of Labor guidelines cant be met during FOF exercises?

Answer (Aldo Capristo - Industry): At all times, the industry follows the industrial safety practice of avoiding risks, if possible, but if it needs to be done, mitigating what you can. During this PHE, we are continuing to follow this practice which includes evaluating the need and mitigating options for FOF exercises.

Question (Aldo Capristo - Industry): NRC Slide 16 discusses benchmarking DOE. What conditions does DOE require before resuming inspections? Did that factor into the NRCs conditions?

Answer (Danté Johnson - NRC): The DOE conditions are like the NRCs and are based on site-specific conditions. They are doing an evaluation every 30 days and notifying sites at that interval.

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Question (AJ Clore - NEI): If a site is 6-8 weeks out from their inspection, and conditions are such that they cant complete the FOF inspection, how will the rescheduling work?

Answer (Sabrina Atack - NRC): The 6-8 weeks evaluation will be a rolling assessment. Staff is continuously monitoring site-specific and local conditions for sites scheduled to complete an FOF exercise in 2020. In addition, staff will continue to work with DOE MILES staff and SOCOM advisors to ensure their availability and safety. If it is determined that a site cannot support the FOF inspection as scheduled, staff will reschedule based on outages, other NRC inspections, and availability of NRC inspectors and licensee staff. If necessary, some B week activities could be pushed to CY2021.

Question (AJ Clore - NEI): What is the NRCs plan if an inspector or MILES staff fail the pre-screen?

Answer (Jefferson Clark - NRC): If a MILES contractor tests positive, a reserve contractor is available to fill in. At this time, DOE doesnt think there will be an issue with MILES staff availability. In addition, they have put in extra cleaning procedures and equipment.

Question (Cory Shimulunas- Industry): What happens if a single or group of players or controllers suddenly cant participate due to symptoms or interaction with a symptomatic person?

Answer (Sabrina Atack - NRC): The NRC recognizes that flexibility is needed in all aspects of this process. Because it isnt possible to plan for every contingency, the NRC will make decisions based off the current information and site-specific conditions. The NRC would not put anyone at unnecessary risk.

Closing Remarks Ken Peters - Industry

• Industry appreciates the NRCs communication and supports further interaction on this topic.

• While extra measures could be implemented, there is significant risk with running FOF exercises and could impact site safety.

• Industry is looking for conditions where security officers arent put in a situation with a heightened health risk.

Brian Holian - NRC

• The NRC recognizes that this PHE is unprecedented but will continue to be an independent regulator that makes decisions based on the best available information.

• All the comments and information discussed today will be evaluated. More information will be forthcoming.

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